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MISCELLANEOUS

ESSAYS AND DISCOURSES,

BY

MARK HOPKINS, D. D.,

PRESIDENT OF WILLIAMS COLLEGE.

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Imperfect as he is conscious they are, he yet hopes they may be acceptable to personal friends; and it will certainly be a source of gratification to him, and a ground of gratitude, if they shall be found to add any thing to the literature of the country, or shall do any thing for the promotion of truth and goodness.

May 27, 1847.

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ESSAYS

AND

DISCOURSES.

MISCELLANIES.

ON MYSTERY.

We may well suppose that the first feeling of Adam was a feeling of mystery. With the conviction, elementary in every mind, that there can be no effect without a cause; with the consciousness of his own inexplicable being; creation, in its original brightness, bursting at once upon his view, and indicating itself through all his senses; he must have felt that mystery enveloped himself and all that he beheld. Accordingly,

> "As new waked from soundest sleep," said he,
> "Soft on the flowery bank I found me laid,
> Straight toward heaven my wandering eyes I turned,
> And gazed awhile the ample sky.
> Thou sun, said I, fair light,
> And thou enlightened earth, so fresh and gay,
> And ye that live and move, fair creatures, tell,
> Tell, if ye saw, how came I thus, how here."

That was a sublime moment—such an one as none of his descendants, under the deadening influence of the familiarity attendant on gradual perception, can ever enjoy. But his descendants have shared largely of the emotion; and who of us, as we too have gazed the bright earth, and the ample sky, has not found himself insensibly falling into this original feeling, and one

bewildering sense of the mystery of being and its phenomena engross his soul? But it is not only in these moments of higher and intenser feeling that it arises; life is full of it, and to a thoughtful mind, it is constantly springing up.

The philosophy of our emotions consists in a knowledge of the occasions on which they arise; and as the exertion of great power is essential to the sublime, and slight incongruities to the ridiculous, so there must be somewhat in mysterious facts which renders them mysterious. To ascertain what this is, and how far mystery can be solved, will be the objects of the present inquiry. Some remarks will also be made on the nature, extent, and practical bearing of the emotion.

I shall first speak of the mystery of particular facts, and of the solution which it is ordinarily supposed to admit; and then of the mystery of general laws. To discover the true foundation of this emotion, it is necessary to distinguish it from ignorance, with which it is often confounded. Mystery does indeed imply ignorance, and in the removal of both, the principle of curiosity is involved; but there may be ignorance without mystery. In an ignorance of any disconnected fact, or class of facts, as of topography, or chronology, there is and can be no mystery. One may be ignorant of the year in which the battle of Actium was fought, and unable to ascertain it; but it is simple ignorance, there is no mystery about it; it may have happened, and no reason can be given why it should not have happened, in one year as well as in another. One may be ignorant whether Actium was in Europe or in Asia; but he has only to consult authorities and his curiosity is satisfied, but no mystery is solved.

Further, though there be a connection between facts, yet if the rule by which their cause operates be entirely unknown, there can be no mystery. This is the case in

the blowing of winds, and for the most part in human conduct; which last, however, is so much governed by known principles, that it may become mysterious when conduct runs greatly counter to its ordinary course.

I am now prepared to observe, first, that those events *are* mysterious which apparently conflict with a general law previously known, or with a theory, which, as a ground of reference, is equivalent to a general law; or in other words, that mystery lies in the apparent contradiction between particular facts and general principles, where we conceive that there ought to be agreement; and secondly, that the only solution of which mystery admits, is a discovery of the manner in which the mysterious fact conforms to the general law. These positions I proceed to illustrate.

For those facts which can be referred to a general law, a reason can be given, and they are not generally deemed mysterious. If we inquire the cause of sound, we are referred to vibrations, and our inquiry is satisfied. It is a general law that vibrations produce sound. If we inquire why heavy bodies descend, we are, in the same manner, satisfied by a reference to gravitation. But let a fact conflict with the general law,—let vibration come to an organ seemingly perfect, and no sound be produced; let a stone thrown into the air remain suspended,—and there is a mystery at once; there are curiosity and wonder blended together, and these form mystery, as expectation and desire form hope.

But to mention instances which actually occur. We are informed that the north star has no actual motion; we observe that it has no apparent motion; but since the earth moves, this fact is mysterious, till we learn the effect of distance in destroying parallax; then the mystery vanishes. On first learning the tendency of all matter to all matter, the ascent of smoke and light bodies is an apparent exception, and a mystery to him who is

unacquainted with the weight of the atmosphere; but when this fact is known, the mystery is solved, and the general law confirmed. Again: a pendulum of given length vibrates seconds at the equator. It is found that a longer one is required at the poles. This is a mystery till it is ascertained that the earth is a spheroid flattened at the poles, and then the mystery is solved. Such apparent exceptions to her general laws are the mysteries which nature presents, and which it is the business and delight of philosophers thus to solve, by showing their conformity to the general law.

In the origin and growth of a new science the general principle is the same, though somewhat modified. Suppose we have hitherto known of motion only as communicated by impulse and gravitation,—by accident a magnet is applied to a piece of iron, and the iron approaches it. It is mysterious. Experiments are performed, and a bar of iron magnetized and balanced on a pivot, is found to point invariably north and south. This is another mystery. These facts are published, and philosophers over the world are in commotion. Experiments, dissertations, and treatises succeed, till the facts are all ascertained, a science formed, and a name given to it. And now, if we are asked why the iron approaches the magnet, we say that it is by the influence of magnetism, and the mystery is solved. This sketch applies with perfect truth to the formation and growth of every physical science. If the facts can be reduced to no order, as was long the case in astronomy, no science is formed, and philosophers continue to observe, form theories, and make experiments till they effect it. If they succeed in some measure, as in electricity, but many facts still remain anomalous, the science is imperfect. If no anomalous fact remain, as in astronomy, the science is perfect. What the facts are, and the manner in which they conform to the general law, is all philosophy can know, all it can teach. Thus

physical science is but a history of facts which take place in a certain determinate order, and differs from other history in nothing but the assurance which it brings with it, that in this, past and future experience will invariably accord.

In theology and morals, our theory, or the obvious dictates of the understanding, are in place of the general law; and facts that conflict with these, are mysterious.

Our whole nature leads us to the conclusion that the object of God in his creation and government, must be happiness. The extent to which evil and misery prevail, is a mystery. When we shall see the bearing of all this on the general and greatest good, then will this mystery be "finished." Our practical feelings tell us that we are free and accountable agents; but the possibility of this is to some minds a mystery. Upon them the conviction of the contrary comes with all the force of a demonstration; drives out the belief, if not the sense of guilt; destroys the force of motives; and in the fierce struggle of feeling and conviction, prostrates the best powers of the man. This mystery would be solved, by a knowledge of the manner in which motives act upon us. Of this kind are most of the mysteries mentioned in the Scriptures. 'That you may understand,' says St. Paul, 'my knowledge in the mystery of Christ, that the Gentiles should be fellow-heirs, and partakers of the promise.' To a Jew, whose conviction it had been from childhood, that the Gentiles were to be excluded, their reception was a mystery.

It is obvious from the above, that facts may, in this sense of it, be mysterious to one person and not to another; may be so to ourselves at one stage of our inquiries, and not at another. Anomalous facts are distressing to a well constituted and philosophic mind, and few pleasures are greater than the unexpected reconcilement of a perplexing phenomenon with our theory; or,

what is the same thing if our theory be true, with the general rule. But when, by an induction of particulars, we infer the law itself, as did Newton that of gravitation, it is a discovery in the highest sense, and no earthly pleasure is more sublime. It is no wonder that his frame trembled, as the mystery that had brooded over a chaos of facts was solved at once, and that he relinquished to another the details of the calculation.

But could all facts be thus reduced, and every science, in the sense above mentioned, become perfect, would mystery cease, and our knowledge become perfect? To all practical purposes it would. Nature is uniform, and we have the most entire conviction that as she is to-day, she will continue till her dissolution. If then we knew perfectly the laws by which her sequences are regulated, facts would become emphatically of the nature of language, announcing what was to come. It would enable us to exercise far more perfectly the high prerogative of man, as the interpreter of nature, and to consult more surely for our happiness as prophets of future events. It would confer upon us the *nil admirari* of the wise man, and nothing could surprise us. Humble as it may appear, it is the only true and practical knowledge, and if we think of attaining farther, we are ignorant of our powers and pursue a phantom.

But the human mind does not rest at this point. Men of every age have felt, as we do, that there was a higher and deeper mystery beyond, and asked after the mysterious power which carried the general law into effect. To the mystery of general laws, therefore, we now proceed. I have before alluded to the fundamental principle of conception by which it is absurd to suppose an effect without a cause, and by which Adam was susceptible of the emotion of mystery; and it is by the operation of this that we feel the mystery of general laws. A permanent and universal tendency is obvious, but the cause

is concealed. To solve the mystery of these, it is necessary to find some cause still more general, to which they may all be referred. With regard to such a cause various hypotheses have been formed, all of which however are entirely unsatisfactory except that which resolves all effects into the immediate agency of one mighty and intelligent Being. This would doubtless have been generally adopted, were it not, that though the cause at work in general operates like a wise and intelligent agent, yet if it be artificially thwarted, it will still go on, and form ludicrous, abortive, and monstrous combinations. If then we suppose it to operate otherwise than by a surd necessity, we must conclude that such operations are called for by the general scheme of Providence, to announce (which is of great importance) the stability, in all cases, of the general rule. If this hypothesis be adopted, we may consider every general law as a single fact, and all general laws as a class of facts, referable to the simple volition of the Deity as their cause. In such a case, the volition takes the place of the general law, as being that to which every thing is to be referred ; and the mystery remains in the fact that volition can communicate motion at all, and in the existence and infinite energy of the will exerted. This sublime view of the universe and its Author, we may perhaps hereafter fully take in and enjoy.

In all this, however, it will be perceived that we have merely traced causes more limited to those more general, but have not proceeded one step in removing the obscurity which hangs over existence and the nature of causation. It will also be perceived, since a general law is only an abstract name for a uniform mode of operation, which name can have no efficiency, that the power which operates according to the law, must be immediately exerted in producing every individual effect ; and that if the law be mysterious, the particular facts, from an observation of which the law was inferred, must, truly and

philosophically speaking, be equally so. It will then follow that every event is in fact equally mysterious,—yes, every event; and it is familiarity alone that deadens the sense of it.

From this universal mystery, it results, that the creation of the world, the resurrection of the dead, the mode of God's being, and all those facts which, from their nature, admit to us of no experience, or analogy, but still involve no contradiction or absurdity, are to be believed on good testimony, however far they may be removed from the course of our experience, or strange to our manner of conception. Since all events are equally mysterious, we ought, as philosophers, on equal testimony, to believe one thing as readily as another, and upon sufficient testimony, to believe any thing that is not absurd. Pure spiritual existence is much more simple in the conception, than the complex manner in which we exist, and we may easily suppose that when the rumor of man's creation reached the other world, some skeptical spirit may have entered into a disquisition on the possibility of such a mode of being. It must have appeared, if not impossible and absurd, at least highly improbable; and testimony alone could have been appealed to, by his fellows, who knew as little of the *nature of the case* as himself.

The feeling excited by mystery, is, as I have said, a union of wonder and curiosity, and when the mystery is deep, becomes a sublime, and at the same time a humbling emotion. Having, as we have seen, its foundation in a principle of order, and always implying the conviction of this, it necessarily involves the higher powers of intellect, and affords, what philosophers have sometimes been at a loss to find, a ground of distinction between man and the brutes. We may therefore esteem it, notwithstanding it implies ignorance, an evidence of our dignity. It is obvious also, that it must most frequently arise in contemplative and philosophic minds.

Of its uses, we may say, that as it is, in great minds, a deep and absorbing feeling, it gives a powerful stimulus to physical inquiry; that it enters largely into the devotions of the pious, and affords an occasion for the exercise of the highest possible faith, and the most sublime confidence in the divine administration; and that without it, the present state, as a scene of discipline, would be essentially changed. Even in the way of argument, important conclusions may sometimes be deduced from it, as that for a future state of rewards and punishments from the mystery of the present mode of administration.

Of the essence of mind or matter we have not, and perhaps no finite being can have, the power of forming an elementary conception. But aside from this, we see, from what has been said, that the intelligence and experience which we may hope for hereafter, may enable us to solve all those difficulties which we now term the mysteries of Providence, to reduce every physical fact to its general law, (consequently to behold the universe without an anomaly,) and to refer all general laws immediately to the volition of the Almighty. That will indeed be a noble elevation of being to attain unto, when, as clearly and as directly as the rays of light emanate from the sun, every being and event shall seem to flow from the energies of Omnipotence and the depths of ineffable love. But though all mystery may thus far be removed, clouds and darkness must still rest upon the existence, creative energy, and attributes of the Great Cause uncaused, and the darkness of "excessive bright" forever encompass *His* throne.

ON THE ARGUMENT FROM NATURE FOR THE DIVINE EXISTENCE.

With the history of the Bridgewater treatises, of which this is the third,* our readers are probably acquainted. Their design is to illustrate the Power, Wisdom, and Goodness of God, as manifested in the creation. This has been done with great ability by Mr. Whewell, in the department assigned to him. But it will be remembered that it is one thing to illustrate the Power, Wisdom, and Goodness of God, supposing his existence to be already proved; and quite another, to prove his existence from such indications as nature exhibits. The difference between a treatise on some branch of natural philosophy or natural history, and one on natural theology, seems to be that in the latter, physical and efficient causes are considered only so far as is necessary to illustrate the final causes or uses of things, and that then these final causes are made premises from which to infer the existence and attributes of God. This is the mode of argument adopted in the work before us.

It is our purpose, before noticing this work, to make some observations on the place which the argument from design, as exhibited in external nature, holds in producing

* Astronomy and General Physics considered with reference to Natural Theology. By the Rev. William Whewell, M. A., Fellow and Tutor of Trinity College, Cambridge.

the belief of a God in mankind at large ; and also on the real import and logical validity of that argument.

It by no means follows, because the argument from design is generally stated as the formal proof of the being of a God, that it is therefore the real ground of our belief ; for it often happens that we are ourselves fully convinced of a truth, and yet, when we would convince others, we are obliged to adduce arguments, and invent media of proof, entirely different from those on which our own conviction rests. Thus, a man may have such a sense of the excellence of the Scriptures, and of their applicability to his own case, as to be perfectly satisfied on this ground alone, that they are authentic and inspired ; and yet, if he would prove this to another, he must resort to arguments entirely distinct from this—he must go to what are called the external evidences.

In the infancy of society,—and many nations are yet in their infancy,—before science has made her researches, nothing can be more obscure and perplexing than the operations of nature. Design itself is often concealed, is often but obscurely perceived, and unity of design is not perceived at all ; and yet we find mankind holding on to their belief in a God, with a strength altogether disproportioned to the clearness with which design can possibly be discovered. If we consider, too, the great importance to the race of a belief in a God, and the analogy of nature in regard to the mode in which essential ideas are furnished, we may perhaps think it probable that this great idea was not intended to be entirely dependent on the varying process of induction from premises without. It may appear probable that religion, to which the idea of God is fundamental, which is afterwards to shoot higher and spread wider in its influence than any other power, should have its roots in the very foundation and elements of the soul of man. It is only on the supposition of something of this kind in the original constitution of

man, that the common definition of him as a religious animal can be sustained.

Influenced by these and similar considerations, several philosophers have asserted that the idea of God is innate; by which we suppose them to mean, that it is elementary to the human mind, and necessarily arises from the development of its faculties and in the circumstances in which it is placed. This is certainly the case with a number of primary truths, the proof of which, just in proportion as they are elementary, is at the same time difficult and superfluous. Take for instance that of personal identity. No one doubts this, yet there are few who would not be puzzled to prove it. We may invent arguments concerning it, we may seem to be convinced by them, they may be in fact conclusive, and yet we are in the end no more certain of the thing itself than we were before.

That the idea and belief of a God are in some such relation to us, arising with more or less distinctness from the development of our faculties, seems probable, as hinted above, from the very general agreement of mankind on this subject. No other instance can be adduced of such general agreement on any subject, the ground of which is to be found in reasoning from premises that are without. Except in mathematical truths, mankind differ in every thing that is derived from deduction, and nothing can be more diverse than their opinions. But in regard to their belief in a God, however different and futile may have been the reasons by which they proved it to themselves, yet they seem, in general, to have been equally certain of the thing; showing that they rather sought arguments for what they believed before on grounds so elementary that they found it difficult to give an account of them, than that their belief was the consequence of their arguments.

If our limits would permit, we should like to enter upon the question of the reality and legitimacy of such

an idea. This, however, is not our intention. If we suppose it to exist, it is still desirable to have a form of proof corresponding to that of the external evidence for the Scriptures. It is desirable that we should be able to state distinctly such data as shall be assented to by those who deny the existence or authority of first impressions, to divest our proof of the obscurity, which, to many minds, hangs around our spontaneous and elementary ideas, and to bring the argument within the province of our reflective and logical powers. There is no man who does not find his convictions strengthened, when his original and obscure impressions are thus confirmed by a logical process of the understanding. But if we do not suppose such an elementary belief in a God, then is it doubly important that we should state our argument from other sources in the best manner we may, since it is only from its connection with him that human nature finds either dignity or hope.

An argument, the want of which is thus indicated, is supposed by many to be found in the order and harmony of the external universe. This argument has been adduced from the earliest times, and either from its coinciding with previous opinions, or from its intrinsic weight, has been generally thought conclusive. Still there have always been those who contested its validity. The ground anciently assumed by those who denied the force of this argument, was entirely different from that which is taken in modern times. The mechanism of the heavens was then undisclosed; nothing comparatively was known of the structure of animals or vegetables, or of the processes by which life is sustained. Nothing was known of chemistry, or electricity, or magnetism, or of the weight of the atmosphere, or of the properties of light. Hypothesis assumed the place of observation, and so long as men endeavored, from preconceived notions, to prescribe the mode in which God ought to act, rather

than to observe how he did act, it is clear that the figments of the human imagination must have been taken as the standard and measure of the wisdom of God. Accordingly, the question then was, not whether perfect, or at least extended order and harmony would prove the existence of God, but whether there was such order and harmony in nature. It was the sensible reply of one of the Byzantine emperors, when a priest endeavored to illustrate to him the wisdom of God from the mechanism of the heavens as then understood, that he thought he could construct them better himself. But the progress of modern science has put this question forever at rest. Every new discovery has added force to the conviction of design, as involved in the production and maintenance of the present system of things, and no man at all acquainted with any department of nature, would now say that he thought he could arrange it better himself. So far indeed have investigations of this kind been carried, and so full is nature of design and purpose, from the blade of grass to the sun in the heavens, that she now seems to stand as one great transparency, through which the workings of a designing agent may be seen. And not only so, but apparent discrepancies have been so reconciled, particular events have been so traced to general laws, and such a convergency and principle of unity has been traced in the laws themselves, as to force upon the scientific inquirer the conviction, that this designing agent, whatever its nature or attributes in other respects may be, must be one.

But while science advanced, and the evidence of design was indicated, the ground of controversy was changed, and speculative atheism increased. That great feature of nature, ascertained by the inductive logic, that she works by general laws, which are universal and unswerving under all circumstances, began to stand out more and more prominently. From some circumstances which we

shall point out presently, connected with this invariable operation of the laws of nature, men began to rest in the laws themselves as a sufficient account of the events which took place according to them, or at most, to attribute their existence and efficacy to the workings of some unreflective, unconscious, adaptive energy, like the plastic nature of Cudworth, or what has been called the "soul of the world."

This is doubtless the strong hold of modern atheism. We call it atheism, because, though it admits, as it must, an energy in nature, it denies the moral character of God; it destroys accountability, and puts in the place of our Father who is in heaven, a blind and remorseless destiny. It is not, however, atheists alone, who, since the revelations of modern science, have thought that the existence of a being at all corresponding to our idea of God, could not be proved from the light of nature. The religious and philosophical Pascal was of this opinion; and recently the same opinion has been common among the German philosophers. It has also been embraced by some in England and in this country.* Our inquiry, then, is, why this argument has not been more universally convincing; and whether design, manifested according to fixed laws, is so encumbered and obscured as to render less imperative the logical conviction of a divine and free superintendence?

The question, it will be remembered, is not whether some power exists, for that is conceded; not whether that power can contrive, for its resources in that way are evidently indefinitely great; but whether that power is a distinct, free, personal agent. If this be not true, then have we no relations to God which our moral nature can recognize, and his existence is not worth the trouble of proof.

* See Coleridge's Aids to Reflection, p. 119, with the note by President Marsh.

It may be difficult to define, exactly, in what personality consists; but our idea of it is distinct, and is implied in almost every action of our lives. No one can fail to perceive how wide is the gulf which separates him from a thing, or from a brute, which is, so far as law and right are concerned, a thing; and no one can believe that any addition, in kind, to the powers of the brute, can make it approximate to an equality with himself. Man is of a different *nature*. The transition from the brutes to man, in the ascending series of creation, was like that from inanimate to animate being; and when nature made it, she passed a chasm across which no bridge can ever be thrown. There is a vast difference between a spire of grass and the oak that shades it; still that spire possesses every thing in kind that belongs to the tree, and is equally removed from the largest mass of unorganized matter. As the difference between that spire and mere matter, so is that between man and the brutes; as the difference between the same spire and the oak above it, so is that between man and the seraphim and cherubim above. The chief distinctive characteristics of man and the elements of personality, seem to be, reason, by which we mean here the power of distinguishing the necessary and the universal; reflection, sometimes termed self-consciousness, by which we become at the same time the subject and the object of thought; free-will; and the power of perceiving moral relations, which last is by some supposed to belong to reason. Whether each of these implies all the others, we need not now inquire; but so far as we can observe, no one of them belongs to any brute; and by the deprivation of any one of them, we should feel our personality impaired. Each of these powers must enter into every rational conception of God, as a personal agent, in distinction from nature, or some blind principle, possessing an efficacy but without personality—in distinction from some voluble spirit, like the air, unconscious

and necessitated, which mere naturalists love to contemplate as working in and rolling through all things.

All valid argument for the existence of God, must proceed on the ground of the necessary connection between every effect, or, to speak more accurately, between every *event*, and some adequate cause. The relation between an event and its cause, is a fundamental law of human belief. We can no more conceive of an event without a cause, than we can conceive of body without space. How the ideas of space and of causation come into the mind, it is not our present business to inquire. That they are necessarily there is certain; and if any man denies their existence, he gives the lie to his own consciousness, and has no ground for the assertion of any thing.

In arguing from the effect to the cause, we are not bound to admit in the cause any thing different in kind from that which we find in the effect. By this it is not meant that there must be in the cause every thing that is found in the effect, for then the creation of matter, and the existence of sin, except as eternal, would have been impossible; but that we are bound to infer in the cause no *higher* powers than are requisite to produce the effect. To do more, would be contrary to a fundamental maxim of the Newtonian logic. It was said by bishop Berkley, that we have the same evidence for the existence of God, that we have for that of our fellow-man. When we look at his body, the material envelope, it is not the man which we see; but from the indications of intelligence manifested through the medium of his body, we infer that that which is truly the man exists, though it escapes the cognizance of the senses. With equal, and precisely the same reason, when we discover marks of design in nature, do we conclude, though it "works unseen," that there is a designing agent. But two orders of intelligence fall under our observation, that of brutes, and of men. To

each of these belongs the power of contrivance and design; but to man, something distinctive and superior is added. If, therefore, we see in the works of nature nothing different in kind from the manifestations of design exhibited by the brutes, then we have no reason to suppose in the power, whatever it may be, which regulates those works, any thing superior to that which exists in them; but if, on the other hand, we see evidence of the higher kind of intelligence which belongs to man, then have we the same evidence for the existence of that intelligence, in such a manner as to constitute the rational idea of God, as we have to suppose that man himself exists.

In order to determine this point, it is necessary to compare the operations of nature with those of animals and of man respectively, and to observe in what respects they agree and in what they differ.

In doing this, we remark, first, as was noticed above, that there is in brutes, as well as in nature, the power of contrivance and design, and that this power, though limited in its sphere, yet seems, within that sphere, to be equally perfect and unerring with that possessed by nature. Nothing can be more artificial, more precisely adapted to its purpose, or, the end being given, show a more perfect capacity of attaining it, than the comb of the bee. There is not only contrivance, but in this case, as in many others, there is also prospective contrivance, which is justly mentioned by writers on natural theology, as making a strong case. The preparation by the bee, without instruction or experience, of honey and wax, against a time of need, is analogous to that by nature of the lungs, before birth. Instances of this kind it is needless to particularize. From the single fact that brutes contrive, we must infer, either that they are persons, or that contrivance does not prove personality. But it will be said that this is instinct, and that writers on natural theology refer the constitution of instincts to some higher power. Be it so; but as it is

only instinct that is produced, since like produces like, it may have been only a more extended and powerful instinct that produced it. A name is nothing. We call the principle by which animals are actuated *instinct;* but call it what we may, we see a being having a sensorium, having individuality and distinct organization, producing effects similar to those produced by nature, and yet not furnishing the least evidence of personality. If, therefore, there may be an individual power, entirely dissevered from reason and conscience, and yet producing such results, who shall limit the extent to which it may reach, or the effect, that is within its own proper sphere, which it may produce?

We remark, secondly, that in their conformity to fixed laws, and in their variation from them, according to circumstances, there is a striking analogy between the works of nature and those of animals. A perfect instinct we conceive of as acting blindly and uniformly, without any variation whatever. But no animal, so far as we know, has an instinct of this kind. They all possess a power of accommodating themselves more or less to peculiar emergencies, and in some instances this adaptive power extends so far, as apparently to border on the province of reason. Thus, it was observed by Huber, that "those ants who lay the foundation of a wall, or chamber, or gallery, from working separately, occasion now and then a want of coincidence in the parts of the same or different objects. Such examples are of no unfrequent occurrence, but they by no means embarrass them. What follows proves that the workman, on discovering his error, knew how to rectify it. A wall had been erected, with the view of sustaining a vaulted ceiling, still incomplete, that had been projected from the wall of the opposite chamber. The workman who began constructing it had given it too little elevation to meet the opposite partition on which it was to rest. Had it been continued on the original plan, it

must infallibly have met the wall at about one half of its height. This state of things very forcibly arrested my attention, when one of the ants, arriving at the place, and visiting the works, appeared to be struck by the difficulty that presented itself; but this it as soon obviated, by taking down the ceiling, and raising the wall upon which it reposed. It then, in my presence, constructed a new ceiling with the fragments of the former one." Bees, when transported to warm climates, soon cease their accumulations of honey. Some birds that build their nests upon the branches in regions where they are secure, suspend them by a cord when exposed to the attacks of serpents or monkeys. Cases of this kind among larger animals are so common that they need not be specified. An example or two of the same kind will illustrate a multitude of others, that occur in the works of nature. If the large vessel, that supplies a portion of the body with blood, be cut or tied, nature will set herself at work, and will enlarge in a surprising manner the small and circuitous vessels leading to the same part, and thus, notwithstanding the interruption of her original plan, will effect her purpose, viz. the nourishment of that part. Or, if it should be said that it is the increased pressure of the blood that enlarges the vessels mechanically, though every physiologist knows that this is not the fact, then we may take the instance of the head of a bone displaced from its socket. In this case, there will be deposited around it, after a time, a substance much resembling cartilage, and something like a new socket will be formed, giving it all the ease of position, and facility of motion, of which its situation is susceptible. In general, however, the laws of operation, both of nature and of animals, are uniform. Let them alone, thwart them in nothing, and nothing can be more perfect than the result, or more admirable than the means taken to accomplish it. But whatever power of varying from these laws, to meet particular emergencies, nature

possesses, this power, call it what we may, animals possess in a still more striking degree.

We remark, thirdly, that if brutes or nature be thwarted in their operations, in a particular manner, or to a certain extent, they will still pursue those operations, in a manner which seems equally abortive and absurd. A bee will fly against a window glass a hundred times, and still be no wiser for it. The blue fly will deposit its eggs upon the *ictodes fœtida*. The hen will continue to lay her eggs, though they are constantly removed; and she will, as mentioned by Paley, sit upon those which have not been fecundated, though it is certain they never can hatch. In nature, instances of this kind are innumerable. Girdle a tree, with the exception of a small space, and, though it is evident that nature can never accomplish her original purpose of nourishing the tree, and producing fruit, yet will she pursue, year after year, her languid and inefficient attempts. If the seed of an annual plant be sown in the fall, it will sprout and grow so long as it can, though it is certain that the ensuing winter will destroy it; whereas, if the operations of nature were analogous to those of man, she would cause it to lie over the winter before it sprouted, and it would then become a perfect plant. If the duct leading from the parotid gland to the mouth be cut off, nature still secretes the fluid in that gland, not only to no good purpose, but to the entire prevention of the curative process which she would otherwise carry on. But the instance most in point, and we mention it because it is so, is in the formation of monsters. In these cases, from some accident, the powers of nature are thwarted; but instead of giving up her work, as it seems to us an intelligent agent would do, she will go on, and form the most fantastic and useless combinations, still, however, struggling after her original plan. She will produce an eye in the chest, she will cause an arm to grow from the back, she will constitute animal structures entirely inca-

pable of sustaining life—machines that will not go; she will even make them so misshapen and unwieldy, that they must necessarily destroy her own works in the person of the mother herself.

Thus far, then, the analogy between the works of nature, and those of animals, is very striking. They may both be compared in their operations to a blind man passing along a narrow track, whose course is guided by a string stretched in the same direction, along which he passes his fingers. So long as he holds to the string, he steps with perfect security, but the moment he loses that, he gropes and stumbles; he continues his exertions indeed, but they are quite in the dark, and can hardly fail to be either nugatory or pernicious.

It will be seen that in this parallel, which might be extended, we have contrasted, and perhaps sufficiently for our present purpose, the active powers in nature with those in man. Nature is apparently necessitated and uniform; man is free and diverse in his actions.

The existence of general and inexorable laws certainly does not preclude that of a personal being. There are many and good reasons, why, if such a being exists, it would be proper for him to carry on his administration by such laws. It may be, it probably is, the best way; but still, so long as they move on in their unvarying consistency, we cannot infer from them alone, the existence of a being who is above law, who is not necessitated, who has in himself any thing other and higher than the laws themselves manifest.

Could this uniformity be once broken up, could this rigid order be once infringed for a good and manifest reason, it would change the whole face of the argument. Could we once see gravitation suspended when the good man is thrown by his persecutors from the top of the rock; could we see a chariot and horses of fire descend and deliver the righteous from the universal law of death;

could we see the sun stand still in heaven that the wicked might be overthrown; then should we be assured of a personal power with a distinct will, whose agents and ministers these laws were. Such an event would be a miracle, an event in its moral relations of the most amazing import. Such attestations of his being, we believe God has given, and given, too, in reference to this very feeling of indefiniteness, of generality, of want of personality in the supreme power, which the operation of general laws, necessarily confounding all moral distinctions, has a tendency to produce. But if such events have happened, they are not a part of nature, it is not nature that tells us of them, and it is only with her that we are at present concerned.

Whatever may be thought of these views, as bearing upon the argument from design, they will not be without their uses if they indicate more clearly than has sometimes been done, those peculiarities of design as manifested through general laws, by which, so far as it is unconnected with the heart, an atheistic impression is produced. To illustrate these, in connection with the argument from design, still farther, we shall make a few observations of somewhat wider compass.

There are two properties commonly ascribed to the works of nature, which if they can be proved from her own light, would seem to imply personality in the agent. These are wisdom and goodness.

Objections to the *wisdom* of nature, are derived from two sources. The first is the independent mode in which her laws act with reference to each other, the result of which is an apparent want of consistency, or of mutual understanding between her several departments. A wise man does not destroy with one hand what he has been at much pains to construct with the other. The tendency of animals to devour each other, may perhaps, when opposed to the instinct of self-preservation, be considered as

a case of this kind. True it is that life is preserved and perpetuated, but it is only on the condition of death. "Life," it is true, "seats herself upon the sepulchre," but then she digs the sepulchre upon which she sits; and nature, so far as she is carnivorous, seems as it were an animal that lives only by preying upon itself. But instances are more striking when taken from provinces of nature more distinct from each other. In one of her departments, we see innumerable blossoms put forth and elaborated with the nicest care, containing, to an indefinite extent, the germs of future fruitfulness; in another department, we see the frost come, and, without remorse, cut them off in a moment. In the man falling from a precipice, we see nature, with one hand carrying on, with her wonted assiduity, the processes of life, while with the other, she is dashing him to destruction. The conflagration and tempest proceed with equal fury, whether they war with the laws of life or spend themselves upon inanimate matter. But the chief difficulty in discovering wisdom from the works of nature, arises from the fact that the real and ultimate end of her works is not discoverable by her light alone. Wisdom and knowledge are by no means identical. Wisdom is judged of from the end pursued; knowledge, from the means taken in pursuing it. Man is always a knowing, but not often a wise being. His contrivances are fitted to his ends, but his ends are folly. In inquiring, then, after the *wisdom* of nature, we must observe, not the means which she employs, not any subordinate end, but whether we can discover any ultimate end, and if so, what that is.

In looking for an ultimate end of nature, we should doubtless expect to find it, if any where, in man, since he is the epitome and crown of all that we behold. But when we observe the uncertainty and brevity of his life, heat and cold, hunger and thirst, poverty and disease, pressing upon him in that little space, when we see how

all his faculties, and life itself, are, as it were, sported with, when we see the grinning idiot and the moody or raving maniac, when we see the pestilence sweep him suddenly into the grave, regardless of his aims or his hopes, when we see him in no way more respected in any of nature's operations than the meanest insect, we cannot suppose that the end of all this mighty scheme is to be found in him. This conviction is especially strengthened when we consider the disorder of the passions, all "the oppressions that are done under the sun," and in general, how the events in the moral world, whether man has to do with nature that brings all things alike to all, or whether he has to do with his fellow-men, conflict with our natural sense of order and of right. But if this end cannot be found in man, much less can it in the inferior animals, or in any thing unconscious, however beautifully organized. The instant indeed that this world is viewed as a preparatory dispensation, the whole face of things is changed. The instant we regard this visible and material structure as a temporary staging which is to stand only till the completion of the true building, which is moral, spiritual, perfect, eternal, that instant do we discover an end worthy of this amazing scene of things, that instant do we discover *wisdom*. But this idea, nature and the works of nature do not give. To whatever extent it has existed in the minds of men, it has existed there, not from a philosophical examination of the works of nature, but from tradition, and from reflecting upon the operations and forebodings of their own minds. If we suppose, as believers in revelation do, that the ultimate end of the present system is the establishment of such a moral and permanent government, then, to suppose that we can discover wisdom in it, without a knowledge of that end, is much the same as to suppose that we could discover wisdom in the contrivances for picking and carding cotton without knowing that cloth was to be made of it. Show us the cloth, the

ultimate end, and then we are willing to admit that there is wisdom in the arrangements, though we may not understand them all; but no elaborateness of contrivance for a nugatory end, or for no end at all, can discover wisdom. What we would say then, is, that the true end of the works of nature being out of and beyond themselves, is not discoverable from them; and that without some knowledge of what the end is in any work, we cannot tell whether there is wisdom displayed in it or not. It may be true, that to a mind of great compass, like that of Bishop Butler, certain general tendencies are discoverable in nature, towards a great moral result, and these, when discovered, go strongly to confirm the direct evidence for that result; but they are not obvious to the mass of mankind, and, when taken by themselves, are so obscure as to leave the greatest and best minds in distressing perplexity.

Several of the remarks made in regard to wisdom, apply equally to the subject of goodness, as discoverable from the works of nature. If wisdom be not discoverable, then goodness cannot be, since *goodness* is a part of *wisdom*. How can it be known of any thing whether it be good, if the end or purpose of it be not known? Particular subordinate ends may be known, but heathen nations were entirely uncertain of the ultimate end of the present state of things. Certain it is, as Butler remarks, that many of the wisest among them considered this world as a place of punishment for the delinquencies of some former state of being. It would seem probable that the opinions of mankind on this subject might vary, as they were situated in different regions or in different circumstances. "Don't you suppose," said a brahmin to an American missionary, pointing to a bearer who was toiling in the sun, "that that man is in hell?" The Greenlander amidst his snows, the slave toiling all his life long under the lash, with no knowledge of a futurity, can hardly feel that the present world is greatly good to them. So

discrepant have been the appearances of nature, the principles of good and evil have been so blended together, that many nations have imagined the existence of two beings to whom they have imputed the origin of all things, the one benevolent, the other malevolent. Between these, they have fancied a continual struggle, and not seldom have they chiefly worshipped and endeavored to propitiate the malevolent being. They knew of the sunshine and the breezes, of the flowers and the fruits; but they knew, also, of the volcano and the earthquake, of the tempest and the pestilence. In estimating any scheme, we judge of it, not so much by particular parts, as by the manner in which it works. However it may come to pass, it is matter of experience that unmixed happiness is not to be found, and that there has been and still is an appalling amount of misery on this earth. Judging then from nature only, from the result, must not the conclusion be, that there must have been a deficiency either of power or of goodness, in that which was the origin of all things, whatever it may have been?

But if we reason with perfect strictness, we shall see that these beneficent contrivances *may* not have been the result of goodness. In order to this, we must make a distinction between beneficence and goodness. The sun is beneficent; God is good. Goodness is the intentional production of happiness, but there may be beneficence or usefulness without this. The parent animal does many things which conduce to the comfort of its young, but no one supposes it to have goodness, in the proper sense of the term. If there be an adaptive, necessitated, impersonal being, such as atheists mean by nature, its adaptations must tend to something, and why not to happiness as well as to any thing else? How can we know that these contrivances arise from any thing higher than that which causes the parent bird to build its nest and line it with soft feathers for its young? Nature, the mother of

all, may be a beneficent instinct, and there exist no personal and good being.

We admit that when we follow the development of contrivance in nature, and observe the infinity of her resources, when we observe the simplicity of her plan, and the diversity of her operations, how perfectly she descends to the minute, and how easily she wields the vast, it would be natural to connect with the power working all this, the highest attributes of intelligence with which we are acquainted. To do this would be the eager aspiration of every heart rightly affected; but if what has been said be correct, logical accuracy does not compel the deduction, and the argument from design falls short of being a strict proof of the existence of a personal God. Contrivance manifested, no doubt proves a contriver, but this is by no means sufficient to furnish us with the elements of his character whom we adore as Lord of all.

The inquiry then naturally arises, whether we have such a formal proof as has been sought for in the argument from design. We think we have, though it seems to have been generally overlooked by writers on this subject. To attain this, neglecting the particular argument from design, we must press the more general one from cause to effect; we must carry it upward, not merely midway in the series of effects, but must make it comprise the highest and noblest of all known effects.

In doing this we remark, that as the eye beholds all things else, but is invisible to itself, so the *mind*, which apprehends other things, too often overlooks and fails to consider itself as a part of that creation which it contemplates. In looking for the evidence of a creative mind, where should we expect to find it but in mind created? As Akenside says of beauty and sublimity,

> "Mind, mind alone, bear witness earth and heaven,
> The living fountain in itself contains
> Of beauteous and sublime;"

so we say, that in created mind alone, do we find the highest and true evidence of mind uncreated. If mind be any thing distinct from matter, it is evident that it can be known only by itself; that the exercise of the faculties of mind is the only condition on which a knowledge of the attributes of mind can be obtained, the only condition on which mind can be conceived of or recognized, and that, consequently, if we have any knowledge of God as a mind, it must be derived, not from any thing *ab extra*, but from the conscious operation of our own minds. The fallacy by which we seem to derive our notions of mind from without, is much like that by which we suppose the existence of color in the object. We see in external things, operations more or less resembling those which mind produces, and we suppose, that it is from those operations that our knowledge of the operating mind is obtained; whereas the recognition of any such operation as belonging to mind, supposes in us a similar previous operation with which we compare it, and without such previous operation in us from which we really obtain the idea, and by which we make the comparison, the knowledge of mind is impossible.

The brutes do not and cannot know God, because they have in themselves none of those elements which constitute his character as God, and man can only know him, in so far as he is made in the image of God, in respect to the *kind* of faculties which he possesses. Certainly it is only by the transference to God of the elements contained in our minds, that we can form any conception of him. If, therefore, there be any thing in reference to which we are not formed in the image of God, in respect to the kind of faculties which we possess, then, so far forth as those faculties exist in him, he is no God to us. As we can have no idea of the qualities of matter, except those derived from the senses which we possess, so we can have none of the attributes of mind, except those derived from

our own mental powers. We can conceive of reason, of conscience, of free-will, of wisdom, and goodness, because we have the principles of these things in ourselves, and we can suppose them to be extended till they become infinite or perfect; but if, besides these and other powers which we may possess, there are in God still other perfections, we cannot conceive of them; they are to us as though they were not.

The above powers or attributes are those which chiefly go to form our idea of God, and without them he would not exist as God to us. But the idea of them is not derived to us from nature, in the usual sense of that term; they have nothing to do with contrivance; they come to us from the fact of the existence of our minds, and from the original, spontaneous operation of the faculties with which they are endowed. We might see nature move on forever, and not have the least idea of conscience or free-will, unless we found them existent in ourselves.

Let us suppose then two systems: the one containing contrivance more perfect, if possible, than the present; the other, and we may suppose it, for we believe it to exist, consisting of minds disencumbered of matter, possessing spontaneous activity, thought, free-will, reason, conscience, judgment, affections. Each of these we suppose to be an effect. Which of them, we ask, would give the most decisive evidence of the existence, in its cause, of those attributes, the union of which, in one being, constitutes our idea of God—that which alone would be able to conceive of him, and would contain in itself faculties and powers similar to those which he possesses; or that which would not? The answer to this question cannot be doubtful. Strange indeed would it be, if the mind, in subserviency to which the body, with its contrivances, was evidently made, which alone can apprehend God, and exhibit godlike manifestations, should furnish less evidence of his existence than the contrivances made for its con-

venience. Mind, it is true, is not mechanism; it is not, so far as we know, a contrivance in any proper sense of that term; but it is an effect, it is an effect *sui generis*, it is the highest of all known effects, and we may infer from it, in regard to its cause, what we can infer from no other of the works of God, even that he is not only "the Former of our bodies," but "the Father of our spirits." We see, therefore, that the existence of a created mind is not only the direct and proper evidence of a mind that created, but that it is the only condition on which the conception of such a mind can be formed, or the knowledge of it brought to light. We see, also, that all the important attributes of God, those without which he would not be God, are derived to us from the operations of our own faculties, and not at all from nature or contrivance. It would seem illogical, then, to say the least, to derive the chief, and indeed the only evidence for the existence of God, from that which may indeed be the consequence of his existence; but which does not contain or indicate the main elements in which his nature and character consist.

What, then, is the state of the argument from cause to effect? Taking along with us the principle that every event must have an adequate cause, our first assertion is, that something now exists. This we prove, or rather it is self-evident, from the senses and from consciousness. The inference from this is, that something must have always existed, since no one supposes that something can come out of nothing—"*Ex nihilo nihil fit.*" Something, then, having existed from eternity, we inquire what that is. Of the possibility that matter has always been, we need say nothing; but, in examining its modifications, we find marks of design and matchless contrivance; there must, therefore, have been a contriver capable of adapting means to ends. But this power of contrivance being possessed by inferior animals, and the operations of nature being, moreover, in many respects, strikingly analogous

to theirs, we do not yet find evidence of the higher and moral attributes of mind; or if we discover traces of wisdom and goodness, they are so obscure as to render it uncertain whether they exist, except by chance. We pass, therefore, entirely from matter and its modifications, to mind. Here we find, as an effect, all the attributes which we ascribe to God as a cause. Here we find personality; here the true evidence for the existence of a personal God. "He that planted the ear, shall he not hear? He that formed the eye, shall he not see? *He that teacheth man knowledge, shall not he know?*"

It only remains to show, and we may do it in a word, that the powers that cause the grass to spring, and uphold the order of the heavens, belong to the same being who created the mind, and who consequently possesses the highest intellectual and moral attributes of which we can conceive. The body of man is one of the productions of nature, is formed in like manner, and with like proofs of contrivance with its other parts. Of this, there can be no doubt. But the adaptation of the body to the mind, and their mutual action on each other, render it certain that one being was the author of both. It follows, of course, that he who made the human mind, and endowed it with its faculties, is possessed of those illimitable powers which carry on the course of nature, as well as of the highest possible attributes of intelligence.

This intelligence must of course be present in connection with those amazing powers, wherever, through the immensity of space, the operations of nature extend. We have, therefore, as the source of all things, as the principle of unity in all things, instead of a blind, unconscious principle, which general laws would seem to indicate, and which men call nature, or by whatever name pleases them, one, free, all-pervading, all-inspecting, all-comprehending, personal God, from whose presence we cannot escape, from whose Spirit we cannot flee. We have also these

general laws, now assuming the form of his stated and most wise administration, the operation of which, when the greatness of the emergency demands it, he still stands ready to suspend.

Such, with the expansion and particular applications of which it will be seen at once that it is susceptible, is the argument from cause to effect, when pushed to its proper point. Thus stated, we see not how it can be evaded by one who does not deny first principles, and thus destroy the foundations of all knowledge. It goes upon no principle or assumption, that is not involved in the argument from design, the true force of which we shall not be suspected of any desire to diminish. Our only wish is, to show the foundations on which the pillars of truth in fact rest, since they always appear more massive and imposing when seen as they really are. We cannot doubt,—as men are freed from the bondage of a material and atheistic philosophy, as the knowledge of mind is seen to be equally certain as that of matter, and the great facts of spiritual consciousness are more distinctly apprehended and more fully rested on,—that the department of the creation of God, which alone is in direct communion with him, will be seen to be that upon which the evidence of his being and high attributes is most legibly enstamped.

In corroboration of this, we now return to the work, the title of which is placed at the head of this article, though, as the reviewers are wont to say, we have already occupied so much space, that our notice of it must be brief. Sooth to say, the body of this article was written before this work came to hand, and we availed ourselves of it, chiefly for the purpose of showing that we are not singular in the views we have taken. Aside from its general ability, we welcome it as the first work of the kind which has fallen under our notice, in which the logic of inferring from the effect only a similarity of cause, has been adhered to. The author, it is true, takes no formal excep-

tion to the argument from design; but he does this virtually, since he bases the general argument precisely as we have done. The only extracts which our limits will allow, must bear upon this point. They will, at the same time, furnish a happy instance of the particular application of the argument of which we have spoken, and give such a specimen of the work, as we hope may lead our readers to its entire perusal.

"All men are perpetually led to form judgments concerning actions, and emotions which lead to action, as right or wrong; as what they *ought* or *ought not* to do or feel. There is a faculty which approves or disapproves, acquits or condemns the workings of our other faculties. Now, what shall we say of such a judiciary principle, thus introduced among our motives to action? Shall we conceive that while the other springs of action are balanced against each other by our Creator, this, the most pervading and universal regulator, was no part of the original scheme? That—while the love of animal pleasures, of power, of fame, the regard for friends, the pleasure of bestowing pleasure, were infused into man as influences by which his course of life was to be carried on, and his capacities and powers developed and exercised;—this reverence for a moral law, this acknowledgment of the obligation of duty,—a feeling which is every where found, and which may become a powerful, a predominating motive of action,—was given for no purpose, and belongs not to the design? Such an opinion would be much as if we should acknowledge the skill and contrivance manifested in the other parts of a ship, but should refuse to recognize the rudder as exhibiting any evidence of a purpose. Without the reverence which the opinion of right inspires, and the scourge of general disapprobation inflicted on that which is accounted wicked, society could scarcely go on; and certainly the feelings and thoughts and characters of men could not be what they are. Those impulses of nature which involve no acknowledgment of responsibility, and the play and struggle of interfering wishes, might preserve the species in some shape of existence, as we see in the case of brutes. But a person must be strangely constituted, who, living amid the respect for law, the admiration of what is good, the order and virtues and graces of civilized nations, (all which have their origin in some degree in the feeling of responsibility,) can maintain that all these are casual and extraneous circumstances, no way contemplated in the formation of man; and that a condition in which there should be no obligation in law, no merit in self-restraint, no beauty in virtue, is

equally suited to the powers and the nature of man, and was equally contemplated when those powers were given him.

"If this supposition be too extravagant to be admitted, as it appears to be, it remains then that man, intended, as we have already seen from his structure and properties, to be a discoursing, social being, acting under the influence of affections, desires, and purposes, was also intended to act under the influence of a sense of duty; and that the acknowledgment of the obligation of a moral law is as much part of his nature, as hunger or thirst, maternal love or the desire of power; that, therefore, in conceiving man as the work of a Creator, we must imagine his powers and character given him with an intention on the Creator's part that this sense of duty should occupy its place in his constitution as an active and thinking being: and that this directive and judiciary principle is a part of the work of the same Author who made the elements to minister to the material functions, and the arrangements of the world to occupy the individual and social affections of his living creatures.

"This principle of conscience, it may be further observed, does not stand upon the same level as the other impulses of our constitution by which we are prompted or restrained. By its very nature and essence, it possesses a supremacy over all others. 'Your obligation to obey this law is its being the law of your nature. That your conscience approves of and attests such a course of action is itself alone an obligation. Conscience does not only offer itself to show us the way we should walk in, but it likewise carries its own authority with it, that it is our natural guide: the guide assigned us by the author of our nature.'* That we ought to do an action, is of itself a sufficient and ultimate answer to the questions, *why* we should do it?—how we are *obliged* to do it? The conviction of duty implies the soundest reason, the strongest obligation, of which our nature is susceptible.

"We appear then to be using only language which is well capable of being justified, when we speak of this irresistible esteem for what is right, this conviction of a rule of action extending beyond the gratification of our irreflective impulses, as an impress stamped upon the human mind by the Deity himself; a trace of His nature; an indication of His will; an announcement of His purpose; a promise of His favor: and though this faculty may need to be confirmed and unfolded, instructed and assisted by other aids, it still seems to contain in itself a sufficient intimation that the highest objects of man's existence are to be attained, by means of a direct and intimate reference of his thoughts and actions to the Divine Author of his being.

"Such, then, is the Deity to which the researches of natural

* Butler, Serm. 3.

theology point; and so far is the train of reflections in which we have engaged, from being merely speculative and barren. With the material world we cannot stop. If a superior Intelligence *have* ordered and adjusted the succession of seasons and the structure of the plants of the field, we must allow far more than this at first sight would seem to imply. We must admit still greater powers, still higher wisdom for the creation of the beasts of the forest with their faculties; and higher wisdom still and more transcendent attributes, for the creation of man. And when we reach this point, we find that it is not knowledge only, not power only, not foresight and beneficence alone, which we must attribute to the Maker of the World; but that we must consider him as the Author, in us, of a reverence for moral purity and rectitude; and, *if the author of such emotions in us, how can we conceive of Him otherwise, than that these qualities are parts of his nature;* and that he is not only wise and great, and good, incomparably beyond our highest conceptions, but also conformed in his purposes to the rule which he thus impresses upon us, that is, Holy in the highest degree which we can imagine to ourselves as possible."

Again:

"But with sense and consciousness the history of living things only begins. They have instincts, affections, passions, will. How entirely lost and bewildered do we find ourselves when we endeavor to conceive these faculties communicated by means of general laws! Yet they are so communicated from God, and of such laws he is the lawgiver. *At what an immeasurable interval is he thus placed above every thing which the creation of the inanimate world alone would imply;* and how far must he transcend all ideas founded on such laws as we find there!"

To these it will suffice to add a single brief extract; and we do it, partly because it seems indirectly to recognize the truth of the assertion made by some, that our capacity of conceiving of God, is itself a proof of his existence.

"It would indeed be extravagant to assert that the imagination of the creature, itself the work of God, can invent a higher point of goodness, of justice, of holiness, than the Creator himself possesses: that the Eternal Mind, from whom our notions of good and right are derived, is not himself directed by the rules which these notions imply."

There are several parts of this work which we would gladly notice; but we can only commend to the especial attention of our readers the two original chapters, one on inductive, the other on deductive habits. In these the author shows, together with the reason of it, that the great discoverers in the several departments of nature have been theists; and accounts philosophically for the deplorable atheism of such men as Laplace.

ON HUMAN HAPPINESS.

Had we more skill and less honesty, we should be tempted to introduce our readers into the main current of the following article, by a *side-cut*, which should enter at an angle so acute that the point of transition might not be noticed. We might thus, for a time at least, beguile those whose distaste may now be awakened by their first glance at a subject upon which so much that is common-place has been said and written. But we have no such arts; and with that portion of our readers who prefer the useful to the novel and the brilliant, we hope not to need them. Not that we should expect a result immediately striking, even if we could establish a correct theory of human happiness, and cause it to be universally received. Far from it. Habits of action are slowly formed, and slowly modified. No man is as good or as bad, as happy or as unhappy, as his speculative principles would make him. When once society is put in motion, it gains a momentum which bears it on in the same direction after the forces which first impelled it are withdrawn; and a gradual power must be applied, an elastic cable must be thrown around it, before the prow can be turned, and the sails set in another direction. Still, the conduct of a rational being, or rather, of one who acts rationally, must, to a great extent, be influenced by his theoretical opinions. Hence, as happiness depends upon conduct, to establish one principle, to fix one wavering idea, to shed one ray of light on this subject, may do more for human well-being,

than would be done by discovering the cause of the aurora borealis, or, were that possible, by an analysis of the moon.

Of modern disquisitions on this subject, probably the chapter of Paley, in his Moral Philosophy, which treats of it, is more read and studied than any other, as that work still holds its place in many of our seminaries of learning. That chapter was written by a shrewd observer; it contains observations of great practical significance, and it is not without reason that it has had a high degree of popularity. It is even quoted as one of the happiest efforts of Paley, by those who dissent altogether from the doctrines of his system of morals. But as the grounds of duty and of happiness must be closely associated, it was hardly to be expected that one who failed to give a correct account of the one, should succeed entirely in his exposition of the other. Accordingly, we think that he has advanced several erroneous opinions, the tendency of which, if they were acted upon, would be highly pernicious; and that the whole discussion is slight, and deficient in general principles. It will be our purpose in the following pages, to show the grounds of this opinion, from an examination of that chapter; and then to make some observations on the general subject.

In his introductory remarks, Paley asserts that all enjoyments are homogeneous. This is the first point that we shall consider, for we believe that there is a radical difference between different enjoyments, or, as we choose to say, between pleasure and happiness. On this subject he says; "I will omit much usual declamation on the dignity and capacity of our nature, the superiority of the soul to the body, of the rational to the animal part of our constitution, upon the worthiness, refinement, and delicacy of some satisfactions, or the meanness, grossness and sensuality of others, because I hold that pleasures differ in

nothing but in continuance and intensity." And here he cannot mean that there is no proper distinction between gross and refined pleasures, since he says a few lines below; "By the pleasures of sense I mean, as well the animal gratifications of eating and drinking, &c. as the *more refined* pleasures of music, painting, architecture, gardening, splendid shows, theatric exhibitions; and the pleasures, lastly, of active sports, as of hunting, fishing," &c. As therefore, he allows some pleasures to be more refined than others, what he means to assert must be that refined pleasures are no better than those that are gross. And as the other distinctions mentioned by him of worthiness and delicacy are equally common, he must, for the same reason, admit their propriety, but would hold that delicate pleasures are no better than those that are indelicate; and worthy pleasures no better than those that are unworthy, which is a contradiction in terms. But not to insist on this, which only shows how difficult it is for a man to use the language of mankind in contradicting their common judgment, without contradicting himself, we will appeal directly for the existence of the distinction contended for, to the only proper tribunal, to the consciousness and common sentiments of mankind. When Sir Philip Sidney, wounded and faint on the field of battle, was about raising to his parched lips the only cup of water to be had, he saw a soldier whom they were bearing past, still more severely wounded, look wishfully upon it. He immediately withdrew the cup and said; "Give it him, for he is more needy than I." Do we then feel that there was no difference in kind, between the satisfaction derived from that act, and that which he would have found in drinking the water? Do we feel that there is no essential difference between the pleasures of the selfish, brutified sensualist, and the satisfaction which Howard felt, in his self-denying efforts to remove ignorance and mitigate wretchedness? No difference between the pleasure of the

pagan in devouring human flesh, and the enjoyment of the missionary when he sees intelligence, civilization, and Christianity, taking the place, through his labors, of the darkness and degradations of heathenism? We should both despise and detest the man, who, when the case was distinctly put, should prefer the pleasures of a debauch, to the relief of a poor family suffering from cold and hunger. Surely it is not in the mouths of declaimers only, that we find the distinction made between the dignity and worth of some pleasures, and the meanness and criminality of others. Nothing is more universally recognized, or more regarded in the estimation which we form of the characters of others.

But it may be said, this is declamation, and not argument. Let us then, as the point is an important one, turn to argument, and not rest on the appeal, which, however, we still affirm is argument. And here we observe that the proposition of Paley takes it for granted that there is no essential difference between a brute and a spiritual being. We judge of the effect from the cause, and reciprocally, of the cause from the effect. If there were two beings entirely different in their nature, different in kind, we should infer that their enjoyments would differ, not alone "in continuance and intensity," but also in quality; if, on the other hand, their enjoyments were the same in kind, we should infer infallibly, that the beings were also. But the grosser sensual pleasures are enjoyed by brutes as perfectly as by man. It is not therefore requisite to the enjoyment of them, that the material organization should have any connection with rational and moral powers. But if man has a spiritual part distinct from the body, though connected with it, possessed of rational and moral powers capable of contemplating the infinite, the eternal, the beautiful, the true, and the good, we should naturally suppose that the enjoyment to be derived from the exercise of these powers, would be as dif-

ferent as the subjects of the powers themselves, as mind and matter, which, Paley himself would, no doubt, allow, differ in kind, or at least, that they may so differ. This natural expectation, confirmed by the common language and feelings of mankind, is met by a bare assertion without proof or confirmation, and we are expected to believe that the intellectual happiness of Sir Isaac Newton, in his highest contemplations, and most complete abstraction from sensual pleasures, differed only in continuance and intensity from the gross pleasures of the debauchee, which might be as well enjoyed without a soul as with one, and in some respects even better. We are expected to believe the same of the moral pleasures of him, who, in the struggle between obduracy and penitence, between selfishness and love, resigns himself into the hands of his Maker, and feels in his union with "the first good, first perfect, and first fair," not in nature only, but in affection, a security which causes the face of nature to be irradiated with a smile, and casts the light of hope over an illimitable future that was dark before. Such moments occur, and though they may quickly pass, how often do we hear those to whom they come, affirm that they then first knew what happiness was? It is not, however, of human beings alone, that we are to believe this; but also that the enjoyments of Gabriel differ in nothing except in continuance and intensity from those of an oyster; and then, if there is no difference in kind between the pleasures, if we choose to call them so, of the two beings, neither can there be any between the beings themselves, and Gabriel is only an imperishable, a more susceptible, and more fortunate brute. Did not an apprehension of irreverence forbid it, it will be seen that the argument might be carried still further. So different, indeed, are different kinds of enjoyment, that we do not suppose that a spiritual being less than infinite, having never been embodied, can conceive of pleasures merely sensual. The minor enigma

of different kinds of enjoyment in the same being, will find its solution, in common with many others, in the solution of the greater enigma of man—in the union in him of two natures or kinds of being, the one spiritual, imperishable, and possessed of *powers;* the other animal, perishable, and possessed of *susceptibilities.*

But we remark again, that this doctrine of the homogeneousness of all enjoyment, takes it for granted that there is no difference between virtue and vice, except in their consequences. In this indeed Paley is consistent, since it enters into his whole system, and is, as it seems to us, a radical defect. Here again, we reason from the effect to the cause. If there is no difference in kind in the pleasures to be derived from different courses, neither can there be between the courses themselves. The *pleasures* of sin, is an intelligible phrase—there are pleasures of sin. But the *happiness* of sin, is a contradiction; we might as well talk of the virtue of sin. But if all pleasures are alike in kind, the pleasures of debauchery, or of revenge, are just as noble, just as worthy of a rational creature, as the satisfactions of virtue; the only difference is, that they are followed by unpleasant consequences. Mankind have unfortunately conjured up certain "prejudices and habits," from which Paley thinks that natural conscience cannot be distinguished,* which will disturb them after the enjoyment of these laudable pleasures. Nay they are sometimes so unjust, as to visit a man with their reprobation for the enjoyment of the same kind of pleasures with themselves, though he may not have been quite so judicious in the selection. Surely, among pleasures of the same kind, a man should be allowed to take his choice without censure, since, from variety of constitution and temperament, no man can fairly judge for another. The vigorous might say to the feeble; "The

* See Moral Philosophy, Chapter v. near the close.

pleasures of knowledge and virtue are no doubt desirable, and it may be well for you to study and deny yourself, since you can attain them in no other way; but for me, I am determined to come at the same kind of pleasures by eating and drinking." We appeal to our readers, whether, of the numerous instances which must have fallen under their observation, in which this process has been undertaken, they have ever known one to succeed. On this system, vice is only folly, and not guilt; and he who pursues a vicious course is perhaps to be pitied for his defect of judgment, but not to be condemned. The only ground too, of the authority of reason and conscience over the instincts and passions, is, not that they give us any notion of what is good and right in itself, but because they are more knowing and far-sighted.

From the preceding considerations we hope it will appear, that there must be somewhere a fundamental distinction between pleasure and happiness. It would appear indeed, from a note in which he refers to it, that Paley himself could not entirely divest his mind of the idea of its existence. The following is his account of it. "If," says he, "any positive signification, distinct from what we mean by pleasure, can be affixed to the term happiness, I should take it to denote a certain state of the nervous system in that part of the human frame in which we feel joy and grief, passions and affections. Whether this be the heart, which the turn of most languages would lead us to believe, or the diaphragm, as Buffon, or the upper orifice of the stomach, as Van Helmont thought; or rather be a kind of network, lining the whole region of the præcordia, as others have imagined; it is possible, not only that each painful sensation may violently shake and disturb the fibres for the time, but that a series of such may at length so derange the texture of the system as to produce a perpetual irritation, which will show itself by fretfulness, impatience, and restlessness. It is possible

also, on the other hand, that a succession of pleasurable sensations may have such an effect upon this subtle organization, as to cause the fibres to relax, and return into their place and order, and thereby to recover, or, if not lost, to preserve that harmonious conformation which gives to the mind its sense of complacency and satisfaction. This state may be denominated happiness," &c. We are not about to spend time upon this passage. Whatever the true notion of happiness may be, the above statement, in the present state of our knowledge, requires no confutation. Its basis is a degrading materialism, and it would be difficult to say whether it betrays greater ignorance of psychology or of physiology. On this system the most direct way to happiness would be the study of anatomy and medicine.

But if Paley has given, formally, no adequate idea of happiness, has he not succeeded in the main object of his chapter, which was to show in what it consists? We think not. He first mentions three particulars in which happiness does not consist; and with his remarks upon them we accord. He then mentions four others, in which, according to him, it does consist. These are; "The exercise of the social affections;" "The exercise of our faculties in some engaging end;" "A prudent constitution of habits;" and "Health." And here we may just notice the inaccuracy of saying that happiness *consists* in any other thing, for instance, in health. Happiness may result from health, but it consists in itself, and in nothing else. It was in this sense, we presume, that Paley intended to use the phrase.

For the convenience of investigation, we shall consider the particulars mentioned, in their reverse order. The most that can be said of health, is, that it is the condition of certain pleasures, and valuable pleasures; but happiness is so far from consisting in it, that it is not necessary to happiness even as a condition. It would certainly be

going too far to say of every man in health that he is happy, or of every one not in health that he is miserable. Even on Paley's system, a man out of health may exercise the social affections and consequently be happy. Health is desirable, but human happiness is not so poor a thing as to be dependent on every casualty by which it may be affected. It often happens, no doubt, that the pains of ill health become a means of so strengthening the moral powers, of so promoting a calm resignation, and a quick and active sympathy with human suffering, that the character is made better, more valuable, and the man more happy. "He is to be pitied," says Seneca, "whom the gods have not thought worthy to suffer;" and suffering in this way may answer the ends of moral discipline as well as in any other. When this is the result of ill health, or indeed of any suffering, it becomes in its effects the reverse of those produced by the roll eaten by St. John, which, in his mouth was sweeter than honey, but in his belly was bitter.

But if happiness does not consist in health, neither does it in a prudent constitution of habits. Whatever the end proposed by any man may be, it is evident that he may have, in Paley's sense of it, a prudent constitution of habits—that is, he may, with reference to one end as well as another, "so cast his habits, that every change shall be for the better." If, for instance, his end be sensual pleasure, he may form habits of abstemiousness to a certain extent, that his pleasures may be of higher relish and longer sustained. The doctrine of Paley is, that whatever is habitual becomes indifferent, and that, therefore, if a man rushes at once into the enjoyment of the highest pleasures, and continues in them, satiety soon ensues, and he has no resource. This is true of pleasure properly so called, but not of every kind of enjoyment. It is not true of a life of virtue, since, the longer we continue in it, and the more eagerly it is pursued, the more it is en-

joyed. In regard to the pleasures of the senses, there is no doubt but a computation may be made on the principle of 'double fellowship,' combining quantity and time, so as to secure the greatest amount; but since, by Paley's confession, happiness does not consist in the pleasures of sense in whatever profusion, he who makes them his end cannot be happy, however good his constitution of habits in regard to them may be. It follows, therefore, that though a prudent constitution of habits in reference to any end is desirable, yet, whether we shall obtain happiness by it, depends, not on the habits, but on the ends which we pursue in their formation.

Nor does Paley more regard the end to be pursued when he says that "happiness consists in the exercise of our faculties in some engaging end." Indeed, he says that if, after the judgment has made choice of an end, we have command of imagination so as to be able to transfer a pleasure to the *means*, the end may be forgotten as soon as we will. Now to some men, and on some occasions, revenge is a very engaging end, in the pursuit of which they may be as active as in any other—and therefore as happy. If to have an end, and an engaging end, were sufficient to happiness, most men would be happy. But there are two kinds of success in life. One consists in the attainment of the particular ends we have in view; the other, which is true success, in the attainment of happiness. The difficulty is not so much that men fail of assiduity to attain particular ends, as that they pursue those which are wrong. But there is another doctrine countenanced by Paley under this head which we cannot receive. We do not believe that life is a mockery; that we are necessitated to pursue phantoms for the activity of the pursuit, and that there are no ends in which we may rest, as good in themselves. We believe that we may have a friend, for instance, in whom our affections may rest as their end, and find satisfaction without reference to

any thing further. We cannot too strongly dissent from the philosophy that would make life a scene of aimless activity, and throw men into the turmoil, that they may be busy—that says to the "great and rich," that it does not "blame them," that "perhaps they cannot do better," than to "frequent the horse-course and gaming-table," and spend "twenty or thirty thousand pounds to gain a contested election," simply that they may relieve themselves of the burden of a stagnant existence. That the world is full of such pursuit to a degree that would beforehand be thought incredible, is true; but to assert that it is the order of Providence, that it is necessary to happiness, or even compatible with it, would be to reproach our Maker, and make life an absurdity. All activity would arise from mere uneasiness, and not from the pursuit of any natural and proper end, and we should be sent into the world under a delusion much like that of the peasant who pursues the receding rainbow that he may find the money buried beneath it—a delusion under which it would be fruitless to act, which it would be misery to discover. The truth seems to be that health, activity, and habits, which are only activity uniformly directed, are merely facilities, or instruments, which being wisely managed, happiness may be the result, but which, being abused or misdirected, become the occasions of misery.

It only remains to consider the social affections. From these we are willing to allow that happiness may result; but still we contend that on Paley's principles it can no more be said to consist in them, than in the pleasures of sense. If there is nothing but pleasure, and all pleasures are of the same kind, then happiness must consist in whatever gives us pleasure; and though the social affections may be the source of more happiness, yet they are no more a source of happiness than the senses, or than any thing else which gives us a series of pleasurable emotions, not excepting vice itself. Consistency, therefore,

would require Paley to adopt the conclusions of Brown, who says that "happiness may be defined to be a state of continued agreeable feeling, differing from what is commonly termed pleasure only as a whole differs from a part; and that every object, the remembrance, or possession, or hope of which is agreeable, is a source of happiness." On the system of Paley, therefore, the social affections have no more claim to rank among the sources of happiness than many other things; and though we allow that happiness results from them in their own proper nature, yet all must feel that any view which should confine it to them alone, would be fragmentary and entirely inadequate.

It matters little to the object we have in view, whether Paley can or cannot be defended by saying that his object was to treat of happiness only in a popular and comparative sense. His book is studied as a scientific work; and if he has failed to make essential distinctions, and to develope fundamental ideas on this subject, it is due to the cause of education that the defect should be pointed out. That he has thus failed, we have endeavored as briefly as possible to show; and shall now, as was proposed, make some remarks on the general subject, which we hope may furnish hints towards placing it in a juster light, or which may, at least, elicit the efforts of those, abler and more successful.

Among the ancients, the question concerning the *summum bonum*, as consisting in some *one* thing, was agitated with more interest than any other, and was, in fact, made to include almost every other in morals. Varro mentions that there were two hundred and ninety different opinions in regard to it. The three principal sects, however, were the Epicureans, the Stoics, and the Peripatetics. Of these the first believed it to consist in the pleasures of sense, the second in virtue, and the third in virtue exercised in a

prosperous life. We are not about to discuss these systems. What we wish to observe is, the very general prevalence among them of an idea of happiness as consisting in some one thing, or at least as not admitting any great diversity of sources, thus indicating an almost instinctive belief, that human nature has some one end in the attainment of which happiness may be found. We may observe running through the speculations of the finest minds of antiquity, a consciousness of something great and permanent in man, fitted to be the basis of an enjoyment independent of time and chance, entirely above and out of the casual flux and reflux of mere sensitive pleasure. They had a conception of a higher and purer region, of permanent being, of fixed relations, and of constant happiness. Their hold of this was sometimes feeble, but still they clung to it, and even when they ran into many extravagances and paradoxes, the light of this great idea may still be discerned beaming through their misty speculations. Nor has this idea been confined to them. Modern philosophers of the most profound reflection, and who have made the most sober estimate of the human faculties, have held fast to the same idea of a real, permanent, satisfactory good of which human nature is capable; and he is to be pitied who has not, in his better moments, felt its inspiration. The question is, What is that good? In order to ascertain this, it will be necessary to consider a little the human constitution, and its relations to the objects by which it is surrounded.

The condition of all enjoyment, is, *the action of some faculty upon its appropriate subject; or the excitement by its appropriate object of some susceptibility.* We can have no idea of any enjoyment in any other way. Could a faculty exist without action, it would be as though it were not; were it to act without its object, it would be only an indefinite yearning, giving no enjoyment; but the moment it meets with its proper object, and acts upon

that, it gives its appropriate satisfaction. So a susceptibility, when it is dormant, must remain unfruitful, but when it is awakened by its adapted stimulus, it gives the enjoyment peculiar to it. But since all enjoyment is derived from a relation of some part of the human constitution to its object, in what, it will be asked, does the difference between different enjoyments, or, as already mentioned, between pleasure and happiness consist?

This inquiry has been anticipated, and is fundamental. The answer to it has already been indicated in the distinction that has been made between powers and susceptibilities. Man is capable of enjoyment in two very different ways; he is acted upon, and he acts, not simply because he is acted upon, but, his powers having been once awakened, by his own proper activity. Men and animals are constituted, irrespectively of any will or purpose of their own, with various susceptibilities, by which they are placed in relation to other things, and when these susceptibilities are awakened by their proper objects, *pleasure* is the result. The universe is full of this beautiful mechanism by which sensitive natures are accommodated to surrounding objects, and that kind of existence rendered desirable. In this point of view the works of God are a most pleasing subject of study. The mechanism of this kind in man—for man is in many respects as much a machine as a steam-engine—is very complex, and puts him in relation with a great variety of objects from which he is capable of receiving, or more properly, which may become to him the occasions of pleasure and pain. In this mechanism we include every thing that is instinctive and animal—all that part of the frame which acts impulsively, and does not involve the idea of self-consciousness, and self-government. What then is the kind of enjoyment thus received, and how far is man active in it? He who opens his eyes upon a landscape, or has a rose brought near him, receives a pleasure; but it

depends upon a constitution of himself and of external objects, entirely independent of his will, and not necessarily connected with any of his voluntary or moral affections. He may be active in opening his eyes, or in bringing the rose near; but the relation between the organ and the object being brought about, no matter by what means, he is then no further active than as he possesses the vitality and the susceptibility which must be the condition of any pleasure. Were a water-wheel capable of a mere pleasurable sensation when the water pours upon it, or a stone when shone upon by the sun, they would hold the same rank, would be the same kind of *thing*, as man considered as enjoying pleasures of this kind unconnected with any other. Superior and heightened pleasures of this kind, depending on an exquisite and durable structure of the sensitive apparatus, would constitute a Mohammedan paradise. These enjoyments are common to man and the brutes, in many of which they are doubtless his superiors. Some of them, however, as those of the eye and ear, are doubtless modified and increased by their connection with rational powers.

But besides these, man is capable of enjoyments of a very different kind. He is possessed of *powers*,—voluntary, rational, and moral,—by which he receives the ideas of the eternal, the infinite, the true, the beautiful, and the good; and it is in the voluntary exercise of these powers upon these great ideas, in their various relations and manifestations in the Creator, in himself, and his fellow-creatures, that he derives an enjoyment entirely distinct from that before mentioned and independent of it. It is from the voluntary exercise of these powers upon their appropriate objects, that we suppose *happiness* to result. On this theory happiness can result only from the exercise of mind, and though every man cannot command the means of pleasure, yet every man must be the artificer of his own happiness.

This is no more than was to have been expected. Every being, besides those appendages by which it is linked into, and forms a part of, the great chain of being, has its own proper nature peculiar to itself, and it is from this nature that its enjoyment, as such a being rather than another, must arise. The powers just mentioned are those in the possession and activity of which man takes his rank and possesses enjoyment *as man*. Nor is this distinction small. The gradations of nature are indeed minute, and the manner in which she causes the forms of being to blend into each other as she passes upward towards the summit of existence, is wonderful; but still she is occasionally obliged in her progress to make a stride, and pass over a gulf which she can never fill up. Such is the step taken in her passage from unorganized to organized matter; such is that from vegetable to animal existence; and such we believe that to have been by which she passed from brutes to man. In vain does she cause the sensitive plant to mimic animal contractility—it is still a plant. In vain does she endow the oyster with but feeble animal powers—it is still an animal. Equally in vain is it that she furnishes animals on the one hand, with instincts and adaptive powers—they are animals still; or on the other, that she grants to some men but the glimmerings of reason and conscience—they are still men. Some would perhaps say, that the great step was taken in passing, not from animals to men, but from men to superior powers. But we say, No. Man is made in the image of God, and therefore possesses, however feebly, the highest possible kind of powers. He is but "a little lower than the angels." Either, therefore, there is no essential distinction between an angel and a brute, or man must have powers in the activity of which he finds an enjoyment entirely distinct from that which is derived through his animal nature. The former of these we term happiness; the latter, pleasure; and this we think is the dif-

ference which mankind at large have in their minds when they use these terms distinctively.

We shall now adduce some considerations which go to confirm and elucidate this distinction. And here we may remark, that though the words pain and misery are sometimes used indiscriminately, yet there is a distinction generally felt and made between them, precisely corresponding with that contended for between pleasure and happiness. Pain has its seat in the sensitive apparatus, and results from the action upon it of objects unadapted to its nature; misery has its seat in the mind, and generally results from a voluntary and criminal misapplication of its powers. Accordingly, as there is no discrepancy in saying of a man, though in the enjoyment of pleasure, (and of how many may we say it,) that he is not happy, so there is none in saying of him, though in pain, that he is not miserable, or even that he is happy. In speaking of one who died recently, a man of some distinction, the writer says, that "though the sufferings of his body were so intense, yet his happiness during some of his last hours seemed indescribable. He could speak but a few words at a time, but was able to say, I have peace, I am happy." Such language is by no means uncommon; we all understand it, and it will be perceived that it involves precisely the distinction for which we contend, and without which it would be unintelligible.

We remark again, that happiness cannot consist in that which, being taken away, happiness still remains. We have then only to see how far we may go in taking away, not only Paley's constituents of happiness, but several others that might be mentioned, without destroying the thing itself. It will be found in this process, that we shall be obliged to stop precisely where the distinction just made would require it. Take the instance of the sick man just mentioned. He was happy, but his happiness did not consist in pleasure of any kind—he was in

pain; nor in the active pursuit of any thing, not even of heaven—the pursuit, the journey, the activity, the effort were over; nor in the social affections—they had done their office, he had done with them; but it did consist in the calm beholding of the prospect before him, in the intense action of his moral and rational nature on the eternal and satisfying objects on which his affections were fixed. The bodily sufferings of Dr. Payson in his long and final illness were intense, without affecting in the least the clearness and vigor of his mind. It was therefore no delusion, when he declared that he was then happier than at any previous period of his life. Here then we have an instance in which, with the exclusion of every thing else, in spite of pain, from the mere possession and activity of mind, happiness shone out, not only with unshorn beams, but with an augmented and purer light. But if we suppose the reason and moral powers destroyed, the eclipse is total, the idea of happiness is impossible. We must therefore conclude that a man on a sick and dying bed cannot be happy, or we must exclude from the essential idea of happiness every thing that cannot be found there. But this distinction is not exemplified in sickness and death alone, it runs through the whole of life. It is only in this, that we can find the secret of his happiness who suffers in any manner for the sake of principle—who is, it may be, imprisoned, or goes as a martyr to the stake; it is in this alone that we can find the philosophy of self-sacrifice, and the solution of the fact that the road of self-denial is so often the road to happiness.

But the different sources of pleasure and happiness are further indicated by some important differences between the things themselves. The first that we shall notice has been already alluded to, and it is, that that law of habit by which impressions become feebler as they are longer continued, applies only to pleasure. "It is," says Paley, "a law of the machine for which we know no remedy,

that the organs by which we receive pleasure are blunted and benumbed by being frequently exercised in the same way. There is hardly any one who has not found the difference between a gratification when new, and when familiar; or any *pleasure* which does not become indifferent as it grows habitual." Paley has here stated an important fact; but if there be nothing but pleasure, how wretched must be the condition of human life, which supplies no fountain to drink at, which will not soon be exhausted. To be well aware of this fact, however, is of the highest moment to those who are just setting out in life. With unworn susceptibilities, and a stranger to satiety, youth is strongly tempted to the pursuit of pleasure. Having entered upon it, it gradually compensates for diminished susceptibility by increase of stimulus, till premature decay is induced. By such a course, sooner or later, life must be drained to the dregs, and in its progress and consummation it is that we hear splenetic remarks about the world, and complaints against Providence, from men who have attempted to make of life what it was never intended to be. "To make pleasure and mirth and jollity our business," says Butler, "and be constantly hurrying about after some gay amusement, some new gratification of sense or appetite, to those who will consider the nature of man and our condition in this world, will appear the most romantic scheme of life that ever entered into thought." The fact above mentioned is the basis of those common figures which represent us as grasping at the rose but finding the thorn; or which picture the path of pleasure as at first alluring and strown with flowers, but after a time becoming sterile and dreary, and terminating at length in an obscure and frightful wilderness. The morning of life is the high noon of pleasure, and well is it, if, as that fickle orb declines, as decline it must, there shall arise a steadier and purer light to cheer, in life's later years, those eyes which must other-

wise "turn and turn and find no ray." And such a light may arise; for active habits of virtue, which are to happiness what the substance is to its shadow, are as much strengthened by repetition as the effect of passive impressions is diminished. This is the law of our frame, and a most beneficent one it is. Were it otherwise, virtue, as it becomes more habitual and perfect, would be less happy—were it otherwise, the whole framework of man's nature would have to be new modelled to prevent the high and pure joys of heaven from degenerating into mere insipidity. As it is, there is an analogy between our moral, our intellectual, and our physical frame. In all three, activity is both the sign and the source of strength, and moral strength is just so much perfection and so much happiness. In this important respect then, pleasure and happiness are entirely contrasted. The one is like a vessel full and sparkling at first, but gradually wasting away and becoming vapid; the other, like a fountain whose waters well up the more freely the more they overflow.

So far as man is concerned, there seems also to be a difference in the rank which pleasure and happiness respectively hold in the arrangements of nature. Pleasure is seldom, perhaps never, like happiness, made an ultimate end by her, but only an expedient by which to bring about her ends. It seems to be the inducement which she holds out to her creatures, to lead them to acts which are to have remote consequences of which the creatures themselves are often ignorant. Thus, the pleasure of eating is not the end proposed by nature in inducing us to eat; it is simply the leading-string, an agreeable one to be sure, by which she brings us to do that which is necessary for the strengthening of our bodies. It is, therefore, in perfect accordance with her design, that while the desire of that which is still future is strong, the remembrance of that which is past should be indistinct and little

worth. The pleasure has done its office. Hence the very different feelings with which we reflect upon different enjoyments. Happiness, on reflection, may not only become a source of satisfaction, but an object of moral approbation, and thus multiply and extend itself indefinitely; pleasure never can. It is, indeed, said by Paley in his Natural Theology, that "the Deity has superadded *pleasure* to animal sensations beyond what was necessary for any other purpose;" but the senses are the inlets of information, which is a necessary condition of happiness, and it may be doubted whether, under any other arrangement, we should ever have voluntarily exercised them so far as to attain the knowledge without which we could not be happy.

We shall mention but one difference more, and that is the permanence of happiness when compared with pleasure. This arises from the permanence of the objects and relations from which it is derived. As every thing without is variable, this can be found only in permanent being and its essential manifestations, voluntary, rational, and, to borrow a term from Mackintosh, which is very much needed, *emotive* or *pathematic*. The difference in question may perhaps be best illustrated by a reference to ideas and relations, which are the necessary product of the rational powers, and the basis of emotion. These are of two kinds. There are first, mathematical ideas and relations which the mind conceives of as necessary and unchangeable. The ideal existence of certain curves and angles would remain, if matter were annihilated, for they are independent of all matter and of all will, remaining under all circumstances immutably the same. Between these abstract conceptions and the actual constitution and laws of matter, there is a remarkable harmony which must have struck every thinking mind. How came this to be? How happens it that the facts of optics, or astronomy, for instance, can be demonstrated from their

conformity to these conceptions? for it is only by the harmony of the two, that mathematics can be the instrument of investigation in physics. The solution would seem to be, that these abstractions were the exemplar in the divine mind to which the constitution and movements of matter are conformed. The laws of natural philosophy and chemistry can most of them be expressed by the formulas of mathematics. But these are not the only permanent ideas and relations, nor is this the only harmony between things abstract and things real, that is revealed to man. As, from the suggestions made by the imperfect curves observed in nature, the mind forms to itself the idea of those that are perfect; so from the glimpses of beauty and excellence discerned in actual being, it forms, by its own proper force, the idea of a beauty and an excellence that are perfect; from the idea of time it passes at once to eternity—from that of space to infinity—from its own acts it gains the ideas of power and of liberty, and it rises to the conception of a principle of unity in all things. Involved in these ideas, and equally necessary, are those others which depend on relations, such as order, fitness, harmony and proportion. The ideal beauty and excellence which the mind can thus form to itself, it is capable of making an object of desire, and of attaining. This it is which renders man capable of self-improvement, "which is possible to any being only by a reflective observation of his own acts, and then by a comparison of them with an ideal excellence which he is capable of conceiving, and to which he is sensible he may conform." This idea of excellence is as complete and independent as any mathematical abstraction. It is conceived of as the law of man's being, as much as the ellipse is as the curve of the earth's revolution, and the mind bears the same relation to it, that the earth would to the ellipse were it an intelligent being capable of conforming itself to that curve by volition. Between

nature and the abstractions of mathematics there is a harmony preserved by forces impressed from without; between the pure ideas of excellence and beauty, and man, there is a harmony which is *to be* preserved by the conscious and voluntary exertion of a force originating from within. The earth has no conception of that ideal ellipse in which it is to move, nor any agency in conforming to it; man has a conception of the course of excellence he is to pursue and is voluntary in pursuing it. It would seem, therefore, that what nature is to the abstractions of mathematics, man is to the abstract conceptions of moral beauty and excellence. The mathematician is assured that he can return to the contemplation of his verities whenever he pleases, and that nothing but the destruction of his own powers can destroy his relation to them as objects of contemplation and sources of enjoyment. This is what we mean by a permanent source of happiness. But the great ideas above mentioned are equally independent, and far more intimate to the mind of man, being wrought into it as the name of Phidias was into the statue, so that in order to blot them out, the mind must be destroyed. It will be observed, too, that these ideas and relations are not viewed by man with the mere intellectual satisfaction with which he contemplates those of mathematics; they create an enthusiasm, a vivid sense of delight peculiar to themselves, and it is in viewing them that the mind seems to respire as in its native element. "There are," says Butler, "certain ideas which we express by the words, order, harmony, proportion, beauty, the furthest removed from any thing sensual. Now, what is there in those intellectual images, forms, or ideas, which begets that approbation, love, delight, and even rapture, which is seen in some persons' faces upon having those objects present to their minds?" It is the distinction of man, that he is capable of forming these great ideas and of putting himself and his acts in harmony with them.

Nor is this removing happiness into a region remote from human life, since there is no voluntary act to which this excellence and conformity may not belong. There may be, as Coleridge says, "a contraction of universal truths into particular duties, as the image of the sun may be defined in a dew-drop; and it is only in this way that these truths can attain life and reality." What are all the forms of beauty, but reflections of one central idea? And what are the graceful and heroic acts of duty which ennoble life, but varied expressions of the one idea of duty?

What is said above is true while we remain in the region of abstraction; but when we consider these ideas as being what they really are, as bearing the same relation to mind, as its primary qualities do to matter, as constituents of it, or rather forms of its manifestation, and as existing perfectly in God, to whom by communion in them we are related, then it is that we pass from philosophy to religion, from the region of abstraction to that of reality, to that of the affections, of obedience and love; to a pure and permanent happiness. It is at this point that duty and happiness, liberty and necessity, coalesce—the highest duty with the most perfect happiness; the most perfect liberty in pursuing our duty with the most binding necessity, and the only necessity known in morals, that by which we are obliged to conform to the laws of our moral being. There was a period in the history of man in which this conformity existed, and then he was happy; and it is only by a return of this conformity that happiness can return. How entirely all this is contrasted with pleasure as defined above, shifting, transitory and uncertain as it is, we need not say.

What we say then, is, that there is a real difference in kind between the enjoyments of man, based on the distinction between powers and susceptibilities; that in the one kind he is active, for in reference to powers there is no passivity, and can be none; and in the other passive;

that the one produces satiety, and is subject to that law of habits by which it constantly diminishes, while the other produces no satiety, and by the opposite law may constantly increase; that the one is made an ultimate end by nature, and is connected with moral approbation, the other is not; that the one depends upon objects and relations that are permanent, the other does not. It is not pretended, that in a being like man, it is always easy to mark the precise limit between the two, more than it is in other cases in which there is an imperceptible blending of two things, as of light and darkness, which are yet entirely distinct. It is only the broad facts for which we contend, and these seem to us to be of great practical moment.

Do we then, in making this distinction, suppose that pleasure is not a good? Far from it. We suppose pleasure and happiness to be, not indeed equal elements, but equally elements of human *well-being*. We simply say that pleasure is a very inferior element of human good, which must be subordinated and give way whenever it would conflict with happiness; that if we neglect it entirely in our calculations, it will come unbidden; but that if, as men too generally do, we make it our end, we shall certainly be disappointed. Were we to form an idea of the perfect well-being of man, in whom the animal and spiritual nature are united, it would result from a condition in which the susceptibilities should meet only with objects that would give them pleasure, and in which the powers, intellectual and moral, should find their appropriate objects, and act in perfect conformity with their laws—in which there should be a union in the highest compatible degree, of pleasure and happiness.

These remarks are perhaps sufficiently extended, but we cannot close without a brief inquiry respecting the conditions on which this complex good may be attained.

It has already been said that the only condition on which enjoyment of any kind can be conceived of, is the action of some power upon its appropriate object, or of some susceptibility from its adapted stimulus. There can be no enjoyment that is not perceived, nor any perception without activity, which is, therefore, involved in the very idea of enjoyment. There is, we know, a notion of enjoyment as resulting from quiescence; from repose; this, however, is not from an absolute, but from a relative inactivity. Absolute inactivity is death. There is, in many people, an inertness and sluggishness, which they seem to enjoy; their minds, like the kaleidoscope, present at every turn, the forms which chance may happen to turn up; and there is in their happiness, if such it may be called, as little intelligence and dignity as can belong to beings constituted as they are. Their bark, intrusted to themselves, is afloat upon the waters; but, heedless of the stranded vessels and bleaching bones of those who have preceded, they suffer it to drift on as it lists, when they ought to watch the compass and ply the oar. In this dreamy listlessness, there is something which acts on many minds like infatuation, and it is the "enchanted ground" on which they fall asleep in their pilgrimage through this world. But the proper enjoyment of man is essentially intelligent and active, and we cannot too well remember that the great condition of all strong and well-defined enjoyment, is *vigorous and intelligent activity*. There is, indeed, a legitimate enjoyment in repose after activity, but it is one accorded to the weakness of our nature. A perfect being needs no repose.

But as all activity is not productive of enjoyment, the practical inquiry is, how it should be directed. This leads us to a consideration of the harmony there is between man and the universe, or at least, that part of it in relation to which he is called to act. It is in this harmony that we shall find the principle, the measure, and

the end of the laws of nature as acting upon man. Whether man shall conform to these laws, is at his own option; but it is not at his option whether he shall be under them; he is so from the very constitution of things. The liberty of nature, like that of our country, is the liberty of order and of law; and no more in one than in the other, can any wrong-headed person do what he pleases without punishment.

Of these laws, there are three kinds with which man is chiefly concerned, viz: physical laws, organic laws, and the moral law. To the first of these he is related as corporeal, as mere matter; to the second, as a living, organized frame; and to the third, as a rational and accountable being.

In our remarks upon these laws, and the relation of man to them, especially the first two, we shall avail ourselves of the views of Dr. Combe, the phrenologist, in his work "On the Constitution of Man." Between these views and phrenology, there is no necessary connection, more than there is between chemistry and alchemy; but the phrenologists, though they seem to have been suggested by Butler, were the first fully to expand and insist upon them. Had those writers confined themselves to them, or at least given them separately, these views would doubtless have been more widely extended, and less frequently doled out surreptitiously by anonymous writers. They respect what are termed the natural laws, and of their soundness we have no doubt.

"In attending to the natural laws," says Dr. Combe, "several important principles strike us very early, viz. 1. Their independence of each other; 2. Obedience to each of them is attended with its own reward, and disobedience with its own punishment; 3. They are universal, unbending, and invariable in their operations; 4. They are in harmony with the constitution of man."

The following passage will be sufficient to illustrate the

independence, distinct rewards, and unbending operation of these laws. "A ship floats, because a part of it, being immersed, displaces a weight of water equal to its whole weight, leaving the remaining part above the fluid. A ship therefore will float on the surface of the water as long as these physical conditions are observed, though the men in it shall infringe other natural laws; as, for example, although they should rob, murder, blaspheme, and commit every species of debauchery; and it will sink whenever the physical conditions are subverted, however strictly the crew and other passengers may obey the other laws here adverted to. In like manner, a man who swallows poison which destroys the stomach and intestines, will die, just because an organic law has been infringed, and because it is independent of others, although he should have taken the drug by mistake, or been the most pious and charitable individual on earth. Or, thirdly, a man may cheat, lie, steal, tyrannize, and in short, break a great variety of the moral laws, and nevertheless be fat and rubicund, if he sedulously observe the organic laws of temperance and exercise, which determine the condition of the body; while on the other hand, an individual who neglects these, may pine in disease, and be racked by torturing pains, although, at the very moment, he may be devoting his mind to the highest duties of humanity."

The harmony of these laws with the constitution of man may be illustrated by a reference to that of gravitation. "To place man in harmony with this, the Creator has bestowed on him bones, muscles, and nerves, constructed on the most perfect principles of mechanism, which enable him to preserve his equilibrium, and to adapt his movements to its influence; and also intellectual faculties calculated to perceive the existence of the law, its modes of operation, the relation between it and himself, the beneficial consequences of observing this relation, and the painful consequences of infringing it. When a

person falls from a house and is maimed or killed; when a ship springs a leak and sinks; or when a reservoir pond breaks down its banks and ravages a valley, we ought to trace the evil back to its cause, which will uniformly resolve itself into the infringement of a natural law, and then endeavor to discover whether this could or could not have been prevented, by a due exercise of the physical and mental powers bestowed on man. By pursuing this course, we shall arrive at sound conclusions concerning the adaptation of the human mind and body to the physical laws of the universe. The more minutely any one inquires, the more firm will be his conviction, that in these relations admirable provision is made by the Creator for human happiness, and that the evils which arise from the neglect of them, are attributable, to a great extent, to man's not applying his powers to the promotion of his own enjoyment."

The law of gravitation applies to man as a physical being; but he is also an organized being. The primary requisite to his well-being as such, is, that his constitution should be originally sound and complete in all its parts. With this condition, "the first organic law is, that the organized being, the moment it is ushered into life, and so long as it continues to live, must be supplied with food, light, air, and other physical aliment necessary for its support, in due quantity, and of the kind best suited to its particular constitution. Obedience to this law is rewarded with a vigorous and healthy development of its powers, and, in animals, with a pleasing consciousness of existence, and aptitude for the performance of the natural functions; disobedience to it is punished with feebleness, stinted growth, general imperfection, and death. A second organic law, applicable to man, is, that he shall duly exercise his organs, this condition being an indispensable requisite to health. The reward of obedience to this law, is enjoyment in the very act of exercising the functions,

pleasing consciousness of existence, and the acquisition of numberless gratifications, of which labor, or the exercise of our powers, is the procuring means: the penalty of neglecting this law, is debility, bodily and mental, lassitude, imperfect digestion, disturbed sleep, bad health, and if carried to a certain extent, death. The penalty for over-exerting the system, is exhaustion, mental incapacity, the desire of strong artificial stimulants, general insensibility, and grossness of feeling and perception, with disease and shortened life. Society has not recognized this law, and in consequence, the higher orders despise labor, and suffer the first penalty; while the lower orders are oppressed with toil, and undergo the second. The penalties serve to provide motives for obedience to the law, and whenever it is recognized, and the consequences discovered to be inevitable, men will no longer shun labor as painful and ignominious, but resort to it as a source of pleasure, as well as to avoid the pains inflicted on those who neglect it."

To these laws as bearing on man, we attach great importance. It must not be supposed, because we place happiness where we do, that we wish to disregard or to underrate the body and its faculties. So far are we from this, that we are satisfied it is not enough attended to; that men do not consider themselves under the laws of God in regard to its management; and that it is impossible for the reason and moral powers to have their proper action, when any of the laws relating to it are habitually disobeyed. Take the instance of intemperance, in which men bring upon themselves destruction, by the violation of an organic law, and see how soon, when this is abandoned, a moral reformation often follows. A few years since many good men, in their ignorance, drank ardent spirits, which are not adapted to the organization of man; and now that they have abandoned it, they can feel that they have risen in their intellectual and moral strength. But this is

not the only habit that may sit, like an incubus, upon a man. The time will come, when men will look back upon habits of indolence, and intemperance in eating, with the same kind, if not with the same degree of feeling, as now upon intemperance in ardent spirits. Men need enlightening on this subject, and we should not think it below the dignity of the pulpit to enforce the observance of these laws of God also, not simply on their own account, but from their connection with the moral law. For the same reason that preaching can have no effect upon a drunkard, it will have less than it would otherwise upon him who violates any other organic law, and thus dwarfs his energies as a man.

The more the physical and organic laws are scrutinized, the more they will be found for the benefit of man, when their requisitions are complied with. And as man has faculties by which he can discover and obey them, the evils which take place under them, evils which comprise a vast deal of the suffering in this world, are to be imputed to his own fault, to his ignorance and folly, and not to an inscrutable Providence. Let us reverence Providence, but let us not charge it foolishly. Most, if not all the diseases that are not hereditary, and these originally, spring from vice, from some violation of the physical, organic, or moral laws, in the way of excess or defect. There can be no doubt but a healthy child may, as men have done, pass, in obedience to the organic laws, his whole life without pain, and die only from natural decay, as a clock stops when the weights are down. Providence is kind to man; the whole progress of science shows that nature is a friend to man; but then this kindness consists in maintaining sternly those beneficial laws by which man may regulate himself, and not in accommodating them to his individual ignorance or caprice. Suppose, for instance, a delicate young lady, after having been in a crowded assembly, to expose herself in a thin dress to

the damp cold air, and the consequence to be consumption and death. Both she and her friends may resign themselves to the will of Providence; but Providence had no more to do with it, than with an act of suicide. An organic law was violated in one case as well as in the other, though with less guilt, and the penalty was paid.

This view of these laws, and especially of their independence, accounts for much of the apparent confusion which we observe in the distribution of happiness, and shows that suffering generally falls where it ought. A man who does not obey the organic laws, must and ought to suffer the consequent evil, whatever his moral character may be. Infractions of these laws are commonly called imprudences, and not guilt; and we may also see the reason why the former are often punished apparently with more severity than the latter. The whole penalty of a physical or organic law is often exacted at once, the reckoning of guilt is reserved till a future day.

In reference to these laws, man is strictly under probation. He can obey or not, as he pleases; but then the consequences are his own. They all admit of more or less violation, not without punishment, but without that which is final; but when transgressed to a certain point, there is no room for repentance, and the system on which they bear is destroyed without remedy. When this point is reached, nature knows no pity, and her hand never falters. Severe in her goodness, she will sacrifice a whole race, sooner than swerve in the least from her laws. Facts like these, constantly written as by an invisible hand, on the scroll of nature and of providence, constitute characters, which vice, if it were not besotted, would read and tremble; for it cannot be supposed, if God is so exact and fearful in his reckoning under these minor laws, that he will stay his hand when called upon to sustain the more imposing and awful sanctions of the moral law.

We have already referred to this law, and it will not be necessary now to spend much time upon it. It is superior to the others and supreme. Other laws act upon us from without, but this is the internal law of our being, the law of man as man. He may infringe other laws as an animal, and be punished as an animal, but the transgression of this law is *guilt*, it is sin, and, without some remedial process, is moral suicide and death; for it is, if possible, even more unbending than the others. "Heaven and earth shall pass away, but not one jot or tittle of the law shall fail." It is for man as having transgressed this law, that heaven has been moved; it is over him as restored to the acknowledgment of its supremacy, that angels rejoice. Its penalties and rewards, as bearing upon us, are immediate and ultimate. The immediate penalty is, the loss of a good conscience, the consciousness of not deserving the esteem and affection of others, disorder of the faculties, the tyranny of the passions, the pains of remorse, and fearful forebodings for the future; the immediate reward is, a good conscience, a consciousness of deserving the esteem and affections of others, inward peace consisting in the activity of well-balanced powers, a sense of present security, and a cheerful assurance of good for the future. The remote penalty, to say nothing of positive infliction, consists in the complete and final disorder and warfare of the powers, in a condition in which restoration shall be hopeless, thus constituting an undying death; the ultimate reward, and that to which every good man hopes to come, consists in a restoration to perfect obedience, in an identification of the principle of the law with the will, consequently of desire with volition, and in the full and harmonious activity of all the powers without weariness and without apprehension.

But whatever may be the rewards and penalties of the moral law, it is not more certain that the physical and organic well-being of man depend on his observance of

the physical and organic laws, than it is that his moral well-being depends on his obedience to the moral law.

We are now prepared, from the comparison which has been made between the powers and susceptibilities of man, and from the relations which he has been shown to sustain to the various laws under which he is, not to give a definition of human well-being, as distinguished from happiness, but to say that it results, and must result, from the activity of the powers and susceptibilities of man, in harmony with each other and with the laws of God.

We have then, the three terms, pleasure, happiness, and well-being, expressive of the good which may belong to man. From this whole discussion, it will appear that the Epicurean solution of the question respecting the *summum bonum*, which made it consist in pleasure, involved a partial truth, involved one of the elements of that good; that the solution of the Stoics, which made it consist in conformity to the moral law, without regard to pleasure or pain, also involved a partial truth, involved another element of that good; and that the true solution lies in the harmony of the two. Still these two sects were not equally right, since the elements which they severally adapted are by no means equal. Virtue is not the only good, but it is the supreme good of man, and whenever a desire for pleasure would obstruct the fulfilment of the moral law, which alone is virtue and happiness, it must be repressed. It is very much from the fact that many pleasures are incompatible with virtue, that this world is a place of probation. On the one hand pleasure solicits, on the other duty commands, and a struggle ensues. But from the comparison made between the powers of man and the laws under which he acts, it is evident that conformity to the proper law of his being, to the moral law, must be his supreme good; that with this conformity, pleasure may come in as an inferior element of well-being, but that without it, happiness is impossible.

Thus, to those who will consider, it is very obvious what our position is in this world, what are the destinies with which we are intrusted, and how we are intrusted with them. We are a part, a very small part to be sure, but still a part, of that stupendous universe which has emerged to our view out of the eternity that is past, and is sweeping on with unexhausted energies to that which is to come. With the majestic and unswerving laws by which the whole is moved, we are in relation; with us, therefore, it rests, whether we shall, by opposing ourselves to their resistless course, be whelmed and swept to ruin, or whether, in the recognition of their legitimacy and wisdom, and in voluntary co-operation with them, we shall throw ourselves upon the tide, and be borne onward and upward in *well-being* forever.

ON ORIGINALITY.

Originality is so much an object of desire, and a means of influence, that some inquiry respecting its nature may not be uninteresting. It may belong, either to the thought as expressed in conversation and in writing, or to the character as expressed by action; and in accordance with this division of the subject I propose to make some remarks on originality in composition and in character. There may, I know, be an originality in mere style; but as it is the thought which is the essential part of a composition, I shall confine myself to that.

That our ideas on this subject may be distinct, it will be necessary to separate from the true idea of originality, some things with which we may be liable to confound it. Originality must be distinguished from independence of thought. This has reference solely to the aid which we receive from others. In some respects all men are constituted alike, are subjected to common influences, and come, without reference to others, to the same results. In such cases there is independence, but it would not be designated as originality of thought. Original thought, then, though it must of course be independent, must also differ from the track of thought into which men ordinarily fall.

But it is not every divergency from the common track that can be dignified as originality; and hence, we must also distinguish between that and singularity. This

arises from a peculiar structure or habit of mind, which isolates the individual from his race, instead of uniting him to it, and causes his processes of thought to be looked upon as matter of surprise and amusement, rather than of admiration and approbation. Such a structure or habit can never be a means of influence. Much more must originality differ from all absurdity and extravagance. When a thought, if indeed it deserves the name, involves a contradiction, we call it absurd; when it departs greatly from nature and truth, we call it extravagant. An original thought, then, must be not only independent and peculiar, but it must also be natural, else there is no distinction between originality, and extravagance, or insanity. Whatever may be thought of this definition of terms, it is clear that it is in this sense alone that originality can be an element of *power*, and it is as such only that I wish to consider it. As original thought accords with the constitution of things and the processes of nature, which are always simple and beautiful, it has, in general, another attribute, that of simplicity, and hence, though so few would have discovered them, yet when its results are once seen, they appear simple, and obvious, and beautiful. Hence too it is that such thoughts not only furnish an evidence of the progress of an individual mind, but that they apply themselves to the mass of human intellect, and quicken it, and become the means of exciting and guiding others to the attainment of intellectual wealth and intellectual power. He who can furnish such means, is evidently a benefactor of his species.

If, as it is often supposed, such thoughts are inspired into the mind by a mysterious power called genius, then no aid can be given in their acquisition; but if they lie only in certain regions, and are in any measure subject to the same laws as other thoughts, then such aid may be given. To ascertain how far this is the case, I shall inquire whether man can be original at all in the sense of

originating any thing; or, as it has been said that an original thought must also be natural, in what sense a thought that is natural is also original.

In the material world we know that man can originate nothing. He can modify, but cannot create; and it is only by changing the form and position of materials supplied to his hands, that the world of nature has been transformed into the world of industry and of art. Equally obvious is it that he does not originate those thoughts and impressions which come to him from without, through the medium of the senses. If I think of a tree, it is a natural thought, but not original with me. The original conception of the tree was with its Maker. I found it standing before me, and received the impression from it, which was an embodied conception already existing. So of all things which can be *imagined*, that is, of which we can form an image. It will be found that we can form an image of nothing which we have not seen. We may indeed imagine a winged horse: but here is no original conception; it is but the joining together of two previously furnished. We can enlarge, or diminish, or variously combine the forms that lie in fantasy, but we cannot create them.

Of course, in the imitative arts, (in which human genius finds some of its highest walks,) the object being to embody and reproduce conceptions thus furnished from nature, there can be no originality in the sense now spoken of. In painting and sculpture, the object is, either to imitate particular objects and scenes from nature, or, as in works of imagination, to unite elements, which, though they exist separately in nature, have never been seen combined. In making this combination, however, as all our associations and modes of thought are formed in accordance with the order of nature, it is necessary to make her the model still, and to represent every thing in conformity with her mode of operation. "If," says Horace,

"a painter should unite to a human head the neck of a horse, and should clothe the limbs, taken some from one animal and some from another, with many colored feathers, and cause that which above was a beautiful woman, to terminate in the tail of a fish, would you be able, my friends, if you should be admitted to see it, to restrain your laughter?" The fundamental idea on which nature proceeds is absolutely perfect, though it seldom happens that we see that idea fully expressed in any individual specimen of her works. It is this idea that must inspire and guide the artist, and any intentional deviation from it, like those just mentioned, so far from being thought original, is not to be endured. In general, a painting is said to be original when the artist conforms to nature, whether with or without a model immediately before him; and the pleasure derived from his work, though in part attributable to our surprise at the disparity between the materials used in imitating and the object imitated, is yet proportioned to the faithfulness with which he represents his great archetype.

This, as was perhaps to be expected, is true in the imitative arts; a brief reference to different species of composition will show whether it be equally true when arbitrary signs are used for the expression of our ideas.

In mere narrative, it is obvious that there can be no ground for originality in the sense of originating any thing. All that can be done is, to ascertain and arrange facts, which may require attention, research, judgment, but not originality. The remarks, the reflections, the theories of the historian, whether nature or man be his subject, are departures from simple narrative, and must be referred to another head.

To descriptive writing the epithet *original* may be applied, but only as it can be applied to painting, to which, indeed, this kind of writing bears a striking analogy. In pure description, the purpose is to give an exact impression

of the object as it is, without reference to any thing else. Those who do this may be called the Dutch school in description. Sparing in the use of figurative language, they give us plain, it may be homely pictures, but withal so distinct and natural that we seem to see them. Take for instance the following lines from Crabbe, who was a master in this way.

> "Grave Jonas Kindred, Sybil Kindred's sire,
> Was six feet high, and looked six inches higher;
> Erect, morose, determined, solemn, slow,
> Who knew the man could never cease to know;
> His faithful spouse, when Jonas was not by,
> Had a firm presence, and a steady eye;
> But with her husband, dropp'd her look and tone,
> And Jonas ruled, unquestioned and alone."

In general, however, a style is adopted which allows the fancy more play. Life is attributed to inanimate objects, and the principal figures are embellished and illustrated by others analogous to them. Thus, in Bryant's splendid description of our autumnal scenery, he says,

> "The mountains that infold
> In their wide sweep the colored landscape round,
> Seem groups of giant kings, in purple and gold,
> That guard the enchanted ground."

But whichever style is adopted, it is obvious that he only is original, who, instead of talking by rote about nightingales and purling streams, observes nature for himself, and by his choice selection of circumstances, and his power of language, conveys his impressions vividly to others. He who can do this, need not resort to foreign scenery, or to that which is wild and anomalous, in which nature herself is, as it were, original. He can delight us by associating the harmony of numbers with those scenes which are the sources of our simplest and purest pleasures. Instead of the nightingale, or rather *Philomela*, the gen-

uine New England poet* introduces into the description of a summer evening twilight, unpoetical as is its name, the lonely snipe:

> "O'er marshy fields high in the dusky air
> Invisible, but with faint tremulous tones
> Hovering or playing o'er the listener's head:"

or the whippoorwill, that

> "Haply on the step
> Of unfrequented door lighting unseen,
> Breaks into strains articulate and clear,
> The closing sometimes quickened as in sport:"

and who does not feel the freshness and originality of the picture? What has been said of external nature, is equally true of descriptions of character. There is room for judgment and selection in the points described, but those points must be given as they are.

It is under the heads of narrative and descriptive writing, that I include all works on physical science. This is merely a knowledge of facts that are permanent as the arrangements of nature. The science of Astronomy, for instance, is a knowledge of certain facts which take place according to fixed laws; the science of Anatomy is the knowledge of certain arrangements in the organization of men and animals to which nature invariably adheres. The only difference then between historical facts and those of physical science is, that the former take place but once, and do not follow each other by an invariable law, while the latter continue the same from age to age. A knowledge of the one makes the natural philosopher an unerring prophet of the future, because the future is but a repetition of the past; a knowledge of the other, because the future is developed from the past, best enables the statesman to discern those shadows which coming events cast before, and to know when, and where, and how, to affect

* Wilcox.

by a wise agency the destiny of nations. But in either case, there must be a knowledge of actual events and relations, which he who writes may indeed have ascertained, but did not originate.

For the purposes of this discussion, I class under narrative and descriptive writing, not only Physics, but the science that is over against it, Metaphysics, since this is a science of facts and observation as much as any other. It is true, observation being here more difficult, that the pursuit of this science has given rise to many idle speculations, that is, suppositions of facts and relations that did not exist; but all these were only so much error, and not originality. Originality supposes power, but in all these cases in which there is a departure from truth and nature, it is from the want, and not from the possession of power.

In treating of whatever *is*, then, there can be no room for originality in the sense of originating any thing. In this sense, the Creator is the only original, and the things that *are*, stand forth as so many symbols of his ideas, which may, from them, be transferred into our own minds. Thus it is that the heavens and the earth, are, according to the beautiful idea of the ancients, an allegorical representation, under the external form of which are couched ideas which the wise only can read; or may we not rather say that they are one great transparency, through which the lines of wisdom, and the forms of beauty, and sublimity, and love, not seen at all or dimly seen by the unobservant many, come out in living light to the eye that dwells long upon them. In all these cases the types are set in nature, and he is the greatest original who can take the truest copy.

We now pass to fictitious writing, in which the characters and events are supposed to be entirely the product of the author's mind, and which, it may be said, is the great field of originality. Let us take, for instance, the character of Hamlet by Shakspeare. If we suppose that no

such character ever existed, then, it will be said, it was the work of the poet's mind, and therefore original. The inquiry is, in what sense this is true. There are certain original and common qualities that belong to man universally. In different characters these are differently blended, are differently modified by external circumstances, and produce, though within certain limits, a wonderful variety of outward manifestation. Any character formed of these materials, and confined within these limits, we esteem natural. In forming his characters then from these original materials, the poet or novelist may weave the thread and shape the pattern a little after his own fancy; but the warp and the woof must be furnished by nature. Nor, when he indulges fancy, may he, more than the historical painter, do it in departing from nature, but in following her. The great excellence of this character by Shakspeare, is, that he has blended no contradictory qualities, that he has combined them after the manner of nature, and having formed his character, has made him act as nature would have done. Of all fictitious characters, it is the especial requisite that they should be natural; and it is only because the events and characters of fictitious writing are not so varied and natural as those of real life, that fiction is less instructive than history. The immortality of Shakspeare's works depends on the fact that he has transferred to his pages the true features of humanity, not as they exist under a single modification of society, but as they exist in nature. It is from an observation of what the nature of man requires, that the rules, for it has its rules, of this species of writing are formed. For the necessity of attention to these, I presume Bulwer will be thought sufficient authority. "It is," says he, "to a critical study of the rules of fiction, that I owe every success in literature that I have obtained, and in the mere art of composition"—I beg leave to finish the sentence, for some students seem to think this also comes by inspira-

tion—"in the mere art of composition, if I now have attained to even too rapid a facility in expressing my thoughts, it has been purchased by a most laborious slowness in the first commencement, and resolute refusal to write a second sentence until I had expressed my meaning in the best manner I could in the first." In all these cases it is clear that nature is the great original, the great model, the great standard to which every thing is to be referred.

But one more species of writing will be noticed, and that consists of observations, reflections, and moral maxims. When Swift said he was too proud to be vain, the remark was thought original, and yet it arose only from a nicer observation than is common of the real relations of pride and vanity. So, when the proverb says, that "The sure way of being deceived is to think ourselves more cunning than the rest of the world," what is it but an induction of a general truth from an observation of what happens in a multitude of instances? All remarks of this kind derive their originality from careful observation alone.

In the important departments of writing, then, which we have now considered, we conclude that man cannot be original in the sense of originating any thing. His thoughts do not come at the immediate and arbitrary bidding of his will, but by the intervention of a law which puts their sequence beyond his direct control. The characters are drawn, and he must decipher them; the relations are established, and he must observe them; the book is written, and if he would read it, he must follow its lines and its order, or confusion and nonsense will be the result. It is only to her diligent student, that nature lifts the veil and discloses new traits. He only can give us impressions of beauty and sublimity, who has observed them where they dwell in her visible forms; he only can touch us with a sense of what is magnanimous and tender

in character, who has the sensibility to feel and the discrimination to mark their development. It is obvious, therefore, that the keenest and most comprehensive observer of nature will be the greatest original; and that what is called genius, is but a quick observation of nature, and a ready power of combining the materials which she has furnished.

There is indeed a sense in which all thought is equally mysterious and original. It is all equally the product of the power of thought, upon which no investigation can cast any light. This is spontaneous and inscrutable; but one thought does not, more than another, arise spontaneously—its outward circles are impelled by those within, till we come to its point of departure in the first mysterious wakings of consciousness in the soul. Original thought, as much as any other, is connected with that which preceded it, and is subject to the laws of association.

Obvious as these remarks may appear, it is from a want of attention to them that much thought has been wasted. Instead of flowing on to swell the mass of available knowledge, it has been turned aside, and absorbed in the regions of barren speculation.

It will not be inferred from what has been said, that every man can have the power of original thought. That is not my opinion. I believe in constitutional differences of mind, as well as of body. But many who might be original thinkers, fail of being so from a misdirection of their powers. It may require more vigor than all possess to ascend the steep when the way is known, for in this path no man can be carried; but the fleetest step will not reach the summit unless the right path be pursued.

But, it will be asked—for the impression is very common—if these remarks are correct, how it happens that so many great discoveries and inventions are made by accident. To discuss this subject fully, it would be neces-

sary to make a distinction between invention and discovery; but the general principles on which the mind proceeds in both are so nearly the same that we need not be detained with it. I answer the inquiry generally, by denying the fact. If great discoveries are made by accident, mankind are entirely at fault in considering those who make them, great men. The slave who finds the largest diamond in the mines of Brazil, would as much be entitled to veneration, as he who makes a new invention, or unfolds a general principle. Man is not original in observing what *is*, unless he *suspected* its existence. It is because Columbus, if I may so express it, so far entered into the views of God in the construction of the earth as to suspect the existence of this continent, and set himself at the risk of his character and fortune to seek for it, that we look upon him in a light so different from that in which we should have viewed him had he been driven involuntarily upon these shores. The history of these discoveries will show us, that they are made only on those subjects in regard to which the human mind is so excited as to know what it wants, or at least, as to know that it wants something, and to question nature on the general subject. It requires some knowledge upon a subject to be able to put pertinent questions respecting it; and he who knows how to question nature wisely, is a great man. We may also observe that these discoveries, accidental as they might appear at the moment, have been made by those individual minds which have been the most highly excited, and have put questions with the greatest energy and perseverance. It was to the mind of *Galileo*, that the swinging of a lamp in a cathedral suggested the idea of the pendulum. It was to the mind of *Galvani*, long conversant with inquiries upon electricity, that the muscular contractions upon the leg of a frog suggested the idea of galvanism. It was to the mind of *Harvey*, that the valves in the veins gave the hint of the

circulation of the blood. It was to *Newton*, that the fall of an apple suggested gravitation; and to one whose experience of the uniformity of nature was less than his, who had not practically learned that the prophetic power which the suggestions of analogy give is based on experience, the refraction of light by the diamond had not suggested its combustibility. It was to *Davy*, who knew the laws of caloric, that the idea of the safety-lamp occurred. It was to *Franklin*, that the phenomena of terrestrial electricity suggested the identity of heat with the lightning that plays in the heavens. If these discoveries were accidents, we may say of them, as the French say of certain hits in the game of billiards, that they happen only to those who play well. We may remark further, that discoveries are seldom much in advance of the age, and that it often happens that they are made almost simultaneously and independently in different countries.

What I have now said of scientific discovery, is equally applicable to those suggestions of resemblance and analogy which form the characteristic and charm of works of genius in the lighter departments of literature. Those correspondences between the material and mental world which flash upon us in the writings of some men, are not seen by intuition. The mind must put itself in relation to them through the laws of association first, as, in intentional memory, it puts itself in the relation to that which it wishes to find. Indeed, between these two cases, with one of which at least all are familiar, there seems to be a striking analogy. Who has not sought again and again to recollect a name, for instance, and seemed upon the point of catching it, till he finally gave it up in despair, when, after a time, it would come without effort? But in this case, however inscrutable may be the connection between the occurrence of the name and the previous effort, there can be no doubt that it exists.

I am aware that thoughts, sometimes in our waking

hours, but perhaps more frequently in dreams, come into the mind as if by inspiration, seeming to have no connection with any thing previously known. If this be the fact, it is obvious that the modes and laws of such thoughts must forever baffle human scrutiny. If indeed any choose to suppose that there is an anomalous department of the mind, into which thoughts are let down from the sphere of intellect above us, or into which they float and alight at random, the belief may be harmless; but it can be the basis of no rational effort, and may lead us to neglect the formation of those habits of association, by which we may calculate almost with certainty on the occurrence of fresh imagery in the region of imagination, and of new and striking views in those departments of nature or of art to which we may turn our attention.

Were man a purely intellectual being, originality of thought, as now defined and illustrated, would be identical with originality of character. But thought is expressed by writing and by conversation; *action* is the index of character; and originality in one of these departments is not necessarily associated with it in the other. There have been original writers who have had an extensive influence without reference to their characters, and there have been others who by their actions alone have had an influence perhaps equally extensive. In the former class we may rank Bacon, whose works are stamped with an intellectual power that must give them authority irrespective of the question whether he was, or was not, not only the wisest and greatest, but the meanest of mankind. It was, on the other hand, the *actions* of Washington that exerted a controlling influence on the destiny of this nation, and perhaps turned the balance in favor of the ultimate triumph of liberal principles throughout the world. The attestation which is given to the value of a great principle by action, and especially by suffering, is more

striking and impressive than any other. Hence persecution, if it be manfully endured, causes sects to flourish; hence the blood of the martyrs has been the seed of the church. But it is only on great occasions, and especially in the great crises of human affairs, that the actions of an individual can have any relation to the mass of mankind; and hence, though the influence of character be more vivid and intense, it seldom happens that it can be so widely diffused as that of the writings of a man of genius.

Still, the disjunction of thought and of action is always deplorable, since intelligence was given for the purpose of guiding action, and since, though exalted intelligence may command our admiration, it cannot of itself secure our respect, or exert a salutary influence over the whole man. He only has our entire respect, who walks over the length and breadth, and around the outermost circle, of the field which a knowledge of duty surveys. We may also remark, that the character of each individual must exert some influence, whereas but few can become the instructors of the world. Character then, so far as it can be separated from intellect, is the more important, and so far as originality of character is desirable, it is important that its elements and conditions should be well understood. These elements and conditions it will be easy to ascertain by a reference to the principles already laid down, for originality of character bears the same relation to ordinary character, that originality of thought does to ordinary thought. It is constituted by a course of action at once differing from that ordinarily pursued, and at the same time conformed to those principles of taste, of rectitude, or of benevolence, with which the permanent well-being of man is connected. It is its germination from these principles, which alone can legitimate and ennoble singularity, which can remove it equally from affectation and from pride, and cause the line of human conduct, instead

of running athwart the intentions and providence of God, to harmonize with them.

It was because the actions of Howard and of Raikes sprang from those principles which have their foundation in the nature of man, and which, though at the time unappreciated and neglected, were demanded by the wants of society, that they gave such an impulse to the human mind, and that their lives form an era in the history of the imprisoned and of the young. It was because Washington turned aside from the vulgar path of successful military chieftains in all ages, out of respect to the dignity of the people and their right of self-government, that his name is the watchword and bulwark of freedom, and that he stands, and must stand, in the van of those who contend for constitutional liberty, as he once stood in the van of the armies of his country.

But the example of originality which eclipses all others, and stands in unapproachable majesty, is to be found in the character of the Saviour of the world. He refused conformity to no practice for the sake of singularity; he ran into no eccentricity or extravagance; but "he knew what was in man," and what course of conduct was necessary for the consolidation and peace of human society, and for the completeness and perfection of that nature which he had assumed. This course of conduct he invariably pursued, regardless of the opinions and corruptions of the age. Especially did he, in an age of selfishness, and ferocity, and retaliation, enforce, and raise to their proper dignity, and most touchingly exemplify, the virtues of universal charity, of meekness, and of forgiveness. It was this peculiarity, far more than his precepts, that made him the light of the world; and such was the completeness of his character, that it is no longer possible to originate any new principle which can be applied to the melioration of our own condition, or that of the race. All such principles are embraced in the spirit which he manifested.

From what has now been said, as well as from the definition given of original character, it will appear that originality of thought not only does not confer it, but that it is not in all cases essential to it. Its true basis is *moral courage*. Most communities are sunk more or less into a practical neglect of those principles of action the authority of which they acknowledge, even when they know where and how to apply them. Truths on which duty depends, and which ought to be living truths, are indeed in their minds, and are perhaps organized into a theoretical system; but they are there as the body of Lazarus was in the grave, and it never fails to excite astonishment when they come forth in the vigor of full activity. There is no community in which he would not be reckoned a phenomenon, in whose conduct the truths dormant in his rational and spiritual nature should expand themselves fully into action. But it requires no common powers of intellect to carry forward these truths into the conduct; and he who advances, were it but one step, before those around him, is original, in the best sense of the term. He has his hand on the only key that will unlock the gates of millennial glory and let in its light upon the world.

But there are whole classes of duties neglected now, as well as there were in the days of Howard and of Raikes; there are practices cherished in the bosom of the community, as intemperance and the slave trade once were, whose deformity is covered up by the thick folds which self-love and inveterate habit have cast around them. So entirely are these often lost sight of, and buried up, that to show by precept and example the application of truth to them, requires originality both of thought and of character. The doing of this opens a wide and promising field to the philanthropist; and the world needs men who will enter it, without passion, without egotism, without ambition, feeling that they have a ministry to perform

under the guidance of a great and a holy principle. The beams of truth, or what on moral subjects is the same thing, the beams of the Gospel, must be turned into those chambers of imagery which they have not yet penetrated, and must be held there, till they fray away, and burn out, every thing which cannot endure them. It has not been by originating new principles, that the cause of temperance has been carried forward. The principles of temperance are as old as the constitution of man, and are fully ratified in the Bible. But it has been advanced because men have learned better than formerly, what these principles mean when translated into action. And so it will be on other subjects. We need no new principles; those which we have are sufficient. We need no new revelation, nor, as is said by some, any modification or improvement of the one we have, to adapt it to the progressive state of society. All the improvement which it needs, is the translation of its principles into action; and there is not an agitation on the bosom of society which they would not allay, nor a foul ingredient in its turbid mass which they would not precipitate.

From what has been said of originality of character, it will also be seen that its value and the demand for it will depend on the state of society. In a community in which correct principles and conduct were universal, there would be no room for it,—there will be no room for it in heaven. And this leads me to remark on a single danger to which we are exposed in seeking for this quality, whether of style or of character. Originality pursues its own independent course, and a prurient desire for distinction is as fatal to it as imitation or contented mediocrity. It perhaps as often requires good sense to go on quietly with the multitude when they are right, as to pursue alone the line of correct taste, or of principle, when they depart from it. But the young and the impatient, goaded on by the stimulus of applause, rather than

moved by the deeper and more solemn inspiration of nature and of truth, dislike to wait for the growth of a reputation that struggles slowly upward like the oak, and choose rather to flatter the caprice of the moment, than to study, and adhere to, enduring principles. Perhaps no example in the history of literature shows more strikingly the transient nature of productions thus originated, and the ultimate and certain triumph of one who does study and patiently adhere to such principles, than that of Wordsworth, 'laker' though he be. The artillery which was levelled at him at the commencement of his career, exploded with the huzzas of the multitude, but he received the shot unmoved. And now, his reputation lifts itself on high in its greenness and freshness, and when in coming time it shall stand in still brighter green, the attacks which were made upon it shall live only like the parasitic plant, which derives its nourishment from that to which it adheres. It is this restless desire for distinction, that gives rise to the ephemeral fashions in the style of literature, and burdens time with so many works which he will shake off long before he reaches posterity. Hence too it is that, in character, effect is studied rather than consistency. As the readiest way of being seen, those under the influence of this desire often change into a color the opposite of that upon which they are fixed, and while they suppose themselves original, have really no character at all. One is sentimental, another blustering, one is slouching, another finical, and all equally affected. Hence we had at one time numbers of young Byrons, who went without cravats and drank gin, and who aspired to the dignity of being misanthropical and wicked, when they were only ridiculous; hence we had fops after the model of Pelham; and hence too you will find starting up in the bosom of Christianity, often in our colleges, young infidels who know little and care less about the truth of revelation, and who, if infidelity were the fashion, would

argue most strenuously for the Bible. Nothing that is thus based on accidental association and caprice, can possess permanence or dignity. It is not alone the diurnal and apparent motions of the system with which we are connected, that the author must notice, whose works are to be valued; he must place himself in the centre, and so observe its real motions that his words shall be, in their spirit, a prophecy of the future: it is not by a factitious standard that the conduct is to be guided that shall combine security with dignity; it must be so directed as to meet the actual, the proclaimed and punctual arrangements of nature, for her mighty vessel puts not back to receive the lingerer. If the doing of this be not originality, I must leave it to others to seek such a definition of the term as may please them; but it can hardly be our duty, whatever it may be, to labor for its attainment.

If there ever was a period when the course of thought and of action now indicated was called for by the wants of society, this is that period. Especially is there needed that form of originality which shall more perfectly develope known principles of action, and extend them in new directions. Obvious as moral principles may appear, they often remain—like those of mechanics, or like the force of steam—long unapplied, though capable of effecting far more than those for the real advancement of society. It is, indeed, the very application of these latter principles with so much success—the triumphs of man over time and space, together with the new forms that society is assuming—that renders this call imperious. The power of man over nature is now greater than at any former period; invention is laying the labor of man upon the untiring elements; steam is hurrying forward our merchandize, and turning the wheels of our machinery, and reaching its long arms into the bowels of the earth, and bringing up for us its treasures; every thing that can minister to the appetites, and foster pride, and pamper

luxury, and stimulate and give facilities to ambition, offers itself to easy acquisition. There is a tendency to measure the progress of the age by these external means of enterprise and enjoyment; and the course of education is too much guided in reference to a utility that can be tested by the ledger, to the neglect of that higher utility, that sees in all these but the means of a more expansive benevolence, and of an end truly valuable in the education and moral improvement of man. But if the sun of our prosperity is to reach its meridian, the reins of its chariot must not be intrusted to a mechanical and sensualized utility, that will be reckless of scorching and withering up every generous principle, and fresh affection, and noble sentiment, and high aspiration; it must rather be so guided as to quicken these into new vigor, and cause them to take deeper root and to overtop the unsightly and noxious plants by which they are so often choked. If, under the excitement of all that can stimulate the lower nature of man, the principles of his moral and spiritual nature do not receive a correspondent expansion, and vigor of action, there can be nothing to control the fierce and thickening struggle of conflicting interests, and we shall but furnish another, and a signal illustration of the truth of that saying of the wise man, "The prosperity of fools shall destroy them."

TWO LECTURES,

ON THE CONNECTION BETWEEN TASTE AND MORALS.

LECTURE I.

Is the prevalence of a cultivated taste favorable to morals? Is there a connection, either in individuals, or in communities, between good taste and good morals?

When I began to reflect upon this point with reference to a public discussion of it, I put the above questions to three educated men, as I happened to meet them. The first said, he had not thought of it, but that, at the first view, he did not believe there was any such connection; the second said, he should wish to see it proved before he would believe it; and the third said, he thought there was such a connection. This difference of opinion among educated men led me to think that an investigation of the subject might be a matter of interest, and perhaps of profit. As every thing, in this country, depends upon a sound state of morals in the community, whatever bears upon that deserves our most careful scrutiny.

To discuss this subject understandingly, we must know precisely what we are talking about. What then is taste? This term is sometimes used to express mere desire, as a taste for dress, or for low pleasures. It can hardly be necessary to say that that is not the meaning now attached

to it. Taste is defined by Alison, to be, "That faculty of the human mind by which we perceive and enjoy whatever is beautiful or sublime in the works of nature or of art." According to this definition, which is sufficiently correct for our present purpose, it will be perceived that there is, first, a perception of certain qualities in external objects, and then, according to the nature of the object, an emotion of beauty or of sublimity in the mind. These emotions are, of course, incapable of definition except by stating the occasions on which they arise, and can be known only by being felt. To talk of an emotion to those who have not felt it, is like talking of colors to the blind. And here I may remark, that these terms, beauty and sublimity, have, in common with those denoting sensations, an ambiguity which has often produced confusion. As the term heat is used to denote both the sensation we feel on approaching the fire, and that quality in the fire which produces the sensation, so beauty and sublimity are sometimes used to express the emotions in the mind, and sometimes those qualities in external objects which are fitted to produce them, though there is, of course, in the external object, no emotion, nor any thing resembling one.

If this account of taste be correct, it will be perceived that it cannot, with any propriety, be compared, as it often has been, to a bodily sense. The impression upon a bodily sense necessarily follows the presence of the object, and is uniform in all mankind. A tree clothed in fresh foliage is necessarily seen, and seen to be green by all who turn their eyes upon it. The same tree, when seen, may be pronounced by one individual to be beautiful, by another, from some peculiar association, to be the reverse, and by a third, however beautiful in itself, it may be looked upon without any emotion at all. It is, therefore, a great mistake to suppose, as many do, that those qualities in objects which awaken the emotions of

taste, act directly and necessarily upon us, like those which affect the senses. A second preliminary inquiry is, What are the causes which produce these emotions? And here I barely remark, without inquiring after any common principle by which they produce similar results, that these causes differ widely from each other. The emotions may be awakened by natural objects, by sound, by the products of the imagination, by the combinations of the intellect, and by certain manifestations of the affections and moral character.

A third inquiry is, how the taste can be cultivated? This obviously can be done only on two conditions. The first is, that we put ourselves in situations adapted to produce the emotions of taste; and the second is, that we preserve a state of mind that will permit those emotions to arise. This last, a proper state of mind, though less often considered, is quite as important as the first. "It is," says the poet,

> "the soul that sees; the outward eyes
> Present the object, but the mind descries,
> And thence delight, disgust, or cool indifference rise."

Upon him whose mind is engrossed by care, or ruffled by passion, the most beautiful objects make no impression. To perceive and enjoy them, the mind must be calm. The beauties and sublimities of nature are like the stars, which the storm shuts out, but when the heavens are serene, they come out, one after another, to the eye that is watching for them, till the firmament glows with their light. He, therefore, and he only, who, in a proper state of mind, will place himself in the presence of beautiful or sublime objects, and will compare the effects produced under different circumstances, will improve his taste, both in its susceptibility to emotion, and in its power of discrimination.

The question then, which we are now prepared to

discuss, is, whether such a cultivation and improvement of the taste has a favorable effect upon the moral character ?

That it has such an effect, I infer, first, because we find in the emotions of taste, to say the least, an innocent source of enjoyment for our leisure hours, and the mind that is innocently happy is less accessible to temptation. Indolence, mere vacuity, we all know, is the porch of vice, and the great dangers to the young arise from their leisure hours—from the want of some means of innocent mental exhilaration, in which they can be induced to spend those hours. It was said by Franklin, that leisure was a time in which to do something useful ; but all are not Franklins. If leisure time can be, as it is by many, usefully employed, so much the better; but he who should provide for our youth the means and the inducements to spend their leisure time innocently, would be a public benefactor. In our cities, where the temptations to mere sensual gratification are so numerous and obtrusive, and where natural objects are very much excluded, this is a point of great importance and of great difficulty. Until of late very little of this kind has been attempted, unless theatres may be called an attempt. But theatres with us are out of the question, for Miss Martineau says that "the Americans have very little dramatic taste ; and that the spirit of puritanism still rises up in such fierce opposition to the stage, as to forbid the hope that this grand means of intellectual exercise will ever be made the instrument of moral good to society there, that it might be made." She says, moreover, so hopeless is our case, that "those who respect dramatic entertainments the most highly, will be the most anxious that the American theatres should be closed." Theatres are indeed out of the question, and I trust it will be a long time before we shall make progress backwards, to that state of morals which is produced by the instructions even of an English theatre.

It is in view of the want now under consideration, that the establishment of associations for literary purposes, and for procuring popular lectures open to all, is not only a new, but a most prominent feature in the history of our cities. Man needs, and must have, excitement and mental exhilaration; and our Creator, if we would but see it, has not been inattentive to this want of our frame. No; to supply it, we have the pleasures of rational social converse, the play of the affections, the duties of kindness and benevolence, (does a man feel depressed, let him do a good action,) and last, but not least, the gratifications of taste: all the pleasure to be derived from the concord of sweet sounds, from the charms of literature, from the forms and colors and groupings of nature, from her sunrisings and sunsettings, from her landscapes of mountain and valley and lake and river, from the stars that roll in their courses and the flowers that nod to each other by the way-side. These are the sources of mental exhilaration which God has provided; and they are, to the artificial stimulants of theatrical exhibitions and of gambling, what the cold water that was drank in Eden is to brandy and gin. May I not here venture to say to young men, 'Beware how you spend your *leisure* hours! Your character and destiny in life will probably turn upon it.' Among the means, as I have already said, of spending these hours at least innocently, the gratifications of taste are conspicuous. They seem for this very purpose to have been had distinctly in view in the fitting up of this world; and so far as they lure the mind from the lower gratifications of sense, they must be favorable to morals.

The remarks now made respect taste chiefly as a guard against evil; but I cannot dismiss this head without noticing more fully its positive influence, as a source of innocent enjoyment, upon morals. A good taste, and I do not hold myself answerable for its perversions, involves a ready susceptibility to the emotions of beauty and sub-

limity, and of course a readiness to receive pleasure from the common appearances of nature, and from every free and natural expression of good feeling. It is, in my view, of the first importance, both to character and to happiness, that the young should cultivate a relish for those simple and natural pleasures, the sources of which are open to all. It is important to happiness. How much happiness does the young florist secure, who can look upon the common violet, as it opens its eye from under the snows of the early spring, with much the same pleasure as upon the choice exotic, which is resorted to and exclusively admired by those who have unfortunately been taught that it is vulgar to admire what is common! How much happiness does he secure who is touched by a beautiful action wherever he sees it, who appreciates sympathy wherever he finds it, and however expressed! A mind rightly constituted in this respect, drinks in enjoyment from the objects and occurrences of daily life, as the eye does light. It is also essential to character. How many young men enter life with a false estimate of the advantages which wealth and fashion can confer; who find their happiness, not in the contemplation and pursuit of appropriate objects, but in what others think of them, and to whom the world becomes insipid unless *they* make a figure in it! Let now misfortune come upon such men, and the world fails them. *Their* world is gone; they have no resource; they become, generally dishonest, sometimes inefficient and gloomy, and sometimes commit suicide. These persons come to consider the common and truly great blessings which God has given as nothing, unless they may possess those artificial and egotistical enjoyments which arise from conventional society. They see not the splendid ornaments and rich provisions which, to adopt, with a slight accommodation, the beautiful language of another, are gathered round the earth for them; —"its ocean of air above, its ocean of water beneath,

its zodiac of lights, its tent of dropping clouds, its striped coat of climates, its fourfold year." It is nothing to them, if they have not man for their servant, that "all the parts of nature incessantly work into each other's hands for their profit; that the wind sows the seed, the sun evaporates the sea, the wind blows the vapor to the field, the ice on the other side of the planet condenses the rain on this, and thus the endless circulations of the divine charity nourish man." What a change when such a person is brought back to a true relish of the simple pleasures of nature! Even sickness, depriving him for a time of what he had undervalued, if it bring him back to this, is a blessing; and then the result may be stated in the words of Gray:—

> "See the wretch who long has tost
> On the thorny bed of pain,
> At length regain his vigor lost,
> And breathe and walk again."

Then,

> "The meanest flow'ret of the vale,
> The simplest note that swells the gale,
> The common sun, the air, the skies,
> To him are opening paradise!"

Then, though he may hold little property by that title which the law gives, he yet feels that the universe is his for those nobler purposes for which it was intended to act on the spirit:

> "His are the mountains, and the valleys his,
> And the resplendent rivers;"

and he looks back upon his former discontent as the petulance of a child. The simple beauties and the glad voices of nature have made him a man again.

But again, I infer that there is a connection between good taste and good morals, because there is an analogy

between those qualities in matter which excite the emotions of taste, and those relations on which morals depend. So much is this the case, that some philosophers found morality upon a theory of the beautiful, considering it a sublime harmony. In all beautiful objects in nature, or in art, there is an order, a propriety, a fitness, a proportion; and the impression which these make upon us is so analogous to that which is made by virtuous conduct, that we use the same terms to express both. To me, indeed, it seems that beauty in matter is to moral beauty what instinct is to reason, or what the light of the moon is to that of the sun; containing some of the same elements, but destitute of the highest. Hence, as we should naturally expect, morals furnish that region in the province of taste in which she gathers those flowers that are richest in beauty and sweetest in perfume.

> "Is aught so fair,
> In all the dewy landscape of the spring,
> In the bright eye of Hesper, or the morn,
> In nature's fairest forms, is aught so fair,
> As virtuous friendship?"

But I observe again, that as there is the analogy just pointed out between their causes, so there is an affinity between the emotions themselves of taste and correct moral feeling, and the transition from one to the other is obvious. This point requires illustration. That our emotions are associated in groups, is practically known to every body. Even the child does not ask his father for a sixpence when he is in an ill temper, because he knows the transition is not easy from ill temper to generosity. Deep grief cannot pass at once to sudden joy. It must be by a gradual transition, first to a tender melancholy, and then to cheerfulness, and then to joy. "The garment of sorrow," as Coleridge expresses it, "must be drawn off so gradually, and that to be put in its stead so gradually slipt on and feel so like the former, that the

sufferer shall be sensible of the change only by the refreshment." It is by understanding well these affinities of the feelings, that the orator can continue to control them as they pass over their widest range. The necessity of a suitable state of mind in order that the emotions of taste may arise, has already been noticed, and what I now observe is, that a state of correct moral feeling is more favorable to these emotions than any other. There is between them such an affinity that they readily associate with each other; while there is, between the emotions of taste and a vicious state of mind, no such affinity, but they are to a great extent incompatible.

The external world often gives back to us but the image of our own thoughts, and hence may seem almost as variable as the dim forms of twilight to which the imagination gives its own shape. This tendency of the mind to cast its own hue over nature, or rather to receive different emotions from external objects, according to its own state, is well illustrated by Crabbe, in his tale called "The Lover's Journey." In this tale, Orlando, the lover, starts on a pleasant morning with the expectation of finding the object of his affections at a village, where she had agreed to meet him. The first part of his journey lay across a heath covered with furze. But hear him :—

> "Men may say
> A heath is barren; nothing is so gay;
> Barren or bare to call this charming scene
> Argues a mind possessed by care or spleen."

And thus he went on, admiring the wholesome wormwood and the vigorous brier, till he reached the village, and then disappointment came. The lady had gone to a village some miles further on, under circumstances that vexed him, and led him to doubt her affection. He doubted even whether he should proceed, but at length determined to see and upbraid her. Now hear him

again, as he passes along by the side of a beautiful river :—

> "I hate these scenes, Orlando angry cried;
> And these proud farmers, yes, I hate their pride;
> See that sleek fellow, how he stalks along,
> Strong as an ox, and ignorant as strong.
> These deep, fat meadows I detest; it shocks
> One's feelings there to see the grazing ox;—
> For slaughter fatted—as a lady's smile
> Rejoices man, and means his death the while."

And if mere disappointment, without a consciousness of guilt and remorse, could produce such effects, what must we expect when the mind is not at peace with itself? Tendencies are shown by extreme cases, and it is in perfect consistency with the nature of things, that Milton makes Satan exclaim, on seeing Eden in its united innocence and beauty,

> "O hell! what do mine eyes with grief behold!"

Who can imagine a miser, even, to say nothing of a thief or a drunkard, lifting his eyes from his buried heaps, and enjoying the scene before him, however beautiful? While he who performs a deed of charity at the end of his walk, will find nature wearing a richer dress on his return. The mind conscious of rectitude is at peace with itself, and is in that calm state which permits it to enjoy whatever is pleasing.

But not only, as in the cases now mentioned, is a right state of moral feeling favorable to taste, but the emotions of taste also tend to introduce moral ideas and emotions. It is, as I conceive, chiefly from this fact that nature has a tendency to lead the mind "up to nature's God;" for we must all be conscious that when we view nature as beautiful or sublime, this tendency is strongest. No one can have stood by Niagara, or upon the White Mountains, without feeling this. Hence the groves and the high

hills were the first places of worship. Hence the Indian sacrifices to the Great Spirit when he passes through the wild rapids. And as we associate the beauties of nature with the wisdom and goodness of God, so do we, in many cases, instinctively infer from the displays of taste in man, something of his moral character. Who, for example, in travelling through a solitary forest, if he should come, as there are many such, to a neat log-house, with a trellised woodbine at the door, and with every thing orderly and clean about it, would not expect to pass by unmolested, or, if he should call, to be civilly and kindly treated?—whereas, if every thing bore the appearance of filth and dilapidation, and the only signs of taste were those which indicated a taste for rum, he might well quicken his pace for fear he should be waylaid. No one expects to find indications of taste about the dwelling of a drunkard, or of one abandoned to any low vice. I appeal to any one who hears me, whether he has not felt that it was an indication of a good moral character, and an encouragement to charity, when he has entered some poor dwelling and found that there was still kept alive, in the midst of poverty, a susceptibility to the emotions, and a regard to the requisitions of taste.

I have just observed, that there is an affinity between correct moral feeling and the emotions of taste. I now observe, that the highest pleasures of taste cannot be enjoyed without correct views on great moral subjects, and especially respecting the being and attributes of God. Whatever may be said of the power of material objects, in themselves considered, to produce the emotions of taste, it is certain that their chief power depends on the conceptions of the mind which they awaken as signs. A single instance will illustrate this. Most of us have probably felt the emotion of sublimity on hearing what we supposed to be distant thunder, which vanished, and perhaps seemed ridiculous, the moment we ascertained

that the sound was produced by the rumbling of a cart. In this case, it is obvious that the emotion depended, not on the sound itself, but on the conception of the mind awakened by it. Now this is pre-eminently the case in the works of nature. How different must be the emotions awakened by a view of the evening firmament in the mind of him who should suppose the stars to be mere points of light, set at no great distance above him, and moving around the earth solely for the convenience of man, from those awakened in the mind of him to whom those points of light indicate the existence of an infinite space, and of suns, and worlds, and systems without number, and at distances which cause the wing of the strongest imagination to flag! How different the emotions produced by the comet now, as it returns at its predicted period, from those excited as it fired

> "the length of Ophiucus huge
> In the Arctic sky, and, from his horrid hair,"

was supposed to shake "pestilence and war!" As, therefore, he who cannot see beyond the stars as they apppear to the sense, must lose by far the highest pleasure which they are adapted as objects of taste to give; so he who knows the physical structure of the universe, and who yet does not see in it, and behind it, an infinite and beneficent Intelligence, cannot have connected with his view those conceptions which awaken the highest emotions of beauty and sublimity.

The relations of man to nature are much less intimate than those of God, and yet our emotions in view of nature are greatly modified by the view which we take of *His* dignity and moral character. It was when Hamlet supposed there was foul corruption and a general want of principle in society, that "this goodly frame, the earth," seemed to him but "a sterile promontory;" "this most excellent canopy, the air, look you, this brave o'erhang-

ing firmament," why, it appeared no other thing to him "than a foul and pestilent congregation of vapors." It was when her inhabitants were oppressed and degraded, that the natural beauty, which is still as bright as ever on the shores of Greece, seemed in the eye of the poet but as

> "the loveliness in death
> That parts not quite with parting breath,
> But beauty with that fearful bloom,
> That hue which haunts it to the tomb,
> So coldly sweet, so deadly fair,
> We start, for life is wanting there."
> "'T was Greece, but living Greece no more."

We must all have felt that a shade of sadness was cast over the face of nature when we have thought of the passions, and wars, and lust, and rapine of man, in connection with her quiet scenes. On the other hand, were the moral state of the world what we trust it shall one day be,—did universal purity, and goodness, and love reign,—would not the sun seem to shine with a more benignant radiance; instead of the thorn, would there not come up the fir tree; would not the mountains and hills break forth into singing, and all the trees of the field clap their hands?

And if the emotions of taste are thus modified by our views of man, how much more must they be by those respecting God! How must a blank atheism hang the heavens in sackcloth, and cover the earth with a pall, and turn the mute promisings of nature into a mockery, and make of her mighty fabric one great charnel-house of death without the hope of a resurrection! On the other hand, how must the beauty and sublimity of nature and of the universe be heightened, the moment we perceive them in their connection with God! Nothing is more common than to hear those, who emerge from that practical atheism in which most men live, speak of the new

perceptions of beauty and sublimity with which they look upon the works of nature :—

> "In that blest moment, Nature, throwing wide
> Her veil opaque, discloses, with a smile,
> The Author of her beauties, who, retired
> Behind his own creation, works unseen
> By the *impure*, and hears his power denied."

All our investigations into nature show that man has no faculties to which there are not corresponding and adequate objects. As infinite as he is in reason, yet the works of God are not exhausted by the operations of that reason: no intellectual Alexander ever sat down and wept for the want of more worlds to conquer. As vast as is his imagination, the revelations of astronomy, as sober facts, go beyond any thing that the imagination had conceived. And is it so, that, in the region of taste alone, the faculties of man have no adequate object? But it is only when nature, like the Bible, is seen to be full of God, that she is clothed with her true sublimity. It is only when "the heavens declare the glory of God, and the firmament showeth his handy work," that they correspond to the highest conceptions either of the taste or of the intellect. Man rests in the Infinite alone, and the universe without a God is not in harmony with his constitution, even when he is considered as endowed with taste only. But if our views on moral subjects thus modify the emotions of taste, it cannot be doubted that those emotions react upon our moral views, tending to elevate and purify them.

I remark again, that the emotions of taste are favorable to morals, because they are disinterested. As admiration becomes intense, men forget themselves, and, in proportion as they thus find enjoyment, they are prepared for that higher enjoyment which a disinterested performance of duty brings with it. Whenever we see excellence in another, we are bound to admire it without reference to

sect or party; and admiration, thus bestowed, is almost always connected with a high moral character. The beauty who can truly forget herself in her admiration for another, deserves admiration for qualities far higher and nobler than beauty.

I only observe further, that a cultivated taste is favorable to morals, because the cultivation of one of our powers has a tendency to strengthen the rest. This, I know, is disputed, and it is even supposed that the union of certain powers in any high degree is impossible. Thus, it is often supposed that a remarkable memory and a sound judgment do not go together; and it must be confessed that the memory may be so cultivated as not to strengthen the judgment. But when I speak of cultivating a faculty, I mean cultivating it on correct principles and with reference to the end for which it was given. Those who remember events as isolated, or only as they are connected by the relations of time and place, and who do not see and remember them as connected by the relations of cause and effect, means and end, premises and conclusion, do not, by such an exercise of the memory, strengthen the judgment, though they certainly show that it has great need of being strengthened. Of what possible use can it be, to the forming of a correct judgment on any point, for a good woman to remember the precise age of every child in the neighborhood? It is these walking chronicles, these living almanacs, who will tell you the weather for all time past, if not for all time to come, who get the credit of having great memories and little judgment. But such a memory is, to one cultivated on correct principles, only what a room full of minerals and birds and fishes and insects and rubbish, is to a well-arranged museum. Who does not know that experience is the best enlightener of the judgment? And where does experience garner her stores but in the memory? It is obvious that he who has the best memory of past

events in their true connections, will have the best possible materials for forming a judgment of the future. The same opposition is generally supposed to exist between the imagination and the judgment. But it occasionally happens that an individual, like Edmund Burke, unites the most gorgeous imagination with the profoundest judgment; and then it is seen that the analogies which the imagination suggests yield important lights to the judgment instead of misleading it. I know that the imagination, striking its roots into the hot-bed of novel-reading, may over-top the judgment; but, judiciously cultivated, I contend that it is not unfavorable to the judgment. And if in these cases a judicious cultivation of one power tends to strengthen the other, much more will the cultivation of taste have a favorable tendency upon the moral nature, since these departments of the mind have never been supposed to be in opposition, but are, as we have seen, closely allied to each other.

But all this time it has probably been objected that, however plausible the reasoning may be on this subject, it is yet contrary to experience. If it were so, it might perhaps be said of it, as was said by Euler of a demonstrated property of the arch, "This is contrary to all experience, but is nevertheless true:"—it is so in the nature of things, but the materials are refractory. But let us see how far it is contrary to experience; or rather, whether we cannot, so far as it is thus contrary, satisfactorily account for it.

In order to this, we must make, as it seems to me, three important distinctions. And, first, we must distinguish between taste considered as a power of judging, and as a susceptibility to emotion. This distinction is often overlooked. Mr. Blair, for instance, defines taste to be, "the power of receiving pleasure or pain from the beauties or deformities of nature and of art;" in which, regard is had to the susceptibility only. But afterwards, when

contrasting taste with genius, he says, "Taste is the power of judging, genius is the power of executing;" in which the susceptibility to emotion is left out of sight. Can I make this distinction obvious? When an unpractised person sees for the first time a grand historical picture, or reads a beautiful poem, he gives himself up to the emotion; he is absorbed; he takes no note of time; he forgets where he is, and neither knows nor cares why he is pleased. The eye drinks in beauty as the thirsty man the cold water, and it refreshes the soul. He sees the picture, or reads the poem again and again, and at length sits down to give an account to a friend of that which had pleased him. Now, he wishes to state the reasons why he was pleased, and he begins to inquire what those qualities were which produced the effect. Here is the rudiment of philosophical criticism, and he goes on perhaps investigating, till he discovers those general principles of taste according to which the work was executed. As long, however, as his mind is thus occupied in analyzing, he feels no emotion of beauty or sublimity. But as this is an enticing species of logic, he may follow it till a work of art shall give him pleasure only by its conformity to certain principles, true or false, which he may have established for himself, and till he becomes a cold critic, or perhaps a reviewer by trade. He may become a mere teller in the bank of taste, to pronounce on what is genuine, and hand it over to others to be used and enjoyed. Now, a man who writes a skilful review of a work of genius, and tells us why we are or ought to be pleased, is supposed to be a man of taste; and the writing of the review is considered as an exercise of taste. This is true of taste considered as a power of judging, but not as a power of feeling. If it were so, the mass of men would be in a pitiable condition. God no more intended that the uninitiated should wait to be pleased with the beauty which they see, until its principles are analyzed, and they

are told when and why they ought to be pleased, than he intended they should wait to be cheered and warmed by the rays of the sun, till they should see light decomposed into the seven colors of the prismatic image. But it is by cherishing and keeping alive these universal emotions, which belong to the race, and which find excitement every where, that I suppose there is a healthful effect produced on the moral character. The power of genuine philosophical criticism,—the power of going back, if I may so express it, into the workshop of nature, and seeing how she mixes her colors,—is a rare, a valuable and a dignified power; but it is still an exercise of the intellect, and I am not aware that it has any peculiarly favorable effect upon the moral character. Indeed, when literature and the fine arts become fashionable, and much the subject of conversation, there is a vast deal of this kind of criticism, which is fallen into from imitation and vanity, and which can have no good effect upon morals except as it supplies the place of scandal. It is not, then, in an egotistical and vain community, who read works of genius, and look at pictures, not to admire and enjoy them, but that they may themselves talk about them and be admired, that any good effect upon the moral character is to be expected from the prevalence of what they are pleased to call taste. How far this comes to be the case with communities in which taste is said to be prevalent, and morals are corrupt, I leave others to judge.

The second distinction which I would make, is that between the cultivation of a taste for the fine arts and for natural objects. This I consider a distinction of much importance on this subject; and I propose to give some reasons why the cultivation of the fine arts—as painting, sculpture, architecture, poetry—has less tendency than a taste for natural objects to improve the character. This I am bound to do; because it is well known that certain nations, as the Spartans and ancient Romans, considered

a taste for the fine arts as having a tendency to corrupt morals; and some of the sterner moralists of modern times, especially religious moralists, have objected to it on the same ground. It must also be conceded that those nations, as the Greeks and Italians, among whom these arts have flourished most, have been exceedingly corrupt, and that that corruption has co-existed with an advanced state of the arts in question.

And, first, I remark, that a taste for the fine arts cannot be general in a community of any considerable extent. If we suppose such a taste, when formed, to have a tendency to improve the morals, yet how few, in a country like ours, have an opportunity to form it! The products of the arts are to be found, for the most part, only in cities; and of the inhabitants of cities, it is only those who have leisure and wealth, who are affected by them. It ought also to be observed that, as these arts do not come to perfection in the early stages of society, they cannot produce their effect till wealth and luxury have had time to work general corruption.

But I observe again, that, as the power either of executing or of judging in these arts is confined to comparatively a few, it becomes a mark of distinction and a ground of ostentation, and thus there comes to be the appearance of more taste than there really is. The artist finds himself a candidate for fame and wealth through his skill, and hence his passions are aroused and his interests are involved. If successful, he is flattered, perhaps almost deified; if unsuccessful, he becomes irritable and sinks back on the proud consciousness of neglected merit. This peculiar position will account for the bad character of many artists. Those also who *patronize* the arts, as it is significantly termed, often do it from ostentation. What better resource has an ordinary person who has money, and who wishes to be distinguished in the fashionable world, than to become a patron of the

fine arts? I knew a person who spent several thousand dollars for pictures, and who, to my certain knowledge, knew and cared nothing about them except as they affected her standing in the fashionable world. But of those who have a good degree of taste, there are few whose motives are not mixed. And then it is to be remembered, that a product of art may be viewed in many different aspects. It may be regarded as costing so much, as requiring such a frame, or to be placed in such a light, or as an ornamental piece of furniture; while there is but a single point of view in which it can be regarded as gratifying taste. The moment a picture comes to be considered as an ornament, or an article of furniture, you might as well have a looking-glass or a pier-table. It not unfrequently happens, that the owner of fine pictures thinks so much of them as ornamental or valuable, so much of their framing, or light, or preservation, that he becomes indifferent to them in the only point of view in which they are truly valuable.

But again, in order to see this point in its true light we must consider the peculiar rank which is held by the pleasures connected with the fine arts. These pleasures are addressed to the eye and to the ear, and hold a middle rank between the lower pleasures of sense on the one hand, and the higher enjoyments of the intellect and of the affections on the other; and may readily associate with, and promote either. This point is well stated by Lord Kames. It is observed by him, that "in touching, tasting, and smelling, we are sensible of the impression made upon the organ, and are led to place there the pleasant or painful feeling caused by that impression;" but that with respect to hearing and seeing, "we are insensible to the organic impression, and hence conceive the pleasures derived from these senses to be more refined and spiritual than those which seem to exist externally at the organ of sense, and which are conceived to be merely cor-

poreal. These pleasures," says he, "being sweet and moderately exhilarating, are, in their tone, equally distant from the turbulence of passion and the languor of indolence, and by that tone are perfectly well qualified not only to revive the spirits when sunk by sensual gratification, but also to relax them when overstrained in any violent pursuit." "Organic pleasures," he observes again, "have naturally a short duration; when prolonged, they lose their relish; when indulged to excess, they beget satiety and disgust; and to restore a proper tone of mind, nothing can be more happily contrived than the exhilarating pleasures of the eye and ear." Now this is precisely the use, and all the use, that many make of the fine arts, and I may add, to some extent, of the beauties of nature too. How many wealthy sensualists are there in our cities, who give an appearance of elevation and refinement to their low and selfish mode of life, by collecting about them specimens of the arts! These men may be best compared to that amphibious animal, the frog. They come up occasionally from that lower element in which they live, into a region of light and beauty, but no sooner are they a little refreshed than they plunge again into the mud of sensual gratification. It is men like these, who, when their capacity for the lower pleasures is exhausted, drive in their carriages about the cities of the old world, (perhaps we are not yet sufficiently corrupt,) and set up to be *virtuosi*. It is easy to see how such a taste must bear upon morals.

But I remark once more, that the fine arts may be made to pander directly to vice. From the middle rank which the pleasures derived from them hold, they readily associate, as has been said, both with the higher and the lower. Thus, music may quicken the devotions of a seraph, and lend its strains to cheer the carousals of the bacchanal; and poetry, painting and sculpture, while they have power to elevate, and charm, and purify the

mind, may be made direct stimulants to the vilest and lowest passions. It is indeed from this quarter that we are to look for danger from the prevalence of these arts. It was thus that they corrupted the ancient cities; and those who have seen the abominable statuary dug from the ruins of Herculaneum and Pompeii, do not wonder that they were buried under a sea of fire. The same process of corruption through these arts has gone to a fearful extent on the eastern continent, and has commenced in this country. Clothed in this garment of light, vice finds access where it otherwise could not. Under the pretence of promoting the fine arts, modesty is cast aside, and indecent pictures are exhibited, and respectable people go to see them. If I might utter a word of warning to the young, it would be to beware of vice dressed in the garments of taste. The beauties of nature are capable of no such perversion. All the associations connected with them tend to elevate and to purify the mind. No case can be adduced in which a taste for gardening or for natural objects has corrupted a people. While, therefore, I believe, that the cultivation of the arts, in their genuine spirit of beauty and of purity, has a tendency to improve the character, it would appear that they are greatly liable to abuse, and that they have been extensively abused.

But though I may thus dispose of the general objection from the co-existence, in many cases, of refinement in the arts and corrupt morals, yet this, I think, will not fully meet the objection which first arose in the minds of some, from those numerous individual instances in which men have been eminent for taste and genius, and at the same time corrupt. What, you have been ready to say, do you make of such a case as that of Byron? Now I would here make an inquiry, how far, and in what sense, those productions of genius which have a corrupt tendency, are really consistent with good taste. Take the Don Juan of

Byron for instance. To say nothing of principle, such a work certainly is not compatible with a correct taste. That it is in some sense a work of taste, cannot be denied; but it seems to me to be only as a splendid palace, built in a low and fetid morass, is a work of taste. The palace may be beautiful, but it was in bad taste *to set it there.* Particular rooms may be elegantly furnished, but still there comes up from the surrounding marsh a pestilential miasm, and it may be said of it, as was said of the atmosphere around New Orleans a few autumns since, that "all is beauty and all is death." So far therefore as these works have a corrupt tendency, they cannot be said to be in the highest sense consistent with good taste. But still it is said that corrupt men have produced works of the highest genius and of the best taste, that have had no such tendency. This is granted; but it is to be accounted for from the fact that men of genius are often men of strong passions and of wayward and unbalanced minds, and from the peculiar temptations in which, as I have already said, they are placed. Taste seems to me to be, to such men, what the music of David was to Saul,—it charms away the evil spirit, but it is only for a time.

But we now pass to the third distinction which was to be made, and that is, between a true taste for natural objects and the fine arts, and what is called taste in the world of fashion. The point of distinction to which I would draw your attention is well stated by Stewart. "It is obvious," says he, "that the circumstances which please in the objects of taste are of two kinds: first, those which are fitted to please by nature, or by associations which all mankind are led to form by their common condition; and secondly, those which please in consequence of associations arising from local and accidental circumstances. Hence there are two kinds of taste; the one, enabling us to judge of those beauties which have a foundation in the human constitution; the other, of such ob-

jects as derive their principal recommendation from the influence of fashion. These two kinds of taste are not always united in the same person; indeed, I am inclined to think that they are united but rarely. The perfection of the one depends much upon the degree in which we are able to free the mind from the influence of casual associations; that of the other, on the contrary, depends on a facility of association which enables us to fall in, at once, with all the turns of the fashion, and, as Shakspeare expresses it, to 'catch the tune of the times.'" Association is the sole foundation of the value which we put upon some articles, and of the beauty which we find in others. Thus, a lock of hair, valueless in itself, may, from associations connected with it, have a value which money cannot measure; and articles of dress, which would otherwise be to us indifferent, or odious, become beautiful by their association with those persons whom we have been accustomed to consider as models of elegance. It is indeed astonishing what an effect this principle will have upon our feelings; and from looking too exclusively at facts connected with it, some have been led to doubt whether there is any such thing as a permanent principle of taste. It would really seem, that, within the bounds of comfort and decency, both of which are often outraged by fashion, one mode of dress may come to be as becoming as another. The wigs, the knee-buckles, the small-clothes, the long-skirts and cocked-hats of our grandfathers, were as becoming then, as is now the dress of the present day. Says Sir Joshua Reynolds, "If an European, when he has cut off his beard, and put false hair on his head, or bound up his own natural hair in regular hard knots, as unlike nature as he can possibly make it, and after having rendered them immovable by the help of the fat of hogs, has covered the whole with flour, laid on by a machine with the utmost regularity; if, when thus attired, he issues forth

and meets a Cherokee Indian, who has bestowed as much time at *his* toilet, and laid on, with equal care and attention, his yellow and red ochre on particular parts of his forehead or cheeks, as he judges most becoming; whoever of these two despises the other for his attention to the fashion of his country; whichever feels himself provoked to laugh, is the barbarian." Good taste with respect to the fashions, then, would seem to consist, not in following them, or in paying them attention, except so far as to avoid attracting notice in any way by dress; for it is a strong indication, when a person seeks notice from that, that there is about him little else that is worthy of notice. The foundation of taste in the fashions, however, being what I have now stated, it is obvious that a quick perception of their ever-varying changes and a ready and careful accommodation to them, can belong, whether in man or woman, only to a mind essentially frivolous; and that such a taste, if not absolutely incompatible with a perception of all that is permanently grand and beautiful in the works of God, is yet seldom connected with it. Such a taste must, of course, rather injure than promote good morals.

I have now considered taste as exercised indifferently upon any objects within its appropriate province. It still remains that I should say something, which I propose to do in another Lecture, on Moral Taste, or on taste having moral actions for its object.

THE CONNECTION BETWEEN TASTE AND MORALS.

LECTURE II.

It was observed, on a former occasion, that material objects produce their effect upon taste chiefly as signs; but it is the opinion of Mr. Alison, of Mr. Jeffries, and others of high authority on this point, that it is solely as signs — solely as suggesting intellectual and moral qualities — that they have an effect. It is quite evident that mere matter in a chaotic state, or in any state which is not either produced by mind or such as mind would produce, cannot be beautiful; and hence it is said that it can be beautiful only as a means of indicating qualities that do not belong to itself.

The great difficulty which this theory has to encounter is the apparent instantaneousness with which the emotion seems to arise when a beautiful object is presented. But this is not a conclusive objection, because emotions which can arise only from association seem to come in the same way. How instantaneous, for instance, are the emotions that throng up when he who has been long on a foreign shore sees, for the first time, the stars and stripes of his country's flag as it enters the port where he is;—and yet, these emotions can be awakened by it only as a link of association with scenes that are past, or as a sign of his country's presence and protection. I have heard the rainbow adduced as an instance of an object which produces the emotion of beauty without a reference to any thing beyond itself. But what was the

impression made by it more than two thousand years ago, upon the mind of one who had no theory to maintain?—"Look upon the rainbow," says he, "and praise Him that made it: very beautiful it is in the brightness thereof. It compasseth the heavens about with a glorious circle, and *the hands of the Most High have bended it.*" How apparently instantaneous, yet how different, are our emotions when looking at the cheek flushed by the bloom of health, or suffused by the blush of shame, or reddened by anger, or wearing that hectic flush which is the flag of distress held out by nature when she is sinking in consumption!—And yet no one can doubt, if these indications were reversed, that the emotions would be reversed also. It is conceded by all, that it is the expression, the indication of mental and moral qualities, that gives its highest beauty to the human countenance. There are no features which may not be so lighted up with noble or tender emotion as to be beautiful. But is there, it will be asked, *no* beauty in any combination of features, or of matter, except as connected with expression? I am inclined to think there is what may be called an instinctive beauty on the perception of certain colors and forms; but it is of little value compared with that of which a rational and reflective being can give an account to himself. Even this, however, presupposes the action of mind upon matter, though that action is not recognized by us as the cause of our emotion. It is therefore still true that, as the beauty of the early morning is produced solely by a reflection from the sun while he is still below the horizon, so the beauty of matter is wholly a reflection from that great central orb of mind, which has never yet beamed upon the eye of man in its direct effulgence—that, to him who views it aright, the beauty of this world is but the morning twilight of heaven.

But, however this question may be decided, the fact that it can be made a question at all, shows how largely

moral ideas and emotions enter into the province of taste, and the intimate connection there is between taste and morals. What is called moral taste, is, in fact, discriminated from taste in general, only as it has the moral actions of free and intelligent agents for its object. When we look at a moral action, there is a plain difference between our perception of it as right, and our perception of it as beautiful. In one case there arises the feeling of *approbation*, in the other of *admiration*, which are entirely distinct, and may exist in very different proportions.

It is, indeed, not always easy to distinguish the point at which approbation and admiration run into each other; and, in treating of this subject, I shall first say a few words of that border-ground between taste and morals where the dividing line seems to be unsettled. Where, for example, shall we place that feeling which we have in view of the manner of doing a thing, in distinction from the thing done? Is that feeling merely the result of taste, or are there mingled with it some elements of moral approbation or disapprobation? Where will you place a mean action in distinction from a dishonest one? I have heard it disputed whether neatness is a virtue, a matter of moral obligation, or merely a requisition of taste. Is a man under moral obligation to be neat in his person? It is along this dividing line that all those actions lie which relate to the proprieties and courtesies of life—all those smaller attentions to the convenience and comfort of others, and that delicate regard to their feelings, which have been designated by the French as the smaller morals.

In regard to this very extensive, and therefore important department of human conduct, there seem to be two common mistakes. The first consists in disregarding it altogether. There are many men whose characters, in their sketching and outline, are fine, and which, seen at a distance, appear well; but on approaching them, they

seem coarse and very imperfect. In all the great duties of life they appear to advantage; but through negligence, or some greater failing, the minor duties, and especially the department of manners, is entirely neglected. They seem like stately trees, in the trunk and main branches of which the sap circulates vigorously, but does not reach and animate the smaller twigs, and give to the leaves their perfect green.

A second and more common mistake, is the giving up of this department to the control of taste under the guidance of selfishness. The manners are polished, and all the forms of politeness adopted, not for the purpose of making others happy, but of securing to ourselves their esteem, and of effecting our own ends in life. This is the school of manners recommended by Chesterfield, and young persons are often exhorted to pay attention to their manners on this ground. In this case the sap does not circulate at all, and the leaves are painted.

But to me it seems, that this whole class of actions falls within the province of morality. Wherever human happiness is concerned, there is room for principle to operate; and the constitution of society will never be sound, and its beauty will never be perfect, till the sap of principle circulates to the extremities of human action. The true polish and beauty of society can result only from the principle of benevolence showing itself in a graceful and practical attention to the minor wants and to the feelings of others. But whatever we may decide in regard to their respective limits in this department, it is obvious that taste, so far as it goes, must be favorable to morals.

We now pass to what is indisputably the province of morals. And here our first inquiry will be, what are the circumstances under which the emotions of taste are awakened by moral actions? In reply to this inquiry I observe, that the emotion of beauty,—leaving sublimity for the present out of the question,—is awakened by a

moral action chiefly, and perhaps solely, when it springs from the principle of duty acting in coincidence with the desires, the affections, or some other natural and inferior principle of action. This point is of practical importance, and requires illustration. Man, as we all know, has various principles of action,—such as instincts, desires, affections, passions. These may impel him to a course of action directly opposed to that indicated by a sense of duty, and they may also lead him to perform the same actions as are dictated by it; and the position is, that moral beauty arises when there is a partial or entire coincidence between the principle of duty and these inferior powers.

That this is so is evident, because there are many actions which are right, which are imperatively required by duty, which yet do not awaken in the mind of the impartial spectator any admiration—for we must here keep in mind the distinction already made between admiration and approbation. The simple payment of a debt, for example, does not awaken any admiration, though we approve the act and should strongly condemn him who should not do it when it was in his power. In this case, there can be mingled with the performance of duty no play of the generous emotions. He who performs all his actions solely from a sense of duty, has our approbation, our respect; but he who, in addition to this, is possessed of warm affections which always coincide in their promptings with what is right, has also our admiration and love. Duty is to the affections, in the conduct of life, what logic is to rhetoric in a discourse. Logic forms an excellent body for a discourse; we assent to it, we approve it, it is good, all good, but it awakens no admiration. It is not till rhetoric sends its warm life-blood to mantle on the cold cheek of logic, and clothes its angular form in the garments of taste, that we begin to admire the discourse. And so it is with duty. It is an excellent body to the

course of our conduct in life; nothing else will do; but it may be so performed as to appear unamiable and even repulsive. In order to be beautiful, there must be connected with it some manifestation of natural affection or graceful emotion.

And here I may remark, that though we have a right to expect of every man that he will do his duty, yet the display of this beauty is not equally within the power of all, since the existence and manifestation of emotion depend, to some extent, upon the temperament. As there are some who have naturally a meagre intellect, so there are others whose minds seem to be barren of those finer sympathies and affections of our nature, which are the verdure of the soul, and upon which the eye always rests with pleasure. The characters of some good men are dry and unattractive. They are harsh, and hard-visaged, and seem too much like wooden men moved by rule and calculation. Such persons often seem better, and worse, than they really are. Their freedom from extravagances on the one hand, and, on the other, that want of feeling which is wrongly termed by many hardness of heart, is equally the result of temperament.

That the doctrine which I now advocate is correct, appears also from the effect produced upon our feelings when we observe habit taking the place of sentiment in the performance of duty. We have all seen persons enter upon a course of virtuous activity, and continue it for a time from a sense of duty, sustained by ardent feeling; but after a time the feeling has died away, and there has come in its stead habit, or a regard to consistency, to sustain the sense of duty in keeping up the same course of external action. When this change has taken place, we are all conscious that the beauty of the conduct is greatly diminished;—its spirit has vanished; the dew of its youth is exhaled.

I said that this was a practical point, and I now wish

to show, in connection with it, precisely how it is that mischief arises from the perversion of moral taste; as was shown, in the former Lecture, how it arises from its perversion in other things. In opposition to the hard and dry characters mentioned above, there are those whose susceptibilities are acute, whose sympathies are quick, whose feelings are generous, whose affections are ardent, who do every thing so promptly and so heartily that impulse seems almost to supply the place of principle. There is something very attractive in a character of this kind; there is an ease and freedom about it which seems to put aside all labor of calculation, and it moreover exhibits our nature in the pleasing garb of natural goodness. It is for this reason that novelists, who draw men as they wish to have them, and not as they are, have almost universally made these fine instincts of humanity the guide of their hero, and the basis of his character. This is, indeed, if I understand it, the basis of this kind of literature, and one chief source of the injury it produces. The exhibition of these instincts, and affections, and emotions, springing up at random and acting without the control of principle, holds out no stimulus to exertion; and their possession and exercise are often in fact, and often too in books, connected with great corruption of moral character.

Taking, therefore, as the main ingredient in the character of those who are to make the chief figure in this kind of writing, what Miss Martineau calls *spontaneousness*,—and which she and a certain wise friend of hers in Boston thought should by all means be encouraged and *reverenced*,—we may mix the other materials somewhat to our taste. An excellent and much-approved recipe for the hero of a novel is the following:—1. Make him handsome, for beauty is to the body what spontaneousness is to the mind, a sort of physical spontaneousness. Or, if you do not make him handsome, do what amounts to much the

same thing, give him an *air;* let him have something about him that is peculiar, so that those who scan him closely may observe, under those apparently indifferent features, a certain something, a sign of the fire that is slumbering within. 2. If you find it necessary, for fashion's sake, to put him at school, or at any place for study, make him idle, generous, somewhat mischievous, a great hater of mathematics, (for, so far as my knowledge extends, no hero of a novel ever yet knew any thing about mathematics,) give him some whimsical pursuit for the hours when he chooses to do any thing, and then make him speak, as he has occasion, Italian, French and Spanish, which he learned by instinct. 3. *Make him act from impulse, and not from principle, and get him into difficulty through the influence of these same generous impulses.* It is on difficulties thus created that the plot must turn. 4. Get him in love. 5. Make him run a gauntlet of difficulties a volume and a half long, furnishing a new illustration of that old adage, "the course of true love never did run smooth." 6. Marry him, and let him live many years in perfect felicity.

We commonly hear it said, that the chief mischief of novel-reading arises from the false pictures of life which novels present. This is doubtless a source of no small mischief; but in my view, a much greater evil arises from their holding up, directly or indirectly, false principles of action, and casting contempt upon the true; from their leading young persons to admire that which they esteem graceful, rather than that which is respectable and right in the conduct of life. There is in those works an unnatural separation made between the principle of virtue and that which gives to virtue its beauty; and principle is represented as formal and cold and perhaps ridiculous. Prudence, especially, is a virtue of which no heroine of a novel must ever be guilty. In a recent work, which deserves great credit for avoiding the general fault just men-

tioned, we are yet told that prudence was a virtue for which the heroine was never famous, and a slight odium is cast upon the virtue itself by making it appear, in the rival of the heroine, somewhat stiff and pragmatical.

It is thus that these works awaken extensively, in the minds of the young, associations unfavorable to the sterner and sterling virtues; and in many cases, these amiable qualities are so associated with vice as to render it attractive. It is thus that we are presented by popular novelists—and in such a manner as I know carries along the sympathies of many young men, while their imaginations are rendered familiar with the haunts of vice—with gentlemen-robbers, who rob in style; who are so generous that they never rob the poor; who never shed human blood if people will give up their money without it; and if they are occasionally obliged to blow out the brains of some agent of the law, they are really sorry for it, though they do not see how such impertinent fellows could expect any thing better. It is thus that the impression is received, that a certain class of impulses is sufficient to secure success in life, and even to excuse the want of principle; and young men with their heads full of pictures, not perhaps so bad as this, yet in their effect the same, rush eagerly into life without fixed principles and fixed aims.

To him who is without experience, there is no sight more beautiful than that of a young man of an ingenuous nature entering upon life, and resting upon his own good impulses to keep him from evil. But such a sight, even when there has been no corruption like that just spoken of, now causes apprehension in me; for I have seen him who had every thing, in his person and in his sensibilities, to excite admiration and love, tarrying long at the wine, and seeking mixed wine; I have seen him going to that "house" which "is the way to hell:" and therefore it is that I would utter a solemn protest against

any thing which would divorce the beauty of virtue from the principle of virtue, or which would give an impression that there is security without fixed principle. Even "genius," with all these amiable qualities—

> "Yet may lack the aid
> Implored by humble minds and hearts afraid;
> May leave to timid souls the shield and sword
> Of the tried faith and the resistless word;
> Amid a world of dangers venturing forth,
> Frail but yet fearless, proud in conscious worth,
> Till strong temptation, in some fatal time,
> Assails the heart and wins the soul to crime."

Then,

> "All that honor brings against the force
> Of headlong passion, aids its rapid course;
> Its slight resistance but provokes the fire,
> As wood-work stops the flame, and then conveys it higher."

With such a basis to the characters presented, it will follow of course, that the emotions and the sensibilities will be chiefly addressed in these works, and thus they become the principal means of promoting that false and selfish sensibility which is so often cultivated in refined society. This is a more refined species of intemperance, and is to the mind what intemperance in strong drink is to the body. It causes excitement for the mere selfish enjoyment produced by it, without leading to any exertion. And as the grosser species of intemperance is more common among one sex, so it is to be feared that this more refined species is more common among the other; and that for both, circulating libraries, and other libraries, instead of furnishing wholesome entertainment, are too often converted into mere intellectual dram-shops. There are many who seek chiefly for excitement, who have a constant craving for it, whose emotions and mental sensibilities have become accustomed to a set of artificial

stimulants till they are sensible to no other, and they become as remorselessly selfish as the drunkard himself. I would sooner apply for an act of genuine kindness, one which should reach actual want, to a woman in a log-house, upon the side of a mountain, surrounded by hungry children, than to the daintiest young lady whose sensibilities have spindled up and wilted in the artificial heat of novel-reading. In order to perform the duties of benevolence and philanthropy, it is indispensable that the sensibilities should be kept alive to the impressions of misery, as it actually presents itself, in all its squalid accompaniments.

> "Sweet are the tears that from a Howard's eye
> Drop on the cheek of one he lifts from earth;
> And he who works me good with unmoved face,
> Does it but half; he chills me while he aids,—
> My benefactor, not my fellow-man.
> But even this, this cold benevolence
> Seems worth, seems manhood, when there rise before me
> The sluggard Pity's vision-weaving tribe,
> Who sigh for wretchedness, yet shun the wretched,
> Nursing, in some delicious solitude,
> Their slothful loves and dainty sympathies!"

It was this esteem in which mankind hold the sensibilities and impulses, this preference of spontaneousness without its connection with principle, which gave its popularity to what has been called the sentimental school —the results of which ought to teach society a lesson not soon to be forgotten. Concerning this school, it is justly remarked by Coleridge, that "all the mischief achieved by Hobbes, and the whole school of materialists, will appear inconsiderable if it be compared with the mischief effected and occasioned by the sentimental philosophy of Sterne and his numerous imitators. The vilest appetites, and the most remorseless inconstancy towards their objects, acquired the title of the *heart*—the irresistible feelings—the too tender sensibility: and if the frosts of

prudence, the icy chains of human law, thawed and vanished at the genial warmth of human nature, who *could* help it? It was an amiable weakness."

I would here remark, that I have no objection to fictitious writings as such. There are those to which I do not object. Let them cease, first, to present false pictures of life: secondly, to array the sensibilities and associations of the mind against principle: and, thirdly, let them cease to create and feed a morbid craving for excitement, and to destroy the balance between the feelings and the judgment: and I shall not object to them. The mass of these writings, however, do produce each and all of these effects, and are, so far, indisputably pernicious.

I have been thus particular in pointing out the evils which arise from arraying what is beautiful and graceful in morals and in conduct against that which is right, because I do not believe that the community are sufficiently warned against the mischief it is working, and in many cases are not perhaps aware of the manner in which it is wrought. Evil gains advantage over man by dividing him against himself, by bringing into collision faculties that were intended to work harmoniously together; and we may regard it as settled, that whoever or whatever would set up mere impulses, or sensibilities, or emotions, in the place of the reason and conscience of man, is thus dividing him against himself. It is with the conscience of man as it is with a king. He may have his prime minister, who is his chief favorite, and next to himself; but he must never abandon his power, or suffer the highest subject to depose him from the throne. The desires and affections are then only truly beautiful, when they are in ready attendance at the court of their rightful sovereign.

Having now spoken of the manner in which evil is done by those who care to please rather than to improve mankind, I cannot leave this part of the subject without

suggesting, to the friends of principle and of religion, how much, if what has been said is correct, they may do to counteract this evil by a free, a hearty, a joyful, and therefore an attractive, mode of doing that which is right. Whence have arisen those associations of coldness and formality and gloom, as connected with duty, which haunt the imaginations of many young persons, and which have just as little existence in reality as other spectres of the night? Is it not in part from an unnatural austerity, or from a cowardly and faltering step, a want of freedom and power and beauty, in the exhibitions of virtue and principle on the part of those who profess to adhere to them? It is not as it should be, when the glad and the graceful emotions readily spring up by the side of every path that we walk in, except the path of duty. He who marches under the banner of principle, is not only to feel that he is engaged in a good cause, but is also to see in that cause a beauty which shall be to him what music is to the soldier, giving cheerfulness to his countenance and alacrity to his step. His is not indeed to be the unchastened, and reckless, and merely animal joy that is unconscious of the evil that exists and must be met; but it is to be the joy of him who, though he is travelling in a difficult and obscure path, yet sees before him the bright and steady light of his own happy home. The more those who act from principle are able to combine, with the most perfect rectitude and uncompromising faithfulness, the cultivation and play of all the graceful and tender emotions, the more will they do to promote the cause in which they labor. I know, and here is the difficulty, that most virtue is too feeble for this; and I would not that there should be put on any affectation of freedom or ease. Virtue should move easily and gracefully only as it is strong, but it should become strong, that it may move easily and gracefully, and thus become to all men as beautiful as it is obligatory.

It is not a little that the Christian religion has suffered from the mistakes of its adherents on this point. It had been better if they had more regarded the spirit of its Founder when he commanded his disciples, even when they fasted, not to be of a sad countenance, as the hypocrites were. The impression we get of Paul, notwithstanding his labors and sufferings, is that he was a happy man. If he was sometimes "sorrowful," he was yet "always rejoicing." The movements of his spirit were so ready and free, in view of the great subjects that filled his mind, that he reminds us, more than any other man, of the "rapt seraph that adores and burns." What is it, indeed, that gives its perfect beauty to our conception of the worship of heaven? Is it not, that the most perfect law is there fully obeyed, and is yet no restraint upon the highest and freest expansion of feeling? It is when this is so, and then only, that moral beauty is perfect.

We have thus far considered moral beauty only. We now pass to another branch of our subject, the moral sublime. When speaking on taste in general, it was not necessary, for any purposes I then had in view, that I should make a distinction between beauty and sublimity, either as they exist in themselves, or as they are occasioned by outward objects. Indeed, it is the opinion of many writers, that there is no radical distinction between them, but that sublimity is merely the feeling of beauty heightened. This seems to me doubtful, even in material beauty; but in our present department, the occasions on which they arise are so different, that they must be distinguished. It was for this reason that I treated of beauty by itself.

It has been observed, that the emotion of moral beauty arises when there is a coincidence between the sense of duty and certain inferior principles of action. I now observe, that the emotion of moral sublimity is awakened, when the sense of duty is opposed by inclination, or

affection, or by any or all the inferior principles of action, and triumphs over them. Its principle consists in a power of self-control and of self-sacrifice, in those cases in which they are difficult.

The illustration of this point will lead to a further confirmation of what was said in reference to moral beauty. No sight, for example, can be more beautiful than that of a family in which there is mutual attachment, and in which the performance of every duty is sweetened by affection. How beautiful is the assiduity of a child, who bears with every infirmity, and soothes every care, and anticipates every want, of a parent in sickness or in age! It is beautiful, but not sublime. The conduct of that young man, who labors hard and denies himself the ordinary pleasures of the young, that he may support an aged mother, or add to her comfort, is highly beautiful; but natural affection co-operates with a sense of duty, and therefore it is not sublime. No one has ever considered as sublime the conduct of Æneas, when he bore his aged father upon his shoulders from the flames of Troy. But when the ancient Brutus, with a power that was supreme, sat in judgment on his own son who was accused of being a traitor, and when he gave the sign to the lictor to take him to execution, then there was a struggle; then inflexible justice triumphed over natural affection; and it was—not beautiful, it was too awful for that—but it was sublime. That act of our Saviour, (if I may be permitted to refer to such a scene in this connection,) by which he remembered his mother upon the cross and provided for her wants, was beautiful—how beautiful! His prayer for his murderers was sublime. It is, in general, acts of tenderness, gentleness, condescension, pity, gratitude, humanity, that are beautiful; while it is, on the other hand, acts of magnanimity, of fortitude, of inflexible justice, of high patriotism, and, on proper occasions, of contempt of danger and of death, that are sublime.

In all these latter cases it will be seen that the principle is the same, and that the sublime emotion is awakened by virtuous self-control, in union with high resolve.

We hence see why it is that periods of difficulty, and oppression, and persecution, are favorable to the exhibition of the moral sublime. They test the amount of attachment to principle which there is among men, and the sacrifices which they are willing to make for it. Accordingly, it has been in such emergencies that men have arisen, who, under the inspiration of the great principles of civil and religious liberty, have been ready to go, in the face of every danger, wherever their duty should call them; as Luther was determined to go to the Diet of Worms, though he 'should find as many devils in that city as there were tiles upon the houses.' These are the men, who, though they have been opposed, and vilified, and persecuted in their day, have yet received the homage of after ages; who have stood as the beacon-lights of the world; and whose names have been the watchword of those who have rallied and struck for the united reign of liberty and law. Such men have almost always been in advance of their age, and the people of that age have not comprehended them. They have reverenced the great men of former times; they have built the sepulchres of the prophets, but have persecuted those who were sent unto *them*. It is not therefore surprising that Seneca has spoken so largely of the benefits of adversity, as alone giving an opportunity for the display of the heroic virtues; and has said that a good man, struggling with adversity, was a spectacle worthy of the gods.

But it is not necessary to the existence, though it may be to the exhibition, of moral heroism, that we should be placed in circumstances of external adversity. Wherever there is moral combat, there may be moral sublimity; and this combat is necessary for the accomplishment of that triumph which every man is called to gain over himself.

The force and grandeur of virtue are then seen, when we sacrifice to it our appetites, our avarice, our pride, our vanity, our ambition, our resentments, till every evil passion is brought into subjection to reason and conscience.

Such being the nature of the moral sublime, it is obvious that there is much less danger to morals from its perversion than from the perversion of the beautiful. There is here no natural passion to come in as an ally of principle, and which may take the place of it; but it is duty struggling single-handed, and triumphing over all the might of external nature, and all the force of human propensity. Virtue may indeed exist in perfect serenity, and be exercised without an obstacle; but in this world, (and it is that which makes it a place of probation,) there is little virtue except on the condition of struggling against and overcoming inclination or passion. If we succeed in this struggle, we feel in our own breasts a peace which is not only present happiness, but the promise of future reward; and we awaken in the breasts of others the emotions of moral sympathy, of approbation, of sublimity in its highest forms, till they are ready to welcome us with acclaim, and we find that virtue is not only happiness, but is also "glory, and honor, and immortality."

But though moral beauty and sublimity are so different in their nature and in the occasions on which they arise, it must not be supposed that they do not often blend with each other in actual life. The general course of Howard, for instance, being in accordance with the dictates of humanity, had great moral beauty, and yet the sacrifices which he made were often so great as to cause that course to partake of the moral sublime.

If the account of moral taste, now given, be correct, the analysis of the subject is the only argument needed. Its cultivation must, of course, be favorable to morals, since it would lead, in its perfect state, to the same course of conduct as would be required by principle. There is,

indeed, a whole school of philosophers, that of Shaftesbury, who have looked upon virtue, and have recommended it, as beautiful rather than as obligatory; who have regarded it as a sentiment rather than a principle; and whose writings have been calculated to awaken enthusiasm in the cause of virtue, but not to give it its proper sanctions. So far, however, as this class of feelings would lead us, it is in the direct path of virtue, and they may, no doubt, be so cultivated, and especially by the young, as to furnish efficient aid to the principle of duty. Perhaps few persons, rightly educated, are aware how many wrong actions they avoid with the greater care because they are also mean; how many right actions they perform with the greater readiness because they are in accordance with the requisitions of a cultivated moral taste. Considered as a principle of action, such a taste provides an effectual security against the grossness connected with many vices, and cherishes a temper of mind friendly to all that is amiable, or generous, or elevated in our nature. While, therefore, we regard taste as an important ally to the sense of duty, we are not to rely chiefly upon it. It would need stability, and would be constantly liable to be led astray by the influence of fashion, or of casual association. We may however do more, we should do more, to combine them; to unite taste and principle in the conduct of life; to do, ourselves, and to lead others to do, what is becoming, as well as what is right.

Man is capable of forming to himself an ideal model, of embodying a conception of excellence such as he has never seen, and of acting with reference to it. It is this which renders him capable of progression; and one great reason why men are stationary, is, that they have in their minds no fixed and definite standard of excellence after which they are reaching. Young men, to whom I speak, here is the point at which many of you doubtless fail. You are borne on by the current, and form to yourselves

no worthy object of pursuit, after which you bring yourselves, by self-discipline, steadily to labor. But without doing this, no man ever yet exerted a high and worthy influence; no man ever can. Permit me then to propose to you, in your capacity as social beings, an object after which you may thus strive. It is the combination of perfect moral principle with perfect simplicity and refinement of manners—the union, in the conduct of life, of Morals and Taste.

There remains but a single consideration which I shall adduce, to show that there is the connection between taste and morals for which I contend. It is, that we naturally associate with goodness, beauty of form; and that in a perfect state, we conceive of goodness as surrounded by objects that are pleasing to the taste. Perhaps this may not have been noticed by all, but a little attention to what passes in our own minds will convince us that it is so. This natural association of beauty and goodness perhaps arises from the fact, that every indication of goodness as expressed in the countenance is pleasing, and may be heightened into beauty. It is suprising how soon we come to regard as pleasing, the most ordinary features, when we have associated with them a fund of good qualities; or rather, the features soon become like the letters of a book, which we regard only for the meaning they convey. As I have said before, no features are so ordinary that they may not come to appear to us beautiful by the expression of good qualities; and if I may suppose, which I would by no means assert, that there are any homely persons present, I would congratulate them on the inducements they have to cultivate the only beauty that is permanent, or that can be the foundation of lasting attachment.

Not only, however, may homely features become beautiful by their expression, but we have, I think, a natural association of positive beauty as connected with

the goodness which we have not seen, and of positive deformity as connected with vice. When we read of good men, we think of them as having something in their appearance corresponding with their character; and no man, I am sure, can suppose that Benedict Arnold had a countenance that was pleasant to look upon. But what is conclusive on this point is, that no man ever conceived of Satan in his proper form, as beautiful, or ever conceived of an angel, except as clothed in light and beauty.

It is this natural supposition of the connection of beauty of mind with beauty of form, that gives its plausibility and point to a dream of Sir Isaac Bickerstaff, as related in one of the Tattlers. He seemed to himself to be in an open plain, surrounded by an immense assembly of females, in the midst of whom the goddess of justice sat enthroned, and holding in her hand a mirror of such peculiar properties as to reflect the faces of those who looked into it in exact correspondence with their characters. This mirror was held up and turned before the assembly, and the effect may well be imagined. Some beautiful women had the satisfaction of seeing their faces become still more beautiful, while many more were shocked to see themselves converted into perfect frights. Some who were homely before, became still more so; while many unassuming and modest persons, who had never dreamed of being handsome, and so had sought the approbation of their own consciences, were surprised to see how their faces were brightened up. There was, however, one face, which seemed to beam with a celestial radiance, and was so surprisingly beautiful, that Sir Isaac determined at once on making proposals to the lady, if he could but ascertain to whom it belonged. This, by careful attention, he was soon enabled to do, and found that it was a little, grey-headed, wrinkled old woman who stood by his side.

There is something ludicrous in the manner in which

this is set forth, but it involves a most serious and pleasing truth. It is as much a part of the disorders of the present state of things, that goodness is ever connected with any thing but beauty, as it is that virtue is depressed while vice triumphs. In a perfect organization and state of things, matter would be entirely flexible to the action of spirit, and, of course, intellectual and moral beauty, as well as their opposites, would stamp their impress perfectly on the features. This we believe will be the case when the physical nature of man shall be reorganized; and the good shall not only be beautiful, but, as I have already remarked that we are naturally led to expect, shall be surrounded with all those objects that are pleasing to the taste. That these expectations are natural may be shown from the writings of all the heathen poets, and it is pleasing to observe how perfectly they coincide with the representations of the Scriptures on this point. We are there taught, not only that the righteous shall shine forth as the sun, but their dwelling-place is described as a city whose foundations are garnished with all manner of precious stones, whose streets are pure gold, and whose gates are pearls.

Thus, as we associate with royalty its regalia, so do we associate with goodness, beauty; which seems to be its natural appendage: and not only in the Scriptures, but also in our own constitution, do we find a promise, that Goodness and Beauty shall be finally and forever united.

ADDRESS,

DELIVERED BEFORE THE PORTER RHETORICAL SOCIETY OF THE THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY, ANDOVER.

September 5, 1837.

In its literal signification, and in its highest character, the Gospel is good tidings; and it is the grand business of those who preach it, to commend it as worthy of all acceptation to them that are lost. Nothing can compensate in a preacher for the want of a heartfelt conviction of the ruin of man, and that the Gospel is the all-sufficient and the only remedy; and nothing can excuse him if he do not urge the acceptance of this remedy upon his fellow-men with his utmost force of intellect and energy of feeling. His appropriate office is to preach the Gospel of peace, to bring glad tidings of good things, to stand as an ambassador for Christ, and to beseech men in his stead to be reconciled to God.

But though this is the chief, it is not the only relation which the preacher holds to society, for, as the light of the sun not only reveals to us the azure depths from which it comes, but also quickens vegetation into life and spreads a mantle of beauty over the earth, so does the Gospel of Christ not only reveal our relations to God and the heaven which is to be our home, but it is spread over all the

social relations, and is an essential element in the production of that moral verdure without which society would be a waste. Where the Sun of Righteousness shines, the whole soil is meliorated. The hemlock and the nightshade grow less rankly, the natural affections expand more fully and shed a sweeter fragrance, and the seed sown bears fruit for *this* life as well as for that which is to come. The system which the preacher advocates is therefore not isolated and arbitrary; it is not a foreign and discordant mass, thrown into society and fitted only to be a source of terror to some, of ridicule to others, and a curse to all; but it has relations to the works of God, to the social and political well-being of man, to the secret thoughts and hidden structure as well as to the future destiny of the soul. It is only in the atmosphere of a pure Christianity that social man can attain his true stature. In this he moves and respires freely; while every other system is like an atmosphere more or less deprived of its vital principle, and lies like an oppressive and suffocating weight upon him. As well then may the natural philosopher rest satisfied with his knowledge of the literal atmosphere as the breath of life, and disregard its connection with vegetation, and its use in evaporating water and reflecting light and conveying sound and facilitating commerce, as may the student of Christianity consider it simply in its relation to another world, without regarding its connection with the works of God, and its present influence on the well-being of society.

It is for the want of studying the Gospel in these relations, of seeing its reach and sweep as a dispensation of God, that the clergy of Christianity have too often failed to study it so as to benefit the intellect, and to seize upon that high vantage ground for the presentation of truth which they ought to possess. Hence, too, they have not merely been weak, but, as partial apprehension is nearly allied to perversion, they have too often partaken of the

peculiar character which has always and necessarily belonged to the priesthood of other religions. To this priesthood, basing themselves upon authority and not upon evidence, appealing to the fears and not to the reason and conscience of man, their doctrines consisting of fables and their rites of whimsical or bloody or obscene observances, a rational science of theology has been impossible. Appealing to the senses by colossal, or hideous, or tawdry exhibitions; placing their ultimate reliance on the sense of guilt which must be appeased; seeking concealment with the instinct of conscious weakness and the skill of practised knavery; with nothing in their doctrines or rites adapted to elevate man, or to attach his sympathy or respect; and separated as they have been from the common interests of the race, their characters have been reserved and subtle, revengeful and cruel. Of course they have been regarded by the people, either with distant and superstitious awe, or with hatred and contempt. The natural allies of arbitrary power, they have had, either as the tools or instigators of despotism, a strong and oppressive influence over the bodies as well as the souls of men. This character has eminently belonged to the clergy in some of the perverted forms of Christianity; and hence the indefinite, often preposterous, and yet, to those in a certain stage of information, not unnatural dread of any connection of politics or government with religion, and a hostile attitude on the part of many towards a cause on which freedom is supposed to look with suspicion.

But even if these moral distortions are not produced by perverted views, yet will there result from an apprehension of the truth itself as a dry and disconnected system, a meagre intellect and a contracted character; and there will be something both in the manners of the preacher, and in his turn of thought, that shall designate him as belonging to a caste. There will be about him, not the

inimitable perfume of the proper anointing of his profession, shedding, like the oil of Aaron, a delight and sacredness around him; but, in the bad sense of the expression, a professional odor; and through his narrow peculiarities he will fall into that great quarry from which the humorist of every age has properly drawn his materials. Instead of an unconstrained seriousness and tenderness, which is the proper attitude of the soul in view of the truths of the Gospel, you will find a professional, formal, trundling gravity that always moves on in the same track, and which is to character what a tone is to speaking. Instead of the free thoughts that embrace man and nature in all their relations, and sweep the circuit of the universe, gathering at every flight fresh incense for the altar of God, you will find his spirit caged within the bars of a technical system. It is thus that the malignity of passion, and the antipathy of taste, have been needlessly arrayed against the Gospel; for when properly studied, it is directly fitted to destroy every feature like those above indicated, and not the broad science of legislation itself has a tendency so strong to liberalize the mind.

How then shall the Gospel be studied so as most fully to liberalize the mind, and to fit the pulpit to stand, as it should, far more than at present, as the great educator of a Christian community, and the guardian of its dearest temporal as well as immortal interests? I reply, that in order to this, the Gospel must be studied, *First*, As a science, connected in its general spirit with other sciences; and, *Secondly*, In the simplicity of its plan, and the variety of its adaptations to the works of God and the different conditions of individual and social man.

I. When I speak of the connection of Christianity in its general spirit with other sciences, I have no reference to that merely accidental and external connection which has

been occasionally a topic of deep interest since the time of Galileo. At intervals within the last two or three hundred years there has appeared some new science or discovery shooting athwart the religious horizon, which has seemed to the timid religionist like the comet of old, not a part of our system, but sent for its destruction. For a time he has watched its progress with breathless apprehension, till it has perhaps seemed to pass out of sight into the darkness of infidelity; while there has been heard rising on every side demoniac exultation. Then it is that he has reposed himself upon that faith which he alone knows who does the will of God; and after resting awhile in that position, has been surprised to see the same erratic star circling back, and coming in to do homage to revelation. Thus has it ever been, thus will it ever be; and the duty of the preacher in regard to this department is, to keep himself informed of the facts, to promote investigation by all the means in his power, and not to be soon troubled in his mind as though every eastern forgery had the evidence of holy writ, or as though the theories of all geologists were as solid as their rocks.

It is not in this loose connection with other sciences that the Gospel is to be studied, if we would have it expand the intellect; but as itself a science, and connected in spirit with other sciences. There are those, I am aware, who object to science altogether as connected with religion, and have even an antipathy to the name. Nothing, they say, has done so much harm as false systems; and that system-making has distorted the Bible, and eaten out the piety of the ministry. But there is a vast difference, as the student of nature has at last discovered, between *making* systems, and, in the exercise of the child-like temper of a learner, *finding* them already made by the hand of God. And we would here inquire, whether the Bible, if it be from God, must not, as well as nature, be adapted to the intellect of man; and if so,

whether it must not furnish materials for scientific investigation. I do not believe that the power of abstraction and generalization, by which he is capable of constructing the natural sciences, is the highest power of man—the characteristic distinction between him and the brutes: but no one can suppose that the Bible is from God, and yet that it does not give this power scope.

What then is that by which nature is adapted to the intellect of man, and by which the works of God become to him a school so admirable? It is not solely the grandeur and striking nature of the phenomena and facts presented. Man does not become a philosopher till he ceases from the admiration of the first impression. But it is because those phenomena and facts are linked together by the relations of resemblance and analogy, sometimes indeed obvious to mere inspection, but often, as if for the purpose of inviting study, so unobtrusive and recondite, as to elude the observation of ages. What could the mind do with a chaos of unconnected facts, however imposing? What purpose of elevation, or of discipline, could they answer? It is because the universe is constructed into a *system*, manifesting unity in the midst of variety, that it is adapted to the intellect of man. It is through the study of the universe in its different departments, *as thus constructed*, that God seems to have intended that we should gain our intellectual training, and it is accordingly with the perception of this, that he has connected the highest intellectual gratification. There is, indeed, a beauty spread over the surface of nature which addresses itself to the eye, and which almost seems to be in immediate relation with the sense, without the intervention of intellect; but there is also a scientific beauty. This results, in our examination of one complex structure, from our perception of the relation of its parts; in our examination of the different individuals of a species, from the relation of resemblance; and in our comparison

of species with species, from the relation of analogy, which is only the perception of unity in the midst of variety on a wider scale. It is this in the works of God, that constitutes their order and harmony. It is in the perception of this, in the resumption of system after system into a higher unity till we arrive at the one infinite God, that the silent music of the universe, that falls only on the ear of the spirit, consists. It is this music that finds its appropriate utterance only through man, who is ordained the priest of the works of God to gather up and transmit intelligently that quiet but intense expression of praise, which seems to wait upon the dumb lips of nature to be caught up by him and find utterance in the ascription, "O Lord, how manifold are thy works, in wisdom hast thou made them all!" "Wonderful in counsel, excellent in working!"

Now it is precisely this perception of unity, which is thus the joy of the spirit, after which it so labors in nature, and which it finds in the uniform course of God's procedure in the material world, that we seek for in his mode of dealing with his intelligent and moral creatures. It is obvious that this perception would not only give us a higher delight than that just spoken of, but also exert an influence in the same way in enlarging the mind; first, by freeing it from superstition; and secondly, by giving it a knowledge and control of the future.

First; religious superstitions clearly spring from ignorance of God's moral laws, just as natural superstitions, if I may so designate them, spring from ignorance of his natural laws, and they must be removed in the same way. In what, for example, do the superstitions of medicine consist, but in observances, which, according to the laws of the physical system, have no tendency to heal the disease, and it may be make it worse? And in what do the superstitions of religion consist, but in observances, which, according to the laws of the moral system, have

no tendency to remove the moral evil, but it may be quicken malignity, or foster pride, or inflame lust? Superstition generally in regard to natural phenomena results from the supposition that they occur capriciously without fixed antecedents, instead of supposing that they take place according to invariable laws. It is the knowledge of these laws that has frightened necromancy and witchcraft from the enlightened parts of the earth, that has disrobed the stars of their dominion over human destiny, and struck down the superstition that sat astride the comet as it came careering up out of the depths of infinite space, "with fear of change perplexing monarchs;" and it is evident that nothing but a similar knowledge of moral laws can put an end to the infinitely diversified religious superstitions.

Again; it is only through scientific knowledge that we can know or control the future in physics. It is by this alone, that we can predict the position, centuries hence, of a heavenly body, and tell when it shall enter and when emerge from an eclipse: and is there no law, discovered or revealed, by which we can ascertain the position of the human spirit ages to come, when that virtue which now "wades in dim eclipse" shall come forth fair as the moon and clear as the sun? Are there no conditions, fixed and invariable, settled as the foundations of heaven, which being complied with, the human spirit is safe, which being neglected, it is lost? and is it not possible to elevate these above the superstitions of the age and the follies of speculation, and to place them in religion where the system of Newton stands in science? It is evident that such a system would encourage the hope of eternal life only on condition of a specified character; that it would always hold up to all alike the same high and holy standard, and would furnish as little hope to the workers of iniquity that they could unbar the gates of salvation, as that they could turn back the falling rock. It would

show men that as they must conform themselves to the laws of nature in order to be benefited by them, so in religion the change is, by the help of God, to be wrought in them, and not to be made in any accommodation to them of the character of God, or the immutable laws of his moral kingdom. This strikes at the root of all narrowness, and superstition, and formality, and evasion in religion, and brings it home to man's moral nature as a matter of awful import, and honors before the universe the moral law as guarded by all the energies of the immutable God. The moral laws of God are the expression of his character; like those of nature they are simple in their principle, comprehensible by a child, but universal in their application, efficient in their action, and mighty and diversified in their results. Religion, considered with reference to the intellect, is nothing but an expression of these laws. History, philology, interpretation, criticism, are mainly useful in bringing them to light. The study of these laws is the study of theology as a practical science, and nothing else is. In the Old Testament we study them absolutely, and we find in the New only a mighty expedient that, while pardon is dispensed, they may still bear sway.

It is indeed a remarkable fact, and one which commends to our special attention the feature of the Gospel now contemplated, that in an age when science as connected with general laws was unknown, the Gospel should have been based upon that very feature in the character of God, his determined adherence to law, which lies at the foundation of natural science. The pardon of the Gospel is not a setting aside of the law, nor a repeal of its penalty; but it is granted in compliance with a law higher and more general than that which was broken. It is, for the purposes of this illustration, as if the law of the periodical time of the earth should be infringed, and its year prolonged a month, by the approach of a new

planet. Were such an infringement to take place without an apparent and adequate reason, it would unsettle the foundations of astronomy. But when the planet is seen to hold such a position as it ought in order to retard the earth, and the less general law of its time of revolution gives way to the more general one of gravitation, the foundations of astronomy remain untouched, and its fundamental law is confirmed and honored. Now in the eyes of all heaven Christ has done just that in relation to the pardon of sinners, which, in the case supposed, the appearance of the new body would do in the eyes of an astronomer — has furnished a reason why that pardon should be granted, a principle on which it takes place, so that the law remains in all its integrity, and the sword of justice in the hand of the eternal God glitters as brightly as ever, or rather since the death of Christ, it seems to cast an intenser light. If then the moral kingdom of God is thus, in all its departments, governed by general laws, shall it be less salutary and ennobling to the mind to understand these, than to understand the general laws of the physical universe, the discovery and comprehension of which has always been esteemed a mark of an enlarged mind, and is often among the highest achievements of genius?

But we should wrong the tendency of the Gospel to liberalize the mind, if we were to represent it as adapted to give us command only over a system of truth, running parallel indeed with others but unconnected with them. The great systems of physical and moral truth are not unconnected; and were it only for the purposes of illustration, it would behoove the preacher to be familiar with the fields of science. They have indeed been studied as separate, just as the arterial and venous systems in the human body were once studied as separate; but it will yet be seen that it is in the moral portion of this universe that the pulse of its life throbs, and that it is from its

connection with this that the rest derives its vitality and importance. In the earlier stages of society the sciences, like the different tribes of men, were supposed to be rivals of each other; but as it has been found that there is a brotherhood of man over the whole earth, and that the prosperity of one nation is the best means of securing that of the rest, so it has been found that the sciences are all of one family, and that the advancement of one has an immediate effect upon that of others; and this has promoted a spirit of liberality and co-operation among scientific men. Into this circle and brotherhood, however, it seems not to have been thought that religion had a claim to enter. It has been supposed to have its own place, and its own claims, and its own modes of investigation. But every thing now seems to indicate that there is an immense intellectual and moral universe, corresponding in extent and variety to the physical universe, and that these are linked together by numberless relations so as to form but one whole. That there must be this unity thoughtful men have long been satisfied, and the present is a period of eager expectation for its more full recognition. It is like that period in the history of electricity, when philosophers were watching for the link that should bind the electrical phenomena of the earth and the heavens together. Or like that period which now again recurs in the history of the same science in its connection with magnetism and light and caloric; when the phenomena of all of them seem to indicate some central point of radiation, by their connection with which they may be severally embraced under the same general law, and be set as a single gem in the diadem of science. It is to this point that the eyes of the student are now turned. This is the next step to be taken. Rising from different and distant sources, science and religion are like two mighty rivers, sometimes seeming to run in opposite directions, but yet tending to empty their waters at the same point,

into the same ocean. Already are they seen to approach each other; words of friendly salutation are exchanged across the isthmus which yet divides them; and on the pennons which gleam from the vessels of those who float upon their surface are inscribed mottos of similar import. On the one I see it written, "Great and marvellous are thy works, Lord God Almighty;" and on the other, "Just and true are thy ways thou King of saints;" and when these two currents shall unite, then there shall go up from the blended multitude, as the sound of many waters, the one undivided song of Moses and the Lamb.

Before passing to another branch of our subject, I may remark, that besides its peculiar tendency to enlarge the mind, from the broad nature of the subjects with which it brings it in connection, the study of Christianity as a science, has, of course, connected with it the three important advantages belonging to all scientific knowledge. As all truth is consistent with itself, it gives us, first, a very important advantage in any subsequent investigation over mere theory or a promiscuous collection of facts, by putting into our hands the clue to any difficulty which the human powers are capable of surmounting; secondly, it assists the memory by furnishing an arrangement and classification that is according to nature, and therefore simple and easy; and, thirdly, it gives us a command of our knowledge in its just proportions, and enables us to present it in its harmony.

II. But I remark again, if the ministry would so study the Gospel as to liberalize their minds, and fit them to become the educators of the community at the present day, they must not only study it as a science, but also in that simplicity of structure and variety of adaptation which it might be expected to possess as coming from God. In this point of view the Gospel stands unrivalled, and is far too little studied, far too seldom presented. It

is perhaps impossible that any system should be more severely tried in this way than the Gospel has been, if we consider the test to which it was put at its commencement, in contrast with that to which it is now exposed.

Christianity, at its commencement, recognized the Jewish religion as from God; and it was a ground of its rejection by the Jews, that it destroyed their law or ritual. Hence it became necessary—and this was the main object of the apostle in the epistle to the Hebrews—to show that it was in perfect harmony with the Jewish religion when rightly understood, and was, indeed, necessary to its completion. Did the Jews insist that Christianity had no priesthood? The apostle affirms that it had such a high-priest as became us, "who is holy, harmless, undefiled, separate from sinners, and made higher than the heavens." Did the Jews affirm that Christianity had no tabernacle? The apostle asserts that Christ was the minister "of the true tabernacle, which the Lord pitched, and not man;" not indeed that he had "entered into the holy places made with hands, which were the figures of the true, but into heaven itself." Was it objected that Christianity had no altar and no sacrifice? The apostle affirms that "now, once in the end of the world," that is, of the Jewish dispensation, "Christ had appeared to put away sin by the sacrifice of himself." Thus did the apostle show the correspondence of the Christian with the Jewish religion, or rather that the Jewish religion, having dropped its swaddling clothes of rites and ceremonies, was in its spirit and actuating principles identical with Christianity. The same correspondence was either attempted to be shown, or taken for granted, by all the New Testament writers. But when we remember that Christianity is a purely spiritual religion, encumbered by no forms, and that the Jewish was apparently the most technical and artificial of all systems; when we remember that there was not only to be preserved a correspondence

with the types and ceremonies, but also that there was to be the fulfilment of a large number of prophecies, we may see the impossibility that any human art should construct a system so identical in its principles, and yet so diverse in its manifestations. Nor, indeed, could there have been any motive to induce such an attempt; for besides its inherent difficulty, Christianity so far dropped all the peculiarities of the Jews as to forfeit every hope of benefit from their strong exclusive feelings, while at the same time it came before other nations subject to all the odium which it could not fail to excite as based on the Jewish religion. We accordingly find that, in point of fact, it was equally opposed by Jews and Gentiles. But such was the system—exclusive, typical, ceremonial, external, magnificent, addressed to the senses—between which and Christianity, simple, universal, spiritual, without form or pomp, it was necessary to show a correspondence; and this the apostle Paul, and the New Testament writers generally, did show.

How different the test to which Christianity is now put! The works of God are acknowledged to be from him, and, as now understood, how simple in their laws, how complex in their relations, how infinite in their extent! And can the same system, which so perfectly corresponded with the narrow system of the Jews, correspond equally with the infinite and unrestricted system and relations of God's works? There are those now, and not a few, who reject or would modify Christianity on the ground of its want of conformity to the works of God, just as the Jews rejected or wished to modify it on the ground of its want of conformity to the old dispensation; and it behooves the ministers of Christ to do that now, in relation to these modern Jews, which the apostle did for those of old. Doubtless he might have known and proclaimed enough of Christianity for salvation, without studying its relations to a

system that was old and ready to vanish away ; and on the narrow grounds of study which some men advocate, he might have excused himself from writing the epistle to the Hebrews. And so may we, perhaps, proclaim truth enough for the salvation of men, that is, by which they might be saved, without the kind of investigation of which I speak in this discourse ; but we are to remember that we are debtors to the learned as well as to the unlearned, to the wise as well as to the unwise, and we are not ashamed of the Gospel of Christ before them. The present test is perhaps even more severe than the former, for we may rest assured that nothing that is arbitrary, or capricious, or childish, or out of keeping with the present enlarged state of knowledge respecting the relations and unlimited extent of the physical universe, can stand. Is it then possible that a religion once embosomed in the ceremonies of an ignorant and barbarous people, which received its expansion and completion in an age of the greatest ignorance in regard to physical science, should yet harmonize, in its disclosures respecting God and his government, with those enlarged conceptions of his nature and kingdom which we now possess? Could Newton step from the study of the heavens to the study of the Bible, and feel that he made no descent? It is even so. The God whom the Bible discloses, and the moral system which it reveals, lose nothing when compared with the extent of nature, or with the simplicity and majesty of her laws ; they seem rather worthy to be enthroned upon, and to preside over, such an amazing domain. The material universe, if not infinite, is indefinite in extent. We see in the misty spot which, in a serene evening, scarce discolors the deep blue of the sky, a distant milky way, like that which encircles our heavens and in a small projection of which our sun is situated. We see such milky ways strown in profusion over the heavens, each containing more suns than we can number, and all

these, with their subordinate systems, we see bound together by a law which is as efficient as it is simple and unchangeable. "They stand up together, not one faileth!" But long before this system was discovered, there was made known, in the Bible, a moral system in entire correspondence with it. We see at the head of it, and presiding in high authority over the whole, one infinite and "only wise God," "the King eternal, immortal, invisible." Of the systems above us, angelic and seraphic, we know little; but we see one law, simple, efficient, and comprehensive as that of gravitation—the law of love—extending its sway over the whole of God's dominions, living where he lives, embracing every moral movement in its universal authority, and producing the same harmony, where it is obeyed, as we observe in the movements of nature. We here find none of the puerilities that dwarf every other system. The sanctions of the law, the moral attributes revealed, the destinies involved, the prospects opened,—all take hold on infinity, and are in perfect keeping with the solemn emotions excited by dwelling upon the illimitable works of God. "Deep calleth unto deep."

I have dwelt thus long upon these extreme and contrasted cases, because they illustrate, very fully, the feature of the Gospel of which we are now speaking—its wonderful adaptation to every thing connected with it which has come from God. But there are other adaptations more practical and not less interesting, which may not be wholly passed over on this occasion; for it is of the last importance that the relation of Christianity to the moral, social, and political condition of society, should not only be asserted, but should be made to appear, and should be comprehended by the community. A new era in the history of Christianity has commenced; it is divorced from all connection with the law of the land, so far as provision

for its support is concerned, and must hereafter rely upon itself alone. How then is Christianity—not preaching, considered as an exhibition or as an intellectual treat, which the wealthy can afford to pay for, but genuine Christianity—to maintain its hold upon the respect and affections of the great body of thinking men who are not religious? How shall we bring the infidel even, as many are brought, (probably all of us have known instances of this,) to assist in supporting its institutions, and to prefer those schools for his children where religious instruction is given; thus arresting, if we cannot cure, the gangrene of society? This result must be produced in part, I say not wholly, for I do not believe it—there is in Christianity a secret power to awe and restrain men apart from all prudential considerations—but it must be produced in no small degree, by showing that Christianity is the salt and the leaven of society; the salt in its effects, the leaven in its mode of operation. It must be done by turning men off from their idolatry of political institutions, as having an efficacy to regenerate society or to keep it pure, and by showing them that republican drunkenness, and profaneness, and gambling, and licentiousness, and dishonesty, are as bad as monarchical or aristocratic drunkenness and profaneness, and will as surely produce their bitter results. It must be done by showing that as civil society is an institution of God, its welfare must depend on obedience to his laws, natural and moral; that the ends of society can be attained only where the domestic and family relations are rightly constituted, and properly sustained; that this can be done only where there is a pure state of morals; and that a pure state of morals never yet existed, and never will exist, where there is not the fear of God, and where religion is dishonored.

In fact Christianity stands, in regard to the solution of many questions connected with the welfare of society, in the same relation to moral philosophy, and political econo-

my, and the science of politics, as algebra does to arithmetic. It is the more comprehensive science, and by means of it problems may be solved for the solution of which the mere politician has no elements. The sciences which teach men the rules of well-being, whether as individuals or as communities, are, so far as they are sound, but experience and the structure of organized nature, echoing back the teachings of the Bible. What principle of Christian ethics does moral philosophy now presume to call in question? Infidels themselves being judges, the New Testament morality is the most perfect the world has ever seen. What are the general principles of political economy, but an imperfect application to the intercourse of trading communities of those rules of good neighborhood and of that spirit of kindness which Christianity inculcates? What is the larger part of political science, but a laborious and imperfect mode of realizing those results in society which would flow spontaneously from the universal prevalence of Christian morals and of the Christian spirit?

Does the Gospel command us to be temperate? Science, some eighteen hundred years afterwards, discovers that temperance alone is in accordance with our constitution, and political economy reckons up the loss of labor and of wealth resulting from intemperance; and then, after an untold amount of suffering, what do they do but echo back the injunction of the Bible, "add to knowledge temperance"? In regard to every course that would lead men to unhappiness, the Bible has stood, from the beginning, at the "entrance of the paths," and uttered its warning cry. The nations have not heard it, but have rushed by, and rushed on, till they have reaped the fruit of their own devices, in the corruption of morals, in the confusion of society through oppression and misrule, in disease and death; and then philosophy has condescended to discover these evils, and, if it has done any thing for the

permanent relief of society, has brought it back to the letter or spirit of the Bible. The Bible is not a treatise of moral philosophy, or of political economy, or a manual of politics, nor is it to be preached as any of these. It is a book, the object of which is to fit men to become freemen, in the great kingdom of God, with that liberty wherewith Christ makes them free; but in doing this it necessarily does all that is requisite to make them good members of an earthly community, and good citizens of an earthly government.

Need I speak further of the adaptations of the Gospel, to commend it to you as an object of interesting study in this point of view? Were it necessary, the materials are abundant and striking. It is indeed, in this respect, like the great elements of nature—like the atmosphere to which I have already indirectly compared it. How simple is this fluid in its structure! How varied and indispensable in its uses! See it furnishing the breath of life, supporting combustion, conveying sound, reflecting light, diffusing odors, giving rain, wafting ships, bearing up birds; and see the Gospel adapted to the infancy of society and to its highest state of cultivation, to the young, to the aged, to every climate, and to every form of social organization. See it expanding the intellect, purifying the affections, giving life and peace to the conscience, reforming the vicious, elevating the lowly, humbling the proud, comforting the afflicted, giving to life its highest joys, taking from death its sting.

It is, then, by studying the Gospel as a science, connected in its spirit with other sciences, and in the adaptations now spoken of, that its ministers will acquire true liberality of mind. This consists in seeing the extent and connections of truth, and in giving every thing its proper place. It is opposed to bigotry on the one hand, and on the other to that fashionable and self-conceited cant,

which has its basis in a want of discrimination, and in indifference to the truth. The liberal minded political economist is he who has extended views, and sees their connection with human happiness, and who, in proportion as his views become clear, values and abides by them. And thus it is in religion. True liberality does not consist in any compromise of the truth, in any lowering of its standard, nor in any insinuations respecting the general fallibility of man, and the impossibility of ascertaining it. It has no fellowship with that estimate of the Gospel of truth, which regards it as so little better than heathenism that it is not worth the cost of being sent to those who are destitute of it. Its language is, "Thanks be to God for his unspeakable gift." The man of a truly liberal, that is, of a comprehensive and discriminating mind, cares comparatively little when he sees the remoter stones in the arch of truth removed, whereas bigotry regards every stone as of equal importance; but when he sees the hand of error approaching the key-stone of that arch, and that there is danger that it will pluck it away, God forbid that he should be indifferent. Then he could shriek in the agony of his spirit, and if need be can come forward holding up his fettered hand and saying, "For the hope of Israel I am bound with this chain." If need be he can go to the stake. There *is* truth that *is* "the hope of Israel."

Connected with this mode of studying Christianity, there is also a quiet conviction of its truth, which is the most happy in its effects upon the temper and influence of him who has it. This conviction may, I know, be produced in other modes; but true science being an expression of the relations which subsist among the works of God, it is evidently impossible that any man should invent a system of truth which shall be analogous to it, in its severe yet beautiful expression, and which shall at the same time travel on and adapt itself to the more correct and expanded views of the physical universe which time

discloses; and when we see Christianity possessed of both these requisites, we seem in all our studies to inhale its truth as an element of our intellectual life, and to gain a conviction nearly allied in strength to that produced by the witness within ourselves, of which the Gospel speaks.

I will only add, as appropriate to this occasion, that this mode of studying the Gospel has an intimate connection with pulpit eloquence. It will not teach us to be graceful in gesture, or to "explode the vowels;" but it will furnish, if any thing can, variety of materials, and wealth of imagery, and the power of adaptation and depth of feeling without which there can be no eloquence. It is in vain to expect that eloquence of any kind, much less pulpit eloquence, can flourish, and shoot high, and endure long, without depth of soil. The water that is to set in motion many wheels must be accumulated, and young men need not be afraid of letting it head back, before they open the gate—they will have need of the whole of it. There is to the preacher more need of this variety of means and of resources than to any other man, because, while he is obliged to speak more, he is permitted to have before him but a single ultimate object. It is the great characteristic of pulpit eloquence, as distinguished from all other, that it has but a single object—to make men better. That which moves or affects men in any way, or to any extent, without being adapted to do this, may be eloquence in the pulpit, but it is not pulpit eloquence. When the true messenger of God touches the chords of excitement, it is not for its own sake, but only as a prelude to those deeper tones which he intends to elicit from reason and conscience vibrating at the touch of truth. The preacher does not come before his fellow men to seek their admiration, or to court a grin, but to transact solemn business; and he who has a vague idea of pulpit eloquence as something which is to *affect* an audience for a temporary purpose, or to cause an excitement, or to call forth

admiration, would find a fitter place in the theatre than in the sacred desk. It is to the one point of making men better that all his efforts are to converge, but if, in doing this, he confines himself to the narrow circle of technical or polemic theology, as it is often taught, together with the common topics of exhortation, he will necessarily repeat himself over and over, his discourses will become narrow and dry, and he will lose his influence over many minds. Instead of this, he should remember on this point the spirit of the apostle Paul when he said, "If by *any means* I might save some;" and should construct and arrange his discourses on the principle on which I have already said that the universe, as adapted to the intellect of man, is constructed and arranged—the principle of unity in the midst of variety, unity of purpose, variety of means. Why, not even the grass we tread on, can grow from the influence of a single element. It needs, not the sunshine alone, but also the rain and the breezes; and shall the soul of man be expected to attain its full expansion by a less varied and complex influence? Acting on this principle, he is to address the imagination, the passions, the understanding, the conscience; he is to preach plain sermons, metaphysical sermons, doctrinal sermons, practical sermons, written sermons, extempore sermons, bringing out of his treasures things new and old, and in all, holding fast to the one purpose, of saving them that hear.

Is it said that few can perform all this? I reply, God is not a hard master; he will not require of you that which you cannot perform. He has put into your charge a Gospel which, as we have seen, is adapted to expand the intellect to the utmost, and to call into action all the energies of the soul. Viewed in its grand characteristic of blended majesty and mercy, in its connection with the best interests of man in this life as well as in the life to come, it can hardly fail to call forth an enlightened zeal, which shall give energy to every effort, and cause you to

feel that in offering yourselves soul and body on the altar of Christianity you are but doing a reasonable service. It is this full, unreserved, cheerful consecration, so lamentably rare among us, that is, after all, the great secret of usefulness in a Gospel minister; and where this is, it will be accepted of God, "according to that a man hath, and not according to that he hath not."

ADDRESS,

DELIVERED AT THE ANNIVERSARY OF THE AMERICAN BIBLE SOCIETY,

May 14, 1840.

Mr. President,—I have been requested to present the following resolution: "*Resolved*, That the duty of furnishing the Scriptures to the young should be deeply felt by parents, guardians, and the conductors of schools." After the very forcible remarks that have fallen from the Chair on this subject, it may be unnecessary to say any thing more respecting it. Still, as it is of unusual importance at the present time, I shall hope for the attention of the audience to some further remarks.

If, sir, we should inquire why it was that this world was made the theatre of redemption, perhaps one reason would be found in the position of man at the very lowest point in the scale of rational existence. When we would measure the range of the human faculties, we first look at what man has done that is vast, at the pyramids and cathedrals he has constructed; and then we turn to the other end of the scale and see him, for example, engraving the Lord's prayer upon a space so minute as to require a microscope to bring it out. And so of the works of God. When we would estimate his power and skill, we first look at the heavens; we point our telescope to the milky

way, and see its misty spots disperse into stars; and then we turn to the wing of the insect, to the smallest microscopic animal, whose frame is yet, like ours, a harp of a thousand strings. And so it may be in the moral government of God. It may be that his wisdom, his condescension, his justice, his mercy, will be more illustriously displayed as they are seen to be called forth by the least act of the least moral agent, as it is seen that the same love that controls all heaven, can be engraved by the finger of God upon the heart of a child. At any rate, the very fact that God has revealed himself to the comprehension of *man*, would lead me to hope that this revelation would be adapted to the mind of the child; that it would be like the light—something provided for the moral, as that is for the natural eye, as soon as it opens.

And here, as it seems to me, is the only question that admits of argument under this resolution. Is the Bible adapted to the minds of children? For if it is, then, in the language of the resolution, the duty of furnishing them with it must be deeply felt.

It is the glory of the Christian religion, and one evidence that it came from God, that it is adapted to every form of government and social organization, to every climate, and to every variety of mental and moral cultivation. And can it be that it fails of being adapted to every age? It is true, it is as the fire and the hammer to break in pieces the flinty rocks of heathenism and infidelity, but then it also "distils as the dew, as the small rain upon the tender herb, and as the showers upon the grass."

That the Bible is thus adapted to the minds of children is evident, because it is not, like natural religion, a mere set of inferences, but it is the *word* of God, that is, it is a verbal and a direct communication as from a parent to a child. It has, I know, been thought by some "a thing incredible" that God should make such a communication,

or at least that it would require extraordinary evidence to substantiate it. Be it so. The Bible has extraordinary evidence. But to me it seems that such a communication was to have been expected, not only from the condition of man, but from his very nature as a religious being. The simple question is, Is man a *child?* Is he *capable* of intercourse with God? If so, why should he be debarred from this intercourse? Has God, in this solitary instance, created a capacity without providing for it the means of gratification? How else could our first parents, even before they sinned, have known that the infinite Being who created them, wished from them, or would even permit, expressions of worship? How else could a probation have been instituted? And when sin had entered, how else could the race have known the great facts of redemption and the forgiveness of sin, of the resurrection of the dead and of a final judgment? The whole history of the race shows that when man attempts to seek the true God, if, indeed he ever does, without a revelation, he gropes in the darkness, and is ready to exclaim, with Job, "O that I knew where I might find him." But if God has spoken to man at all, he has spoken to him as a religious being, and of course to every one capable of being religious. There is no more reason why a child cannot receive in a trustful spirit the simple statement of a fact made by God, or obey a plain precept given by him, than there is why he cannot trust and obey his earthly parent. "My son," says God, "give me thine heart." When? Certainly as soon as he is capable of looking up to heaven and saying, "My Father." The Bible reveals God in his parental relation, and chiefly requires of us obedience and trust.

But it is said by the Roman Catholics, and by our republican school committees, some of them at least, that the Bible is a book full of mysteries; that it has given rise to disputes and sects without end; and therefore, that

to put it into the hands of a child would rather perplex and confound than benefit his mind.

Now if the principle of this objection were sound, it would justify the Catholics in withholding the Bible from the common people. But it is not sound, for the Bible does not regard man solely as possessed of understanding, but also, and chiefly, as susceptible of obligation, as having a moral nature, and its truths act with a quickening power upon that nature, as light and heat do upon vegetation. I saw, sir, recently a little plant in a room with but one window, and all its branches grew towards the light. It could not analyze light, but it could feel it; and so can the conscience of a child feel the power of the great precepts and doctrines of the Bible. But if it be said that the moral nature acts only through the understanding, then I say that a child can surely see that it is reasonable for him to obey his father before he can understand his plans, and that this is so far from being derogatory to his understanding, that it is often the best and the only evidence the child can give that he has good sense and is a reasonable child. It seems to me that our rational nature may be very properly employed in discovering our relations to God as practical beings; and how very *reasonable* it is that such creatures as we should trust and obey him in all things! This brings us to the exercise of a filial temper towards God, and makes us all children, little children, yes, sir, very little children before the infinite Father of all. There is no right-minded philosopher, there is no experienced Christian, who does not feel more like a child as he knows more of the works and the word of God. It is in the exercise of this filial temper that we know the Bible to be true, because we feel it to be true. He that doeth his will shall know of the doctrine, and he who has not come to the study of the mysteries of the Bible in the exercise of this temper knows nothing yet as he ought to know.

But, sir, I would gladly know why those who are so much afraid of mysteries, make such a distinction between the Word of God and that other revelation which he has made of himself in his works. Did any one of them ever hesitate to show his child a granite cliff, lest his mind should be perplexed by the theories and disputes respecting the mode in which granite was raised up through the strata that once lay above it? Did he ever hesitate to show his child the sun-rising or the sun-setting, because he could not yet understand the Copernican system? No, sir; they know that the works of God are of other uses to the spirit of man, than to call forth his intellect in the investigation of their nature and laws. They awaken directly the emotions of beauty and sublimity. There is a spirit in them with which we commune. And so it is with the Bible. It is a good thing to understand the truths of the Bible systematically. I would not disparage that. Let the biblical geologist dig down into the strata of truth, and tell us the order in which they lie; let him, if he will, dispute about that order, and call himself a Huttonian or a Wernerian; let him adopt his "*ism;*" but do let the unlettered man and the child feel the beauty, and sublimity, and moral power of those precepts and facts of revelation which God has made to stand as the great mountains. Let the biblical astronomer tell us of central and planetary truths, but let the unlettered man and the child walk in the light of the Sun of righteousness. And, sir, is this the way to produce perplexity, confusion, heresy? In my opinion the first step towards doctrinal union is to bring the Gospel to bear practically upon the hearts of men. We are not sufficiently aware how much a love of the truth assists us in comprehending the truth. Let the mind be early freed from the controlling power of selfishness, and that reluctance to admit humbling and self-denying truth, which is the great ground of heresy, will be done away. Or if error should remain,

as perhaps through human imperfection it always will, it would not, as it now does, darken the moral sky, and bear in its bosom the elements of the tempest—it would be only as the light cloud that causes a passing shadow in the general sunshine.

These, sir, are some of the arguments with which I would sustain the resolution. But if facts could be adduced on this subject they would be more powerful than any argument. Here I cannot enlarge, but may perhaps mention a single case in point, that occurred recently. It was of a boy only ten years old, a member of a Sabbath-school in Brooklyn, who was in danger of being shipwrecked off the coast of North Carolina. There was a heavy sea, the ship had struck, and it was every moment expected she would go to pieces. As soon as he was told by his mother the danger they were in, he went to his little cabin, (he was the son of the captain,) and after spending a short time alone, came out prepared to buffet the waves. And what was his preparation? He had lashed tightly about him a few articles of clothing and his Bible. He felt that he should be safer in the waters with his Bible near him. Here is the spirit that we wish to see, and that we may see. Let our children bind the Bible to their hearts, and then whenever they are called upon to cast themselves upon the agitated waters of life, it will bear them above the waves of temptation; the waters of death itself shall not overflow them when they pass through; they shall reach a safe and a happy shore. And here let me say to Sabbath-school teachers, as well as to the friends of this Society, go on, go on, lash the Bible to the hearts of the young, lash it to the heart of this nation, and then the noble vessel that bears our liberties will never founder; she will outride the wildest hurricane that ever blew. But laying aside cases of early conversion, and of strong moral impression, which are the main thing, I wish the ministers of the Gospel present

could testify what knowledge of the Bible it is that is blended most intimately with their thoughts, that presents itself most spontaneously, and is most useful for reference and quotation. I appeal to you, my brethren, whether it is not that which you obtained before you were twelve years old, yes, and in many cases before you were six.

If now we add to this the benignant aspect with which the Bible every where looks upon the young, that he who was next to the apostles in usefulness, knew from a *child* the Holy Scriptures which were able to make him wise unto salvation; if we remember that the Saviour took up little children in his arms and blessed them, saying, "Of such is the kingdom of heaven;" if we hear him saying, "Verily I say unto you, whosoever shall not receive the kingdom of heaven as a little child, shall in no wise enter therein;" it seems to me that our duty on this subject could not be made plainer..

We would, sir, have this blessed book circulated and read every where; read in private, in families, in schools. We would have it read by every body; by the aged, by the middle-aged, and especially by the young; for just in proportion as we can bring its truths to bear upon *their* hearts, shall we lay the foundation of a reformation that will supersede the necessity of all others. We shall change the *spirit* of society, and then, whatever is wrong in its external forms will be cast off naturally and without convulsion, just as the chrysalis drops its old covering when its wings are fully grown. Then a just, and therefore a permanent order of things will be established. "The people shall be all righteous, and shall possess the land for ever."

ADDRESS,

DELIVERED AT THE THIRD ANNIVERSARY OF THE MOUNT HOLYOKE FEMALE SEMINARY.

July 30, 1840.

Important as female education is now admitted to be, it is not perhaps surprising that it did not receive early attention. Men attack evils as they find them, without first investigating secret influences and remote causes. It was natural, for instance, that intemperance should first be attacked as it existed in the intemperate, before it was traced back to its source in temperate drinking. And so it was natural that mankind should first attempt to control the waters of society as they found them flowing on, impetuous and turbid, before tracing them up to their source and purifying the springs from which they flowed.

This attempt has been made from the beginning and is still made. It is not even yet understood how true it is, in the body politic as well as in the natural body, that "if one member suffer, all the members suffer with it," that if one portion of the community be enslaved, or oppressed, or degraded, there will be sown indirectly the seeds of vice, of debility, and of ultimate dissolution; and especially, that if those who hold to us the relations of wives, and mothers, and daughters, and sisters, are restricted, or

cramped, or in any way prevented from receiving that expansion of the intellect and of the affections which will enable them to exert an elevating and a purifying influence upon man, society cannot reach its full stature and perfection. It is not understood how high those qualities of the intellect and of the heart are, which are needed for the right management of the young, how much light and how much love must shine around the opening bud of early childhood that it may expand in fair proportions; it is not understood how early the ductile material of character begins to grow rigid, so that before the age of eight, or even of six, it generally assumes lineaments to which subsequent life only serves to give greater prominence. In forming that material, *man* cannot do what ought to be done, he cannot undo what *will be* done by a mother who is ignorant or weak or selfish or unprincipled; and whatever influence he may wish to exert, will be far more efficient if he has the co-operation of one who can enter fully into all his views,—just as the oak will cast a shade that is deeper and more refreshing if the vine that adorns it mingles its leaves with those of every branch, and entwines itself to the topmost bough.

But these truths are beginning to be understood and felt, and there are probably more persons now than ever before, who feel that if we are ever to do any thing effectual for the improvement of society, the proper place to begin at is the beginning—that the influence that presides over the cradle, and the nursery, and the fireside, must be a right influence.

My opportunities for information on this subject are slight, but I believe there are now few who will not assent to the two following propositions: first, that so far as the object of education is to fit the individual for a particular sphere, the education of woman—her preparation for that sphere—should be as complete and thorough as that of man; and, secondly, that so far as the object of

education is to expand and strengthen the mind, without reference to a more specific and immediate result, the advantages of the sexes should be equal. By this I do not mean that their education should be the same, but that the education of woman should be as well adapted to expand and strengthen her mind, as that of man is to expand and strengthen his.

Between these two parts of education there is a broad distinction, and it is now generally understood that it is a false method to neglect the specific and the practical for the more general. The trades, the business, the individual duties of life, its ordinary arrangements both domestic and public, must move forward. We must, for example, have good blacksmiths. They must perfect themselves in their business, and then, if they please, they may learn fifty languages. It is precisely for this that Mr. Burritt claims our admiration. It is not so much that he knows so many languages, though this is certainly very extraordinary, as it is that he has acquired them without neglecting the labors or slighting the details of his occupation. This is what is needed every where, and especially in female education. It is from a want of this on the part of some distinguished females, and of many others who have had a school education, that more prejudice has arisen against female education than from any other source. Woman has so much to do with details, that it is particularly unfortunate, and incongruous, and often one of the "miseries of human life" to those intimately connected with her, when she is so imaginative as not to see things as they are, or so much given to general speculation as not to attend to the minutiæ of domestic and social life. It is even said by some respecting this Seminary that it is doing more harm than good, because, as they say, it "turns all the girls into ladies." And their idea of a lady seems to be, that she is a sort of person who has a smattering of knowledge without knowing much that is sub-

stantial; that she is above work, a good deal dressed up; and that she is particularly pleased when she can find somebody who will talk nonsense to her and to whom she can talk nonsense. They would imagine that the following description, by Crabbe, of a boarding school Miss, is as applicable now as it was in his day.

> "To farmer Moss, in Langar vale, came down,
> His only daughter, from her school in town;
> A tender, timid maid, who knew not how
> To pass a pig-stye, or to face a cow;
> Smiling she came, with petty talents graced,
> A fair complexion, and a slender waist."

Or, if intellectual advantages are really obtained, they take it for granted it is at the expense of the more homely, and useful, and domestic qualities. So prevalent has this prejudice been, even among the better informed portions of the community, that young ladies whose tastes have led them to make uncommon attainments in languages or science have felt themselves, from other motives than their native modesty, desirous of carefully concealing the fact. This prejudice ought to be entirely done away, and young ladies now in a course of education, owe it to themselves and to the cause to see that it is done away. Let them have independence, and keep to their good sense on this point, fully preparing themselves for domestic duties, and acquiring no fastidiousness or false refinement in regard to their performance; and there is no friend they have now, or ever will have, who will not be happy and proud to have them accomplished to any extent, and make the highest attainments in literature and science. A single *Miss* Burritt, if she could be found, would, in my opinion, do more for the cause of female education than any money that can be raised.

Regarding it then as settled that woman should be as well fitted for her particular sphere, whatever that may be, as man is for his, let us look at the proposition stated

in regard to her general education. This was, that so far as the object of education is simply to expand and strengthen the mind, the advantages of the sexes should be equal. But taking this as our principle, and perhaps we cannot adopt a better, there are still two reasons, as society is now constituted, why the general education of females will be less extensive than that of the other sex. The first is, that the particular callings of men render much of the study that is specific and professional with them, entirely general with females. The great motive with men in studying languages and mathematics, is not, generally, to cultivate their faculties, but to prepare themselves for the attainment and practice of their professions. There evidently is not the same reason for teaching young ladies navigation, and engineering, and Hebrew, as if they were expected to take the command of our men-of-war, or lay out railroads, or expound the Old Testament. This reason must have a very considerable influence, so long as the present distribution of employments remains. The second reason is to be found in the comparatively early age at which females enter into society and into married life. The effect of this also upon a protracted course of study and general mental discipline must be unfavorable —but whether there will be any change in this respect, is, perhaps, doubtful.

Still, making every allowance which, in a practical world like this, we must make for these two reasons, there will remain what may be fairly called a liberal education for females, which we are called upon by parental affection, by a regard to the general good, by the spirit of Christianity, by justice itself, to diffuse as widely as possible. It only remains therefore to inquire, what should be the spirit and principle of such an education, and what means ought to be provided for its promotion.

And here I may observe, that deficient as the means have been, yet the great reason why the legitimate objects

of female education have not been more fully realized, has existed, not so much in that deficiency, as in the wrong spirit and principle by which fashionable female education has been governed. Let woman be rightly estimated, let her be so treated that she shall rightly estimate herself, and the extent and quality of her moral influence upon a family and upon society will be less modified than many have supposed, by the precise amount of acquisition she may make in the higher branches of intellectual education.

It is obvious, then, that the inquiry respecting the spirit and principle of female education is first in importance; and as that education is, and ought to be, conducted very much with reference to the opinions and feelings of others, perhaps it may be well to inquire what those feelings are to which we should have respect, if we had it in our power to endow a female friend with every thing that we thought desirable. What are the feelings which a young lady would herself wish to excite in a judicious and impartial person of her own sex?

And here we will not ask the young lady to answer, but we will answer for ourselves and for her, that one feeling which we should wish to have excited would be *admiration*. Perhaps some would hesitate to avow this; but it is, to some extent, common to all, and if properly regulated, is not, in my judgment, wrong. This is the feeling awakened by that excellence in natural objects, in human actions, and in the products of skill, which addresses itself to the taste. God evidently made his works to be admired. The human figure and countenance, as the chief of those works on the earth, ought to be admired. If he has given us endowments capable of exciting this feeling, it is an advantage to us, and if those around us are what they should be, a pleasure to them, for which both we and they ought to be thankful; and if we are able to embody and express the principles

of a pure taste, I do not see why we may not emulate what is beautiful and graceful in nature; and innocently seek to become the conscious objects of that feeling which God excites by his works.

It must be confessed, however, that this brings us on dangerous ground. The love of admiration, as distinguished from the love of those things which may properly awaken it, can never be called a virtue. Under its best forms it is simply innocent; and under almost all the forms in which we see it, it is decidedly selfish. It is, in the female world, what the desire of power is among men—the moving spring of the world of fashion, as that is of the world of politics; and it is to obtain this that the tactics of rival belles are displayed at places of fashionable resort, as those of politicians are in congress and at the polls.

The feeling itself is awakened, first, by natural gifts, as beauty and grace of person; and, secondly, by those acquisitions that are termed accomplishments. So far as it depends upon the first, it can evidently have no good effect in stimulating industry; and the readiness with which such advantages are made the ground of pride, and vanity, and affectation, and impertinent display—the facility with which they lead to a line of feeling and conduct inconsistent with a high state of either moral or intellectual culture, renders the possession of them in any remarkable degree, in almost all cases, a misfortune. No woman much distinguished for any thing else, has, so far as I know, been distinguished for beauty, and most distinguished women have been remarkably plain. By this I do not mean to say that beauty is, in itself, undesirable, but only relatively so, for in a perfect state of things every individual would be perfectly beautiful. When the character is so strong that beauty seems to be possessed with that charming unconsciousness with which the flower blooms, it is well; but if, when we say, "she is beautiful," we must hear from some dear friend of hers

the too well founded remark, "yes, and she knows it too," then would a countenance expressive simply of good temper and good sense be on the whole more pleasing.

But it is not of admiration as excited by natural gifts, so much as by the results of education, that I ought here to speak. Those acquisitions which have this desire for their object, are, as I have said, termed accomplishments; and it is the gratification of this desire by means of them that is often the express, if not the avowed, end of most of the pains taken in female education. It is, indeed, by the predominance of this, that the whole spirit of fashionable female education has been corrupted, so that there are few things in the treatment of women in heathen or Mohammedan countries more irrational and degrading than the sacrifice of the health, and intellect, and affections of young girls that is often made with reference to it. The physical system is distorted, and years are spent in mere mechanical drudgery in which neither the head nor the heart are interested or improved. If there is in any human being a true love of that which lies at the foundation of the arts,—of that which is beautiful, and graceful, and sublime, let it be cultivated, and brought out in its appropriate forms of expression. It will add not only grace, but dignity to the character. It will refine and elevate society. But when the true inspiration gives place to the selfish love of admiration, it is like the coming in of idol worship, under the name, and in the place, of true religion. Instead of the simplicity of character and unselfish pleasure connected with a true love of the arts, —forwardness, artifice, affectation, envy, come in; and under the pretence of cultivating a part of our nature which was intended to be the ally of virtue, the affections are perverted and the heart hardened. There becomes fixed in the mind, (and who has not seen it?) a passion which is among the most absorbing and unhappy of any in its effects. The individual under its influence becomes

entirely selfish. There is no artifice to which she will not resort, no meanness to which she will not descend. The desire increases by indulgence, affection is sacrificed to it, fortune is wasted, and the comforts and duties of home are neglected. Well has Lady Morgan observed, that those who excite general admiration are seldom calculated to make *one* happy.

Nor is there any passion that will more certainly lead to ultimate disappointment and unhappiness. The period during which admiration can be expected, is brief, and nothing can be more pitiable than attempts made to retain it as age comes on. I have seen few persons more restless and apparently wretched, than some who have lived in the midst of admiration and flattery, when they found themselves passing into the shadows of age. Let accomplishments come in as accessories to a cultivated intellect and pure affections, and they are to be desired. They are as the clouds that sometimes follow in the train of the evening sun, and that reflect in brighter colors, without obscuring, the common light of day. But when they are taken out of their proper place, and it is attempted to make them shine by their own light, even admiration is seldom gained, and when it is, it is too dearly purchased by the loss of respect.

Respect—this is the next feeling which we should wish our young friend to excite ; and the foundations of it are very different from those of admiration. With this, beauty, accomplishments, and even talents, considered by themselves, have very little to do. They may increase respect when its fundamental requisites are present, but they cannot give it. The foundation of respect is laid in the use which we make of our own powers. One who uses the faculties which God has given in a right way, and for right ends, is always respectable ; and respect is diminished by any neglect or perversion of those faculties.

If they are perverted by vice, it is criminal; if they are neglected through indolence, it is, if less criminal, more contemptible; and if they are used in an improper sphere or in an affected way, it is either pitiable or ridiculous.

But a right use of the faculties implies, of course, the ascendency of the moral nature, manifesting itself in a sacred regard to duty, whether towards God or towards man. Wherever this is seen it commands respect, and no other element of our nature does, except in combination with this. The moment a child has an idea of any thing as *right*, and struggles and makes sacrifices for it *as such*, that moment we respect that child. We see in it something sacred; we recognize its relations to God; we see evidence of moral accountability, and the pledge of an immortal life. Here is the germ that we are to cultivate. Here is the ground on which angels sympathize with man, on which man has been redeemed. He was redeemed because his moral nature rendered him capable of communion with God, and brought him into relations to his government which can cease only when that ceases. And shall a being thus endowed, thus cared for, be set up as an exhibition?

But essential as the manifestation of moral principle is in order to respect, there is still another element not to be overlooked. It is a sense of propriety. By this I mean that nice perception of the natural relations as constituted by God, by which many persons adopt, as by a finer sense or instinct, the course of conduct that would be found best on the widest view of things. This, it must be confessed, is not always proportioned to moral principle, and when it is not, we feel a painful want of harmony in the effect produced upon our minds. Certainly we are not to mistake conventional arrangements for the natural order of things; but if woman has a sphere that is appropriate to her, she must lose respect whenever she attempts to move out of that sphere.

The only danger of those who seek to be respected is

of becoming formal and stiff. But of this there is no need. The firmest principle is entirely compatible with the kindest affections, and the most perfect grace of manner. Who was kinder in heart than our Saviour? Who ever regarded all the principles of taste more uniformly than he? Respect may seem a cold word to some; but we may rely upon it that no woman was ever truly and worthily beloved further than she was respected; and she is false to her own interests, as well as to the dignity of the sex, who, for the sake of pleasing, steps from the high ground of moral principle, and does any thing that would diminish respect. Young women little know how eagerly this is watched for, how quickly it is perceived, how contemptuously it is spoken of. The qualities which excite respect may become repulsive. They will, when principle verges towards bigotry, and propriety towards precision. But when those qualities are connected with good taste, and pervaded, as they may be, by the affections, they become as the diamond fitly set, not only solid but brilliant, the most precious gem that can sparkle upon the breast of beauty. Respect need not, and should not be incompatible with the warmest affection.

And this leads me to add, that we should not only wish our young friend to be admired and respected, but also to be *beloved.* Unless there is between us and others a reciprocal affection, the light and warmth of life have gone out. That woman should be the object of affection is especially desirable, both as her happiness is more dependent upon it than that of the other sex, and as it is the legitimate source of her influence. When her qualities are such as properly to attract love in addition to respect and admiration, however great her influence may be, man would not wish it less; and it certainly will be so great, that woman ought not to wish it more. It will be an influence, too, that will preclude all idea of conflicting and rival interests between the sexes, while it is felt, through the Christian views and devoted affections of man, upon the

widest movements of society. The sphere of woman, in its relation to these great movements, is like the wheel in the vision of the prophet that was within a wheel. It lies at the centre. There the affections of our hearts cluster, and nothing can go well unless the same spirit inspires and guides the movements of both the wheels.

The great mistake in regard to affection, obvious as it is, seems to consist in supposing that it can exist permanently, without permanent qualities in the character by which it is naturally attracted and upon which it can fix. How can we love, if there is nothing to be loved? But how far education can confer those qualities on which affection depends, may admit of a question. Certainly it cannot secure them, as it may accomplishments and knowledge, for affection depends, not upon what a person may acquire, but upon what she may *come to be;* not upon what she *has*, but upon what she *is*. This is an important distinction, and a proper attention to it would do much to correct the general spirit of the education of both sexes. Interest asks, *has* she money? Pride and vanity ask, *has* she accomplishments? Yes, and *has* she knowledge? But the heart asks, *is* she affectionate? *is* she benevolent and disinterested? *is* she pure and elevated in her moral character? These are qualities which cannot be obtained by playing on musical instruments, or reciting lessons.

So far as what is termed education, merely assists individuals in *acquiring* either knowledge or accomplishments which are to be used for purposes of display, it is not to be encouraged. So far as it gives this knowledge and these accomplishments for innocent pleasure, or to advance the civilization and comfort of the world, it is to be encouraged as any other useful art. It is only when it seeks to change what man *is*, and make him what he *ought to be*, that it assumes an importance beyond every thing else. Then it goes down into the depths of his being, and seeks to lay the foundations right. It says in

words of more than human wisdom, "First make the tree good, and the fruit will be good." Make men what they ought to be, and acquisitions and accomplishments will come as a matter of course. It is only as education can do this, that it will greatly affect for good the results of human society.

And here, I may observe, we see the distinction between an artist in education, a skilful professor, one who assists us in making a particular acquisition, and a mother, a father, a true educator, who moulds the feelings and principles of action, who enters into the work with an affection and a sense of responsibility which money cannot purchase, and which nothing but high aims and virtuous conduct on the part of those cared for can reward. Here then there is needed not so much talents, as, what is by no means always proportioned to them, influence—and such an influence too, as none but a good parent can ordinarily exert. And I cannot believe that education will ever be what it should, till parents feel their responsibilities more, and give more personal attention to the subject, than they do at present.

But so far as any thing can be accomplished in this department of education, no system is worth comparatively any thing that is not based on the Bible. The spirit of the Bible reaches down to the depths of the soul, has power to transform it, and to confer those qualities upon which the affections of a reasonable and a moral being must depend. It looks entirely at what a man *is*, and not at all at what he *has*. Hence it is that a young woman of good sense, and natural endowments, who should take the Bible, and seek in simplicity of heart to learn and manifest its spirit, asking wisdom of Him who giveth liberally to all, and should grow up at home with a sensible mother, would not only be more estimable and lovely, but would be better fitted for usefulness, and in the highest sense better educated, than ninety-nine in a hundred who spend years at school.

I have nothing to say here of those specific affections which belong to the different relations of life; but as showing the general ground of what in my idea constitutes loveliness, and which alone exalts and sanctifies all those affections, I wish I could present before this audience a picture which I once had the pleasure of seeing at the house of a gentleman in Boston. It was a picture of Mary, sitting at the feet of Jesus and hearing his words. *There* was loveliness, as there always must be when the countenance reflects the spirit of those instructions that fell from the lips of Christ. *There* was disinterested affection, and reverence, and purity, and moral elevation, and a settled peace which it would seem that even torture could not disturb; and where these are expressed, there will be loveliness whether the features are beautiful or not. But when, as in the picture, these qualities irradiate features that are in themselves beautiful, then the eye and the heart are both satisfied—we have before us the impersonation of female loveliness. A copy of that picture ought to be hung up in every female seminary in the land; for as it is the religion of Christ that has given woman the high position that she now holds in the respect and the best affections of man, so it is the spirit of that alone that can fit her to maintain that position. Even admiration of the highest kind, as well as respect and love, can flow only from the manifestation, in female character, of the spirit of the Christian religion.

Having thus considered severally the emotions with reference to which we should educate a young lady, and the qualifications upon which those emotions must depend, perhaps it may be well to bring those qualifications together, and contemplate the being we should have. There can surely be no harm in thus gathering up a little the fragments of that excellence that was broken and scattered in Eden, and holding them together long enough to see what we might have been—what, through the restoring grace of the second Adam, we may yet be. It

may even do us good to contemplate ideal excellence by stimulating us to higher efforts, if we are at the same time careful to acquire no disrelish for those sober and chastened views which experience gives, of what we are really to expect in a world like this.

Let us, then, suppose the qualities mentioned to be combined in a high degree in a single individual. Let us suppose her beautiful in person, and, I will not say *accomplished*, for there clings to that word something of ostentation which I do not like, not accomplished, but possessed of accomplishments, and simple and elegant in manners. Let us suppose her intellectual faculties so exercised and balanced, that she has extensive information and good judgment, in connection with the lighter graces of imagination and fancy; and then that she so combines simple piety and the severer virtues with practical goodness as to awaken mingled respect and affection; and we have a combination, certainly possible, of solid and brilliant qualities, such as might well remind a person of no extraordinary enthusiasm of that expression in the Revelation, "And I saw an angel standing in the sun."

Having made these general remarks, which were, perhaps, rather expected than needed, I will proceed to say something on what I learn from those more immediately interested in it to be the peculiar feature of this Seminary —that is, its *permanence*. This, I understand, is the only Female Seminary in the Union where the buildings and grounds, the library and apparatus, are pledged as permanent contributions to the cause of female education.* All other seminaries are sustained by individual enterprise, —in some cases by a single person—in others by associations, who receive an income from the investment of their money. It is on this ground especially that the trustees of this seminary present their claims upon the liberality

* It has been mentioned to me since the above was spoken that there is at least one exception. It is however of recent origin.

of the public, and as it seems to me with good reason. It is an attempt to do that for the daughters of the State, which the State itself, and beneficent individuals, have from the first done for its sons. Some of the advantages connected with this feature are the following.

First, it makes a good education less expensive. The practical operation of this single feature is of great importance. In those female schools that have been ranked highest, the expense, so far as I know, of sustaining a young lady for a year, is nearly double, and, in some cases, more than double what is required to give a young man the advantages of a college course. This, of course, prevents any, except the daughters of the wealthy, from receiving what is called the best education. This is not in accordance with the spirit of our institutions, which is to give no political preferences, to diffuse knowledge and education as widely as possible, and then to let wealth and social institutions take care of themselves. If our colleges were not so endowed as to furnish a better education than private wealth can generally give, we should very soon have one education for the rich, and another for the poor, such as would lay the foundation for distinctions far broader than any that now exist. But these institutions were founded in an age when our legislators had not yet discovered that to make the best education cheap by endowments, so as to bring it within the reach of the great body of the people, was aristocratic in its tendencies. That discovery, so far as young *men* are concerned, is now made and generally received, at least in this State; but I cannot see how it would have that tendency as applied to young women. There are many wealthy men who pay three and four hundred dollars a year for the education of their daughters, and I cannot see why it would not be a public benefit if these same advantages, and perhaps better, could be had for *sixty* dollars, so that the daughters of clergymen, country merchants, farmers, mechanics, might have the advantages

of knowledge and truly cultivated intellects. The connection of female education with the general welfare, has been already alluded to. This is such as to render it a matter in which the State is concerned; for even the influence of common schools, concerning which so much is said, is as nothing in comparison with the home which is so much made what it is by the mother, and where instruction and influence are combined as they can be no where else.

Nor should I be in the least deterred from giving such an education by any untoward symptoms of the present times. A period of transition is always one of some confusion. It was long ago said, that "a little knowledge is a dangerous thing." This we are seeing exemplified. But we believe that a judicious and liberal education would not only lead woman to be satisfied with her present sphere, but would enable and induce her to render it more fruitful of blessings. On this subject we desire investigation. If there is any thing, which, upon an enlarged view of the constitution of God, and the relations of things, ought to be conceded to woman which has not yet been, then it is for the true interest of man to concede it; and any thing more is not for the interest of woman.

But after all the expense, what are the advantages offered by these private and shifting seminaries? So far as apparatus and libraries are concerned, next to nothing. Nor can such advantages be expected, while the business is in the hands of individuals for the purpose of making money. But since the advances that have been made in the natural sciences, I consider some acquaintance with them essential to a good education of any rational being. I should sooner leave a daughter ignorant of many other very important branches of knowledge than, if I had the means of teaching her, to leave her ignorant of the great laws and principles of chemistry, and botany, and natural philosophy, and astronomy, which unfold to us the structure

of the universe, and bring us into intelligent communion with the works of God. This is a kind of knowledge, in the acquisition of which I should have no reference to the mere utility of physical results, but to the higher utility of its general elevating and strengthening and purifying influence upon the mind. To give this knowledge adequately, there must be more apparatus than would ever be found in private seminaries, where the chief part of the apparatus generally consists in pianos, and guitars, and music-books. I may also add here, that I do not suppose it would be possible to incorporate the peculiar features of this institution, by which its advantages are afforded so surprisingly cheap, into any purely private establishment.

Another advantage connected with permanence, consists in securing and fixing the results of experience and of individual wisdom. This, also, is of great importance. In time past, when a school has been established by some able person, and become celebrated, it has been thronged for a time, till the principal became old, or sick, or wearied, or was married; and then, however striking her improvements, or wise her arrangements, there has been no framework to sustain them, and they have been lost to the world. No more striking instance of this could be mentioned than the school at Ipswich under the care of Miss Grant. That school was a public benefit, which, from the number of teachers it sent forth, cannot be wholly lost. But how much greater the benefit, if its principles and order shall be perpetuated in a permanent institution as this is intended to be? The experience which would be acquired in such an institution, might be expected to give it authority, by which a degree of uniformity would be produced, so that, instead of the present uncertainty in regard to schools, the public would know where to look, and what to expect.

There are also some advantages connected with a per-

manent institution gratuitously endowed, from its more direct responsibility to the public. In such institutions the salaries are fixed; there is no intention of making money, and little temptation to those various kinds of mismanagement which are sometimes complained of in private schools.

With these advantages, the trustees of this institution hope to make it greatly and extensively useful. They do not, I presume, lay claim to any infallibility, nor to any perfection in their present arrangements. Many judicious persons still look with suspense at the issue of the experiment; though I am happy to say, that so far as I know, the objections are vanishing as the institution makes progress and becomes better known; and what I have seen this day, strengthens my conviction that those objections will vanish entirely. For myself, I have no doubt of the correctness of the general principles of which I have spoken. First; there is an education, which may if you please be termed liberal, higher than can be attained at our common schools or even academies, which it is desirable should be as generally and as equally within the reach of the young women of the country as possible. And secondly; what this is, and the best manner of giving it, can be best ascertained in a permanent institution, the object of whose trustees and teachers is not private interest, except as that is promoted by a fixed salary, but solely the advancement of a rational mode of education. If these two points are established, we may safely leave it to the wants and the good sense of the public, how long the course shall be, and of what studies it shall consist.

On such a subject I ought to speak with great diffidence, for I have no experience, and have had very little opportunity for observation; but I am free to confess, that if the mother and the home of a young lady were such as they should be, and such as many are, I should not desire for her a four, and I should have great doubts in regard

even to a three years' course at any public seminary. I think too highly of the influence of home, the love of home, the habits and associations of home. I should not be without apprehension, too, that the manners might suffer, for there is such a thing as school-manners; and possibly the morals of some might be endangered. Still there must be very many to whom such an institution will be an unmixed and an unspeakable blessing. Many young ladies have no mothers; others have those who either cannot, or will not, give them the requisite attention; others still, who expect to teach, require an extended education; and if there should be some evils connected with such an institution, as indeed there must be with all the institutions of man, they would doubtless be far overbalanced by the good.

In the meantime, the public have every reason to confide in the trustees and teachers of this seminary, that their course will be guided by sound discretion, and by enlarged, liberal and Christian views. Let them be sustained, then, and furnished with the means necessary to carry forward their great and good work. Their success hitherto has been all, and more than all that they anticipated. The omens of the future are full of promise. If the connection of this cause with the best destinies of the country, and of the world, is less perceptible than that of some others, it is not less intimate. That period for which the world waits, can never come till woman shall assume her proper place in intelligence and moral influence. Woman, as she ought to be, was reserved originally to give completeness to the creation of God; and it is only when she shall again become what she ought to be, that we can expect to see the moral elements which are now in commotion, arranging themselves into a permanent and happy order of things.

ADDRESS,

DELIVERED BEFORE THE MEDICAL CLASS AT PITTSFIELD,

November 4, 1840.

It is now ten years since I have attended to the practice of Medicine, or to the studies connected with it. Not that those studies have lost their interest to me, but I have been so much occupied with other things as necessarily to exclude them. During this period, if I may judge from the nature of the case, or from the years that preceded it, there have been changes, it may be improvements, both in the theory and practice of medicine. Of these changes however, whatever they may be, I am almost entirely ignorant; for 'few and far between' have been the rambles that I have taken along the shores of medical literature, to see what accident, or the love of truth, or the love of fame or of money, may have thrown up upon the surface of that ever restless sea. Of the new cases reported, the new operations performed, the new medicines discovered, the new theories proposed, I know very little. I am even ignorant whose treatise on fever is now considered the best, and who has made the last attempt to bind, in his nosology, the protean form of Disease.

Under these circumstances, though ready to do any

thing in my power to add interest to this occasion, it is with reluctance that I come before the profession, for nothing that I shall say can have the advantage of novelty, or of being connected with the exciting and contested points of the present time. If the profession itself is, in some way, as has been said by Shakspeare of the times, out of joint, I cannot reduce the dislocation; if it needs physic, or bloodletting, or perhaps a touch of the actual cautery, I am not sufficiently acquainted with the symptoms to administer the remedy, or to foretell the result.

I shall therefore ask your attention to a more general, and of course a less exciting topic—to the inquiry how far medicine can properly be called a science; and to some remarks on the qualities of mind that ought to be cultivated by the physician, in consequence of the peculiar relation which his scientific knowledge bears to the practice of his art.

Every physical science is founded on observation, and implies, in the production of the phenomena which it considers, the uniform operation of what we call a principle or law. If this principle has ceased to operate, we then observe and classify things; if it is still in operation, we then observe and classify phenomena or facts. In geology, for instance, we observe rocks, and in mineralogy, minerals. In these cases we observe and classify the results of an agency that has worked according to some law, and left its impress upon material things, and passed away. But in astronomy, and magnetism, and electricity, and medicine, we observe phenomena—facts that are taking place by an agency now in operation, and that is moving on and will move on according to its own laws, whether we understand them or not. When the stone falls, it is not the stone that we notice, but the fact of its fall. This fact is classed with many others that resemble it—with the tendency, for example, of the moon towards the earth, and of the earth towards the sun, and then they are all

referred to the operation of one principle, which we call gravitation. This is the active principle which lies at the foundation of the science of astronomy; that which lies at the foundation of magnetism, we call magnetism or the magnetic fluid; of electricity, electricity or the electric fluid; and that which lies at the foundation of medicine, we call the principle of life.

Of these different principles, that of Life certainly is not the least wonderful, and is by far the most interesting to us. What this is in itself, we are forbidden by the spirit of the inductive philosophy to inquire. We use the term principle, or law, simply to express the fact of a uniform mode of operation, without supposing that the principle or law can itself be an agent, and without intending to indicate any theory in relation to the nature of the agent. In this, as in similar cases, physical science can only record the order of those events by which the hidden principle manifests itself. We can note down, and that is all that is practically needful for us, the progress of the hour and of the minute hand upon the dial plate of nature; we can sometimes, as in the dissection of the human body, uncover its machinery; but its moving power cannot be investigated so as to become, as that term is understood in the Baconian philosophy, an object of science. Here the part of true wisdom is to know and respect the limit of our powers. This limit, at the point now in question, is well defined. There is not on either side of it the breadth of a northern, or even the narrow range of an equatorial twilight. When we would step from facts and their classification to powers, we find that as objects of physical science they utterly transcend and defy all the means and methods of the Baconian induction. In respect to these, that shore of the ocean of truth along which Newton felt that he had but strayed and gathered pebbles, is a bold shore, and if even he had stepped off, he would have plunged at once beyond his depth.

This principle of life and the true method of investigating it, do not seem to have been fully recognized till the time of John Hunter; and to him we are probably more indebted on this subject than to any other man. He first ascertained that life, in its lowest forms, always raises the temperature of bodies—that a tree, for example, that is alive, is warmer in winter than one that is not. Here then is the first great fact by which life exhibits itself—it raises the temperature of all bodies in which it resides; a fact, by the way, which those who investigate the cause of animal heat might do well to regard more fully than they seem to have done. The second, and grand mode in which life manifests itself, is by taking ordinary matter and building it up, in opposition to the common laws both of chemistry and of gravitation, into organized forms. Belonging at first to a germ, perhaps too small for inspection, it commences its inexplicable process of accretion, of assimilation, and of arrangement, and working always with the certainty of instinct, if not with the skill of reason, it becomes the grand architect of every living structure. In every such structure Hunter was the first to recognize the operation of the one principle of life. He saw that it was only through the structures that the principle itself could be studied, and it was his conception—a conception which he went as far towards realizing as any man could in that day—to collect in one cabinet, and range in regular gradation, specimens of every structure formed by this principle.

There are, indeed, superadded to this simple principle of life in animals and in man, sensibility, locomotion, and the power of thought; but these need not be studied by the physician except as they affect that principle, for his object is generally gained if that can be preserved, and can be brought to assume a regular and healthy action. The higher has its root in the lower. The plant grows from the soil; the animal from the plant. Keep the soil

good, and the plant will grow. Keep organic life sound, and the powers of sensibility, and locomotion, and thought, will generally take care of themselves.

The principle of life then, lies at the foundation of the science of medicine; but is it to be studied as manifested in this wonderful range of productions only by the physician? Certainly not. We might as well say that no one should study the science of music except those whose business it is to repair musical instruments. In its regular manifestations the principle of life presents itself as one of the great principles of nature, inviting equally with gravitation, or light, or magnetism, or electricity, the study of every liberal and inquiring mind. This I know has not been so regarded, but it is coming to be so more and more. It ought, at least, to enter somewhat largely into every course of liberal education, and I trust that in one college at least, more will be done with reference to it than has been done.

On this point physicians themselves have perhaps been in fault, or at least have misjudged. They have been inclined to regard the whole domain as their own, and to publish books, especially on human physiology, solely for the use of the profession. This, however, has been much less the case within the last few years, and the change cannot fail to be advantageous both to the public and to the profession. It will be advantageous to the public, because, by giving them a knowledge of the laws of health, which are nothing more than the conditions on which the principle of life will act with regularity, much disease will be prevented; and it will be of advantage to the profession, because it will furnish the only possible guard against the prevalence of quackery, which is found to deposit its eggs and mature its growth upon ignorance alone. Nor would it encroach upon the proper province or science of the physician, if the whole of physiology were well understood by the community; for though the principle of life

lies at the foundation of the science of the physician, yet if it were like gravitation, and never irregular in its action, there would be no physicians or science of medicine. The laws of life manifested in regular action ought to be understood by every body, so far at least as is necessary to preserve health. It is only as it manifests itself in diseased action, that the principle of life lies at the foundation of medical science. Diseased action, and the means of controlling it—diseases and remedies—these are the appropriate subjects of the study of the physician.

As a prerequisite to the knowledge of diseases, anatomy and physiology are necessary; to the knowledge of remedies, chemistry and botany. No physician can be fully qualified to practice his profession unless he is acquainted with these sciences; and the field of observation and of general cultivation to the mind which they open is so wide, that from its connection with them, if from nothing else, the profession of medicine would be entitled to the rank of a liberal profession.

In these preliminary sciences great advances have been made within the memory of man. It was a great step when Bichat discovered the different tissues and it was found that the character and duration of disease was very much dependent upon the tissue in which it was seated. This laid open at once a new and scientific ground both of diagnosis and of prognosis. Of perhaps equal importance have been some of the discoveries made in reference to the uses and sympathies of different parts of the nervous system. "Botany," as has been remarked, "is no longer an overgrown accumulation of synonyms and absurdities. It no longer is deformed by the ignorance, the want of method, and the lack of fertility of invention of its historians, as it had been rendered by the followers of Linnæus." Chemistry is constantly bringing to light new substances, or bringing into a more convenient and effective form those already known; and now, both chem-

istry and botany conspire to constitute a materia medica such as was never dreamed of by Paracelsus himself.

The knowledge acquired by the physician in these prerequisite sciences *is* scientific knowledge. The question then arises whether the phenomena of diseased action are so uniform and so subject to observation, that they can be classified, and that the knowledge of them can constitute a science. This question, if we must answer it without qualification, must certainly be answered in the affirmative. In a majority of cases the phenomena of diseased action do occur so uniformly that we may bestow upon a succession of them, or as some would say, upon their cause, a name, and they may be so described as to be recognized by others. But while this is true, it is yet at this point that the trouble of the practical physician begins. If there are some diseases, the symptoms and course of which are so uniform that they were as well described by Hippocrates as they could be now, this is rarely the case. From physical or moral causes diseases are almost constantly changing their type; they often become complicated; when they are different, the symptoms are sometimes apparently the same, and the same disease often manifests itself by different symptoms. Hence it may become a matter of great difficulty to ascertain the true nature and the primary seat of a disease. In such cases the most experienced physicians will sometimes disagree, one placing it in the intestines, the other in the liver; one in the lungs, the other in the stomach. In judging of such cases, experience must evidently be of great service, but experience in this case cannot be transferred. The grounds of judgment are of such a nature that they cannot be described, and when a skilful physician dies, much of his most valuable knowledge must die with him. Perhaps science and accumulated observation may do more than they have yet done to relieve this difficulty; still there must always remain, in the progress

of the young physician, a degree of uncertainty and a "Slough of Despond," at this spot.

But the great difficulty is yet to come. Suppose the disease to be known. The question then is, Can it be cured? It is obvious that preliminary science is of no consequence except as it can be successfully applied at this point. What the patient wishes, is to be cured. He cares nothing about the claims of science, as such, or the pretensions of quacks, or the modus operandi of medicines. It is at this point that the value of the profession to the public must be decided. Do more persons recover from disease under medical treatment than would recover without it? On this point the community seem to have no doubt. There are, indeed, some persons whosé general turn is towards sarcasm and disparagement, from whose conversation you would infer that the doctors kill more than they cure; but we find that when they or their friends become sick, they are as ready to send for a doctor as any one else. The profession is useful, greatly so. Still, if we ask here whether the application of scientific knowledge to the cure of diseases is itself scientific —whether it can be done with certainty in regard to the result—we must answer, No.

When the manufacturer wishes to form a particular dye, he has only to mix the ingredients in the proper proportions, and the result will invariably follow. When the physician wishes to make an effervescing draught, he has only to mix lemon juice and the carbonate of soda, and he is sure of the effect. But in the application of knowledge to the cure of diseases, however scientific it may be, there must always remain some degree of uncertainty in regard to two points. One is, whether the medicine will produce the effect intended; and the other, whether that is the effect which ought to be produced. The physician, for example, gives calomel with the intention of producing salivation; but it is well known that the medicine in this

case will not act like the soda and the acid, and that physicians often wish and intend to produce this effect without accomplishing it. The same quantity given in the same manner will usually salivate, but the agencies concerned here are complicated, and there may be something in the constitution, or in the nature of the disease, that will prevent it. This, then, is the first source of uncertainty. The question then arises, If salivation be produced, will it benefit the patient? It may; and it may too be the cause of his death, when he would otherwise recover. Here, in truth, lies the great difficulty and source of anxiety—it is to know what ought to be done. Here is a patient, threatened with a fever. Will you stimulate, or deplete? 'Stimulate,' says the Brunonian. 'You might as well pour oil upon fire,' says the follower of Cullen. 'But,' replies the Brunonian, 'connected with this excitement there is real debility. Put your hand to the wheels of life and roll them over the obstacle, and then they will go on smoothly.' Now in some fevers, and in some stages of them, this may undoubtedly be done; and when it can be, the patient is greatly pleased, and the cure is so prompt, and the mode of it so pleasant, that the doctor gains much credit. It must be remembered, however, that if he fails to roll the wheel quite over, it will come back with a force that generally renders the case hopeless. Again; among those who deplete, there are two courses. Some are prompt in their practice; use the lancet and emetics freely, and thus seek to break up the disease. Others are more cautious, and reserve the strength of the constitution for the turning point of the disease.

Now let a man adopt either of these courses, and it will happen, either in consequence of the treatment, or in spite of it, that some will die and some will recover. The disease is the same, it has the same name in both cases, but the result is different. Some modifying circumstance that was inappreciable, has come in. In some cases, such cir-

cumstances may come to be known, but often not without the sacrifice of life. I well remember hearing it stated from this place, by an able lecturer and most excellent man, that when he was settled in an upland and hilly country, he had been in the habit of treating a particular fever successfully by the lancet and emetics. He afterwards removed to a section that was more flat, where there was a tendency to fever and ague. Here he soon had several cases of what seemed to him the same fever to which he had been accustomed. He treated it in the same way, and all his patients died. He then changed his course, and stimulated his patients, and they all recovered. The doctor did not hesitate to say that his experience was gained at the expense of the lives of his patients. It is well known that persons of intemperate habits cannot be treated as they otherwise might be, and to make the proper allowance is like steering between Scylla and Charybdis. If they are not bled, the inflammation will kill them ; if they are, it must be done with great caution, or the bleeding will kill them. Diseases may be called by the same name, but probably no two cases were ever precisely alike, and the general evidence on which the physician must proceed is that of analogy rather than of experience. Each new case presents something peculiar and may require modified treatment. General principles there are, but in the application of these to individual cases there is room for every variety of skill, and the most sagacious must often be left in painful uncertainty.

Here then, as it seems to me, we find the grand peculiarity of the medical art. It consists in the uncertainty that must often rest upon the proper course of action, combined with the great responsibility involved in acting at all. Life, priceless life is at stake, it is hanging on the decision of the physician, and that decision must be based, not upon scientific and certain, but upon probable

evidence. In this respect, and as having the actual charge of a patient, the physician is like the man whose business it is to conduct boats down the Mississippi. He is well provided with oars and setting poles, he knows the general course of the stream, there are many difficult points, and hidden snags which he will pass safely, when one of less experience would be lost. But sometimes the stream shifts its bed, and then he gets aground by attempting to go the old way; sometimes, when he supposes all is well, he suddenly strikes a new snag where he had gone safely before; and sometimes he is mortified to see some squatter along the shore put out, and by a short cut run a boat through some cove where he would never have thought of venturing, and go on with flying colors far before him. Every sensible man would choose to entrust his boat to one acquainted with the stream; still, with all possible vigilance, he cannot be sure of success till the course of the stream shall be uniform, and it shall cease to wash new trees into its bed.

Such, then, is the relation of medical science to the practice of the art. It is best compared to that which the science of navigation bears to the conducting of a ship on the ocean. In both, while science is necessary, there is room for much practical skill, and a kind of knowledge which no lectures, and no science can ever give; and in both, the adverse influences may be so strong that no science and no skill can avail any thing.

From what has now been said I remark here, and before passing to the other branch of our subject, that we may see why there is such a difference between the study and the practice of medicine. The study is pleasant, but the practice, to say nothing of physical exposure, must often lead to great perplexity and trial of the feelings.

We see, also, how it happens that physicians are so often both praised and censured when they do not deserve it, and what peculiar facilities and temptations there are to the disparaging of each other.

We see, also, why this profession always has been, and probably always will be, next to that of politics, the favorite resort of quacks. The real uncertainty that often exists on the part of the best physicians, together with the great ignorance of the mass of the community on medical subjects, form a sort of jungle into which they can retreat with comparative safety.

Having thus spoken on the relation which the scientific knowledge of the physician bears to practical skill, I proceed, as was proposed, to some remarks on the qualities of mind which he ought especially to cultivate.

From the fact that the science of medicine is to be applied to the practice of the art, not by any precise rules, but by the constant exercise of judgment founded on observation, I should place the power of accurate observation foremost among those which a physician ought to cultivate. In this there is as much difference among men as if phrenology were true. To every disease, to every kind of pain, there is a natural language—something in the position, the breathing, the eye, the skin, the expression, which, though it may be exceedingly slight, the practised eye readily detects. Hence one man will tell, as soon as he looks at a patient, what the disease is; while another, with the same symptoms before him, though he has eyes, does not see. We have all known men celebrated for the readiness with which they detect the nature and seat of disease. This is the first step towards a cure. And then, in the progress of a disease there is the same difference in the readiness with which men notice the effect of remedies, and the phases of the disease requiring a change of treatment.

This power of observation often exists in combination with very moderate powers of reflection and generalization, which some would place first. Where this is so, the individual will be more of a physician than he is of a man; and will succeed better in his profession than

we should expect from his general intellectual power. There is between these two powers no incompatibility; but in the present limited state of the human faculties they are seldom combined in a high degree, and one is often cultivated to the exclusion of the other. If President Edwards, who, it is said, did not know his own cow, could ever have made a good physician, it would have required a strong effort. A great physician, a Sydenham, a Boerhave, a Cullen, a Rush, is formed only when there is united with uncommon powers of observation, powers of generalization and reflection, such as will enable their possessor to group his facts and present them as a system. The practitioner is skilful as he discriminates case from case, adjusting his treatment to every individual in all the varieties of temperament, season of the year, and local situation. His business is, knowing that there are resemblances in every case, to perceive the differences. The business of the systematizer, the writer and the lecturer, is, on the other hand, knowing that there are differences, to perceive resemblances and class cases together. He who can do both these will rise to the highest point in his profession. The best practitioners, however, are generally those whose tendency is to observation; and the best lecturers, those whose tendency is to reflection. It will not follow, therefore, because a man is an able writer and lecturer, that he is a good practitioner. Give such an one general principles, and he will manage them to a charm; but give him a case under them, and many a man that he looks down upon will manage it better than he. Hence, as I have already intimated, success in this profession does not always correspond with general mental power. That young man is to be pitied, who has learning and a knowledge of general principles, when he sees men, far his inferiors, running away with all the practice. Nothing is more common than this, and it is right. No man ought to succeed, who will not descend to the mi-

nutiæ and undergo the drudgery of the profession; and if his reflective faculties predominate so as to disqualify him for this, then he has mistaken his calling, and has no right to make splenetic remarks about the ignorance and injustice of the world.

Nor am I sure that I should place those higher powers, as they may properly be called, of reflection and generalization, second among the qualities which a physician should cultivate if he would be successful. I think I should give that place rather to a quality that, where it exists, is generally partly constitutional and partly moral—a feeling of heartfelt interest in his patients. This will operate in two ways. It will invigorate and quicken, more than any thing else, the powers of observation. When the navigator feels a strong interest in the safety of the cargo, how frequently does he watch the horizon! how careful is he whom he places at the helm! How masterly do the senses of touch and hearing become when sight is gone, simply because they are educated, and interest and attention are concentrated upon them! A heartfelt interest in his patients, and that alone, will result, on the part of a physician, in a general education of the senses, and a watchfulness in particular instances, of more practical value than much power of reflection and general combination. Another mode in which such an interest contributes to success, is by gaining the confidence of the patient. In many diseases this is of great importance, and the visit of such a physician does more good than his medicine.

If now, to these qualities, the physician can add those already mentioned as necessary to the lecturer and the writer, which not only add to success in practice, but give dignity to the profession, he will be distinguished both as a physician and as a man, and may take a rank in society, and will have means of doing good, such as to give ample scope whether to his ambitious or his benevolent feelings.

I have thus spoken, in accordance with the plan proposed; and in connection with what I have said, the reflection that strikes my mind most forcibly relates to the responsible nature of the medical profession. To it is often intrusted the health and consequently the lives of the community. To the physician, husbands and wives, parents and children, intrust that which is dearer to them than any thing on earth, and the injury is deep, and the unhappiness bitter when, from unfaithfulness, or unfitness, he fails to do all that ought to be done, and life is lost. If there ever was a man who was bound to have all his faculties about him, and to avoid every habit that would impair them in any degree, the physician is that man. Of all others he ought to avoid the least approach towards intemperance. It is enough for the intemperate man to expose his own life as he staggers along the street, or holds the reins with unsteady hand; but the intemperate physician not only exposes his own life, but the life of every patient, as he haunts his bedside with foul breath, and reeling judgment, and deceptive senses, and often with his long maudlin chat. There was a time when intemperance was much more prevalent among physicians than at present; but the profession took a noble stand on this subject, one for which it deserves the thanks of the community, and now, though there are a few relics of former times who seem, like their own specimens of morbid anatomy, to be preserved in spirits, yet as a whole, I believe the medical profession is remarkably free from this vice.

But if a physician may not fall into positive vice, neither may he be indolent. It is not always a sufficient justification, when a case is not properly treated, to say that he did the best he knew how to do. It may be he ought to have known better. There is such a thing as a criminal ignorance. How does the indolent or dissipated medical student know that he is not putting the knife to

the throat of some future patient, while he is spending in folly or something worse, the time that ought to be given to preparation for his responsible duties? The physician is bound to know every thing in regard to the proper treatment of diseases that he can know, and hence the imperative obligation that rests upon him to be a man of industrious habits. Doubtless there are many instances of malpractice that never reach the tribunals of justice, that are never suspected by the friends, or even by the physician himself, which yet involve moral guilt.

Another obvious reflection is, that the proper education of physicians is a matter of interest to the whole community. If there *are* fixed principles, then the degree of difficulty in their application of which I have spoken, only shows the need of the greater skill, and furnishes the strongest possible reason why the community should not encourage ignorance, pretension, rashness, quackery in any of its forms. The community ought to see to it that they have good physicians. They ought to encourage and sustain those institutions which are necessary for their full education.

I will only add that if the responsibilities of the physician are peculiar, so are his rewards. He has, set before him, not only a general reputation as a man of science, but those higher rewards of a moral kind which satisfy the heart. Let him, in addition to the qualities already mentioned, be possessed of a moral and religious character in which his patients and the community can have entire confidence, and there are few persons who can become the object of so much attachment and respect. He becomes the family physician. With him they pass through trying scenes. With his efforts and skill are associated relief from pain, recovery from sickness, the restoration of themselves or friends from the grave. No other, though equally skilful, can fill his place, for he knows their constitution, and they have been used to him. He is the

friend of the poor. In their distress he has often visited them without the hope of a fee, and he can have access to them for their physical and moral benefit in a way that no other man can. Nor will his sympathies be confined to bodily suffering. He will be able to speak words of comfort to the troubled spirit, and will lead those whom he may, in the hour of their extremity, to apply to the Great Physician, for the cure of those deeper maladies which his art cannot reach. When such a man goes down from the land of the living, he leaves a place which cannot be filled, and is followed by the blessings of a bereaved and a grateful community.

ADDRESS,

DELIVERED AT THE DEDICATION OF WILLISTON SEMINARY,

December 1, 1841.

We are commanded to rejoice with them that do rejoice, and to weep with them that weep. This we do to some extent involuntarily. God has given us a principle of sympathy, by which families and circles of friends are affected by the joy, the grief, the hope, the fear, the indignation of one of their number; by which society, with its causes of local feeling, its neighborhood successes and reverses, its marriages and its deaths, seems but as the field over which the cloud and the sunshine are passing. Hence it is that in a population so homogeneous as that of New England, we have only to awaken feeling upon some subject of common interest, and a wave of sympathy will commence, and widen till it extends over the whole surface. Drop the pebble in, and the circling waters will show it. This has been done at this spot. A movement has been commenced here upon a subject most nearly affecting the community; it has been carried forward by individual munificence and energy; and it has now reached a point when it is proper that we should come together and mingle our feelings and sympathies in view of its anticipated results.

Nor is it surprising, when we look at the present position of things in this country, and at the results which may be reasonably anticipated, that so much interest should be felt. This does not arise solely from an unusual manifestation of individual liberality and public spirit wisely directed, but from the fact that the establishment of such an institution as this is an indication of a general movement, a rising tide, coincident with individual effort; and from the hope and conviction that though this institution may just now be borne up by a wave and placed for a time above high water mark, yet that ere long the waters will come up and surround it, and perhaps bear others still farther on. It marks, and tends to facilitate, an advancement in that system of education which was the object of so much solicitude to our fathers, and upon which individual happiness and the public welfare so much depend.

That individual happiness is connected with extensive and accurate information respecting the past, with a perception of facts, and laws, and relations, as they exist in God's universe, and with that general culture of mind which the acquisition of such knowledge implies and induces, cannot admit of a question. This is generally admitted, but it may be doubted whether it is upon right grounds; and education can never do for man what it ought, till it is pursued with reference to its highest ends.

Many suppose that the chief advantage of education to the individual arises from the facility it gives him to acquire property, or to take a better relative standing among his fellow men. This view of education, so far as it is true, ought not perhaps to be discouraged. If these advantages are to be gained by it, I see no reason why they should not be thus sought, more than I do why men should not put their sons to learn mechanical trades, or behind the counter, with the same view. But this is a low and mercenary view, and I do not hesitate to say that

if it were universal, all that now excites the enthusiasm and warm devotion of the highest order of minds would be gone. The moment that takes place, literature is prostituted, and its institutions, being but the means of a selfish advancement to a few, will lose their honor, and perhaps be trampled in the dust.

But to me it seems that if there is any one thing that may be regarded as an end and not as a means, it is the expansion, by a true culture, of the mind of man. Wealth is a means, place and power are means, but this is an end. This is in fact the highest result that is wrought out, we have reason to believe that it is the very result intended to be wrought out, by the whole framework and the steady course of nature. This framework cannot stand, this wonderful harmony cannot be preserved, for its own sake. It subserves, indeed, material uses, it ministers to bodily wants, but it has higher uses than these, to which material uses and bodily wants are themselves subservient. The opening flower, the ripening harvest, the falling leaf, the running water, the starry concave, have a voice that speaks to the spirit of man, to instruct him, and to lead him in the way that is good. It is not, therefore, in the city only, in the chief places of concourse, that wisdom cries and understanding utters her voice ; it is also in the forest, on the hill-top, by the side of the still river. Whoever will observe the constitution of nature with reference to this, will see that it is wonderfully adapted to chasten and elevate the feelings, to awaken curiosity, and to call forth the observing and reflecting powers of the mind. This is an end which enters into our very conception of man as a rational and a progressive being ; we can conceive of him as having no bodily wants, or as having those wants supplied without labor ; we can conceive of him as divested of those selfish and ambitious passions which are now too often the motives to mental effort ; but we cannot conceive of him as acting in his true character as a

man, who is to become in knowledge and virtue what God intends him to be, except in connection with the expansion of his higher powers. The more these are strengthened and expanded, the stronger is our feeling of satisfaction, and the stronger would it be even though man had no physical wants to which he might cause science to minister. We love to see the river increase as it moves onwards; we love to see the pillar of light in the aurora borealis shoot upwards till it reaches the zenith. Men speak of material beauty, and well they may in such a world as this; but to me there is no object upon which the eye can rest with so much satisfaction, as upon a community of young men in a course of true progress, coming forward to be what they ought to be, and to lay the fruits of their ripening faculties upon the altar of the public good.

It is not then to elevate some above others, or to give them an undue advantage, that seminaries like this and our higher seminaries are established. It is to elevate the nature of man, to quicken and call forth all that is good within him; and since, in a government like ours, there will always be a continuity from the highest to the lowest, it is to do what we can to elevate the whole mass. It is to join the top of the water-spout to the cloud, so that the lowest drop may be taken up and float in the upper sky. It is this high and disinterested idea of the elevation of man, which can, and ought to be felt by all, that gives their chief interest, when they are estimated as they should be, to the institutions of religion and of learning in a country. This makes them points around which associations cluster that bind men together in links as strong as steel. They are like the great men of a country in whom all have a property, and whose greatness tends to elevate all. But let these points vanish, let religion and learning cease to have their sanctuaries, and there would be little left which a good man would wish to call his

country. I dwell on this subject here, because it will be seen that if the true and highest end of education is lost sight of, buildings and apparatus can be of but little worth.

But if it is so obvious that individual happiness depends upon proper culture, the connection between that and the public welfare, in a country like this, is not less so. The first and fundamental proposition in our government is, that the people must rule. Their will, expressed according to the forms of a constitution which they have themselves adopted, is and must be, the law. But a second and perhaps equally important proposition is, that the people should be so educated as to be fitted to rule well. These are the fundamental principles of a republican government. If they shall be maintained, then the superficial divisions and rents of party will not extend to the foundation, and the building will stand. If not, there is no charm in the forms of a free government by which they can preserve themselves, nor any alchemy in any forms by which intelligence, and justice, and purity, and kindness, can be extracted from the associated action of men, ignorant, unprincipled, intemperate, and selfish.

That the people *can* be thus educated there is no doubt. The question whether they will be, is of greater interest than any other. But if they are to have an education that will meet the wants of society now, it must be one that will be to it a stronger cement than has been needed heretofore. We are not, as in the times of the Revolution, pressed together by a force from without; the great men of those days are gone, and we have none like them who can become points of union within. More men than formerly look to the government as a means of subsistence through office, rather than as the dispenser of equal and general blessings, thus increasing the tendency to faction and corruption. The amount of business and the facilities of intercourse stimulate the activity and the passions

of men to a higher point than ever before; and who can doubt, when these facilities are still farther increased, that there will be, in times of excitement, mass meetings of tremendous extent and power; and unless those composing them are educated as no people have ever yet been, they will interfere with the proper functions of the government and perhaps change its whole character. The whole movement of society is accelerated, and it generates and conducts, more rapidly than hitherto, the electric fluid of excitement and passion. And while a higher and more general education is thus becoming indispensable, the people are slow in appreciating its necessity. They hold on too strongly to that thriftless parsimony which prevents their having better instructors. There is still too, to a large extent, an undue estimate of talent and mere intellectual education, as if that were all that we needed; and, as I have already said, there is a low and mercenary view of the great end of education.

But notwithstanding all this, I believe this great work will be done. Public sentiment is aroused; the eye and the heart of Christian benevolence are awake; the importance of moral education is better appreciated; and it is even possible we may yet have a system of education that shall act upon the whole man, the emblem of which shall be, not the moon—cold, cheerless, acting upon the eye only—but the sun, pouring forth light and heat, knowledge and love, and calling up from the mould of man's original faculties the flowers and the fruits. There is too a Divine Providence; there is a Christian Religion; and in connection with the overruling and moulding influence of these, I feel a cheerful confidence that this great work will be done, and that there will be wrought out from our free institutions a social order better than we have yet seen. This will not be done at once, for the course of human improvement is seldom direct—it is rather like that of the winding river—but it will be done. Those

of you who have stood upon Mount Holyoke will remember how your own Connecticut now reaches far off to the northward, now passes in a more direct course at your feet, and then winds, or rather did wind around the great circuit of Hockinum at the south, making scarcely an ell of progress for a mile of movement, and then passes off like a long riband of light towards the ocean. Such we must expect will be our course—and, if I may be permitted to extend the figure, I would say that we must wait with patience, and row with vigor, whether we seem to ourselves to be going backwards, or, as now, to be coming round the great bend.

But if this is to be done, the question arises—How? To do it perfectly, we must have, first, a right system of institutions and material apparatus; secondly, the right branches must be taught; and thirdly, they must be taught in the right time and manner. These are obviously the three conditions of a perfect system of education; and so far as I shall attempt an answer to the above question, it will be by some general observations on one or more of them.

First, then, I observe, that no change is needed in our present general system. That system has grown up from the wants of the people, and is complete in all its parts. We have first the Common School, where the whole people are, or should be, taught so far as to qualify them for the duties of men and of citizens. We have the Academy, where all who choose may qualify themselves to enter college, or to commence, with a limited general preparation, a course of professional study. We have then the College, and the Professional School. These qualify men for the professions, for the business of instruction, for legislation, and for those literary and scientific labors which please and refine and elevate a people. These are all essential to a well organized community. They are all needed, and in one sense equally needed, since

they are parts of one system, and so exert a reciprocal influence, that neither can be what it should be without the other.

This reciprocal influence is what many are slow to understand. It is because of it that the establishment of this institution, is, as I have said, of general interest. In other states of society, this would not be so. If society were divided by a horizontal line into different classes, it would be chiefly for the benefit of one class. If there were no common schools, as at the south, the general interest would be much less, since it could not, as here, reflect and diffuse its light. But here every thing circulates freely. If this institution prepares better teachers for the common schools, they will send back to it scholars better prepared, and it may be able, after a time, to relinquish to the common school some of its branches, and to elevate its own course. If, again, it sends scholars to college better fitted, college, to say nothing of other and indirect benefits, will send back to it better instructors, and may, in its turn, be able to relinquish to it some part of its course. This process has, indeed, gone on to some extent within my remembrance, but it needs to go much farther. I see no other way in which our general system of education can be elevated. We need, and must have, institutions like this, which shall give a thorough preparation for college in the English as well as classical department, and which shall not only be thorough as far as they go, but shall carry the student much farther than he now goes in them. I see no difficulty in it, and I hope to see the day when almost all that is now studied in the freshman class in college, especially in languages, shall be required for admission, and shall be thoroughly taught in schools like this. This would relieve the colleges from the heavy load they are obliged to drag when the classes are poorly prepared, and would give them time, not only to be more full and thorough in their present branches of

science, but to introduce new ones as the wants of the age may require.

But reverse this process, and the results will be reversed. This nothing can prevent. Hence we see how unwise must be any feeling of jealousy towards the higher seminaries. This feeling has existed, it exists to some extent now, and sometimes conceals and justifies itself under a profession of exclusive attachment for common schools. So far as I have observed, the persons who speak thus, seldom do much for any thing; but if they would really go to work in their favorite department, nothing would please us better. So far as they have ill-will towards the higher seminaries, it would operate much like that of the passionate woman who poured boiling water around the roots of her husband's favorite peach-tree with the intention of killing it, but in fact only killed the worms, and stimulated the roots, and made it bear such peaches as it never bore before. Let the common school be made what it ought to be, and it will create a thirst which it cannot slake. The numbers will be increased who will not stop there. They will find their way to the academy; they will scale the walls of these out-posts of knowledge, and will not rest satisfied till they have entered its citadel, and taken a broad survey from the highest point in the land where its flag is flying. Means may be wanting, but they will be furnished; buildings may burn down, but they will be built again. The people will feel that they have a right to provide themselves with the best means of education, and they will do it.

Wherever, therefore, you give an impulse, it will be felt throughout. The system is articulated, and it is good; but what we need is, to give it greater thoroughness, and efficiency, and compass. We are now like that scientific farmer who has a good system of rotation of crops, but who does not manure his land, or plough deep enough, or

keep up his fences. We have common schools; but many of them are in buildings without taste, without a library, without proper seats or proper means of warmth and ventilation, and above all, without competent instructors. We have academies; but many of them were built by a few enterprising persons for the credit of the village, and are without endowment, without apparatus, without steady patronage, and without the means of commanding a permanent instructor, or of prescribing a regular course. We have colleges; but some of them are in debt or embarrassed, and by no means able to do what ought to be done by institutions of that class. Well therefore may we rejoice in any event that promises to give efficiency to this system. The ship in which we are embarked is a good one, but it needs to be better fitted up and better manned.

But if our present system of institutions and external apparatus is good, the next question is, whether we teach all the branches that ought to be taught; or whether we do not retain, through prescription and prejudice, some that ought to be rejected. Upon the first of these inquiries I shall not enter; but in regard to the second, many, as is well known, suppose that the languages are thus retained. As it is intended that the languages shall be thoroughly studied in this seminary, and as its establishment has occasioned considerable discussion on this point, I may perhaps be pardoned for touching upon it, though it was briefly discussed when the corner stone of the seminary was laid.

It was then stated by my valued friend, and former instructor, that in his opinion the study of Latin and Greek is indispensable to a finished education. In support of this opinion he said, first, that "no studies are better adapted to form in a student a habit of making nice distinctions between things that differ;" secondly, that "no studies afford such a stimulus to the mind;"

thirdly, that "no other study gives the scholar such a command of language;" and fourthly, that "no study prepares the scholar so well to understand the frequent allusions made by orators, poets, and historians, to ancient mythology and fabulous history." These reasons were briefly but strongly enforced, and have great weight.

If I might be permitted to add something farther, I would say, first, of the study of languages in general, that it ought to be pursued because of the knowledge it gives us of mankind. There are certain things which every man has in common with all other men, and when we speak of human nature in our books of philosophy, we do not include in it any but these common qualities. But it is with man as it is with trees—there are important varieties under the same species. An Englishman differs from a German as much as a hard maple does from a soft maple; or a white, from a black oak. He who would know the oaks must study not only their common properties, by which they come into the class of oaks, but he must study the white oak and the black oak. And so with men. They are separated into great classes, having the different faculties of the mind distributed in different proportions, having different prejudices and habits, different modes of thought and forms of literature. What can be more different than the oriental and the western forms of thought and schemes of philosophy? What more unlike than the German and the French mind? The Greek mind and the Roman were as different as is the graceful elm from the stately pine. And his knowledge of the race who should know it only as it appears in one nation, would be like his knowledge of a universal language who should know but one of its idioms. But language is the picture and counterpart of thought. It is to it, what certain impressions that I have seen of leaves upon paper are to the leaves themselves. Its analogies, its idioms, its figures of speech, and above all its generalizations, show us the character and

progress, not merely of the mind of man, but of national mind. He who is familiarly acquainted with the language of a people, is acquainted with that people. Hence the study of the language of a country gives us the local ideas of that country, and many of the advantages of travelling in it. I have no hesitation in saying, that he who is familiarly acquainted with the language and literature of a people, but without travel, would know them better than he who should travel among them without knowing their language. It is because there is this idiomatic difference, if I may so call it, in mind, that many things cannot be translated from one language into another so as to convey the same impression. This reason, however, as thus far stated, applies equally to ancient and modern languages; but if languages are to be made a part of general education at all, there are reasons why the ancient should be preferred. One is, that they are, if not essential, yet nearly so, to those who are to enter either of the professions. Another reason is, their common and intimate relation, not only to our own, but to all the modern languages. These are so much derived from them, that they cannot be understood in all their compass and force without them, and when once they are thoroughly mastered, most modern languages are obtained with comparative ease. If a person wished to get a speedy and thorough knowledge of the French, Spanish and Italian languages, he would probably gain time by studying the Latin first.

A second reason for the study of the classics is their peculiar structure. In consequence of their inflections and forms of conjugation, prepositions and auxiliaries are to a great degree dispensed with, and the grammatical relations of the words are indicated in whatever part of the sentence they may be. This makes them better models than ours can be, of both compactness and harmony.

A third and more important reason arises from the place which the works in these languages hold, and always must hold, as standards of taste. The reason why they must continue to hold this place, is to be found in a fact stated by Dr. Campbell, in his Philosophy of Rhetoric. He there says, that the useful arts, having their foundation in necessity, originate first, but that those arts, as architecture, painting, sculpture, oratory, poetry, whose object is to please, come soonest to perfection. In the useful arts, indeed, we scarcely know what perfection is. One generation easily comes up to the point reached with much toil by the preceding, and is ready to make advances. Here, wherever industry and genius break the path, mediocrity readily follows. But those arts, the object of which is to please by presenting the idea of beauty in material forms, and in language, seem to have sprung at once to maturity, as Minerva is said to have come fully equipped from the head of Jove, and if we would equal the great artists and orators of antiquity we must be such men as they were. If there is a summit, and they have reached it by the right path, then we must either wander, or follow their footsteps. Hence it is that the architect must study the Grecian models and orders of architecture ; hence it is that every young artist makes it the first object of his wishes to go and study the pictures and statues of the old masters, and if those pictures and statues shall remain unimpaired, they will be the object of study till the end of time. But the classic writers are in style, what the Grecian models are in architecture—what the old masters are in art, and we might as reasonably object to the study of the one as of the other.

A single reason more that I shall mention, may be found in the reciprocal influence of language and thought upon each other. Between these, the connection is more intimate than is generally supposed. Language is not only the medium, but, to a great extent, the instrument

of thought. The man who has language in which he can embody his thought with precision, will himself perceive it more clearly, and hold it more firmly, than if he had no words but such as were loose and indeterminate. Horne Tooke says of language, that it not only conveys thought, but is the wheels upon which it moves. Hence one language is better than another, not only as a medium, but as an instrument of thought, and the man who has acquired a familiarity by use in discriminating nice shades in the meaning of words, will be far more apt to have, and to detect, nice shades in thought. He has not merely acquired more power to think, but he has a better instrument to think with.

But while I speak thus of the absolute value of the ancient languages, I would say that their relative value has greatly changed within a century. During that time, there has been a wonderful increase of the number and utility and grandeur of the physical sciences, and also a more earnest and intense scrutiny into the world of mind. This progress of science has drawn universal attention, both from the intrinsic interest of the facts disclosed and from their practical applications, which have become so numerous and important that a knowledge of them is supposed by many to be the only part of a higher education that is practical. Of this part of education no one can think more highly than I do. I well remember when a perception of the laws of the universe first began to enter my mind, and it was like the dawning of a new day. But important as these branches are, they should not exclude the classics. If we would have a complete education, suitable instruction in these must be combined with that taste, and imagination, and power of expression, which are best cultivated by a study of the languages. This combination it has been the object of the colleges to effect. There have however been practical difficulties. From want of proper instruction, from haste in young

men to go forward, and from the competition of different institutions, the languages have been studied so imperfectly, that the objects in view have not been realized. It is from this imperfect mode of study that many have been led to doubt the utility of the languages, for here one may go a considerable way, and his labor be nearly lost if he does not go a little farther—just as a man may go to the top of Saddle Mountain, and see very little, if he does not go forty feet higher to the top of the tower. Another difficulty is, that in the present accumulation of knowledge, the study of the languages occupies time which should be given to the sciences. A remedy for both these evils is to be found in institutions like this, which shall give a more thorough preparation for college both in the English and in the classical departments, and which shall, as I have already said, enable the colleges to transfer to them a portion of their present studies.

This, too, would enable the colleges to meet the wants of the community in another respect. It certainly is true, that there is a body of scientific knowledge which ought to be diffused more widely among the people than classical studies can be; and that too in that thorough and complete form in which the colleges only can give it. I would, if possible, by means of lectures and suitable apparatus, open the laws and structure of the universe to all. But if a more full and thorough course were given in the languages before entering college, then the college course might be so arranged as to drop the classics, say at the end of the second year, as some colleges now drop them at the end of the third; and during the last two years, there might be a course of study and lectures in physics, and in mental and moral science, which should be practically thrown open to all. This would place the best English education, including mathematics, within the reach of all, and would be without additional expense for buildings, apparatus and teachers. If something of this

kind could be done, I think the wants of the community would be fully met in regard to the branches which should be taught.

It would now remain, if I should follow out the scheme of thought proposed, that I should say something of the time and manner in which these branches may be best taught. I have however already detained you too long, to enter at length upon these topics, and shall only refer to two general characteristics, which, I understand, it is intended shall pervade the whole course of instruction in this seminary. One is thoroughness; and the other is moral teaching based on the Bible. If both these can be secured, we may safely leave details to take care of themselves. Where these are not, nothing can be right; where they are, I think we may say, that in this age of light in regard to the proper modes of teaching, every thing will be essentially right.

Without thoroughness, no education can be what it ought to be in any respect. The want of it not only vitiates our knowledge of particular subjects, but it implies the formation of such habits as must unfit a man for any difficult and responsible station. Even wrong methods of study thoroughly pursued, are better than right ones pursued laxly, for they give the student right habits and mental vigor. From various causes, there has hitherto been a great want of thoroughness in our preparatory schools, and there is no point on which reformation is more needed. Thoroughness can be secured only on three conditions. The first is, that you have a permanent instructor; the second is, that your permanent instructor be a thorough man; and the third is, that you have a prescribed course. For each of these, provision has been made in this institution.

In regard to moral and religious instruction, I am happy to feel that I am in a region where there is less need of inculcating its importance than in most others, and where

those unfounded and dangerous opinions of the sufficiency of mere intellectual education have not taken deep root. Strange indeed it is that they should have been prevalent any where. Has not man a moral nature? Why not then cultivate it? Is it not the highest part of his nature —that to which the control of all his other faculties is intrusted? Is it not moral evil, pre-eminently, that causes the unhappiness of individuals and of society? Are not intellectual light and power a curse when under the direction of moral depravity? Is not the morality of the Bible perfect? Are not its teachings often accompanied with a divine power? In a Christian community but one answer can be given to these questions, and it must settle for ever the propriety of our seeking to bring the moral nature of the young under the control of the principles of the Bible. I think of education more highly than as simple instruction—the giving of information. I think of it as that which imparts and moulds the principles of action. And if this is to be done, let us at least go as far as that infidel philosopher who was once found teaching his little son the New Testament, and who when he was inquired of with surprise why he did it, said, "After all, my friend, there is nothing better." Long may it be the sentiment of all those who have the formation of the youthful mind—"there is nothing better."

Having, then, these two characteristics of thoroughness and moral instruction broadly enstamped upon its course, with a liberal endowment, with a healthy and favorable location, with experienced and successful teachers, with buildings convenient, beautiful, soon to be fully completed, and the grounds in connection with them tastefully adorned, this seminary may hope for distinguished usefulness and success. Doubtless there will resort to it, as to all others, some who are indolent, reckless, and wanton, who will pervert the provisions made for their good, who will, perhaps, deface the buildings, and spread moral contami-

nation around them. It does, indeed, sometimes seem strange that this must be so. But we are to remember that God's world is better than any thing that we can build, and men do so in that. When we remember this, we are not only prepared to expect such things, but to treat the unhappy persons who do them with forbearance and love. But while some such instances are to be expected, the founder and trustees of this seminary may reasonably hope to see it bringing forward many young men of right habits and principles, storing their minds with knowledge, strengthening them by discipline, and preparing them for usefulness in the church of God, in our beloved country, and in the world. To this high purpose, imploring upon it the blessing of God, we now devote the Williston Seminary.

INAUGURAL DISCOURSE,

DELIVERED AT WILLIAMS COLLEGE,

September 15, 1836.

Connected as the cause of Education is, in this country, with every thing that we hold dear in our social, civil, and religious institutions; and sustained as our Colleges are by public and private benefactions, it is desirable that the principles and feelings of those who conduct them should be fully known by the community. That much is constantly said on the subject of education, only shows that much still needs to be said; for the public will can act efficiently only in view of principles which are regarded as settled, and in favor of institutions in which it has confidence. It may not, therefore, be inappropriate for me, on this occasion, to make some observations on the nature and objects of education in general; and more particularly upon collegiate education, as adapted to attain those objects and to meet the wants of the community.

To all the productions of nature there belongs an ideal perfection of which they are fully capable, and beyond which, under the most favorable circumstances, they cannot go. We may so plant a particular seed and cultivate its shoot, that it shall attain the highest perfection of which the species is capable; or we may so plant and neglect it, as to cause it to be dwarfish and deformed.

The elm, for example, if its soil and situation are favorable, may attain in size the limit of its species, and may leave, in the figure of its graceful boughs, nothing for the eye to desire. It would be the object of culture to produce such a tree. And so it is with man. There are a strength and beauty of physical structure, a compass and accuracy of knowledge, a soundness of judgment, a readiness and retentiveness of memory, a richness and grandeur of imagination, a refinement of feeling, a correctness and strength of principle, and a promptitude of action, which it is possible should be combined in the same individual, and which, if we are to cultivate man as man, it must be the object of education to produce.

By education, I mean, not merely formal instruction, but any system of excitement or restraint the object of which is to effect some definite change in the physical, intellectual, or moral character of man. The term, I know, is often used, in a broader sense, to include every thing in external nature, and in the circumstances of the individual, which can exert an influence upon him, whether intended to exert such influence or not. That there are circumstances in local situation, and in the structure of society, the influence of which cannot be avoided, and which yet often control the character and destiny of the young, there can be no doubt. Climate, the form of government, childhood spent in the city or in the country, in luxury or in poverty, and perhaps more than all, early and casual impressions caught from first associates, operate imperceptibly, but irresistibly, in modifying and giving variety to character. But though the influence upon the mind of causes beyond our control, may be an interesting subject of speculation, just as is the influence of gravity on matter, and though these causes may form a part of that tutelage under which in the providence of God his creatures are put, and we may, if we please, call it the education of circumstances, yet if

we regard the common use of language, or if we would define a practical science, we must include in the term Education, only those circumstances over which we have a control, and which we can and do bring to bear upon man with the intention of effecting a particular end. The simple fact that the parent is rich, will have an effect upon the mind of the child; but that effect is, as I use the term, no part of education—it is often something which it is the business of education to counteract. According to any other use of the term, one individual is as much educated as another, since all are equally under some influence by which they are formed to some particular character.

But besides those circumstances which act upon the mind, and over which we have not control, there are others over which we have; and education may be said to consist, according to its most general division, first, of those influences which we may bring to bear upon the mind aside from direct instruction; and secondly, of direct instruction.

Of these two, the first is, no doubt, the more important, and will be most regarded by a wise parent. A child may be an inmate in a family, and form virtuous habits from the general influence by which he is surrounded, without having a word directed especially to him in the way of advice—indeed it is perhaps in this way that he would be most likely to form them; and we all know that it needs no positive instruction to render children vicious where the general influence by which they are surrounded is bad. When direct instruction is obliged to struggle against such an influence, it finds a current which it cannot breast. Among the circumstances which can be controlled to some extent, and which ought to be desired, are opportunities and inducements for physical exercise, a healthy situation, fine scenery, proper books, a suitable example on the part of instructors, companions of

correct and studious habits, and above all, a good religious influence. On this subject, the apathy of many parents is astonishing. They do not seem to consider this a part of education for which they are in any way responsible. If their children are in a reputable, it may be in a fashionable or celebrated institution, they live in contented ignorance of the rest. In regard to this part of education, perhaps no system can be formed;—but wise and good men need to consider it more deeply, and the public mind needs to be awakened, and the public conscience stimulated respecting it. It may be doubted whether by the combined influence of parents, and of teachers, and of those students who are governed by principle and who know the moral power which is exerted by one young man who pursues throughout his course of study a consistent and holy course, our seminaries of learning, and especially our colleges, may not be made places where vice and indolence cannot remain. Instruction may form the intellect; influence moulds the moral character.

But whether we consider education as comprising more or less, or whatever division we may make of it, the general principle which we are to regard, especially in its second part, which is positive instruction, is now settled among all thinking men. It is, that we are to regard the mind, not as a piece of iron to be laid upon the anvil and hammered into any shape, nor as a block of marble in which we are to find the statue by removing the rubbish, nor as a receptacle into which knowledge may be poured; but as a flame that is to be fed, as an active being that must be strengthened to think and to feel—to dare, to do, and to suffer. It is as a germ, expanding, under the influence certainly of air and sunlight and moisture, but yet only through the agency of an internal force; and external agency is of no value except as it elicits, and controls, and perfects the action of that force. He only who can rightly appreciate the force of this principle, and carry it

out into all its consequences, in the spirit of the maxim, that nature is to be conquered only by obeying her laws, will do all that belongs to the office of a teacher.

That there has been so much mistake respecting this fundamental principle, obvious as it appears, and conformable as it is to the analogies of nature, can have arisen, only as most practical mistakes do, because men were "willingly ignorant." There is, indeed, great temptation on the part of both teachers and scholars to pursue a course not in accordance with this principle. It is far easier for a teacher to generalize a class, and give it a lesson to get by rote, and hear it said, and let it pass, than it is to watch the progress of individual mind, and awaken interest, and answer objections, and explore tendencies, and, beginning with the elements, construct together with his pupils, so that they shall feel that they aid in it, the fair fabric of a science with which they shall be familiar from the foundation to the top-stone. It is far easier also to induce students to get particular lessons, than to study subjects. The one they may do from any transient motive—from fear of disgrace, or mere ambition; the other is seldom done except from interest in the subject. This is a point that needs attention; for it is astonishing how often even intelligent young men content themselves with being able to appear well in particular recitations, without ever tracing relations, and carrying out principles, and taking a wide and comprehensive survey of the whole subject.

This course is also more fruitful in immediate results of a certain kind, and there are especial temptations to it in rival seminaries, and where examinations are made the test of what is done. There are not wanting schools in this country in which the real interest and progress of the pupils are sacrificed to their appearance at examination. But the vanity of parents must be flattered, and the memory is overburdened, and studies are forced on pre-

maturely, and a system of infant-school instruction is carried forward into maturer life. Nature, however, will not be hurried; and if it is desired to enter upon a study for which the faculties are not yet ripe,—for example, the study of intellectual philosophy, before the reflective faculties are somewhat mature, as is often done of late,—the only honest course is to advise its postponement, and not to attempt to satisfy ignorance, and really to foster conceit, by substituting memory for investigation. I will not say that studies so pursued invariably perplex, and discourage, and disgust the student,—because he often remains in such happy ignorance of the subject as not to be aware of its difficulties, and thus a little that is valuable may be picked up, and the memory be improved;—but I do say that whenever a mind, proceeding in the true method, is brought to wrestle with a subject which in the nature of things it is not yet competent to master, and it has only discernment enough to see difficulties, it must be perplexed and discouraged, and its progress retarded. A great part of the complaints which we hear of studies as hard and dull and dry, is no doubt the result of sheer indolence; but they may also result from an injudicious attempt on the part of parents or teachers to push a really good mind too fast.

But thus it is that indolence and interest in teachers have conspired with vanity in parents to sustain a false system. And the reasons are equally obvious why it should find favor with the mass of pupils. The habit of patient attention, that to which Newton attributed all his superiority, is perhaps formed with more difficulty by mankind at large, and especially by the young, than any other. But it is only by means of this that they can investigate for themselves, or proceed in the spirit of the principle we are now considering. Innumerable are the expedients which are resorted to on all sides to avoid this, and yet obtain an education. The rich may employ

tutors, and purchase apparatus, and procure lectures, and still, if they cannot inure their children to intellectual toil, they will not be educated. The young man may get another to prompt him, or may slily read from a book and cheat his instructor—but he is cheating himself still more. There is a strange slowness in assenting practically to that great law of nature, that the faculties are strengthened only by exercise. It is so with the body, and it is so with the mind. If a man would strengthen his intellectual faculties, he must exercise them; if he would improve his taste, he must employ it on the objects of taste; if he would improve his moral nature and make progress in goodness, he must perform acts of goodness. Nor will he improve his faculties by thinking about them and studying into their nature, unless by so doing he is enabled and induced to put them into more skilful and efficient action.

We hear much said about self-educated men, and a broad distinction is made between them and others; but the truth is, that every man who is educated at all, is, and must be, self-educated. There are no more two methods in which the mind can make progress, than there are two methods in which plants can grow. One seed may be blown by the winds, and cast upon the southern, or perchance on the northern side of some distant hill, and may there germinate, and take root, and do battle alone with the elements, and it may be so favored by the soil and climate that it shall lift itself in surpassing strength and beauty; another may be planted carefully in a good soil, and the hand of tillage may be applied to it, yet must this also draw for itself nutriment from the soil, and for itself withstand the rush of the tempest, and lift its head on high only as it strikes its roots deep in the earth. It is for the want of understanding this properly, that extravagant expectations are entertained of instructors, and of institutions; and that those who go to college

sometimes expect, and the community expect, that they will be learned of course,—as if they could be inoculated with knowledge, or obtain it by absorption. This broad distinction between self-educated men and others has done harm; for young men will not set themselves efficiently at work until they feel that there is an all important part which they must perform for themselves, and which no one can do for them.

And here I may mention, that from this view of the subject, it is easy to see what it is that constitutes the first excellence of an instructor. It is not his amount of knowledge, nor yet his facility of communication, important as these may be; but it is his power to give an impulse to the minds of his pupils, and to induce them to labor. For this purpose, nothing is so necessary as a disinterested devotion to the work, and a certain enthusiasm which may act by sympathy on the minds of the young. It is from the decay of this that courses of lectures and of instruction, once attractive, often cease to interest. When a teacher has advanced so far beyond his class, or has become so familiar with his subject, as to feel no interest in its truths, then, however well he may understand them, and however clearly he may state them, he is not all that a teacher ought to be. He who carries the torch-light into the recesses of science, and shows the gems that are sparkling there, must not be a mere hired conductor, who is to bow in one company, and bow out another, and show what is to be seen with a heartless indifference; but must have an ever living fountain of emotion, that will flow afresh as he contemplates anew the works of God and the great principles of truth and duty. This is no more impossible in regard to the beauties and wonders which science discloses, than it is in regard to the more obvious appearances of nature, and the instructor may adopt in spirit the words of the poet—

" My heart leaps up when I behold
A Rainbow in the sky:
So was it when my life began;
So is it now I am a Man;
So be it when I shall grow old,
Or let me die!
The Child is Father of the Man;
And I could wish my days to be
Bound each to each by natural piety."

It is such an one alone who can know the pleasure of carrying forward a class of ingenuous youth, and watching them as they gain new positions, and take in wider views till the whole prospect is at their command. And when, as sometimes happens, he has a class of an opposite character, and his instructions fall dead, and no interest is excited, it is he alone who can know the anxiety, I had almost said agony, with which, as the prophet of old upon the dead body of the child, he once and again as it were puts his mouth to its mouth, and his eyes to its eyes, and stretches himself upon the class, and finds no life come. And he alone knows how cheerless and hopeless and slavish is the dull routine of his labors after that. There are, it seems to me, few modes of gaining a living short of actual villainy, which a man of sensibility would not prefer to it.

With such an object, and such a method, our further views respecting education will be determined by the opinions we may have formed respecting the faculties of man which are to be perfected, and the relative attention to be bestowed upon each. On these points there are different views, and views substantially the same may be involved in different classifications. I may however remark briefly, as my limits compel me, that a wise system of education will regard man,

First, as possessed of a body which is to be kept in health and vigor. It is now agreed that the health of the

body is to be one great object of attention, not only for its own sake, but from its connection with a sound state and vigorous action of the mind.

Secondly, a wise system of education must regard man as possessed of intellectual faculties, whose object is truth. It is upon these faculties that education has too often spent all its force. In cultivating these, we are to point out the great sources of prejudice to which mankind are liable in their search after truth, to strengthen the memory, to exercise the judgment, to teach the mind both to comprehend and carry on general reasoning and to descend to details; we are to make distinctions, and go back to first principles, being always careful to quicken and keep in exercise all that there is of that most uncommon quality, good common sense. As far as possible, knowledge is to be communicated; but we are not to aim so much at giving the world men whose minds are already full, as those who have the power of attention, and habits of analysis, and of accurate investigation, and of intellectual labor, and the power of communication.

Thirdly, a wise system of education will consider man as having faculties whose object is beauty. That part of our nature whose object is beauty and sublimity, (for no one word expresses it exactly,) does not probably receive its due share of attention, and is sometimes wholly overlooked. The cultivation of these emotions is, by some powerful though dry intellects, rejected as effeminate, and they are often buried up amidst the pursuits of ambition and of wealth. But it is not for nothing, that nature addresses herself to this part of our constitution in a thousand forms, and with a thousand voices; that she has so frequently united beauty with utility, and even stamped it with an independent value by often setting it alone. It is not for nothing that she has consulted appearances by painting the flower, and turning the glossy side of every leaf to the eye, and dipping in gold the plumage of the

bird, and bathing in its pomp of hues the coming and the parting day. Nor was it merely to impart a transient pleasure;—but it was, that the exercise of this part of our nature might throw a refining and softening influence over the rest, and to teach us to carry the principles of taste into our manners and outward conduct. If there is nothing morally good in these emotions, yet are they naturally allied to goodness, and seem to be its twilight; they are the transition step in the creation, from mere matter, to moral worth and beauty. And if but little can be done, which is by no means certain, to cultivate directly this part of what may be called the emotive or affective part of our constitution; we at least need not overlay it, and carry forward education as if it did not exist. We may appreciate it, we may dwell upon it, we may favor to some extent the operation of circumstances in eliciting it.

Fourthly, it is hardly necessary to say that a wise system of education will regard man as possessed of a moral nature, the object of which is goodness. This implies the combined action of the rational and affective nature of man, and is their consummation and final cause. The union of cultivated intellect and refined taste with moral corruption, however common it may be, is monstrous; and if there are institutions the legitimate tendency of which is to produce that result, they are a curse to the community. As in the intellect we endeavor to form the mind, if I may be allowed the expression, to self-progress, so in morals we are to endeavor to form it to self-government. This gives us our principle in moral education. Evil is in the world, and must be met. This world was intended to be a place of trial, and if a scheme of optimism can be made out upon any supposition, it is upon this. Temptation cannot be excluded. It leaped the walls of paradise, and the frontier which we have to guard is far too wide to enable us to prevent its incursions. Our main reliance must lie in strengthening the citadel. There

should be no needless exposure; there should, if possible, and this is the point to be attended to, be *none* till there is strength to meet it. The youth must, if possible, be prevented from tasting the cup of Circe, till we have shown him the swine that had once been men; he must be kept from the fascination of the serpent, till we have shown him its fangs; and having done this, we must commit him to his own keeping and to God.

According to this division, we shall have physical vigor, knowledge and intellectual power, refined taste and moral excellence; or in other words, we shall have formed the mind to the love and pursuit of truth, of beauty, and of goodness.

I might here close this enumeration, but I should not feel that it was complete, unless I were to add that a wise system of education will regard man as susceptible of the influence of habit. The susceptibility to habits, is to the mind, what the system of involuntary muscles is to the body—for as it would require our whole time to cause the heart to beat, so there are modes of voluntary action constantly recurring, which would engross life if they did not, by being often repeated, pass to some extent beyond the sphere of deliberation and immediate volition. But in passing from the sphere of conscious volition, they also pass from that of observation, and it is this fact that renders it so difficult to correct habits that are wrong, and so important to form those that are right. Few, probably, practically estimate as they ought, the power of repetition to give facility of action, and the decrease of susceptibility on repeated impression. It is through these that man may, on the one hand, come to perform with ease the nicest operations of art, and on the other, become gradually reconciled to almost any situation; and the system of education that should disregard these facts would be highly defective. A regard to them will lead us to look at an act in its connections, and when a *habit* is in ques-

tion, as that of punctuality, for instance, to insist upon some things with a particularity which would not be justified by their intrinsic importance.

From these general views I now pass to consider how far the course pursued in our colleges is adapted to attain the ends mentioned, and to meet the wants of the community. Time however will permit me to do this only so far as will be necessary to meet some of the objections that are made against them.

And first, it is objected that colleges destroy physical vigor. There has, no doubt, been ground for this objection. From its local situation, this college has probably suffered less in this way than some others, and there has been here, especially of late, comparatively little failure of the health. Something has been done, but there is still room for improvement. It ought, however, no more to be expected that the student should have the same robustness of frame and muscular vigor as the laboring man, than that the laboring man should have the same intellectual cultivation as the student. There is no use in undertaking to combine things that are incompatible; and however useful and desirable on many accounts and in many situations manual-labor institutions may be, (I believe they may be both,) still there always have been, and probably always will be institutions not on that plan, and yet compatible with perfect health. If we were to regard the general voice on this subject, we should suppose that a want of exercise was the great, if not the sole cause of the failure of health among our literary men. But there is a power of adaptation in the human constitution which fits it for different occupations. It was never intended to lay down, in this respect, a railway, from which, if man deviated, he should be dashed in pieces; and experience shows, that if other things are attended to, the range of safety to health is comparatively

wide. It is not a fact that students in Germany exercise more than those in this country, and yet they are healthy. But the truth is that students, in common with other classes of the community, not only do not exercise enough, but they live in the constant violation of all the rules of dietetics. Some have used, and still use, intoxicating drinks; a much larger number use tobacco; some are constantly eating dried fruits and various kinds of confectionary; many eat too much; many sit up late under the excitement of novel reading, and perhaps for study. Let their food be of proper quantity and quality, let them avoid poisonous and narcotic substances, let them keep regular hours, and shun the predominance of an excited or polluted imagination; and they will find that there is an elasticity in the human frame that requires exercise. Nor need it be aimless exercise. Let them saw their own wood, let botany and mineralogy lead them over the hills, let them cherish a love of fine prospects, let them cultivate the taste and manly spirit that have originated and carried forward so happily in this college, the horticultural and landscape gardening association; and there will be cheeks as fresh, and limbs as agile, and animal spirits as buoyant, as if they spent three hours a day in a workshop, and, (which would be necessary in some of our institutions,) as if a thousand dollars a year were expended to enable them to do something useful. It has been a fault, which I trust will be avoided here, that this subject has not been sufficiently urged upon students in the early part of their course.

Again; it is objected that colleges are not practical. There are some who seem to be slow in understanding what is meant by the discipline of the mind, or mental training, as if it were different in its principle from a military drill, in which a series of actions is performed, not so much for its own sake as a preparation for the future battle. It is true the discipline must be such as

will fit them for the combat. We must not put bows and arrows into their hands when they will have to use the cartridge-box and the musket—but discipline there must be. We are indeed to consult utility, but it must be in its highest and broadest sense—not that eager utility which would cut down the tree for the sake of sooner getting its fruit, its unripe fruit; but that far-sighted utility, which would plough a crop under for the sake of benefiting the soil, and which would look forward to the coincidence of its plans with the high purposes of God in the creation of man. But if there are any who never make a distinction between general and professional education, who look upon man solely as a being who is to be fitted to make money in some particular sphere, and not as one who has faculties to be perfected, to them I have nothing to say.

Again; it is objected that colleges do not keep up with the spirit of the age. This objection probably does not always assume a definite form in the minds of those who make it. But if it be intended that improvements in the sciences are not ingrafted, as they are made, upon the scientific courses, or that new sciences are not introduced as the wants of the public demand; if it be intended that there is an adherence to things that are old because they are old,—then, however much ground there may have been for the charge formerly, and especially in England, from which this complaint is mostly imported, I do not think there is any ground for it now. It is within the memory of our older graduates that chemistry, and geology, and mineralogy, and botany, and political economy, were either not taught at all, or scarcely at all, in the college course. These have been introduced as fast as the sciences have become so mature as to furnish good text books; and now, if the public will furnish us the means, we shall be glad to introduce more of modern languages, and something on constitutional law, which we intend to

introduce, and perspective, and civil engineering. In regard to those things which are retained, there is not, to my knowledge, much complaint except respecting the Latin and Greek languages. But this subject is of so wide a compass, and the propriety of retaining them has been so often and so fully shown, that I shall not enter upon it here.

Again; it is objected to colleges that they are aristocratic. Besides those who form no theory of society, there are two classes who would be thought to aim at the perfection and perpetuity of republican institutions, but their methods are directly opposite. The one can conceive of no improvement except by levelling every thing down—and probably there always will exist in every community a sediment of such people, whose uneasy malignity, manifesting itself in a pretended zeal for republicanism, nothing but a return of society to a savage state could satisfy. The other class do what they can to level up. And if there be one of these who imagines that colleges are not co-operating with him, it is because he is entirely ignorant of the facts. Must men be told at this day that the diffusion of knowledge is the only safety of republican institutions? Or are they ignorant that without higher seminaries the lower can never be sustained in any efficiency? Or that if there were not some institutions like colleges, to make education cheap, we should soon have an aristocracy of knowledge and refinement as well as of wealth? On this subject there is a mistake in regard to two points. One respects the class of persons who go to college. While a portion of these are sons of wealthy men, the great mass are the sons of clergymen, and farmers, and tradesmen, who feel that an education is the best patrimony they can bestow upon their children, and who are unable to give them even that, unless they assist themselves in part by teaching. The most of those therefore who graduate at our colleges spend no incon-

siderable portion of time, either before or after graduating, in teaching, and thus diffusing the blessings of general education. The other point on which there is a mistake, respects the real extent to which the cost of education is diminished. At this college a young man receives instruction, and has the use of the buildings, and library, and apparatus, and cabinet, and pays the college but about thirty-three dollars a year. The whole necessary expense per annum is less than one hundred dollars; a sum quite insufficient to maintain a boy in a common family school. In addition to this, we have funds bestowed by benevolent individuals, which enable us to appropriate something to meet the bills of those who promise to be useful but are not able to pay so much. Still the whole expense is greater than is desirable, and if our funds would permit it we would gladly make it less. It is thus that the poor man who has no farm to give his son, can give him an education, which, if he is a suitable person to be educated, is better. He is thus enabled to start fairly in the race of competition with the sons of the wealthy. In a class in college, each is on a perfect equality with the rest, and must stand on his own merits; and if the son of the rich should happen to have the advantage in previous training, he may yet find that he will have as much as he will care to do to maintain it in the field of open competition; and often when he does his best, much more if he become vain or frivolous or self-indulgent, will he find himself left behind by the stern efforts of those who feel that they must depend on themselves alone. Surely he who would tax and cripple colleges, would tax and depress general education, and keep down the people.

The last objection against colleges which I shall notice, comes from another quarter, and is, that they do not teach manners. And it must be confessed that this is not one of those things for which we give a diploma. Good manners certainly ought to exist and to be acquired in

colleges, and more ought to be done on this point than is done. Still there are difficulties in the way which will be appreciated by every sensible man. In the first place, manners cannot be taught by direct inculcation; they must mainly depend on parents and on associates during the earlier years of life. Again, many of those who come to college are of such an age that it would be impossible to remodel their manners entirely under the most favorable circumstances. They seem to have lost the power, which indeed some never had, of perceiving the difference between the easy intercourse of good fellowship which is consistent with self-respect and respect towards others, and a coarse familiarity which is consistent with neither. There is further a sentiment often prevalent among young men, than which no mistake could be greater, that manners are of little importance, and that to be slovenly and slouching, and perhaps well nigh disrespectful, is a mark of independence. But after all, college is not, in some respects, a bad place to wear off rusticity and break down timidity. And if those who make the complaint could see the transformation and improvement which really take place in many, I may say in most instances, in a college course, they would perhaps wonder that so much is accomplished, rather than complain that there is so little. Still, when a young man comes with a frame of granite rough from the mountains, or as rough as if he came from them, and has seen perhaps nothing of polite society, and knows nothing of polite literature, it cannot be expected that he should learn during his college course the manners of the drawing-room, or the arbitrary forms of fashionable etiquette. If he shall possess, as perhaps such men oftenest do, that higher form of politeness which consists in respecting the feelings of others and consulting their happiness, and we can send him into the world with a sound head and a warm heart to labor for the good of the world, we shall be satisfied, and the

world ought to be thankful. Such men often become the pillars of society.

I now proceed to make some remarks on college government. In regard to this, the principles on which we are to proceed are very simple. As in a community, so in a college, government ought always to be regarded, not as an end, but as a means to a further end. The end of a college being education, there should be no regulation or restraint which is not subservient to that; and when it becomes necessary to enforce those regulations that are thus subservient, it would be treason to the cause of education not to do it at any sacrifice. If it should be necessary for this purpose to send away the half or the whole of a class, it must be done without hesitation. It is, however, always unfortunate when much is said or thought about government. There should be among young men an ardor of study, a sense of propriety and self-respect, a strength of moral principle, which would render government unnecessary, and cause every thing to move on as it ought, spontaneously. That college is in the best state in which the least government is necessary.

Closely connected with the government of a college, is the manner of intercourse between the officers and students. In this a great, and no doubt a beneficial change has taken place. It is within the memory of some who hear me, that seniors had well nigh despotic authority over freshmen, could send them of errands, exact their obeisance, and settle authoritatively their disputes; and the distance within which a student might approach an officer without taking off his hat, was prescribed by law. All this was as little in accordance with the nature of man, as with the spirit of our institutions, and we have no wish for its return. Nor do we desire any form, except so far as it is useful in fitting men for society, and in keeping alive in the minds of the young that respect towards

others which ought to be cherished for their own sakes. He who has no respect for those qualities which fit men for responsible situations, can have no proper sense or appreciation of them, and he who has no sense of those qualities can never attain them. As he alone is fit to command who knows how to obey, so he alone who knows how to pay respect will ever come to deserve it. Hence it is that pertness and self-conceit, and disregard of those who ought to be respected, are so very unpromising symptoms in the young. There is, indeed, between the officers and students of a college, something of official intercourse; and all the usages of society require that when this is the case there should be something of official respect. But in general the intercourse between the officers and students ought to be free and unrestrained, and precisely that which takes places between one gentleman and another in good society.

But the great point here is,—and it is absolutely necessary in order to carry forward the principle of instruction of which I have spoken,—that there should be such an intercourse and state of feeling that the officers and students can go on harmoniously together, and feel that they have a common object. *This is all-important;* and there is in regard to it much need of reformation. A young man often enters college with the impression that the faculty and students are opposite parties with opposing interests. As long as he has such a feeling, it would be better for him and for the institution that he should be away. On this subject, I have recently met with a letter from Fellenburg, in which my sentiments are so fully expressed that I shall quote a few sentences from it. "They," says he, referring to this class of young men, "consider teachers and pupils as opposite parties with distinct interests, or at best as rulers and subjects, the former seeking for power, and the latter having the right of resistance. They cannot understand our desire to act as

parents, who seek to direct and restrain their children in order to improve their character and secure their happiness. They attribute to the lowest and most sordid motives all that is done to furnish an education truly Christian and entirely disinterested; an education liberally provided for in reference both to science and the arts. Pupils of this character often find their greatest pleasure in defeating all the efforts which are made for their improvement, instead of co-operating in them and considering their own best interests as identified with the success of their teachers." If such a state of things must exist in our colleges, they ought not to be sustained.

It was my intention to consider at this point some of the obstacles in the way of our success; but as I have already occupied so much time, I shall only indicate them.

One is, want of preparation on the part of many. Much of what is done in colleges, especially in the languages, ought to be done before entering.

Another is, the necessity of so much absence for the purpose of teaching. This breaks up and retards a class, and makes general scholarship meagre.

Another is, the want of interest on the part of parents. If parents would come with their sons, or occasionally visit them, or let us know by letter their peculiarities and tempers, we might sometimes avoid mistakes.

Another is, the diversity of ages, capacities and tastes. Many enter too young.

But the great difficulties with which we have to contend, result from influences that flow in from the community; and if they would have colleges what they ought to be, they must be what they ought to be themselves. A college is not an isolated community. No place sooner feels the undulations of public sentiment; and it is impossible that it should not partake of the tone of feeling and adopt the practices of the community in

which it is. The young man does not forget, on coming to college, the associations and habits of home; and if smoking, or drinking, or profane swearing, or gambling, or any other habit, is prevalent in a community, then it cannot be entirely excluded from the colleges. They can never be what they ought, till the general tone of moral feeling in the community is elevated.

The remarks already made may suffice to indicate my views of the general course of instruction and government that should be pursued in our colleges. In carrying out these views, I have the happiness to know that I shall not have to labor alone; that I shall have associates in whom I can confide—some of them of wider experience and maturer views than myself—who will not merely second my endeavors, but who will go abreast with me in bearing the responsibilities and sustaining the labors which are inseparable from a faithful performance of the important trusts committed to us. But with all their aid, and the indulgence which I may hope for from the public, it is with much diffidence and self-distrust that I enter upon the office to which I am called. Whether I remember the venerable men who have preceded me, and especially my distinguished predecessor to whom this college is so largely indebted, or the high reputation of this institution, or the standing and influence of its alumni, or the standard of education now demanded, or the character of the times for excitement and change and reckless attack upon those who conduct our public institutions, I feel that the responsibilities and labors and inquietudes of the office will be fully equal to its honor. I enter upon it with no excitement of novelty, with no buzz of expectation, with no accession of influence to the college from abroad, and with no expectation of pleasing every body. I have no ambition to build up here what would be called a great institution; the wants of the commu-

nity do not require it. But I do desire and shall labor that this may be a *safe* college; that its reputation may be sustained and raised still higher; that the plan of instruction which I have indicated may be carried out more fully; that here there may be health, and cheerful study, and kind feelings, and pure morals; and that, in the memory of future students, college life may be made a still more verdant spot.

But deep as is my anxiety when I look at the connection of this college with the interests of science and literature, it is far deeper when I look at its connection with the immortal destinies of those who shall come here, and with the progress of the cause of Christ and the conversion of the world. The true and permanent interests of man can be promoted only in connection with religion; and a regard to man as an immortal, accountable and redeemed being, should give its character to the whole course of our regulations and the spirit of our instructions. This college has for a long time been regarded, and not without reason, with interest and affection by the churches. Of its whole number of graduates, as many as one third have devoted themselves to the Christian ministry, and recently a larger proportion. It was on this ground that American missions had their origin. It was here that Mills and Hall prayed, and their mantle has so descended on the institution, that now we can hardly turn our eyes to a missionary station where one or more of its sons are not to be found. Others are on their way, and there is remaining behind an association devoted to the same glorious work. This college has also been the scene of revivals of religion, pure and repeated and mighty, which have caused, and are still causing, joy on earth and in heaven. It is upon these, and upon the higher standard of consistent piety that follows in their train, that we mainly rest our hopes for the distinguished usefulness of this college. For these let the churches pray; and let

them join with us, in the words of my venerable predecessor when this building was dedicated, "in devoting this College to the Holy Spirit as a scene of revivals of religion, and to the blessed Redeemer as an engine to bring on the millennial glory of His church." This would we do, not only as the friends of religion, but as the friends of science, and of a pure literature, and of the freest spirit of inquiry. We would do it that we may disabuse the world of the absurd prejudice that the knowledge of God cramps the mind, and disqualifies it for the study of his works—that we may hasten that day, which must come, when it shall be seen and felt that there is a coincidence and essential unity between reason and religion; when the spirit of literature and the spirit of science shall minister before the spirit of piety, and pour their oil into the lamp that feeds its waxing flame; when study shall be nerved to its highest efforts by Christian benevolence, and young men shall grow up at the same time into the light of science and the beauty of holiness.

ADDRESS,

DELIVERED BEFORE THE SOCIETY OF ALUMNI OF WILLIAMS COLLEGE, AT THE CELEBRATION OF THE SEMI-CENTENNIAL ANNIVERSARY,

August 16, 1843.

Brethren Alumni:—It is my first, and most pleasing duty, to bid you welcome to this spot. I do it with a full heart. I do it personally, as an Alumnus of this Institution to his brethren Alumni. I do it feelingly, as holding a position in which I need your sympathy and approbation; in which, aside from those high moral considerations which I trust will always be paramount, I find in that sympathy my best encouragement to labor; in that approbation, my highest reward. I do it as gladdened and strengthened by your presence; for few as have been the difficulties I have been called to encounter, they have yet been enough to make me feel how like the sunshine after clouds is the presence of so many here to-day, come up to manifest their continued attachment to the cause of sound learning, their interest in each other, and in the prosperity of this Institution. Men of earlier times, to whom I have been accustomed to look up with reverence; men in active life, who have left your business and your cares to join in these glad scenes; and you, younger men, who have gone out with my own instructions and parting

blessing, it is with emotions which I cannot express that I welcome you all.

But it is not in my own name only, or chiefly, that I bid you welcome. It is in the name of our venerated Alma Mater. With her you have sympathized, in her prosperity, and in her adversity. When she has been in poverty and distress, when she has been opposed and misrepresented by ignorance and prejudice and faction, when the flames have swept over her, she has still heard your voice of encouragement, and has been sustained by your generous aid. In your hearts, far rather than in buildings and in apparatus, she has hitherto had, and still has her best and her highest life. In her name, then, I bid you welcome to her quiet seats, to this green spot in the memory of the past, to these familiar scenes, these remembered walks, to the sound of that bell, not unwelcome now, to these circling and unchanged mountains, to this scenery unsurpassed. Especially do I bid you welcome to the fellowship of this literary festival, where, with our congratulations in view of the progress and success of fifty years, we may mingle our hopes of a brighter future.

Fifty years! What changes do not these words suggest—some of them occurring in those ordinary and ever repeated movements of nature which return upon themselves, and some in that onward march of things which is made known only as the scroll of Divine Providence is unrolled! Fifty years! So many times has the verdure of spring been seen to brighten this valley, and to creep up the sides of these mountains; so many times have their tops slept in the sunlight of the summer noon; so many times have they put on the gorgeous robes of autumn, and been swept bare and rested in the embrace of winter. These changes have passed upon them, but they are still the same. Not so those who have looked upon them. Of those who were in active life at the commencement of this period, few, if any, remain. He that was

then an infant clinging to his mother's bosom, is now a man with gray hairs upon him, and with his children grown up around him. In the meantime, with the regularity of the seasons, there has come the Senior Examination, and then the Commencement, with its greetings, and partings, and wide dispersion; with its gathered crowd that has come in like the rush of the brook after a shower, and has again dispersed, leaving these streets solitary and quiet. During this time more than a thousand young men have received the honors of this Institution. Here they have been agitated with the hopes and fears, and have shared the pleasures and perils of this miniature world. From this retreat they have looked out upon the ocean they were to sail, and have gathered strength and skill for the voyage. Ah! who can tell how many anxious thoughts, how many hopes and fears of parents, how many fervent prayers have clustered round, and ascended for all these! During this time too, the heads of the three venerable men who have presided over the Institution, have been laid low. Fitch and Moore and Griffin, whose voices have so often been heard in this place, and were once so familiar to many of you, where are they!

Such have been the changes in this valley. Need I refer to those that have passed upon the great theatre of the world? It was often said by Dr. Griffin, that this College came into being at the commencement of a new era. It was just then that the smoke and the lava of the French Revolution began to be thrown up, and that the shocks of that great moral earthquake began to be felt among the nations. Infidelity, having gained the ascendency in France, was then mustering and concentrating her forces, and was sending out her emissaries to convert the nations, and anarchy and bloodshed were following in her train. These events alone have marked the period as an era among historians, and have caused it to be regarded

by the interpreters of prophecy as the opening of a new seal. But besides these, it was the same year that Carey and his associates were ordained to the great work of modern missions, and that the angel having the everlasting gospel to preach among the benighted nations of the East, began his flight. This was the commencement of a movement far more important than the French Revolution. It was as the invention of the art of printing to the effects of a battle. It was a moral movement, embracing in itself not only moral, but political revolutions, which are to be accomplished, not by blood, but by the noiseless and irresistible progress of truth and love. In the same year, too, commenced that series of revivals of religion in this country, which has never since entirely ceased, in connection with which this College has been so largely blessed, and in consequence of which alone it has been sustained.

Coming into being at such an era, its first half century could not but be eventful in the history of the race. Perhaps no fifty years since the world began has been more so. And in connection with the great events that have taken place, the human mind has been thoroughly agitated and aroused. Every institution has been scrutinized, every opinion has been tested, and certain great truths with reference to civil and religious liberty have, as we trust, become so firmly established that they cannot be shaken. It has been the era of the application of science to the arts, and of the extension of the dominion of man over physical nature. If man had been endowed with the strength of a giant, and with the wings of an eagle, the gift would hardly have been greater. It has been the era of the extension of liberty, and of the diffusion of knowledge among the masses—not merely an era of change, but also decidedly an era of *progress*.

And this leads me to the topic to which I propose to call your attention on the present occasion. I propose to

make some remarks and inquiries respecting what has been called THE LAW OF PROGRESS OF THE RACE, and then to say something of the connection of this College with that progress.

The questions of deepest interest to man are those which relate, not to the destiny of the race, but of the individual. If we are to perish at death, it matters little to us whether the race of man is to be destroyed immediately after, or to remain forever; or whether it is yet to await the coming round of some great geological cycle, when his bones and his works, found in the more recent strata, shall be his only record to the race that shall succeed him. Still, and this is one argument for our immortality, we do feel a deep interest in those who shall come after us, and we wish to know the channels along which the mighty current of events will wind in coming time.

But we have only two modes of penetrating the future. One is by experience. This enables us, supposing the course of nature to be uniform, and human nature to remain as it is, to tell, in general, what the course of events will be, by transferring to the future a modified past. The other mode of knowing the future is by prophecy, in which the question is not about tendencies, or principles, or general laws, but about what a free and personal God has said he will do. Hence there are two points of view both of the past and of the future. In the one case we see a personal God carrying forward his providence with reference to the great ends of his moral government, causing the wrath of man to praise him, destroying nations for their wickedness when their iniquity was full, and closing up the great drama of time with a universal and righteous judgment. In the other, there is indeed a verbal recognition of God, but every thing is referred to the action of uniform laws, and to the development of tendencies supposed to be inherent in the nature of things. According to this, the race is said to have a growth, a development,

in the same way as an individual man. Every thing is supposed to go on in regular order. That which precedes prepares the way for that which follows, and that which follows is the necessary consequence of that which precedes. The individual man is nothing, and the course of events and the destiny of the race are every thing. Every thing is good in its place. Wars and revolutions and tumults are but the necessary struggle of the new ideas with those that are old and ready to vanish away, and all apparent stagnation or retrogression is only as the damming up of water that is accumulating its force, or as the retreat of one who is to make a mightier leap. Great men are the product of the age, its representatives, coming when they are needed, and instead of controlling and shaping the course of events, as was formerly supposed, they are controlled and shaped by it. As there are not the same reasons for the decay of the race as of the individual, this view has naturally given rise to a belief in the law of progress, and in the doctrine of human perfectibility.

As these points of view are so different, I will just observe here, that when they become entirely separated, they will produce atheism or pantheism on the one hand, and superstition and fanaticism on the other. He who severs the connection between the uniform movements of nature and the freewill of God, is an atheist or a pantheist; and he who does not sufficiently heed the stated order of providence, and imputes too much to direct interposition, is superstitious and fanatical.

The true point of view undoubtedly is gained by combining the two. By doing this we have a uniform course of events as the basis of experience and a ground of rational effort to man; but that course is sustained by the agency of a personal God, and is carried on in entire subserviency to great moral ends. If, therefore, we would read aright the history of the future, we must consult, not only the

records of the past, but also that "sure word of prophecy which holy men of old spake as they were moved by the Holy Ghost." We must look, not solely to the *philosophic*, but also to the *prophetic* mode of knowing what is to come.

But when we inquire, as we now do, concerning a law, or a tendency, it is plain that we can have nothing to do with the prophetic mode. The simple question is whether there is, inwrought into the constitution of things, a law of progress of the race, or a tendency towards it, which we may hope to see realized.

The idea of such a law has arisen, not only from the view which I have mentioned, but in connection with a remarkable change in the views and habits of thought of the community respecting the point to which they were to look for improvement. There was a time when the antiquity of the world was associated with the wisdom of old age, and when it was supposed that all wisdom was to be found in the records, and all excellence in the models of the past. But when the human mind was aroused as it was by the Reformation and the invention of the art of Printing; when Columbus discovered new continents on the earth, and Galileo new worlds in the heavens; when Bacon introduced his new method, and Newton weighed the planets and decomposed the sunbeam; it was impossible that the same reverence for antiquity should continue; and, as was natural, an opposite feeling took its place. Instead of supposing that mankind had already attained all the perfection of which they were capable, and that nothing remained but to carry modern degeneracy up to the heights of ancient achievement, it was said that the ancient world was really the infant world, and that to us moderns belonged the honor of the hoary head in the life of the race. Hence arose an impression that all the arts, and science, and philosophy, and institutions of the ancients were imperfect, from the simple fact

that they were ancient, and therefore the product of an immature age of the world; and the eyes of men were turned from the past to the future, and to those ideal models, dim and shadowy, which were sketched quite as often by the imagination as by the judgment. Then, as literary, and scientific, and commercial intercourse increased, the great idea arose that there was a community, instead of an opposition, of interest among nations, till at length, when the figure and extent of the earth, and the condition of its inhabitants became known, and facilities of intercourse were increased, there was originated the idea of a reciprocal influence, a common bond of interest, and a law of progress for all; till now there is scarcely a periodical, or a lecture, or a literary address, in which this law is not spoken of as familiarly and as confidently as the law of gravitation itself.

As was to be expected, an idea so exciting to the imagination has been carried too far, and has given rise to something of extravagance, and to something of cant. With this for their watchword, and probably honestly believing themselves under its influence, egotistical and unquiet and ambitious men, and men of one idea, have attacked without scruple or discrimination every thing that was old; have eagerly adopted new systems of thought, or those supposed to be new; have originated impracticable schemes, and have been zealous in introducing them, little regarding their congruity with the existing state of things. When all this has produced its natural consequences, division and confusion, they have cried out—*progress;* thus mistaking the commotion caused in the vitals of society by the crudities with which they have drugged it, for the excitement of healthy action. Even the Bible has been supposed to have grown obsolete, and to need to be adapted to the progress of the age.

What then is the true idea of progress? And here I observe, that the idea of progress presupposes a defi-

nite object to be attained, and a movement towards that object. It is not the tossing of a vessel on the waves without a rudder or a compass; it implies that there is a port, and that the ship is tending towards it. Unless there is some definite idea, towards the realization of which society is moving, there can be no progress. There may be, as there now is and has long been in many parts of South America, excitement, agitation, confusion; society may be broken into fragments; there may be collisions of local and individual interests; but all may be chaotic, the movement may be without direction, the agitation without result. In such a state of things there can be no progress till society becomes organized, and begins to move forward towards some definite object. Let this take place, let any idea become the prominent and governing idea in the community, and it will be supposed there is progress when men are in the process of realizing that idea. Is war and conquest, as it has often been, the prominent idea? Then there is progress when the science, the instruments and the art of war are becoming more perfect. Is luxury and sensual gratification the leading idea? Then there is progress when a new dish is invented, and when, as in ancient Sybaris, the cocks are prevented from crowing in the morning. Is wealth the leading idea? There is progress when the country is becoming rich. Is it the power of man over external nature? or liberty? or equality? or the perfection of the fine arts? There will be supposed to be progress when there is an approximation to the attainment of these. Would there then be a true progress in the advancement of society towards any or all of these ends? Yes, on condition, and only on condition, that society would thus attain a true end, and not a means.

The true idea of progress, then, is not that of movement, or simply of progression towards the realization of an idea; but it involves a recognition of the true end of

man as a social being, and an approach towards that. This end I suppose to be, the upbuilding and perfection of the individual man in every thing that makes him truly man. I hold, that the germ of all political and social well-being is to be found in the progress of the individual towards the true and the highest end for which he was made. And here we have an instance of that incidental accomplishment of subordinate ends in the attainment of one that is higher, that is every where so conspicuous in the works of God. Is it the end of the processes of vegetation to perfect the seed? It is only when those processes move on to the successful accomplishment of that, that we can have the beauty and fragrance of the flower, or the shade and freshness of the green leaves. So here, we find that social good can be wrought out, and social ends be attained, only as individuals are perfected in their character; and that the beauty and fragrance and broad shade of a perfect society would grow, without effort or contrivance, from the progress of the individuals of society towards their true perfection and end. Thus, and thus only, can we have that state of ideal perfection in which perfect liberty would be combined with perfect security, and with all the advantages of the social state. If this be so, then political organizations, which are merely means to an end, are most perfect when they so combine protection with freedom as to give the most favorable theatre for the growth, and enjoyment, and perfection of the individual man; and that society itself is most perfect, whatever its form may be, in which the greatest number of individuals recognize and pursue this end. It cannot be too often repeated, that the ends of society are not realized when there are great aggregate results, magnificent public works, great accumulations of wealth and of the means of sensual and sensitive enjoyment, with the degradation, or without the growth of individuals; and that all changes in the forms of institu-

tions and the direction of active industry, must be futile, which do not originate in, or draw after them an improvement in the character of individuals. But it is self-evident that society can furnish a free arena for individual growth, only as the principles of justice and benevolence are recognized—only as the spirit of that great precept of doing to others as we would that they should do unto us, pervades the mass. The fundamental condition, then, of any progress that can be permanent, and solid, and universal, is a *moral* condition. Let this exist, and there will come in, as accessory, progress in science and in arts and in wealth; but without this, whatever progress may be made in physical improvements, there will be constant agitation and restlessness; and through every change of form, society will continue to be like that stick of which most of us have heard, which was 'so crooked that it could not lie still.'

If then there be a law of progress for the race, it must be one by which society advances towards a state of things such as has just been described. And that there is such a law, is affirmed on three distinct grounds: The first is, that such a law is required for the vindication of the wisdom of Divine Providence. It is supposed that the world would be a failure unless it should manifest the evolution of a regular plan, whose parts should succeed each other like the five acts of a drama, and form by themselves, when time was over, a completed whole. But it is far safer and more becoming to ascertain what Divine Providence has done, and then presume it to be wise, rather than first to assert what would be wise, and then to presume that Divine Providence has done it. It may be so. It would be in accordance with the analogy of God's works in which we so often find, as in the vision of the prophet, a wheel within a wheel. But it may also be, that this world holds in the plans of God the same relation that the nursery holds to the fields of transplanted

trees, and that its end lies entirely beyond itself. If society had always remained in a patriarchal or nomadic state, without any thing of what we call progress, and there had simply come up such men as Abraham, and Isaac, and Jacob, to spend here "the days of the years of their pilgrimage" and then go up higher, who would say that the world had been a failure? This question man cannot decide without a wider survey of the plans of God than falls within our present vision, and hence we cannot rely upon any argument for such a law, drawn from this source.

The second ground, on which the existence of this law has been argued, is to be found in the fact that the product of the human mind is not mere sensations that perish as they arise, but that we inherit the experience and knowledge of all who have gone before us. This *is* a great fact, and on it the capacity of the race for improvement is based. It gives a tendency to improvement, and that tendency would become a law if there were nothing to counteract it. Former generations have labored, and we have entered into their labors. They were as the prophets of old, "unto whom it was revealed that not unto themselves they did minister, but unto us upon whom these ends of the world are come." Ours are all their conquests over physical nature, all their accumulations of wealth, all their machines and inventions in the arts, all their literature and science, and all the political and social experience of the world. Ours are their observations on individual facts and beings, ours their arrangement of those facts and their generalizations, and ours those grand ideas and methods which have come to the scientific seers of the race, not so much from what is called induction, as suddenly, and like a direct revelation from the suggestion of a single fact. And rich as are these golden sands that have been brought down by the river of time, there is every reason to believe that those will be richer yet which

shall be borne still farther on. In the progress of the race, not less than of the individual, the great principle applies, that to him that hath, shall be given. Every day shows that there is open before us the path of a limitless progression, and that science has but just begun to be applied to the purpose of subjugating nature to man, and of causing the elements to minister to his happiness. No one, for example, unacquainted with what has been done by the application of chemistry to agriculture, by an investigation of the laws of vegetable life and of the nutriment and stimulants of vegetables, can conceive what prospects are opening in respect to the cheapness and abundance of the products of the earth, the multitude of inhabitants it may consequently support, and the leisure they may have for rational culture and enjoyment. And what is thus true of the products of the earth, is also true of the means of transporting them, and not only so, but of communicating to the whole race any invention or discovery, and of binding them together as one in the bonds of interest and of sympathy.

We fully admit, then, the great fact on which the possibility of this law is based; we admit the tendency to progress under certain conditions; but how far this compels us to admit the law, will be best seen by passing on as we now do to the history of the race—the third ground on which the existence of such a law is asserted. The advocates of this law do not permit themselves to doubt, as indeed they cannot consistently, that every succeeding generation has, on the whole, been wiser and happier than the preceding. But can this view be sustained by the history of the past? Or does not this history rather show that while there is a tendency to progress in the race, yet that this tendency can take effect and become a law only on certain conditions, both physical and moral?

On the physical obstacles to progress, I need not enlarge, because they have not in fact been *the* obstacles to

man. It is obvious, however, that life may be, and sometimes has been, such a mere struggle for existence, as to preclude all idea or hope of individual or general culture. But is it a fact that tribes, that nations, that continents, in which no physical condition of progress was wanting, have always made such progress? How was it with the tribes of this country, when they were discovered? Were they making progress? Or were they going on towards extinction? How was it with the race, comparatively civilized, that preceded them? What voice do the ruined cities and other remains of ancient art and civilization, found on this continent, utter respecting the progress of man? To what point of elevation have those many generations attained, who have lived, and raised themselves upon the shoulders of their predecessors, and perished, throughout all the islands of the Pacific? How has it been with Africa? Has Egypt, once so mighty, but now so long the basest of kingdoms, made progress? Has Carthage? Or Numidia? Or have the unnumbered millions in its central and southern regions? Has Asia made progress? Has there been any progress for a thousand years in India, or in China? Has there been in Tartary, or Persia, or Arabia, or Turkey? Do not the Chinese and the Hindoos now use astronomical tables, of the principles of whose construction they know nothing? So far have the principal nations of Asia been from making progress within the last thousand years, that it would be hazarding nothing to assert that they have deteriorated. Their movement has spent its force, their civilization has become effete. And if this is so, what becomes of the law of progress of the race, when such vast masses are not acted upon by that law? Does not the law become a law of deterioration, and progress the exception? I do not understand by what right it is, that in considering the history of the race, the larger portion of it is accounted by the advocates of this law as nothing.

But tracing the line of movement and of civilization from its reputed origin, whether in India or in Egypt, first to Greece, then to Rome, and then to modern times, do we find any indications of a law of progress?

It is doubted by some whether we are really in advance of the ancient civilization. It cannot be pretended that we have greater individual men. Grander specimens of man will probably never exist than are to be found among those of old time. Many of their arts, it is well known, are lost, and many others, at one time supposed to be solely of modern discovery, are now known to have been in use among them; and any one who will read attentively the twenty-seventh chapter of Ezekiel, may doubt whether we are before them in what pertains to the luxuries and refinements of life.

But if we are in advance of them, is our civilization a continuation of theirs? Is the course of civilization and improvement properly represented by a river flowing on and expanding? Or may we not rather compare what has been done, to the formation in the stream of separate islands of sand, where we may see one now accumulating, and enlarging, and giving promise of permanence, but at length undermined and washed away by the waters, and its materials dispersed, or floated down till they reach a new point of aggregation? The latter seems to me to be the more accurate representation, and if many, and perhaps the more valuable, materials have been saved in the general confusion connected with the transfer of the seats of power and of civilization, much also has been lost. Indeed, till modern civilization began to extend its arms, and to give indications that it would ultimately embrace the globe, this alternation of growth and decay was supposed to be the law of the race. Thus Peter the Great says, in his will, "I look upon the invasion of the countries of the East and West by the North, as periodical movements determined by the designs of Providence,

who thus regenerated the Roman empire by the invasion of barbarians. The emigrations of the polar races are like the flow of the Nile, which, at certain periods, is sent to fertilize the impoverished land of Egypt." This *is* the lesson which history alone, separated from the movements and prospects of modern civilization, teaches.

What then is this civilization which thus erects itself to the survey of the whole earth? It is Christian civilization—one whose roots are watered by the life-giving springs, and upon whose leaves descend the dews, of the religion of Christ—a civilization preserved, and kept from putrefaction, by that salt of the earth. It is a civilization, not like that of old in one great mass, but pervading all Christian nations, and every where manifesting the same great characteristics. It springs from the principle of individual growth, manifesting itself in accordance with the fundamental fact that the true growth and well-being of one is not opposed to that of any other, but must be coincident with the well-being of all. So an impartial God has ordained it, and we might as well expect a body to rest before it finds its centre of gravity, as to expect society to be at rest till this great principle is recognized and acted upon. In connection with this religion and with this principle there has been progress, and no where else. In connection with this, we can trace an expanding stream from the fountain head of the race. We see it at first, winding its solitary and threadlike way in the patriarchal and Jewish dispensations, till at length it burst forth from the hills of Judea and became a mighty river, whose current is to-day flowing on and becoming deeper and broader. The ancient forms of civilization fell to pieces by their own weight, nor is there any evidence that the fragments of their wreck would have been caught and preserved, if Christianity had not come in with the influence of its pure precepts, and the weight of its eternal sanctions, and formed new points of aggregation. No

instance is known in which, without this, civilization has rekindled its fires upon altars where they have once gone out. That portion of the race which is the most hopeless, which it is most difficult to impregnate with intellectual and moral vitality, is the residuum of an extinct civilization. There is no evidence that any thing except Christianity could have amalgamated materials so discordant as the northern barbarian and the effeminate Roman, nor any reason to suppose that without it Europe could have been freed from the curse of domestic slavery, and of feudal institutions. Barbarians have, indeed, been said to regenerate decayed civilization, but it was because there was at work an element mightier than that of civilization, amalgamating and fusing masses that would never have become one by any other power. There has not been upon the earth for the last thousand years, there is not now, any true progress except in connection with Christianity. On the contrary, all other systems of religion, and all other types of civilization, are falling to decay, and man is deteriorating individually and socially under their influence. It is then for Christendom, if at all, and for the race only as it may be embraced within the expanding limits of Christendom, that history indicates a law of progress.

While, therefore, in view of this brief and very imperfect discussion, we believe that man was intended to be a progressive being, and that God has laid the foundation for this in the very nature of things, we also believe that the inherent tendency to progress can become a law only on certain moral conditions, and that these conditions can be sustained in society only by the vital influences of the Christian religion. We believe in no *law* of progress that would exclude the providence of God, and in no conditions of progress that would exclude the religion of Jesus Christ. If men choose voluntarily to adopt the ends which God proposes, and to act in coincidence with

the laws which he has instituted, they will make a progress, individual and social, such as will realize the brightest dreams of poetry and of prophecy; but if they pursue any other course, their progress can be only progress towards ruin.

But whether it is in accordance with a universal law or not, certain it is, as I have already said, that there are now a movement and a progress in the race more grand and exciting than ever before. A centre of aggregation is formed. We believe it is fast anchored in the stream of time—that it is indeed an immovable rock placed there by the hand of God. If we are to judge by laws, or by tendencies operating under conditions that gave them the present effect of laws, we should be led to hope for a rapid improvement in the condition and prospects of the race. But this must depend, as it has in all past time, upon the state of the moral elements, and if we would know what is really to be, we must refer to the prophetic, as well as to the philosophic mode of ascertaining the future. It may be that these tendencies are to take effect, and that by a gradual process of melioration, as the light of the morning comes in, the light of the knowledge of the glory of God shall cover the earth; or it may be that the bringing in of the new order of things shall be seen to be, not from any law, or human agency, but by the direct interposition of God. It may be that an atheistic philosophy, or a mingled formalism and infidelity, or a general licentiousness and opposition to moral restraint, shall pervade the masses, and that all constitutional barriers shall be swept away before their immediate action, and that license shall be enthroned in the place of liberty, and right and order and religion shall be trampled under foot, and the fiendish malignity that showed itself at the crucifixion, and in the French revolution, shall be again in the ascendant, and the church of God be to human eyes once more about to be destroyed, and that

then there shall come in the arrest of sudden and awful judgments, and the sign of the Son of Man shall appear in heaven, and a great voice shall come out from the throne, saying, "It is done;"—"the kingdoms of this world are become the kingdoms of our Lord and of his Christ, and he shall reign for ever and ever."

Having thus dwelt, too briefly for the theme, but I fear too long for the occasion, on the first branch of the subject, I pass to one of more immediate interest; for however wide may be the excursions of the intellect, I am sure we can all say on this day, and on this occasion, of our Alma Mater,

"My heart untravelled fondly turns to thee."

To her we turn, and, obscure as she may have been in the eyes of many, we do not fear to ask what she has done to swell the mighty movement of the last fifty years. This is the test by which the value of all our institutions must be tried, and this we do not hesitate to apply. What has this college done? Need I ask, with such a body of its Alumni before me,—the venerable, the honored, the distinguished,—men high in office, and in influence? And how many whose hearts are with us, are not here? Probably the Alumni of no college in the Union are more scattered than ours, composed as they have so largely been of those who have had their own way to make in life. As I have already said, more than one thousand young men have completed their course of study here, and of these more than one third either have been, or will be ministers of the gospel. Many of these, too, would never have been liberally educated—I have no reason to suppose I should myself have been—if it had not been for Williams College. Embosomed among these mountains, it has exerted a suggestive power, and called out many such men as become most useful when educated. They have come from the yeomanry of the country, from the plough and the work-

shop, with clear heads and firm nerves, and industrious habits, and unperverted tastes—in need, it may be, of polish, but susceptible of the highest. They have come because they felt high impulses struggling within them and they have made their own way. Such men we welcome. They become, intellectually, the working men of the land—energetic, practical men, whose influence has been and is extensively felt in the benevolent operations of the day. It is probably by bringing forward such men, as teachers, as ministers, as practical men in all the professions, and diffusing in society the leaven of their influence, indispensable in institutions like ours, that this college has done most good.

But if our number had been smaller, and we had done less by that general influence that belongs to all literary institutions, it might still not be presumptuous to speak of what we had done on so broad a field. In some respects the progress of knowledge and improvement, is like the gradual accumulation of a pile to which every scholar may be expected to add something—as every Indian is said to have laid a stone upon the pile at the foot of Monument mountain—but in other respects it is more like the progress of fire which is set at certain points, and spreads on every side. Luther, and Bacon, and Newton, and Carey, and Samuel J. Mills, set fires; and he who does this to any extent, does something for the race, even though that which kindled the blaze was but a spark, and was lost in the brightness and glow of the succeeding conflagration. The brightest history of an institution is to be found in what it has done in setting such fires.

And here I cannot fail to be reminded by the position in which I stand, surrounded by its genial light and warmth, of one such fire. So far as I know, the Society of the Alumni of Williams College, was the first association of the kind in this country, certainly the first which acted efficiently, and called forth literary addresses. It

was formed, September 5th, 1821, and the preamble to the constitution then adopted, was as follows: "For the promotion of literature and good fellowship among ourselves, and the better to advance the reputation and interests of our Alma Mater, we the subscribers, graduates of Williams College, form ourselves into a Society." The first president was Dr. Asa Burbank. The first orator elected was the Hon. Elijah Hunt Mills, a distinguished Senator of the United States. That appointment was not fulfilled. The first oration was delivered in 1823, by the Rev. Dr. Woodbridge, now of Hadley, and was well worthy of the occasion; and since that time the annual oration before the Alumni has seldom failed. In 1832, a measure was adopted by this Society of great importance to the college. It is scarcely credible how meagre the philosophical and chemical apparatus then was, and it was voted that this Society would attempt to raise for the benefit of those departments, the sum of $4,000, by subscriptions of the Alumni, and other friends of the college. The effect of this, faithfully applied as it was to the direct means of instruction, has, I know, been felt from that time to this, in every beating pulse of the institution. Since this Society was formed, the example has been followed in other institutions, and bids fair to extend to them all. Last year, for the first time, the voice of an Alumnus orator was heard at Harvard and at Yale; and one of these associations, I know, sprang directly from ours. It is but three years since a venerable man attended the meeting of our Alumni, one of those that have been so full of interest, and he said he should go directly home and have such an association formed at the commencement of his Alma Mater, then about to occur. He did so. That association was formed, and the last year the voice of one of the first scholars and jurists in the nation was heard before them. The present year the Alumni of Dartmouth were addressed for the first time, and the doctrine of

Progress was illustrated by the distinguished speaker in more senses than one.* Who can tell how great the influence of such associations may become in cherishing kind feeling, in fostering literature, in calling out talent, in leading men to act, not selfishly, but more efficiently for the general cause through particular institutions?

Another important idea originated here is that embodied in the Horticultural and Landscape Gardening Association, the results of which are seen in the college garden, and in the garden around the observatory. With slight exceptions, the whole labor bestowed upon these, from the first, (and its amount is greater than most would suppose,) has been done by the students. The object has not been profit, but the promotion of health and of a taste for the beautiful, and the effect has been most happy upon health and cheerfulness, and upon the emotive nature. Perhaps it does as much as can be done in remedying that evil of college life, the want of a domestic and home influence. It shows that students can make of college just what they choose—that they can make it a home of peace, and connect with it associations of beauty and moral purity, a place full of unspeakable interest to parents and friends, and to those who have the oversight of it. When standing in the midst of beauty thus created, my mind has often been led on to the conception of a higher beauty than that of flowers and mountains, and I have had a vision of what a college might be. I do not know that our example in this respect has been followed by other colleges—in some it could not be—but I know of several academies which are now surrounded by tasteful grounds in consequence of what has been done here. I hardly know of an idea with which the young people of this land more need to be imbued, than that which lies at the basis of this association.

* Hon. Levi Woodbury, whose subject was "Progress."

Another thing which I may properly notice here, is the fact that to this college belongs the honor of having erected the first Astronomical Observatory on this continent. This was commenced at a period of great apathy on the subject, but since then the interest has become extensive and intense. Nor was this building erected as a single isolated undertaking. It was one mode of realizing an idea that had been adopted in regard to all education respecting sensible objects, which is, that we are not so much to talk about a thing, as to show it. You may tell me that the stone you hold in your hand is petrified wood, and I may believe it; but let me see, by a microscope, the porous structure and the layers still remaining, and I have an impression that I could get in no other way. You may tell me of the magnitude and motions of the planets; but let me see them hanging in space, and passing rapidly through the field of a large telescope, or let me turn that same telescope upon one of the nebulæ, or into the depths of infinite space, and it is quite another thing to me. The idea is, that the teacher is to make nature the principal, and as far as possible, is to let her do her own teaching. In pursuance of this idea, the Magnetic Observatory has been built, very efficient Meteorological and Natural History Associations have been formed, and scientific expeditions and pedestrian tours have been several times undertaken. The direct object was not so much the extension of science, as to convey a more full and accurate impression of the universe as now known, and to promote habits of observation. Have the means and apparatus to do this fully, and your course loses the character of mere book learning. The student is led to direct communion with nature, and with nature's God; and though you do not advance science immediately, yet you kindle fires. You incorporate your course into the very being. You wake thoughts and feelings "that shall perish never." Such is the idea which we have attempted to realize in

the teaching of physical science, which we have realized as far as our means would permit, and of which the Observatory was but a single result. And here I cannot omit to mention, as connected with our facilities in this department, the donation during the past season by Professor Emmons, of a complete suit of the New York minerals and rocks, a gift of great importance, connected as those rocks are with the general science, and one worthy of the munificence of a State.

I will mention one idea more, indigenous here, as it must have been elsewhere, which we have of late attempted to realize. It is that of making the college studies have the impression and effect of a *system* on the mind of the student. Laying the power of expression, whether by writing or speaking, out of the question, we divide our course into the Languages, Mathematics, Physical Science, and Man, as he is in himself, and in his relations to his fellow creatures, and to God. Pursuing Mathematics and the Languages in the usual way, and Physical Science in the manner just spoken of, we take up first the physical man, and endeavor to give, as by the aid of the admirable preparation of Auzoux we are able to do, an idea of every organ and tissue of the body. We then take the intellectual man, and investigate, first, and classify his several faculties; then the grounds of belief and the processes of the mind in the pursuit of truth, with an explanation of the inductive and the deductive logic; then the moral nature, together with individual and political morality, comprising a knowledge of constitutional history and of the rights and duties of American citizens; then the emotive nature, as taste and the principles of the fine arts; then natural theology and the analogy of the natural to the moral government of God. Perhaps other and better systems have been adopted elsewhere; but I know that formerly here, the studies were pursued as separate and isolated, and there is reason to suppose that

the idea of system, of the communication of one grand organized body of knowledge, answering in unity as well as in diversity, to the universe of God, is too little regarded.

But the grand distinction of this college, in the aspect in which we are now regarding it, is, that on this spot American Missions had their origin. "It is," in the words of another, "from the little fountain among the green hills of Williamstown, that the noble river may be traced which now bears upon its surface the benefactions of so many churches to heathen nations." That such a movement should have originated with the undergraduates of a college, at a time when there was the apathy of death every where in the land on the subject of Missions, when there was so much in the state of the world to excite the youthful imagination, and fire ambition, and distract the mind, when Europe was quaking under the tread of the man of destiny, and this country was fearfully excited by political divisions, can only be accounted for from the special agency of the Spirit of God. It was according to the wonted methods of Him who chooses the weak things of the world to confound the things that are mighty.

The history of this transaction is now known, and there is connected with it a high moral sublimity. How busy, and active, and loud, and prominent were many then, in connection with the exciting topics of the day! What quietness, what force of character, what far-reaching thought, what trust in God did it require to hear the roar of all the temporary movement as it was passing by, and yet be unmoved by it, and seek out retired places of prayer, and of hallowed conversation respecting the interests of the permanent and eternal kingdom of God, and to devote themselves personally to the work of a mission among the heathen! What a moment was that, when Samuel J. Mills led James Richards and Robert C. Robbins

to a retired place near the Hoosack, and there, by the side of a large haystack, opened to them his feelings and views on this great subject; and when he found their minds as tinder to the spark, and their hearts flowed together, and they spent the day there in fasting and prayer, in consultation and in self-dedication to this work! This was thirty-six years ago. The year following, in September, 1808, in the north-west room of the lower story of the old east college, an association was formed with a written constitution, the objects and character of which are thus stated in the original document.

"The object of this Society shall be to effect *in the person of its members*, a mission or missions to the heathen."

"No person shall be admitted who is under any engagement of any kind which shall be incompatible with going on a mission to the heathen."

"Each member shall keep absolutely free from every engagement, which, after his prayerful attention, and after consultation with the brethren, shall be deemed incompatible with the objects of this Society; and shall hold himself in readiness to go on a mission when and where duty may call."

This constitution was originally signed by Samuel J. Mills, and James Richards, and Ezra Fisk, and Cyrus W. Gray, and Robert C. Robbins, and Daniel Smead, and afterwards by Gordon Hall, and others. It was one part of their plan to take dismissions from this college and go to others; and one of them, supposed to be Edward Warren, afterwards one of the first missionaries to Ceylon, did thus go to Middlebury and kindle the flame there. To this association may be distinctly traced the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions, and the American Bible Society, two of the noblest institutions on earth. "The honor of the establishment of the Board of Missions," say Choules and Smith in their history,

"is to be devoutly ascribed to Him who worketh all things for the advancement of his own glory;" but, "of human agency, Mills and his coadjutors stand in the first rank. Mills was the prime mover, but much credit," they add, "was also due to Judson, Hall, Nott, Rice, Richards, Warren, and Newell." Of the eight individuals thus designated, it will be seen that five were connected with this college.

In 1811, a similar association, which still lives, was formed at Andover, and of the eight original members of that, four, Mills, Rice, Richards, and Robbins, were from this college. For the purpose of waking up the public mind, the association here, published two sermons at its own expense, and that at Andover published Horne's Letters on Missions, and other similar works. They also addressed a communication to the General Association of Massachusetts, which was the immediate cause of the formation of the Board.

But the agency of this college in the great work of Missions is not fully stated when its connection with the American Board only is spoken of. In the class succeeding that of Mills, was Luther Rice, who went out with the very first missionaries, who, together with Judson, became a Baptist, lost his health, returned to this country, and was the principal agent, going from one end of the land to the other, in waking up a missionary spirit in that church, and in sustaining those missions that have since been so successful.

Wherever, therefore, the history of American Missions shall be known, this spot and this college must be looked to with interest; and we do not think it was the design of God that the moral effect of the associations connected with it, should be lost. Accordingly, though the college seemed at times afterwards to be on the verge of extinction, yet God interposed and saved it, and has since owned it in a signal manner by pouring out his Spirit

here, and we think has given indications that he intends to use it as a distinguished means of carrying forward that great work which was here commenced. So may it be. Here, in this retreat, may the seeds of mighty influences germinate, to be afterwards transplanted and overshadow the world. Here, as gems in their ocean depths, may plans for the true good of man receive their form. Here may the words of Mills, "Though you and I are very little beings, we must not rest satisfied until our influence is felt to the remotest corner of this ruined world," always pervade the moral atmosphere. We echo those words. We would make them the motto of those who come here. Here may the Spirit of God, who has blessed us with revivals of religion in all their rich and precious fruits, still continue to descend; and may this college stand no longer than its interests are identified with those of the kingdom of the Redeemer. We recognize, in its full extent, the obligation to cultivate every faculty of man; but we believe in no true culture over which the religion of Christ does not preside. We would cultivate literature and science to the fullest extent, but we would value most, and most cultivate, that mingled spirit of quietness and of high moral enterprise, which sees indeed the passing cloud, and understands its origin, and the laws of its motion, but which yet fixes its gaze upon the star that lies in the serene depths beyond.

And now, as a half century has rolled away, and this College, notwithstanding its struggles, has accomplished so much, we cannot help anticipating for it a high career of usefulness for the half century to come. We cannot but hope that those who shall be gathered here fifty years hence, will find far higher occasion to rejoice in what this Institution has done for the good of the church and of the world. Why should it not be? The great difficulty of former times, a want of facility of access, is now

removed. Probably a greater proximity of railroads would not benefit the college. We are removed, comparatively, from temptation. We are not only in a beautiful, but healthy region. I think it remarkable, and I mention it with gratitude, that since I have been at the head of the college, not a student has sickened and died on this ground, and, with the exception of a single case of consumption, there has been no instance of the death of any one connected with us. We are indeed still embarrassed from the loss of that building where so many of us have roomed and studied. But ampler accommodations have risen in its place. And here I will say, that severe as was that loss, dark as was that hour, yet the college never gave indications of a higher vitality than when those ruins were yet smoking. And when I saw a full and prompt meeting of the Board of Trustees; when I saw every student, without exception, standing by the college, often at great inconvenience; when I saw the spirit of accommodation among this people; when I heard an excellent woman, who has done more good than the world knows, tell me not to be discouraged, at the same time subscribing a thousand dollars; I knew that the cloud would pass over. It will pass over. To this place now as a site for a college, I know of but one objection, and that perhaps necessarily connected with the peculiar retirement and quiet it enjoys. From its position in the county and in the State, it can have but little local sympathy, and it is remote from the observation and sympathies of men of wealth, who often take a pleasure and a pride in doing something for our institutions of learning. Accordingly no halls have risen here by private munificence, no professorships have been endowed. Hence, with the exception of the Woodbridge Little fund, amounting to about five thousand dollars, and two bequests of one thousand dollars each, the whole income of all which goes to pay tuition, the college has

never received any thing by legacy or private gift, except what has been solicited by subscription for special purposes. Hence, we have often struggled for years and labored under great disadvantages, for the want of that which, if they had known it, I am sure it would have given hundreds pleasure to supply. Hence, while it was found impossible in a case of great emergency and destruction by fire, to raise two thousand dollars for this college in a city justly celebrated for its liberality, another institution more favorably situated, found no difficulty in raising at the same time fifteen or twenty thousand dollars, to increase its already large library; and while only three hundred dollars could be raised from such sources when an observatory was contemplated here, there is no difficulty in other quarters of obtaining twenty thousand dollars for the instruments of one. I do not say this in the way of complaint. It is natural it should be so, and we are only the more grateful to our friends for the indispensable aid they have rendered. Possibly, as wealth increases, and the means of communication are greater, there may be some change in this respect. It may perhaps occur to some one of the many who wish to do something for the progress of the human mind, that such things, coming to those who need them, are far more highly prized, and that the name of the benefactor that stands comparatively alone, is oftener repeated, and more fondly remembered. But however this may be, we have no wish to be rich. But we do wish the means to keep pace with the times, in cabinets, and books, and apparatus, and in the introduction of new branches of study. These means, by the blessing of God, we hope to have. Let the college have these, and who can estimate the good it shall do in the coming fifty years? Who can tell the gratulations of those who shall gather here at the end of that time, and look back upon its bright career?

Brethren Alumni, you have come up at the call of your committee, to celebrate this semi-centennial anniversary. *You* have come, but our number is not all here. Many whose hearts are with us, are detained by business, or prevented by distance; but many, too, are where no call of ours could reach them. Some rest beneath the soil of their own New England; some beneath the prairies of the far West; some are with Mills in his ocean bed; and some slumber with Hall, and Richards, and my own classmate and associate tutor, the beloved Hervey, "on India's coral strand."

Along the earlier years of our catalogue, the stars have gathered thickly. In all, two hundred and seventeen are known to have terminated their earthly career. And those stars will continue thus to gather, as, one by one, we too go down to the tomb. When another half century is past, and the call shall go forth for the *centennial* gathering, we shall not hear it. Possibly, indeed, as we now venerate the age, and are to be instructed by the wisdom of one who was within one year of the very earliest of the Alumni, so those who shall be gathered then, may hear the voice of one whose words shall fall with weight, as from the height of these earlier times—possibly they may listen to one who now hears me. But long before that time, the most of us will have done what we have to do for the weal or the woe of man. The impressions which we choose to make in the yielding materials of time, will, before that, have been made, and have become set in the eternal adamant of the past. What then remains to us, in this period of the birth-throes of coming wonders, but to meet our responsibilities as patriots, as scholars, as Christians, as the Alumni of an institution where the fire of a benevolence, practically embracing the world, was first kindled in this country, and upon whose altars that fire has never gone out. Let us then throw ourselves upon the tide of this great movement—the advancing tide of

Christian progress, which we trust is to rise, and swell, and flow over the earth. We are here to-day to build up no merely local or sectional interest. We have, indeed, our personal feelings, we have associations dear to us, connected with this spot. But there are higher considerations than these, and we would do nothing, and ask nothing for this Institution, except as it may be, and ought to be, in its place, one of the grand instrumentalities through which we can labor most effectually for the highest good of man. As such, we cherish it. As such, we commit it to the guardian care of Him who has hitherto watched over it. As such, we hope to see its influence expanding, as a seat of all liberal culture, but especially as connected with the great cause of Christian benevolence, till those plans and movements which originated here shall be consummated, and they shall not teach any longer every man his neighbor, and every man his brother, saying, Know the Lord: for all shall know him, from the least to the greatest.

SERMON,

OCCASIONED BY THE DEATH OF THE REV. EDWARD DORR GRIFFIN, D. D.

November 26, 1837.

For David, after he had served his own generation by the will of God, fell on sleep, and was laid unto his fathers.—Acts xiii. 36.

David, the king of Israel, is perhaps the only man who ever sustained the three-fold character of the King, the Poet, and the Prophet. In each of these characters he was eminent. As a king, he united under his sway the jealous and factious tribes of Israel, and, by his victories over foreign foes, extended his kingdom to those limits which had been designated by prophecy as the borders of the promised land. As a poet, he was original, tender, descriptive, beautiful, and often sublime. As a prophet, he "heard the words of God, and saw the vision of the Almighty;" and scarcely in Isaiah himself do we find clearer delineations of the sufferings of the Messiah, and of the glory of His kingdom. In their double character of poetry and prophecy, his writings have elevated the taste, quickened the piety, and strengthened the hope of all ages. Next to the pride which a Jew cherished in having "Abraham to his father," was that which he felt in David as the illustrious founder of a long line of kings,

and as the representative in his kingly office of the promised Messiah.

But notwithstanding these grounds for admiration and distinction, when an inspired Jew looked back over the space of a thousand years, what was the condensation and substance of all that he saw in him that was worthy of remembrance? It consisted simply in this — that he *served his generation.* They were made wiser, better, happier, through his instrumentality. He had, it is true, striking faults, and was guilty, especially in one instance, of departing very widely from the path of duty; but when his whole career is taken together, it must be conceded that he was a good and a great man, and that he served his generation. He did not merely benefit his generation involuntarily in the pursuit of his own selfish schemes, but he *served* it,—he devoted himself voluntarily and of set purpose to promote that end.

We find at this point, a striking difference in the characters of men. The mass of men have evidently had, and still have, very little regard for the general consequences of their actions. Prompted by impulse, or guided by self-love, each pursues his inclination or his interest, forming his own plans, and toiling after his own ends, little regardful of the effect which his labors may have on the general course of human affairs. The emigrant who sets himself down in the mighty forest, and opens over a little spot a path for the sunlight, has his arm nerved solely by the hope of his own future independence and of the good of his children. One, and another, and another, incited by the same motives, and with the same circumscribed vision, follow his example, till the forest disappears, and villages, and cities, and schoolhouses, and churches spring up on every side; and there are perhaps thus laid the foundations of an empire that is to keep alive liberty and religion in the earth. Thus it is that the world goes on, and that God, by means of numberless sepa-

rate and free agents who "mean not so," works out his grand designs.

In the pursuit of their distinct and independent objects, individual men hold the same relation to the great purposes of God, which the separate workmen upon a complex and magnificent structure do to the original design and ultimate effect of the whole. Of the busy multitudes who labored upon the rising walls of St. Peter's church at Rome, each polishing his own stone or shaping his own angle, how few had any conception of the grand result, or cared for any thing beyond the wages he was to receive at night! They toiled for their bread; and yet from their voluntary toil thus induced, and directed by the controlling genius of Michael Angelo, there arose a structure that has astonished the world. True, it did not affect the result whether the workmen understood the design or not; but it does essentially affect the estimate which we make of them. In the one case they were drudges, and could never share in the glory and pleasure of the design; they were instruments, as the saw and the axe. In the other, they were fit companions of Angelo himself, their bosoms swelled with the same impulses and shared the same anxieties, and their humblest labor, no matter how insignificant, was dignified and cheered as connected in their minds with an idea so grand and ennobling. They were no longer instruments, they were free intelligences in the likeness of the chief architect, and co-operating cheerfully with him. And so it is in the works of God. Moved by benevolence and guided by wisdom, he is rearing a structure that is going up without the sound of the axe or the hammer, and which shall stand for ever. He whose heart has once throbbed with benevolence, and whose eye has caught the outlines of this building, is thenceforward no longer a slave, nor an instrument; but is an intelligent and cheerful co-worker with God, and shall be a participator in the joy and the triumph that shall wake the

echoes of heaven, when the topstone thereof is laid with shouting, and they cry, "Grace, grace, unto it!" Thenceforward all labor connected with this result purifies and elevates the mind. There is no act so humble that it cannot be ennobled by its germination from this principle of action; and though what he may do, may seem to be, and may be, but as the drop to the ocean, yet he remembers that the ocean is made up of drops; the little he has to give, he gives cheerfully; and it is accepted. When the unostentatious widow goes to deposit her two mites, the Saviour is there to notice it. He who does this, whether he does little or much, is a *good* man; he *serves* his generation; he co-operates with God, feebly it may be, but intelligently and cheerfully, in the promotion of his benevolent purpose. He who does this is a good man, and no other is.

But I have said that David was not only a good, but also a *great* man. We have seen what it is to be a good man; let us see what it is to be a great one. There are those who suppose that goodness is an essential element of greatness; but this is not in accordance with the common usage of the term, nor with the common apprehensions of men. Give to goodness that intelligence and power which we believe it shall, in every instance, one day possess, and it becomes great; but there may be great men who are not good. The designs of Providence respect the great masses of men; and great men, considered as distinct from the masses, are the instruments by which those designs are accomplished. Thus, though the course of society is generally uniform, yet as it flows on, it will occasionally happen that its embankments will give way, that "the waters will be out, and a new and troubled scene will arise." He who can then stop the rush, and repair the breaches, and cause the waters to flow again in their accustomed channel, is a great man. Again, it sometimes occurs that society outgrows its institutions, and, for the

expansion and moulding of its energies, demands new forms. He who can then preside over the transition from the old to the new, and conduct it to a prosperous issue, stands at the head of a new epoch, and is a great man. Again, it has often happened that nations have attained a point in intelligence and civilization beyond that which they have reached in moral culture, and then society, like a building whose timbers have decayed, has fallen in upon itself, pressed down by its own weight. The mass has been tending to corruption, and there has been no redeeming principle. This always has been the case with cultivated nations where a pure Christianity has not prevailed; it always must be. It is impossible that civilization and the arts should reach and maintain a high state of perfection, without a corresponding progress of morals and a stability of principle adequate to resist the multiplied temptations arising from a dense population, the increase of artificial wants, and the general diffusion of knowledge. But when society has become thus corrupt, then it seems necessary that it should be scourged, and perhaps thoroughly overturned. Then there has always arisen some ambitious conqueror, who has headed barbarous hordes under the impulse of want, or legions controlled by some overmastering principle, and who, when the time of those corrupt nations has fully come, has swept over them like the tornado, and made them as the chaff upon the summer threshing-floor. Such have been the Nebuchadnezzars, the Alexanders, the Alarics, the Attilas, and the Buonapartes of the earth. These have been as the storm in the hand of God, and have fulfilled his purposes, though "they meant not so, neither did their heart think so, but it was in their heart to destroy and cut off nations not a few." So far, indeed, as they were great without being good, they were instruments, not with reference to their own ends,—which they pursued in the exercise of all those powers of free agency which good

men possess,—but with reference to the great purposes of God, which they involuntarily accomplished. Still, notwithstanding their wickedness, these too were great men. He, therefore, who in any great crisis of human affairs stands at the turning point, and whether by restraint or impulsion controls their course, or who in any way exerts a decided and permanent influence upon large bodies of men, whether for good or for evil, is a great man. The influence of the many, in their individual capacity, either to swell or to control the tide of human affairs, is as that of the rain-drop upon the river; the influence of a great man can be distinctly traced.

He then,—to class mankind very briefly with reference to goodness and greatness,—who exerts the ordinary and comparatively petty influence in favor of evil principles, the common drudge and low mercenary of sin, is neither a great nor a good man; while he who exerts his little daily influence in an intelligent and honest endeavor to serve his generation, and further the benevolent designs of God, is a good, but not a great man. He, on the other hand, who manifests great talent, and under the influence of his ambition or his evil passions, scourges or corrupts the world, is a great, but not a good man; while he who exerts a wide influence under the control of benevolence, and in voluntary co-operation with God in his beneficent purposes, is both a good and a great man. The possession of such a character forms the highest object of ambition which this world presents. Such a man was David; and such, though on a theatre much more limited, was he who recently presided over this Institution, and with reference to whose death we are now assembled. He served his generation, and, from his distinguished talents, and the peculiar positions which he occupied, his influence for good may be distinctly traced. These assertions I proceed to confirm by some reference to his history.

"Dr. Griffin,"—to adopt the language of an account which most of us have probably seen,—"was born at East Haddam, Connecticut, the second son of George Griffin, an independent farmer of that place, January 6, 1770. He graduated at Yale College in 1790, at the age of 20; and received his theological education under the second President Edwards, at New Haven. He was ordained at New Hartford in 1795; and installed as colleague of the Rev. Dr. McWhorter, then pastor of the Second Presbyterian Church in Newark, in October, 1801."

I have just intimated that it is often the juncture at which a man appears, no less than his talents, that places him in such a point of view that the world will recognize him as a great man; and it may here be remarked, that Dr. Griffin entered upon his career at an important period in the history of the world. Of this he was himself accustomed to speak. "In the year 1792," he was often heard to say, "the blood began to flow; in that year the first missionaries, among whom was Carey, were sent out; and in that year began that series of revivals which has not ceased till the present time;" and which, it was his full conviction, would not cease till the millennium should be ushered in. These events were doubtless the commencement of mighty changes, and seem to give to that period the character of one of those transition points which is indicated in the language of prophecy by the opening of the seals, and the pouring out of the vials, and the sounding of the trumpets. It was then, perhaps, that the last angel began to sound, when "there were great voices in heaven, saying, The kingdoms of this world are become the kingdoms of our Lord and of his Christ, and he shall reign for ever and ever."

In saying that the blood then began to flow, reference was made to the opening of the French revolution, and the commencement of that series of unparalleled convulsions over Europe, which lasted with little intermission

for four-and-twenty years. These convulsions have not, I think, resulted in any immediate change of old organizations so distinct as was generally anticipated both by the political and by the religious world. Still there was then wrought a great revolution in the opinions and feelings of men, and those events constituted a most important act, or perhaps I should rather say, the opening scene in the last act of the great drama of this world's history.

To the missionary movements of that day, as the commencement of a new era in the history of Christianity, it does not appear that Dr. Griffin attached too much importance. It would seem that the angel having the everlasting Gospel to preach, then plumed anew his pinions, and gathered his energies for a higher and a wider flight than ever before. These movements must form a prominent characteristic in the religious history of the times from that day to this; and so extensive have they become, that no impartial history of the world can be written in which they shall not find their place. The impulse is still onward, acquiring strength by progression, and there are no indications that it will spend itself, till the Gospel shall be preached to all nations.

The spirit of religious revivals, so intimately connected with that of missions, then first awoke after the time of Whitfield, and was most surprising in its manifestations, both in the eastern and the western States; and it is true that there have been revivals from that time till the present.

It was in this last great movement of the day that Dr. Griffin was particularly interested, and that he acted a conspicuous part. In 1795, as has been said, he was ordained at New Hartford, Ct., and a revival immediately commenced. This I ascertain from a letter published by him in the Connecticut Evangelical Magazine, dated August, 1800. This letter was written to give an account of a revival, which commenced in October, 1798; but in

the commencement of it he says, "The work of divine grace among us three years ago," which was of course in '95, "by which nearly fifty persons were hopefully added to the Lord, had not wholly ceased to produce effects on the people generally, when the late scene of mercy and wonder commenced." Of this revival in 1795, I find no other notice; but of the succeeding one in 1798 and 1799, he goes on to give some particulars. And here I shall introduce an extract from his account, which will be interesting, both as showing how revivals in those days commenced, and as recalling expressions which will be familiar to some who hear me. "Late in October, 1798," says the account, "the people frequently hearing of the display of divine grace in West Simsbury, were increasingly impressed with the information. Our conferences soon became more crowded and evinced deeper feeling. Serious people began to break their minds to each other; and it was discovered that there had been, for a considerable time, in their minds, special desires for the revival of religion; while each one, unapprised of his neighbor's feelings, had supposed his exercises peculiar to himself. It was soon agreed to institute a secret meeting, for the express purpose of praying for the effusions of the Spirit; which was the scene of such wrestlings as are not, it is apprehended, commonly experienced. Several circumstances conspired to increase our anxiety. The glorious work had already begun in Torringford, and the cloud appeared to be going all around us. It seemed as though Providence, by avoiding us, designed to bring to remembrance our past abuses of his grace. Besides, having been so recently visited with distinguishing favors, we dared not allow ourselves to expect a repetition of them so soon; and we began to apprehend that it was the purpose of Him whom we had lately grieved from among us, that we should, for penalty, stand alone, parched up in the sight of surrounding showers.—This was the state

of the people, when, on a Sabbath in the month of November, it was the sovereign pleasure of a most merciful God very sensibly to manifest himself in the public assembly. Many abiding impressions were made on minds seemingly the least susceptible, and on several grown old in unbelief. From that memorable day, the flame which had been kindling in secret, broke out. By desire of the people, religious conferences were set up in different parts of the town, which continued to be attended by deeply affected crowds; and in which the divine presence and power were manifested to a degree we had never before witnessed." Near the close of the letter, he says, "It is believed that the outlines of this narrative equally describe the features and fruits of this extensive (and may we not add genuine and remarkably pure) work, in at least fifty or sixty adjacent congregations." Of the numbers added to the church in this revival, nothing is said; it is remarked, however, that it was hoped that about fifty heads of families were subjects of the work, and if the proportion of other persons was as great as is usual, it must have been very extensive. In 1801, Dr. Griffin left New Hartford for Newark, so that he must have been, during almost the whole time he was there, in a revival of religion.

At Newark, Dr. Griffin was, as has been said, installed as the colleague of Dr. McWhorter in October, 1801. In the works to which I have access, I find no further mention of him till 1808. In a Panoplist of that year is a letter from him to Dr. Green, giving an account of a revival at Newark, still more remarkable than that at New Hartford. In July, 1807, Dr. McWhorter died, and Dr. Griffin took the whole charge of the congregation. In the following September, the revival commenced. This revival began in much the same manner as the former. The letter states, that silent and unsuspected preparation for it, in the providence of God, could be

traced for near eighteen months previous. The death of Dr. McWhorter made a powerful impression; the seriousness became more deep, till at length, "at a lecture preached at a private house, it was no longer doubtful whether a work of divine grace had begun." "During that and the following week," says the account, "increasing symptoms of a most powerful influence were discovered. The appearance was as if a collection of waters, long suspended over the town, had fallen at once and deluged the whole place. For several weeks the people would stay at the close of every evening service, to hear some new exhortation, and it seemed impossible to persuade them to depart, until those on whose lips they hung had retired."

"I never before," he observes further on, "witnessed the communication of a spirit of prayer so earnest and so general, nor observed such evident and remarkable answers to prayer." And again, "This work in point of power and stillness, exceeds all that I have ever seen. While it bears down every thing with irresistible force, and seems almost to dispense with human instrumentality, it moves with so much silence, that unless we attentively observe its effects, we are tempted at times to doubt whether any thing uncommon is taking place. The converts are strongly marked with humility and self-distrust. Instead of being elated with confident hopes, they are inclined to tremble. Many of them possess deep and discriminating views, and all, or almost all, are born into the distinguishing doctrines of grace." "I suppose," he continues, "there are from two hundred and thirty to two hundred and fifty who hope that they have become the subjects of divine grace, and many remain still under solemn impressions, whose number I hope is almost daily increasing. We have had but one sacrament since the work commenced, at which time we received ninety-seven new members who had been propounded a fortnight before."

Such was this wonderful work, and no doubt it continued till he left Newark.

In the early part of 1809, he accepted a call to the professorship of Pulpit Eloquence in the Theological Seminary at Andover, and was inaugurated in June of that year. His inaugural discourse was published, and spoken of in terms of much commendation. Dr. Griffin had already acquired reputation, and now entering upon a prominent station, in the full maturity of his powers, and under the influence of a recent extraordinary revival of religion, he seems to have made at once a strong and favorable impression in the eastern part of this State. That he was an able and a successful teacher in his department, there can be no doubt; and what he taught by precept, he illustrated by example; for he soon acquired the reputation of being, if not the most eloquent, yet certainly among the most eloquent men in New England. I have understood that the classes under his instruction had for him a strong personal attachment.

At Andover, however, Dr. Griffin remained but a short time, having been called in 1811, to occupy what was then a more conspicuous and important station. The position which he occupied in Park Street Church, Boston, was peculiar; and, to present it fully, it would be necessary to go more at large into the history of that period than time will now permit. Suffice it to say, that there had been recently manifested, and after a painful period of hesitation, had been publicly avowed, an alarming defection from the faith and practice of the New England Fathers. In this defection the wealth and fashion of Boston, and the learning of Cambridge, were involved. It was suddenly discovered that the Pilgrim Fathers had been amazingly bigoted and prejudiced and narrow-minded; and their sons were proud of having descended from them, only as a rich man will sometimes boast that his father was poor, the better to show what he has done for

himself. It was understood that an age of light had commenced, and this light was so very plain, and so very obvious, that no sensible man, much less any man of literature and refinement, could help seeing it. The old foundations seemed to be giving way, and only a single orthodox Congregational church, the Old South, remained firm. In this state of things, a few individuals, after much prayerful deliberation, determined to erect, in a conspicuous place, a large church, and procure an able and popular man, who should there defend, in that day of rebuke, the evangelical doctrines thus despised and ridiculed; and who should rekindle that flame of experimental piety, which, for want of its appropriate nutriment, had already begun to wane and flicker to its final extinction in the socket of rationalism. After many sacrifices, the house was finished, and was dedicated in January, 1810. The dedication sermon was preached, and the dedicatory prayer offered, by Dr. Griffin. This sermon was published. In July, 1811, a year and a half after the dedication, Dr. Griffin was installed as pastor of that church, and entered upon a course of labors, the moral effect of which upon the community was great and lasting. It was here, probably, that his most powerful efforts were made. He felt that he was standing in the breach; a large portion of the religious community at a distance, felt so too, and he had their sympathy, while he wielded the force of a giant. Many who hated his doctrines, were drawn in by his eloquence, and it not unfrequently happened, that those who "went to scoff, remained to pray." As he was the only orthodox Congregational clergyman in the city except one, his church was much resorted to by members of the legislature, and by strangers, and he thus became extensively known throughout this State, and indeed throughout the country. It was not uncommon for persons who dropped in casually, to have their attention riveted, and to have impressions made upon their minds,

which did not leave them till they found peace in believing. Many striking instances of this kind are related. I met, when recently at Andover, with a man who said he never heard him but once, but that he remembered the sermon as distinctly as if he had heard it but yesterday. It was here that he preached his celebrated Park Street Lectures, which produced a powerful effect at the time, which were afterwards received with so much favor by the community, and which will remain as a standard theological work. These Lectures gained him reputation in Europe. By these efforts a decided effect was produced. The tide began to turn; men again began to ask for "the old paths;" and from that day to this, the cause of truth has been gaining ground in Boston; so that there are now in that city nearly as many Congregational churches that are orthodox, as there are that are not; and other orthodox denominations have greatly increased. I have been surprised, when at Boston, at the warm affection with which, after so long a time, many persons there still speak of Dr. Griffin. They all say that the battle in Boston was fought by him. He was their first pastor; he carried them successfully through their struggles, and they can never forget him.

It was while Dr. Griffin was at Park Street, in 1812, that he assisted at Salem in ordaining, and laid his hands upon the first five missionaries from this country. These were Messrs. Newell, Judson, Nott, Hall, and Rice; of whom Messrs. Hall and Rice were graduates of this College.

Of the causes which induced Dr. Griffin to leave Boston, I have no knowledge. I only know that in June, 1815, he returned to Newark, "at the invitation of the Second Presbyterian Church, which had been but recently formed out of the congregation in which he had before presided." After his return to Newark at this time, he remained there a little more than seven years. I have no access to

sources of information that will enable me to state much that is of interest respecting him during this period. It was during this time, however, that he completed and published his book on the Atonement; a work of much labor and research. He was, also, during this period, as he had been indeed during the former, much engaged in originating and promoting the various benevolent societies, which have since had so much influence upon the world.

Of his agency in forming and promoting these societies some account should be given, and as that agency was more distinguished during this and the preceding period than at any other time, it may not be out of place to notice it here. There seems, so far as I have information, little reason to doubt, that with the exception of Samuel J. Mills, he had more to do with bringing those societies forward than any other man. Mills was a native of Torringford, and had been known to Dr. Griffin from a child. It was in the great revival of '98 and '99, already noticed, that he was converted; and he, doubtless, during that time, often heard Dr. Griffin preach. He would of course, after coming into the ministry, more naturally and freely lay open his plans to him than to any other man, especially as he could find no person more suitable to bring them before the public. Accordingly, Dr. Griffin says in his sermon at the dedication of this building, "I have been in situations to *know*, that from the counsels formed in that sacred conclave," alluding to a society formed by Mills and others in this College, "or from the mind of Mills himself, arose the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions, the American Bible Society, the United Foreign Missionary Society, and the African School under the care of the Synod of New York and New Jersey; besides all the impetus given to domestic missions, to the Colonization Society, and to the general cause of benevolence in both hemispheres. If I had any instrumentality in originating any of these measures, I

here publicly declare, that in every instance I received the first impulse from Samuel J. Mills." It is then added in a note, "It was at the request of Mills and his associates, that I carried the proposition for an American Bible Society to the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church, in the spring of 1814. On my return to Burlington, I first proposed the subject to Dr. Boudinot, the great instrument by which the society was formed. Mills went from my house to lay the project of a missionary society before the General Assembly, at the time the United Foreign Missionary Society was formed. And the letters of his correspondents, addressed to me, by an understanding between us, were the engines that swayed the Synod to the establishment of the African School." Standing in such a relation to Mills, it is easy to see that though these projects may have originated with him, yet the agency of Dr. Griffin in shaping them, and especially in commending them to public favor, must have been all-important. His eloquent voice was never withheld when the cause of these societies was to be plead; and with the exception, as I have already said, of Mills, probably the cause of benevolence is as largely indebted to him, through these societies, as to any other man.

We now come to that period in the history of Dr. Griffin, when he became connected with this College. This was in 1821. At the commencement in that year, Dr. Moore presided for the last time. It had for some time been the opinion of the majority of the trustees, that if there was to be but one college, and it was supposed there could be but one, in the western part of this State, Northampton would be a more favorable location, and Dr. Moore had accepted the presidency with the expectation that the College would be removed. A majority of the trustees had voted that it was expedient to remove it, and had petitioned the legislature for permission to do so. This petition had been met by a spirited opposition on

the part of the inhabitants of the town and of the county; and upon their own responsibility, they raised a subscription of seventeen thousand dollars, which was laid before a committee of the legislature, and which was to be paid to the College in case it should not be removed. This subscription, raised against the wishes of a majority of the trustees, but which they could not refuse without a fraud upon the legislature, some persons afterwards refused to pay, and it was made the ground of much misrepresentation respecting the College. In consequence, however, of this subscription, and of the representations made from this part of the State, the legislature refused to the trustees permission to remove the College. In the mean time, strong expectations had been excited in Hampshire county, that there would be a college there. The people of Amherst, acting in concert with some of the trustees of this College residing in that region, raised large subscriptions and erected buildings for the reception of students, with the expectation of obtaining a charter. Having therefore accommodations prepared in a region upon which his eye had been fixed, Dr. Moore was about to place himself at the head of an institution there, and to take a considerable number of the students with him. The trustees had already elected one or two persons as president, who had declined, when Dr. Griffin was fixed upon, and one of their number went to Newark to lay the subject before him. He had been interested in the College from its connection with missionary operations; and coming on immediately to meet the trustees, he arrived here on the commencement-day at noon, and took his seat upon the stage. His appearance at that time revived the hopes of the friends of the College; and it was soon understood that he would accept the appointment. He had precisely the kind of reputation which was needed for the College at such a crisis; a comparatively large class entered, and the College continued to increase in

numbers and to prosper till 1825. In February of that year, Amherst obtained a charter, and as it had been often urged against granting it that two colleges could not be sustained in the western part of this State, it was supposed by many that it would be a death blow to this. This impression caused a number of the students to take dismissions, while a very small class entered at the ensuing commencement. It was now seen, that "to extract the seeds of consumption which had lurked in the College for eleven years, something must be done to convince the public that it would live and flourish on this ground."

The trustees accordingly resolved to attempt to raise twenty-five thousand dollars for the purpose of establishing a new professorship and building a chapel. In obtaining this sum, Dr. Griffin was the principal agent; and, strengthened by an extraordinary revival of religion with which God in his mercy then favored the College, he accomplished what probably no other man could have done. In a time of general embarrassment, he raised twelve thousand dollars in four weeks. The fund was completed; a professorship of rhetoric and moral philosophy was endowed; this building was erected, and September 2d, 1828, standing where I now stand, he dedicated it "to the honor and glory of the ever blessed Trinity—Father, Son, and Holy Ghost." From that time it has been felt that the College is permanent; and it has been going on side by side with sister institutions, doing its part in carrying on the great business of education in this country. In estimating this effort of Dr. Griffin, it should be remembered that it was the first of the kind, and probably led to the more extended and the successful efforts of other institutions in the same way.

Dr. Griffin continued to preside over the institution with distinguished ability and success, till the spring of 1833, at which time he had a slight paralytic stroke, which affected his left side. The succeeding year he had

some dropsical affection; and from that time it was evident that the infirmities of age and of disease were gathering upon him. He continued, however, to exert himself for the College till the fall of 1836, when, in consequence of his increasing infirmities, he was led to resign.

During his connection with the College there were several powerful revivals of religion, especially that in 1825, which for a long time changed the whole aspect of the College, and by which the hopes and destinies of many have been affected. Through these, and the ministers raised up in consequence of them, Dr. Griffin, though dead, may be said still to live, and to speak in the churches, and even to lift up his voice on heathen shores. He also took an active part in several revivals in the town.

In this brief sketch of the public life of Dr. Griffin, which may be said to have closed when he resigned the presidency of the College, I trust I have said enough to illustrate and confirm the position, that he was a good and a great man, and that he served his generation. Probably the labors of no preacher in his day were blessed to the conversion of more persons than were his; few, if any, did more to originate and give impulse to those benevolent movements which characterize the age; in a period of apparent peril to the church, he occupied for a number of years a post of peculiar difficulty on the walls of Zion; and by his writings he was an able defender of the truth. In his later years, when he had become extensively known to the benevolent, the influential and the wealthy, and, from his services in the church, held the key to their hearts, he devoted his energies to the building up of an institution, whose existence was then in peril, but which, through his exertions and those of other generous and indefatigable friends, we trust and believe will stand to

raise up other Millses, and Halls, and Rices, and Richardses, and Harveys, till it shall not be needful for one to say to another, "Know the Lord."

In discussing the claims of any one to be considered great or good, it might be expected that some delineation would be given of the lights and shades of his more private and individual character; especially if he were one of those, who, while they excite warm feelings of attachment in some, excite in others a decided dislike. This, however, the limits of the present occasion will not permit. The friends of Dr. Griffin would be the last to deny that in connection with his peculiar excellencies, he had a share of those faults which are incident to a temperament like his. The gold was mixed with alloy, but there was still much gold; and those, if any there are, who would wish to hear his faults dwelt upon, must seek it from other occasions than this, and from other voices than mine. There is reason to believe that before his death, He who sits as a refiner to his people, purified him as silver, and tried him as gold is tried.

It now only remains to speak of the closing scene. It is said in the text, that David, after he had served his generation, fell on sleep. This is a consoling figure often used by the Jews, used by our Saviour to denote death; and it suggests to the mind both a gentle manner of departure and the hope of a happy resurrection. In both these respects it may be appropriately applied to the death of Dr. Griffin. His was not a sudden or an unexpected departure. In 1833, as has been said, he evidently began to fail. His moorings to the shores of time then began to be loosed, and the resistless tide to rise that was to bear him away. For a time he struggled against it, and his eyes and his wishes were towards these shores; but as cord after cord was sundered, and he perceived that the earth was receding, he turned his face towards the ocean,

and he passed not from the view of those who were watching him, till they heard him say that his eye had caught a glimpse of the green fields and the glittering spires of that happy land to which he was bound. It appears from an extract from his diary, entered just before leaving here, that he felt it was time to relinquish his earthly cares, and that he set himself to prepare to die.

By a singular providence, he returned to Newark a second time, there, in the family of his son-in-law, and in the midst of a people who remembered him with affection and reverence, to close his days. It was well said by a clergyman of that place in reference to his death, that "it was fitting that he who came in his youth to teach us how to live, should come when his head was gray to show us how to die. It was fitting that he should lie side by side till the resurrection, with those to whom he had so often preached the resurrection and the life." For the larger part of the year while there, he was able to take his accustomed exercise, and to preach some; but after the death of Mrs. Griffin, in August, he began evidently to decline. He was, however, able to attend that most interesting meeting of the American Board at Newark in September, and there, on the fifteenth of that month, before that Board whose first missionaries he had assisted to ordain, he was permitted to make his last public address and prayer. "On the week succeeding the meeting of the Board,"—I now quote from an account furnished by his daughter, Mrs. Smith, to his friends here,—"his difficulty of breathing, indicating dropsy in the chest, returned. A general dropsical effusion soon followed. After Thursday night of that week, he never attempted to lie down; he at once resigned the expectation of ever being any better, and said to me that night, 'I never expect to lie down again, till I lie by your mother's side.'" —"To the numerous friends who," when his situation was understood, "flocked to the 'privileged chamber,' he

would say, (while his breathing was such as to draw tears from every eye but his own,) 'I want to tell you, for the honor of God, and for your own comfort, (for you have yet to die,) of his most merciful and faithful provision for a poor wretched sinner, so needful for an old man going down into the grave after his beloved wife. *Not one anxious thought* is left me from day to day about *the event or the manner.* I am taken up in thanking the blessed God for his wonderful mercy and faithfulness in thus dealing with me. That he should select this time to do for me, what he never did before, to remove every concern, and to fill me with peace—to make that most solemn event, and all its dreaded means, no longer dreadful but delightful—is proof of mercy and faithfulness beyond the power of language to express.' · · · To one of his brethren in the ministry who came in, he said, extending his hand, 'You see me just going home.' His friend said, 'It has often been your privilege to administer consolation to the dying; I hope you experience all those consolations you have offered to others.' Raising his voice in the most emphatic manner, he repeated, 'more, more, much more.' In the evening of Tuesday, a beloved friend was introduced to him. 'I do not recollect my friends now,' he said. 'You remember the dear Saviour who is by you?' she asked. 'O, yes,' emphatically, 'he never so manifested his preciousness to me before.' It was during that night that he ceased to breathe, without a struggle or a groan. He had preached the gospel forty-five years.

Thus departed one who was long conversant among us, and from whose lips most of us have heard much solemn instruction, and many admonitions to prepare for that world to which he has gone. To those of us who have known him long, and heard him often, it must be a touching thought that that venerable head shall no more appear in our assemblies, and that voice be no more heard. That

"tall and reverend head" now lies low in the grave, and that eloquent voice is silent in death. He is gone, and to you, and especially to me, does his death bring a solemn admonition to prepare to follow him.

To the students of this Institution, many of whom remember him as their President, and at whose request this discourse was prepared, it is my desire that this sketch of his life may teach true wisdom. Few of you, my dear young friends, can expect to attain to the age which he reached, and perhaps fewer still to be as useful and distinguished. But notwithstanding he lived so long, and was useful and honored in life, you see that a time came when all the applause that had been bestowed upon him, and all the honors he had received, could avail him nothing; and he felt himself to be, according to his own expression, only a poor sinner, and an old man going down into the grave. Oh the agony of that hour, if the life then past had been spent in the service of sin! But he had, we have reason to believe, given himself to the Saviour; he had spent his life in spreading his Gospel; and in that hour he had the support which was "so needful" to him. Will you not now give yourselves to the same Saviour, that *you*, in *your* trying hour, and in *your* old age, may find the same support?

SERMON,

OCCASIONED BY THE DEATH OF PROF. EBENEZER KELLOGG.

October 11, 1846.

Very pleasant hast thou been unto me.—2 Samuel i. 26.

Among the sources of happiness provided for us, none is more worthy of notice, and if we except those moral powers by which we are made in the image of God and are capable of communion with him, none is more rich, than our social nature. It is a pleasant thing to behold the sun, it is pleasant to look from an eminence on the varied face of the green earth, to be alone in the forest amid the stillness of nature, to hear the music of birds, the hum of insects, and the sound of waters; but it is more pleasant to behold the countenance of a friend, to be in the midst of those whom we love and who love us, to feel the pressure of the hand of affection, and to hear ringing around us, not merely the voice of sympathy and kindness, but the varying voices of our common humanity. "No man liveth to himself, and no man dieth to himself." God never intended that one man should suffice to himself; but in that dependence upon each other of all material things, by which 'the heavens hear the earth and the earth hears the corn and the wine and the oil,' by which

the earth itself and every star in the depths of space holds its place only on the condition of a mutual attraction and an interdependence which may almost be termed sympathy, do we find an intended emblem of that dependence and sympathy, and of that harmonious movement which God purposed should take place in human society.

It is true, indeed, that this sympathy has been interrupted and this harmony disturbed by the entrance of sin, so that human society corresponds to the emblems presented by nature, only as the images of the stars in troubled water correspond to the quiet heavens. It is true there is often repulsion when there should be attraction, and that discord and war have disfigured the earth. Yet man cannot renounce his nature, and the great bond of human sympathy has not been broken. If it has not been strong enough to hold the race together as one, it has yet sufficed to unite them in families and communities. Every where man has a social, as well as an individual life, without which his animal life could not be preserved, and his mental faculties, finding neither motive nor theatre for action, must always remain in imbecility. So general and pervading does this social life become, that it almost seems to have a separate and independent existence; and under the form of national character and of public opinion, becomes the great theme of history. The individual is forgotten, or is only so far regarded as he represents and expresses what is common to the whole.

The social nature of man is thus essential to his physical, his intellectual, and his moral well-being; but it cannot be that he is necessarily selfish in its exercise. He may become so, but in the first instance he puts this nature forth because he has it and feels its promptings, just as he breathes because he has lungs and feels the necessity of breathing, and he may be no more selfish in the one than in the other. No theory of human nature can be more false than that which represents it as incapable of disin-

terested friendship. Even heathen antiquity rebukes with scorn such a theory as this; and it finds its full refutation in the sacred friendship of David and Jonathan. This, from the circumstances of the case, is more especially true of the part taken by Jonathan. He was heir apparent to the throne, and, if David were removed, had before him a prize for which thousands have violated every tie, and waded through seas of blood. But when his father, with the view of securing the crown to him, sought the life of David, what did he do? "And Jonathan, Saul's son, arose and went to David into the wood, and strengthened his hands in God. And he said unto him, Fear not: for the hand of Saul my father shall not find thee; and thou shalt be king over Israel." Here was a friendship which may well defy all the refinements and quibblings of that debasing theory, called the selfish system, to explain it away.

Doubtless there is the same diversity here as in the other natural endowments of men; and as some men have by nature a clearer and more powerful intellect than others, so some are more happily constituted than others in their social nature. They seem made to be beloved, and to become the centres of delight in social converse and in the exercise of the affections. But while this is so, there is no part of our nature which more requires assiduous cultivation, or more feels its influence. The happiest natural constitution, unguarded and unsustained by principle, will degenerate into weakness and caprice; while the colder and harder combinations, by turning them up to the genial influences of kindness and Christian affection, may bring forth the richest fruits of social enjoyment. It is, however, only when, to fine original endowments, there is added principle, and care in their cultivation, in connection with the pure and ennobling doctrines and motives of the religion of Christ, that man, as a social being, becomes all that he may be, and all that we delight

to contemplate. When this is the case, and different individuals thus endowed and qualified become acquainted with each other, there is immediately felt to be an affinity, their souls flow together, and they come at length to have a delight, not only in the conversation, but in the mere presence of each other. And when, to the attachments of friendship thus founded in our rational nature, there come to be added, and often to blend in with them, the ties of natural affection as growing out of the relations of parent and child, of brother and sister, of husband and wife, it is easy to see how one man may so become the centre of thought and affection that he cannot be removed without calling from the hearts of many the lamentation of David over Jonathan: "I am distressed for thee, my brother; very pleasant hast thou been unto me."

These words, the utterance of bereaved friendship three thousand years ago, we repeat to-day. They are the utterance of our hearts in view of the departure of one long known, and loved, and honored among us. Standing, as it were, over the remains of the departed, how many of us can say, with an emphasis which we might use in regard to few whom we have known, "very pleasant hast thou been unto me!" And not only can we say this, who have known him so intimately and so long; but it will be said in substance, if not in form, through all the numerous circles of his relatives and friends, and by the graduates of this college for the last thirty years, wherever they are dispersed over the whole land. Probably few men could be taken from the community whose death would call forth more extensively the sentiment of the text.

Let us, then, in the grateful recognition of His goodness, from whom cometh down every good and perfect gift, and in humble submission to His wisdom who gives and takes away, after a very brief statement of facts, look at some of those traits of character in our departed friend,

regarded as a *man*, as a *college officer*, and as a *Christian*, by which this sentiment has been so extensively produced.

Ebenezer Kellogg was born at Vernon, Connecticut, October 25, 1789; so that if he had lived till the twenty-fifth of the present month, he would have been fifty-seven years old. Of his childhood and youth I know nothing that would require a mention in this place. He entered the Sophomore class in Yale college in 1807, and graduated in 1810. In a revival during his college course, he was, as he hoped, brought to the Saviour, and he made a profession of religion. After leaving college he was engaged in teaching for two years. He then went to Andover, where he pursued his theological course. About the time that was completed, having received a license to preach, but not having, so far as is known, preached any where as a candidate, he received an appointment to the professorship of languages in this college. This he accepted, and entered upon his office at the same time with President Moore, in 1815. Two years after, in 1817, when on a visit at Vernon, he was suddenly taken with bleeding at the lungs, and by the advice of physicians went to the South and spent the winter there. The following spring he returned with improved health. His constitution, however, had received a blow from which it never recovered. His attacks of bleeding recurred, sometimes bringing him to the borders of the grave, and it has only been by the utmost prudence and care that his life has been preserved so long. In 1826 he was married to Miss Susan Coit, of New London, Connecticut. Notwithstanding the utmost care, the disease of his lungs made progress, and in 1844 he judged it best to resign his office in college. Since then he has been gradually failing. He continued, however, to sit up the most of the day till two days before his death. This occurred on Friday morning, the second day of the present month.

I now proceed to observe, in accordance with the sentiment of the text, that Professor Kellogg was very pleasant to his friends as a *man*, because they had perfect confidence in him.

I mention this first, because it is a general condition, without which no brilliancy of talents, and no charm of social qualities can ever give full satisfaction. It is like a clear and healthy atmosphere, in which we are able to see and to enjoy all other objects. In the most of our intercourse with our fellow men we may be conscious of no distrust; but in all the intercourse of his friends with him there was a positive feeling of confidence and security of which he only can know the value who has felt the want. This arose from the union in him of integrity and purity of purpose, with prudence. It is comparatively easy to find men in whose integrity of purpose and purity of motive we have confidence, and we give them our esteem and moral approbation; but they are often far from being persons to whom we can go for counsel in difficult and trying circumstances, and to whom we can intrust matters requiring secrecy and discretion. But this union existed in Professor Kellogg in an unusual degree, and accordingly his friends felt, not only that he was an honest and well meaning man, but that he was a man in whom they could confide in all respects. They felt that they could consult him in the most delicate matter, and intrust to him a full knowledge of the most important interests, without any fear that he would improperly repeat what had been said, or incidentally and thoughtlessly expose to hazard the interests intrusted to him. Free alike from ill nature, from vanity and from heedlessness, —from one or the other, or from a combination of which, men are most liable so to expose secrets, or to prejudice interests intrusted to them, as to create difficulties in families and in neighborhoods,—he lived in an atmosphere of social serenity, not only creating no difficulty by any

remarks or conduct of his, but if any existed, seeking to allay it. Having then these qualities, and manifesting them steadily for a long course of years, it is not to be wondered at that he had very fully the confidence of his friends.

I observe secondly, that Professor Kellogg was very pleasant to his friends because of that general structure of mind which might be said to constitute his individuality.

He was one of those men who have strongly marked peculiarities, which yet do not go to such a length as to become weaknesses. On the other hand, they were such only as are required by the variety, the harmony, and even by the wants of human society. While, therefore, we should not wish to have every man to be, in the points referred to, such a man, we should yet not have wished to have *him* different. Among these I will only mention here that peculiarity of mind which led him to notice all the particulars of every subject in which he was interested, and to go into all its details. No one can have been long acquainted with Professor Kellogg without noticing this trait. It showed itself in his inquiries, in the kind of knowledge which he had on many subjects, in the objections he would start to any plan proposed, and in the thoroughness and completeness with which he would carry out those things which he undertook. A striking illustration of this, showing at the same time his continued interest in the college, he gave in a plan which he drew up not long before his death for the improvement of extempore speaking among the students, by the institution, if the means could be procured, of prizes for that purpose. The plan was judicious, and, if it could be carried into effect, would do much good; but it covered two or three sheets of paper, and every possible emergency and objection were considered and provided for. This habit of mind would naturally beget caution, and

accordingly, he well understood, and in its spirit commended to others, that maxim which would teach us to "make haste slowly." This particularity and caution did not, however, render him deficient in enterprise. He often originated new plans, which he was just as ready to scrutinize, as he was to check the ardor of others in those proposed by them.

I observe thirdly, that he was very pleasant to his friends, because of the elegance of his mind, and the refinement of his taste.

These traits are naturally connected with the peculiarity just mentioned and were heightened by it. In connection with his social nature,—for no man could more enjoy the pleasant, and even playful unbending of the mind, and with the fertility of classical allusion to which his studies could not fail to give rise,—these traits gave to his conversation among intimate friends, a charm seldom to be met with, especially in these days of intense occupation and of railroad speed in everything, when fine powers of conversation seem to be in danger of dying out. Without causing him to be fastidious, they rendered every thing that he said, and everything that he did, neat, and often exceedingly happy. He was, of course, in his feelings, and in all his associations and habits, gentlemanly,—very far removed from any thing gross or unseemly.

I observe finally, under this head, that Professor Kellogg was very pleasant to his friends because of his genuine kindness of heart, and of his attachment to them.

This kindness, which really seeks the good of others, is very soon distinguished from those civilities and polite attentions through which persons seek their own good by ingratiating themselves into the good opinion of others. He knew, only to despise, that school of manners of which this is the leading aim, having deception and hy-

pocrisy, under the name of good breeding, for its means, and an unmitigated selfishness for its end. He was truly kind, not unnecessarily wounding the feelings of any, but not over-complaisant, and never deceptive in his expressions of attachment and good will. This led him to make real sacrifices for his friends, and for any whom he thought he could benefit. And not only did he do acts of kindness when asked, but he was thoughtful in devising methods to gratify his friends, and remembered those slighter attentions which many quite overlook. But while he was thus kind, he did not hesitate, as indeed no truly kind man ever can, to give reproof. He did it, however, in such a way, that he who was the subject of it generally felt that the wounds of a friend were faithful, and that he was ready to say, "Let the righteous smite me, it shall be a kindness; and let him reprove me, it shall be an excellent oil which shall not break my head." This attachment to his friends appeared in a strong and affecting light just before his death. To show this, it will be necessary to state the circumstances in which he was placed. In the morning, when I was called in, he was unable to speak, and his mind seemed to be wandering. He breathed with much difficulty, and it was doubtful whether he would ever speak again. However, he gradually recovered so far as to ask us to pray with him. This was done very briefly, as his state seemed to require; but as his mind returned, he again requested prayer. The family were then called, and he gathered from some expression in the prayer that we supposed his time had come, and when the prayer was concluded he asked if we supposed he was about to die. He was told that we did. He said he had all along expected to die, but that he had not particularly expected it that morning; that his mind was then much occupied with his bodily state, and he wished us to pray with him again, and to ask that he might have clear views of God and of those great reali-

ties to the consideration of which he now wished to address himself. After the prayer he remained for a time in thought; then looking up he said, "My friends, kiss me all round." When this had been done, he called his wife, and afterwards all who were present, one by one, to whisper to them his last words of affection, of thanks, of kind wishes. He also remembered the absent, and sent messages, with his love, to his brothers and sisters and other friends. He then called to the doctor, and said, "Doctor, remember me to the aged and suffering members of this church." This he repeated. He subsequently broke out and said, "My thoughts are upon my friends, one and another are running through my mind." He also prayed for those for whose good he had labored, that God would bless them. And here I may mention what also occurred afterwards, a slight incident, but one which affected me much. I was standing alone by his bedside, with my hand resting on the bed near his. He moved his hand, and took hold of mine, and simply said, "Dear brother." Such expressions, at such an hour, could have come only from a heart possessed of genuine kindness, and of strong attachment to his friends. How could such a man fail of fulfilling aright the duties of a husband and a brother? How could he fail of being very pleasant to his friends?

I next proceed to observe, that Professor Kellogg was very pleasant to those who were associated with him as a *college officer*, because of his general attainments as a scholar.

The department in which he was, and which he adorned, was undoubtedly that which was best adapted to his taste and habits of mind. There was, indeed, a remarkable adaptation to the structure and habits of his mind of the classic elegance of the Greek and Latin, and of the minute research and nice perception of the shades of meaning in words, required by the study of languages.

Still, while he excelled in that department, he was by no means deficient in others. On the contrary, his knowledge in other branches was extensive and thorough. He was a good mathematician, so much so, that at one time, when it was found difficult to fill the professorship of mathematics, he was transferred from his own department to that, and it was not from any deficiency of knowledge or ability to teach, that he was not continued in that department. This general acquaintance with the different branches of study gave him liberality and breadth of view, enabled him rightly to appreciate the importance and bearings of other branches of knowledge besides that in which he was more immediately interested, and when it became necessary or desirable that he should hear recitations in different departments, he could do so with advantage. All this made him far more pleasant to those who were associated with him than if he had been a mere literary artizan, pursuing his own narrow track.

But I observe secondly, that he was very pleasant to those who were associated with him as a college officer, because of his thorough devotion to the interests of the college.

It was always, and evidently, his object to serve the college and advance its interests, and not to make the college a means of serving him and of advancing his interests. Hence, having no personal ends to carry, there was always about him a spirit of accommodation in regard to any arrangement or distribution of labor by which the good of the college was to be promoted. Hence too, the extent to which his thoughts, and cares, and efforts, were given to the college, was by no means limited simply to that range which would be required by public sentiment in immediate connection with his department. He was not the man to suspect that any thing was going wrong and shun the labor or the responsibility of looking into it. In every such institution too, there must be many miscella-

neous matters that need attention, which will seem to devolve on no one in particular. To every thing of this kind he was prompt in giving his attention, and in calling to it the attention of others. His labors of this kind were indefatigable and invaluable. Any such body of men as the faculty of a college, must be deficient in its organization, without one man, at least, who is able and willing to give attention to this class of duties, and to see that every thing goes right. For this class of duties the trait of mind of which I have already spoken admirably fitted him, and he gave it full scope. Having been for twenty-nine years in active duty here, and the college during that time having often been in circumstances of embarrassment, he never hesitated to make sacrifices, to live on a small salary without complaint, or to do an amount of miscellaneous labor which few men would have been willing to undertake. And not only is the college indebted to him in these respects, but to him chiefly was it owing that the apparatus fund was raised; with him also originated the idea of the college garden, and he purchased the ground and gave it to the college. There are, therefore, few men to whom the college is under greater obligations.

My last observation under this head is, that Professor Kellogg was very pleasant not only to the officers of college, but also, generally, to the students, because of his firmness, united with faithfulness and patience, in instruction and discipline.

By this I do not mean to say that he was always popular among students. This was not the case; but when it was not, it was an honor to him. It is in itself no honor to be unpopular. There may be those who are unpopular, and who ought to be. But when times and tastes are changing, and young men are capricious and restive under salutary restraint and an exact requirement of their duties, it is then an honor to be unpopular among them. I would not say that he never pressed a minor point farther than

was necessary, that he was never over strenuous in an unimportant matter; but whenever this was so, it was from principle, and though students might dislike it at the time, yet when they became acquainted with him, they respected him for it. Seldom has that saying of the wise man been more fully exemplified than in his case; "He that rebuketh a man,"—that is, is faithful with him, presses him up to his duty,—"afterwards shall find more favor than he that flattereth with his tongue." After students left college, it is believed that they almost uniformly regarded him with great affection and respect. Certainly their feelings were very different towards him from those they would have had towards one who should have lowered any standard, or relaxed any requisition, or accommodated himself to any desire, for the sake of gaining immediate and temporary favor. And what thus rendered him pleasant on the whole to the students of college, rendered him also pleasant to those associated with him as an officer, because he was always ready to stand in his place, and if there was odium to be borne, to bear his full share of it.

We now come to consider Professor Kellogg as a Christian.

And here I should say, that perhaps his prominent characteristics were, a pervading reverence for God, and a deep awe of him as a holy God. Hence, there was in him no approach towards levity, or towards a certain familiarity which borders upon it, in connection with the name, or institutions, or worship of God. In connection with this, too, he had, as he naturally would have, a strong sense of the dreadful nature of sin, and of the anger of God against it, not unmixed with apprehension, and of this he was not fully divested till at, or near the close of life. With him it was by no means a matter of course that God should forgive sin, and it was only in connection with the plan of salvation by Christ, which, he at one

time said, seemed almost too great and glorious to be real, that he supposed it could be forgiven. This general feeling which I have described, I have heard him express more than once, and it showed itself strikingly in that interval of strength and clearness of intellect of which I have already spoken, and for which, when he became exhausted, he expressly thanked God. During that time he broke out in a prayer commencing thus, "O God, thy wrath I cannot bear." The conclusion of the prayer, I will add, was expressive of confidence. It was from the same feeling, that among the things that he wished us to pray for expressly at one time, the first that he mentioned was pardon—that he might be forgiven. Hence, too, when he asked me to repeat passages of Scripture that might meet his case, and when, after having repeated a number, I mentioned that in Isaiah, where it is written, "Though your sins be as scarlet they shall be white as snow, though they be red like crimson they shall be as wool;" he immediately said, "There! there! hold on there! How blessed at such a moment to be able to add, 'The blood of Jesus Christ his Son cleanseth us from all sin.'" This was one of the subjects on which, as he said a few weeks previous, his views changed as he drew near death. He said he had a deeper sense of the dreadful evil of sin as committed against God. In this feeling, and in his reverence and awe of God, there was nothing of slavish fear—no man could be farther than he from any tincture of gloom—it was the feeling becoming the creature towards the Creator, becoming the redeemed, yet trembling sinner, towards the holy Lawgiver. It was the opposite alike of the stupidity and spiritual obtuseness of the sensualist and worldling, of the blind self-complacency of the mere moralist, and of a certain fool-hardiness and presumption sometimes mistaken for true fortitude; and we could have wished to see it removed only by a fuller and more joyful consciousness of acceptance in the Beloved.

Intimately connected with the trait in Professor Kellogg just mentioned, was a strong sense of his unworthiness, and of the imperfections of his Christian life. This he expressed to me in a conversation some time before his death, in which he said he was led to doubt whether a person whose life had been so imperfect as his, could be a Christian. His mind seemed to rest, not so much on what he had done that was wrong, as on the fact that he had done so little for Christ. He said that when he looked at the amazing love of Christ for us, and at what he had done, it seemed to him that any one who loved him in return, that is who was a Christian at all, must have done more for his cause than he had.—"That," said he, "is my trouble." The same thing appeared in a prayer a little before his death. He prayed twice that God would do away the evil effects of his example; and he said it was a very consoling thought, that God could do that, and that he could bring good out of evil.

With the general turn of mind now spoken of, there would naturally be connected submission and patience under suffering, and accordingly, I observe again, that Professor Kellogg was remarkable for these.

In the practice of these virtues his trial was severe and long continued. For many years his life was preserved only by such care as few men would have given, and more than once during that time he was brought to the borders of the grave. This interfered with all his plans and interrupted all his labors. Nor was his principal disease the only difficulty with which he had to contend during this long period; when general weakness came on, and the constitution began to fail, there were others which caused him much suffering: but so far as I ever heard or knew, he never once spoke unadvisedly with his lips. In this respect he may properly be held up as an example.

Having the views which I have stated of the character

of God, and of his own life, it was to be expected that he would rest his hope for salvation on Christ alone. This he did. He had no ecstasies, no raptures; it was not the tendency of his mind. He had none in life, he had none in death. But he had faith, and that faith sustained him. True, he was at times distrustful of himself. I remember to have heard him say at one time, "I cannot doubt his readiness to receive all who come, but do I come?" Still, there was during his sickness a gradual strengthening of faith and hope, so that once particularly, during that period of an hour or more of which I have already spoken, he broke out of his own accord in strong expressions of hope in God, and of confidence that the Saviour would receive him. That the Saviour has thus received him we humbly hope. We cannot doubt but that to him it has been gain to die; that he is now in a world where there shall be no more death, neither sorrow, nor crying, neither shall there be any more pain: for the former things are passed away. "Blessed are the dead which die in the Lord from henceforth: yea, saith the Spirit, that they may rest from their labors; and their works do follow them."

And now, having mentioned some reasons why Professor Kellogg was very pleasant to his friends and his associates, and given some traits of his Christian character, I trust I may be permitted, individually, to adopt the language of the text, and to say, 'Very pleasant hast thou been unto *me*.' The greater part of the time for the last twenty-five years, I have been associated with him either as a student or as an officer of this college. During all that time, I have no recollection that one unkind word ever passed between us, and no knowledge that a single unpleasant feeling ever existed. On the contrary, he has been uniform and steady in his friendship and support, and has often given indications of his kindness and interest that can never be forgotten. I feel, to-day, that there has

been taken from my side a counsellor and friend. "I am distressed for thee, my brother: very pleasant hast thou been unto me."

Thus has there ceased from among us, one, who for the last thirty years has gone in and out here as a member of this church, and an officer of this college: and who is there that hears me, whom this life and this death do not address in tones of interest and of solemnity?

To her who has stood to him in the nearest and dearest relation that earth knows, this life and this death must ever remain inwoven as a part of her being. We pray that their whole influence may be to bring her nearer to God, to make her more like the Saviour, to give her a firmer and a brighter hope in the hour of her own death. We rejoice in all the circumstances of alleviation which she must feel are connected with this event, and we join with him who has been taken from her in his parting words to her, "God be with thee—the Saviour love thee."

To the officers of this college, this event is a call solemnly to review the spirit and motives by which they are actuated in the responsible work in which they are engaged. It is, my brethren, a great thing to fulfil such a trust, not merely so as to avoid the censure or to meet the approbation of men, but so as to meet the approbation of God. It is ours to make impressions upon the deathless minds of those who may be expected to take a prominent part in human affairs, and we need the grace of God, and wisdom, not merely to teach particular branches of knowledge, but to *educate* the whole man for this world and for the next. All the qualifications requisite for this, no one man possesses; but for the attainment of this wisdom we may find most valuable lessons by pondering the life and spirit of our departed associate. Let none of us fail to read those bright lines of goodness which the providence

of God has thus caused to be traced before our eyes; or reading them, fail to devote ourselves with a more chastened and unselfish, and yet more earnest spirit, to the great work in which we are engaged.

And will it be said by the students who hear me, that because no one of the present classes has been taught by Professor Kellogg, therefore no special voice of instruction comes to them? I think not; for not only has he been an honor to the institution with which you are connected, but he has been your predecessor in the paths upon which you have now entered; and it is something for one in his novitiate to see a veteran lay his armor down. The hopes and fears, the excitements and the toils, by which you are now agitated and employed, were once shared by him. He once began to climb the same steep which you are now ascending, and he plucked a richer store than is gathered by most, of the flowers and fruits that grow by the way. But those flowers were not amaranthine; those fruits were not that bread of which if a man eat he shall live for ever. In the hour of death it was not his attainments as a scholar that he valued; it was not these that sustained him. What he needed, and what he felt to be needed by others, was hope in death. Yes, hope in death! That is what you will each one of you need—a good hope—a hope that shall be as an anchor to the soul. O that, in view of this solemn event, you would turn from the things of time, and cast the anchor of your hope within the vail!

To this church and congregation, to all of us who are embarked on the voyage of time, and are interested to know the views that will open upon us as we proceed, this event ought not to be in vain. You all know what the example of Professor Kellogg was—one of uncommon uprightness, conscientiousness and purity. He wronged no man. He met very fully his duties in the various social relations, and as a member of society, not with-

drawing from them, as he might have been expected to do, on account of his health or of his literary pursuits. He was interested and active in the affairs of the town, and of the church, and was for a long time the superintendent of the Sabbath school. Nor, if we try him by what is generally expected, or by what is generally done, could he be said to be deficient in direct efforts for the spiritual good of others. And yet, when he approached death, he prayed earnestly that God would do away the evil of his example. Shall we say then, that he was unnecessarily disquieted, and that his example was all that it ought to have been? He would not wish me to say this; faithfulness to you, who are nearing the same point, forbids me to say this. What then can I do, but to point you to a higher example, even that of Christ, and to sound in your ears those fearful words of the apostle, "If the righteous scarcely be saved, where shall the ungodly and the sinner appear?"

But this is not the only point on which his views changed. I have already spoken of what he said of the evil of sin. This he repeated more than once. As he approached the borders of eternity, it seemed to him more and more a dreadful thing that men should sin as they do against God. In the security of health, mingling in with the currents and allured by the examples of this world, who is there that habitually and constantly fears to sin against God? It seems then a light matter; and there are even fools that make a mock of sin; but when the world recedes, and we feel that we are approaching into the immediate presence of God, we must view this in another light. Then we see the true ends of life, the goodness and forbearance and long suffering of God towards his creatures, and how awful a thing it is for his creatures to pervert all the good gifts of the Creator, and to live for ends that he never intended, and then, having done this, to reject redeeming mercy. Is it wonderful,

that when this is seen, the pardon of sin should be felt to be the great thing needed? And when the hope that this pardon may be granted, that his sins, though they be as scarlet, may become white as snow, is brought home to the soul in the blessed language of Scripture, may it not be felt that the great problem for man is solved? Is it wonderful that he should exclaim at once, "There! there! hold on there!"

It was also said by Professor Kellogg some time before his death, that it seemed more and more strange to him, that so many persons believed the great truths of the Christian religion, or professed to believe them, and yet acted as if they did not. This is, indeed, the great moral wonder of Christendom, whether we regard those who profess religion, or those who do not. It is not, my hearers, that there is not truth enough pervading the moral atmosphere, and lodged in your minds. Let but this truth be quickened so that every person should obey it, acting up honestly to his own convictions, and there would be a movement like that which took place among the dry bones of the prophet. Bone would come together to its fellow bone, and sinews and flesh would come upon them, and, in every valley of moral death, and over this sin-stricken world, there would stand up an exceeding great army, ready to march whithersoever they might be directed, under the banners of the Lord of Hosts.

I observe finally, that as Professor Kellogg approached eternity, his views changed in regard to the brevity of life at its best estate. He said that when persons came in to see him, they felt that they had come to see a sick man who was just about to die; but that to him there seemed to be but little difference between himself and them. "The time," said he, "must soon come, when every man must turn his face to the wall and die." And so it is. "What shadows we are! What shadows we pursue!" And shall we then go about to cause our

hearts to despair, and say that all men were made in vain? Shall we say that this garniture of earth, that these bright heavens with all their hosts of stars, that these infinities in the midst of which we are placed, and these aspirations within us, were given but to mock us? Made in vain! Man made in vain! Speak from thy rest, disciple of Jesus, clothed in thy white robe, and with the palm of victory in thy hand. Speak, redeeming blood!

SERMON,

DELIVERED BEFORE THE LEGISLATURE OF MASSACHUSETTS, ON THE ANNIVERSARY ELECTION,

January 2, 1839.

We ought to obey God rather than men.—Acts v. 29.

Man was made for something higher and better, than either to make, or to obey, merely human laws. He is the creature of God, is subject to his laws, and can find his perfection and consequent happiness only in obeying those laws. As his moral perfection, the life of his life, is involved in this obedience, it is impossible that any power should lay him under obligation to disobey. The known will of God, if not the foundation of right, is its paramount rule, and it is because human governments are ordained by him, that we owe them obedience. We are bound to them, not by compact, but only as God's institutions for the good of the race. This is what the Bible, though sometimes referred to as supporting arbitrary power, really teaches. It does not support arbitrary power. Rightly understood, it is a perfect rule of duty, and as in every thing else, so in the relations of subjects and rulers. It lays down the true principles, it gives us the guiding light. When the general question is whether human

goverments are to be obeyed, the answer is, He that "resisteth the power, resisteth the ordinance of God." "The powers that be, are ordained of God." But when these powers overstep their appointed limits, and would lord it over the conscience, and come between man and his Maker, then do we hear it uttered in the very face of power, and by the voice of inspiration, no less than of indignant humanity, "We ought to obey God rather than men."

It has been in connection with the maintenance of this principle, first proclaimed by an apostle of Christ eighteen hundred years ago, that all the civil liberty now in the world has sprung up. It is to the fearless assertion of this principle by our forefathers that we owe it, that the representatives of a free people are assembled here this day, to worship God according to the dictates of their own consciences, to seek to Him for wisdom in their deliberations, and to acknowledge the subordination of all human governments to that which is divine.

Permit me then, as appropriate to the present occasion, to call the attention of this audience,

First, To the grounds on which all men are bound to adhere to the principle stated in the text; and

Secondly, To the consequences of such adherence, on the part both of subjects and of rulers.

I observe, then, that we ought to obey God rather than men, because human governments are comparatively so limited and negative in their bearings upon the great purposes, first, of individual, and secondly, of social existence.

The purposes for which man was made, must evidently involve in their accomplishment both his duty and his happiness; and nothing can be his duty which would contravene those purposes. Among them, as already intimated, the highest is the moral perfection of the individ-

ual; for as it is by his moral nature that man is distinguished from the inferior animals, so it is only in the perfection of that nature, that his perfection, as man, can consist. As absolute perfection can belong only to God, that of man must be relative, that is, it must consist in the proper adjustment of relations, and especially in the relation of his voluntary actions to the end for which God designed him. This is our idea of perfection, when we affirm it of the works of man. It involves, mainly, such a relation of parts as is necessary to the perfect accomplishment of the end in view. A watch is perfect when it is so constructed that its motions exactly correspond in their little revolutions with those of the sun in the heavens; and man is perfect when his will corresponds in its little circle of movement with the will of God in heaven. This correspondence, however, is not to be produced by the laws of an unconscious mechanism, but by a voluntary, a cheerful, a filial co-operation. It is this power of controlling his faculties with reference to an ultimate end, of accepting or rejecting the purpose of his being, as indicated by God in the very structure of his powers, and proclaimed in his word, that contra-distinguishes man from every inferior being, and gives scope for what is properly termed, character. Inferior beings have qualities by which they are distinguished, they have characteristics, but not *character*, which always involves a moral element. A brute does not govern its own instincts, it is governed by them. A tree is the product of an agency which is put forth through it, but of which it is not conscious, and which it does not control. But God gives man to himself, and then sets before him, in the tendency of every thing that has unconscious life towards its own perfection, the great moral lesson that nature was intended to teach. He then causes every blade of grass, and every tree, to become a preacher and a model, calling upon him to put forth his faculties, not

without law, but to accept the law of his being, and to work out a character and a happiness in conformity with that. It is, as I have said, the power which man has to accept or reject this law of his being, the great law of love, that renders him capable of character; and it is evidently as a theatre, on which this may be manifested, that the present scene of things is sustained. Not with more certainty do the processes of vegetation point to the blossoms and the fruit as the results to which they conspire, than does every thing in the nature and condition of man indicate the formation of a specific, voluntary, moral character, as the purpose for which God placed him here. But this purpose is not recognized at all by human governments, and we have only to observe the limited and negative agency which they incidentally bring to bear upon it, to see how insignificant must be their claims when they would come into conflict with those of the government of God.

I observe then, first, that human governments regard man solely as the member of a community; whereas it is chiefly as an individual, that the government of God regards him. Isolate a man from society, take him beyond the reach of human government, and his faculties are not changed. He is still the creature of God, a dweller in his universe, retaining every thing he ever possessed that was noble in reason, or grand in destiny; and in his solitude, where yet he would not be alone, the government of God would follow him, and would require of him such manifestations of goodness as he might there exercise—the adoration of his Creator, resignation to his will, and a temperate and prudent use of the blessings within his power. Indeed, so far as responsibility is concerned, the divine government considers man, whether in solitude or in a crowd, solely as an individual, and produces an isolation of each as complete as if he were the only person in the universe. God knows nothing of divided responsi-

bility; and whether acting alone, or as a member of a corporation or of a legislature, every man is responsible to him for just what he does as a moral being, and for nothing more. The responsibility of each is kept disentangled from that of all others, and lies as well defined in the eye of God, as if that eye were fixed upon him alone. The kingdom of God is within man, and there it is, in the secret soul of each, that the contest between light and darkness, between God and Satan is going on, and in the struggle, in the victory or the defeat, he who walks the city is as much alone as the hermit in his cell. It is over the thoughts of man, his affections, his passions, his purposes, which mock at human control, that the government of God claims dominion; it is with reference to these, and not to the artificial index of appearances which we set to catch the eye of the world, that the register of heaven is kept. On the other hand, how very few of the moral actions of man can human government reach, how imperfectly can it reach even these! It is only of overt acts, those which it can define, and which can be proved before a human tribunal, that it can take cognizance; and its treatment even of these can never be adjusted to the varying shades of guilt. It has no eye to reach the springs of action. It may see the movements of the machinery above, perplexed, and apparently contradictory; but it cannot uncover the great wheel, and look in upon the simple principle which makes character, and sets the whole in motion.

But I observe again, that human governments are not only thus limited, but are also chiefly negative in their influence upon the formation of individual character. There is, indeed, a positive and widely pervading moral influence connected with the character, and station, and acts, of those who are in authority. This cannot be too prominently stated, the responsibility connected with it cannot be too carefully regarded; still this influence is

entirely incidental, and is the same in kind with that exerted by any distinguished private individual. Human governments have also positive power to furnish *facilities*, as distinguished from *inducements*. They can authorize and guard the issue of paper money, to give facilities to men of business; they can lay down railroads, thus opening facilities to the spirit of enterprise, and calling out the neglected resources of the State ; they can, too, and our fathers did it, construct and keep in repair the *railroads of the mind*, thus giving facilities to the poorest boy in the glens of the mountains to come out and be an honor to his country. Still, human government is chiefly a system of restraint for the purpose of protection. Its object is to give equal protection to all in using their faculties as they please, provided they do not interfere with the rights of others. It does not propose to furnish inducements, but to enable men to live quiet and peaceable lives, while they act in view of the great inducements furnished by the government of God.

In saying this, I do not undervalue the benefits conferred by human governments, but only assign them their true place. The office performed by them is indispensable. They are the inclosure of the field, without which certainly nothing could come to maturity ; but they are not the soil, and the rain, and the sunshine, which cause vegetation to spring up. These are furnished by the government of God, which is not only a system of restraint and protection, but also, and chiefly, of inducements to excellence. Into the ear of the humblest of its subjects it whispers, as it points upward, "Glory," "Honor," "Immortality," "Eternal Life." It is parental in its character, makes us members of a family, gives us objects of affection, and by its perfect standard of moral excellence, and the character of God which it sets before us, it purifies and elevates the mind. Without a God to whom he is related and accountable, man has neither

dignity nor hope. Without God, the universe has no cause, its contrivances indicate no intelligence, its providence no goodness, its related parts and processes no unity, its events no convergence to one grand result, and the glorious spectacle presented in the earth and the heavens, instead of calling forth admiration and songs, is an enigma perplexing to the intellect, and torturing to the heart. Seen in its connection with God, the universe of matter is as the evening cloud that lies in the sunlight, radiant and skirted with glory; without him it is the same cloud, cold and dark when that sunlight is gone. Without God, man is an orphan; he has no protector here, and no Father's house in which he may hope for a mansion hereafter. His life is at his own disposal, and has no value except in relation to his personal and present enjoyment.

On the other hand, as the idea of God is received, and his relations to the universe are intimately felt, unity and harmony are introduced into our conceptions of that which is without, and acquiescence and hope reign within. Nature, as more significant, becomes more a companion. Her quiet teachings and mute prophecies, her indexes pointing to the spirit land, instead of being felt as a mockery, are in accordance with the best hopes, and the revealed destiny of man. Life, too, assumes a new aspect. A common destiny is set before all, and the consciousness of it runs as a thread of sympathy through the race. The poor man is elevated when he sees that the principle of duty may be tried and strengthened in his humble sphere, as well as in those that are higher, and his labor becomes a cheerful service, done with good will from the heart. Every duty to man becomes doubly sacred as due also to God, and the humblest life, pursued from a conscientious regard to his will, is invested with an unspeakable dignity. It is indeed, I may remark, this view of life that furnishes the only possible ground of equality. Men are upon an equality only as they are

equally upon trial in the sight of God ; and nothing will ever reconcile them to the unavoidable inequalities of the present state, but the consciousness that their circumstances were allotted to them by Him who best knew what trials they would need, and whose equal eye regards solely the degree in which their moral nature is improved by the trial. When this is felt, there is, under all circumstances, a basis for dignity without pride, for activity without restlessness, for diversity of condition without discord.

And not only the aspect of life in the relations of men to each other, but its end also is changed. The moral nature assumes its true position, and, acting in the presence of a perfect law as its standard, and of a perfect gospel as its ground of hope, the idea of true liberty dawns upon the mind. This consists in the coincidence of the affections and inclinations with correct principle. It is only when the internal constitution of a reasonable being is in harmony with the law under which he acts, that he is conscious of no restraint, and knows what true freedom is. The chief value of what is commonly called liberty, consists in the opportunity it gives to use our faculties without molestation for the attainment of this. This is that glorious liberty of the sons of God, of which the Scriptures speak. It is not a mere freedom from restraint, which may be abused for the purposes of wrong-doing and become a curse ; merely making the difference between a brute enclosed and a brute at large ; but it is, in its commencement, the resolute adoption of the law of conscience and of God as the rule of life ; in its progress, a successful struggle with whatever opposes this law ; in its completion, the harmonious and joyful action of every power in its fulfilment. This is the only liberty known under the government of God. He who knows it not is the slave of sin. He who struggles not for it is in a contented bondage, of which physical slavery is but a feeble type.

The perfection of this liberty is only another name for moral perfection, which, as I have said, is the great end of the individual; and as the direct motives and means for the attainment of this are furnished only by the government of God, it is evident that "we ought to obey God rather than men."

Having thus spoken of the effect of human government upon man in his individual character, I now proceed to inquire, whether it is equally limited and negative in its bearing upon him in his social condition.

And here I remark, that it is only incidentally that human government is necessary to man as a social being at all. Society was before government; and if man had retained his original state, it might, perhaps, have existed without it till the end of time. Man is constituted by his Creator a social being; he has faculties, to the expansion and perfection of which society is requisite; but he has no faculties the necessities of which constitute him a political being. There must be politicians, just as there must be farmers, and merchants, and physicians, that they and others may enjoy social life; but social life is corrupted when politics enter largely into it. It is not sufficiently noticed, that it is through social institutions and habits, far more than through political forms, that the happiness or misery of man is produced. It was not from the oppressions of the government, but from a corrupted social state, that the prophet of old wished to flee into the wilderness. It was because his people were all adulterers, an assembly of treacherous men, because every brother would supplant, and every neighbor would walk with slanders. Such a state of things may exist under any form of political organization. It may exist under ours. Men may be loud in their praise of republican forms, and yet be false, and unkind, and litigious; they may be indolent, and profane, and Sabbath-breakers, and gamblers, and licentious, and intemperate. Yes, and there may be

neighborhoods of such men, and the place where they assemble nightly, hard by a banner that creaks in the wind, may be the liveliest image of hell that this earth can present. I certainly know, and my hearers are fortunate if they do not know, neighborhoods in this land of liberty and equality, where the only use made of liberty is to render families and society wretched, and where the only equality is an equality in vice and social degradation, which no man is permitted even to attempt to rise above without constant annoyance. Better, far better, is family affection and kind neighborhood under a regal or even a despotic government, than such liberty as this.

Government then is not an end, but a means. Society is the end, and government should be the agent of society, to benefit man in his social condition. The extent to which it can do this will depend on its form, and the power with which it is intrusted. Absolute power, which should be used for this purpose, is generally abused. Considering itself as having interests distinct from those of the people, it too often seeks to keep them in a state of degradation, and to appropriate to itself the largest possible share of those blessings which ought to be equally diffused. "Get out of my sunlight," said Diogenes to Alexander the Great: "Get out of my sunlight,"—cease to obstruct the free circulation of blessings intended for all,—might the people say under any arbitrary form of government ever yet administered. Still, such a government, when under the direction of wisdom and benevolence, has power to produce great social and moral revolutions for the good of mankind. Such a revolution was commenced by Peter the Great, and his measures, though necessary, were such as none but an absolute monarch could have adopted. Aside from Christianity, the judicious exercise of such a power is the only hope of a people debased beyond a certain point. The king of Prussia can maintain a better and more efficient system of

schools, than any republican government. He can provide qualified teachers, and can compel the children to attend.

But when, as in this country, government is the direct agent of society, when it is so far controlled by the people as to secure the majority at least from oppression, being merely an expression of the will of that majority, it can have no power to produce moral and social reformations. Laws do not execute themselves, and in such a state of things they cannot be effectually executed if the violation of them is upheld by public sentiment. In such a case, when vices begin to creep in, and the tendency of things is downwards, we must have a force different from that of the government; we must have *moral* power. Here religion comes in, and must come in, or "the beginning of the end" has come. The intellect must be enlightened, and the conscience quickened, and moral life infused into the mass; the good and the evil must commingle in free conflict, and public sentiment must be changed. When this is done, when patriotism, and philanthropy, and religion, have caused an ebb-tide in the flood of evil that was coming up over the land, then government may come in, not to carry forward a moral reformation by force, but to erect a barrier against the return of that tide. It can secure what these agents have gained. It can put a shield into the hands of society, with which it can, if it pleases, protect itself against that selfishness and malignity which always lurk in its borders, and which moral influence cannot reach. If, for example, polygamy were established among us as it is among the Turks, a government like ours could do nothing for its removal. But religion could awaken a sense of obligation, and statistics could point out the number of poor women and uneducated children thrown by it for support mainly upon those who had pledged themselves to be the husband of one wife, and Christian and philan-

thropic effort might show that it was injurious to individuals, and families, and the state; and then a law might be passed, as there has been, to defend society against this evil.

This inefficacy of our government to produce moral and social reformations should be well understood, because it throws the fearful responsibility of maintaining our institutions directly upon the people, where it must rest. A government originating in society, can have but slight ground to stand on in resisting its downward tendency. That there is in society such a tendency, all history shows. As nations have become older, they have invariably become more corrupt. They have never reached that point in general morality at which men cease to corrupt each other by associating together. Such a tendency, not counteracted, must be fatal to republican governments, for republican government is self-government, and as the internal law becomes feeble, external force must be increased; and accordingly we find that every people hitherto, have either been under regal power from the beginning, or have, in time, reached a point in corruption when that power became necessary. Republican government, then, is not so much the cause of a good social state, as its sign. It can never be borne up, with its stars and stripes floating, upon the surface of a society that is not strongly impregnated with virtue. Take this away, and it goes down by its own weight, and the beast of tyranny, with its seven heads and ten horns, comes up out of the troubled waters. Here is the turning point with us. All depends upon the influences that go to form the character of our people. Those who control these influences will really govern the country. To this point we turn our eyes anxiously. At this point we look to legislators to stand in their lot, and do what is appropriate to their station. At this point we look especially to fathers and mothers, the guardians of domestic virtue.

Those waters will be sweet that are fed by sweet springs. We look to Christian ministers, to enlightened teachers, to patriotic authors and editors, to every good citizen. If there ever was a country in which all these were called upon to do their utmost, this is that country; if there ever was a government that was called upon to second in every proper way the efforts of these, this is that government. To all these we look; but our trust is only in the influences they may bring to bear from the blessed gospel of Christ, from the government of God. "We ought to obey God rather than men."

I have thus shown, as fully as the time would permit, though far too briefly to do justice to the subject, the grounds on which we ought to obey God rather than men. These are to be found in the relation of the divine and of human government respectively, to the ends of individual and of social existence. But the occasion on which the text was uttered, a subject having directly refused obedience to rulers lawfully constituted, will lead us to consider the effects of the principle of the text, when acted upon by men in those relations in which civil liberty is directly involved—in the relations of subjects and of rulers. What then will be the effect of an adherence to this principle on the part of subjects, as such?

There is a tendency in irresponsible power to accumulate. It first gains control over property, and life, and every thing from which a motive to resistance, based on the interests of the present life, could be drawn. But it is not satisfied with this. Nothing avails it so long as there is a Mordecai, sitting at the king's gate, that does not rise up and do it reverence. It must also control the conscience, and make the religious nature subservient to its purposes. Accordingly, the grand device of the enemies of civil liberty has been, so to incorporate religion with the government, that all those deep and ineradicable

feelings which are associated with the one, should also be associated with the other, and that he who opposed the government, should not only bring upon himself the arm of the civil power, but also the fury of religious zeal. The most melancholy and heart-sickening chapter in the history of man, is that in which are recorded the enormities committed by a lust of power, and by malignity, in alliance with a perverted religious sentiment. The light that was in men has become darkness, and that darkness has been great. The very instrument appointed by God for the deliverance and elevation of man, has been made to assist in his thraldom and degradation. When Christianity appeared, the alliance of religion with oppressive power was universal. In such a state of things, there seemed no hope for civil liberty but in bringing the conscience out from this unholy alliance, and putting it in a position in which it must show its energies in opposition to power. This Christianity did. It brought the conscience to a point where it not only might resist human governments, but where, as they were then exercised, it was compelled to resist them. This appeared when the text was uttered, and there was then a rock raised in the ocean of tyranny which has not been overflowed to this day. The same qualities which make the conscience so potent an ally of power, must, when it is enlightened by a true knowledge of God and of duty, and when immortality is clearly set before the mind, make it the most formidable of all barriers to tyranny and oppression.

By thus bringing the moral nature of man to act in opposition to power, and by giving him light, and strength, and foothold, to enable him to sustain that opposition, Christianity has done an inestimable service, and has placed humanity at the only point where its highest grandeur appears. At this point, sustained by principle, and often in the person of the humblest individual, it bids defiance to all the malice of men to wrest from it its true

liberty. It bids tyranny do its worst, and, though its ashes may be scattered to the winds, it leaves its startling testimony, and the inspiration of its great example, to coming times. The power to do this, Christianity alone can give. No other religion has ever so demonstrated its evidences to the senses, and caused its adaptations to the innermost wants of the soul to be felt, as to enable man to stand alone against the influence of whatever was dear in affection, and flattering in promises, and fearful in torture. Other religions have had their *victims*, who have been led, amidst the plaudits of surrounding multitudes, to throw themselves under the wheels of a system already established; but not their *martyrs*, who, when duty has permitted it, have fled to the fastnesses of the mountains, and, when it has not, have stood upon their rights and contested every inch of ground, and met death soberly and firmly only when it was necessary. When this has been done by multitudes, it has caused power to respect the individual, to respect humanity; and while Christianity was wading through the blood of ten persecutions, it was fighting, more effectually than had ever been done before, the battles of civil liberty. The call to obey God rather than men met with a response, and it is upon this ground that the battle has been opened in every case in which civil liberty now exists. It is upon this ground alone that it can be maintained.

I deem it of great importance that this point should be fully and often presented, because it is vital, and because there are constant attempts made to obscure it. Whatever elevates the individual, whatever gives him worth in his own estimation and that of others, whatever invests him with moral dignity, must be favorable both to pure morality and to civil liberty. Hence it is that these are both incidental results of Christianity. They are not the gifts which she came to bestow,—these are life and immortality. They are not the white raiment in which

her followers are to walk in the upper temple; but they are the earthly garments with which she would clothe the nations; they are the brightness which she leaves in her train as she moves on towards heaven, and calls on men to follow her there. These belong to her alone. Infidels may filch her morality, as they have often done, and then boast of their discoveries. But in their hands that morality is lopped off from the body of faith on which it grew, and produces no fruit. They may boast, as they do, of a liberty which they never could have achieved. But under its protection they advance doctrines and advocate practices which would corrupt it into license. Their only strength lies in endeavoring, in the sacred name of liberty, to corrupt the virtuous, and to excite the hatred of the vicious against those restraints without which liberty cannot exist and society has no ground of security. "Promising liberty to others, they are themselves the servants of corruption." Liberty cannot exist without morality, nor general morality without a pure religion.

The doctrine thus stated is fully confirmed by history. The reformation by Luther was made on strictly religious grounds. He found an opposition between the decrees of the Pope and the commands of God; and it was the simple purpose, resolutely adhered to, to obey God rather than men, that caused Europe to rock to its centre. In the train of this religious reformation civil liberty followed, but became settled and valuable only as religious liberty was perfected. It was every where on the ground of conscience towards God that the first stand was taken, and in those countries where the struggle for religious liberty commenced but did not succeed, as in Spain and Italy, civil liberty has found no resting place for the sole of her foot to this day. It is conceded even by Hume, that England owes her civil liberty to the Puritans; and the history of the settlement and progress

of this country, as a splendid exemplification of the principle in question, needs but to be mentioned here.

In speaking thus of the resistance of Christian subjects to the government, perhaps I should guard against being misunderstood. In no case can it be a factious resistance. It cannot be stimulated by any of the ordinary motives to such resistance—by discontent, or passion, or ambition, or a love of gain. In no case can it show itself in the disorganizing, the aggressive, and, in a free government, the suicidal spirit of mobs. Christians have in their eye a grand and a holy object, and all they wish is to go forward, without violating the rights of others, to its attainment. In so doing they set themselves in opposition to nobody, but merely exercise an inalienable right, and if others oppose them, they must still go forward and obey God, be the consequences what they may.

We will now consider, as was proposed, the effect of an adherence to the principle of the text on the part of rulers. This becomes appropriate from the peculiar form of our government, and the relation which the rulers hold to the people. Rulers have indeed, in all countries, need to be exhorted to obey God; but when their will is supreme, and their power is independent of the people, there can be no propriety in exhorting them to obey God rather than men. In this country, however, this principle needs to be enforced upon legislators and rulers quite as much as upon the people, perhaps even more. It is at this point, if I mistake not, that we are to look for the danger peculiar to our institutions through those in authority. In other countries the danger is from the accumulation and tyrannical use of power. With us, limited as is the tenure of office, there is little danger of direct oppression. The danger is that those who are in office, and those who wish for it, will, for the sake of immediate popularity, lend the sanction of their names to

doctrines and practices, which, if carried into effect, must destroy all government. How is it else that mobs should often escape with so little rebuke? How is it else that we hear such extravagant and disorganizing doctrines maintained in regard to the rights of a majority respecting property, and their power to set aside any guaranties of former Legislatures? Certainly the people are the fountain of power; they establish the government, they have a right to alter it; but when it is established, the state becomes personified through it, and its acts are to be consistent. When it is established, it *is* a government, it has authority, it becomes God's institution, and those who administer it are to obey God rather than men. Wo to this country, when the people shall become, to those in place, the object of adulation and of an affected idolatry. Wo to this country, when the people shall cease to reverence the government as the institution of God, because it is established through them; when they shall suppose that it is in such a sense theirs, that they can supersede its acts in any way except by constitutional forms.

There is also another reason why the principle of the text ought to be especially regarded by the rulers of this country. So far as a nation can be considered and treated as a moral person, its character must be indicated by the acts of its rulers. Accordingly, we find that under every form of government, God has made nations responsible, as in the natural course of things they evidently must be, for what is done by their rulers. But if this is so in monarchical governments, where the agency of the people is so little connected with public acts, much more must it be so in one like ours. Here the rulers represent the people more immediately. They indicate, in the eyes of the world, the moral condition of the people, and hence the peculiar responsibility of those who act under the oath of God in making and administering the laws of

a representative government. If it can ever be required of God to vindicate his administration by the treatment of any people, it must be of one whose government is thus administered.

I observe then that the principle of the text should be adopted by rulers, because it furnishes the only broad and safe basis of political action. The adoption of this principle I consider the first requisite of a wise, in opposition to a cunning and temporizing statesman. Statesmanship, as distinguished from that skilful combination of measures which has for its object personal advancement, consists very much in a perception of the connection there is between the prosperity of states, and the accordance of their laws and social institutions with the laws of justice, and benevolence, and temperance, which are the laws of God. The laws of God are uniform. The general tendencies which he has inwrought into the system will take effect, and nothing, not shaped in accordance with these, can stand. Now it is an attempt to evade the effect of these tendencies, by expedients in particular instances and for the sake of particular ends, that has been called statesmanship; while he only is the true statesman who sees what these tendencies are, and shapes his laws and institutions in accordance with them. The mere politician, if I may so designate him, perceives the movements which take place in the different parts of society relatively to each other, and is complacently skilful in adjusting them to his purposes; but he fails to see that general movement by which the whole is drifted on together, and which is bearing society to a point where elements that he had not dreamed of will be called into action, and where his petty expedients will become, in a moment, but as the barriers of sand which the child raises upon the beach, when the tide begins to rise.

"I tremble for my country," said an American statesman, in a sentence, which, though awfully ominous in

the connection in which it was uttered, does equal honor to his head and his heart, "I tremble for my country when I remember that God is just." In that sentence are involved the principles of that higher statesmanship, before which the expedients of merely expert men dwindle into nothing. He knew not how, or where, or when, the blow might fall; but he knew that there was always a joint in the harness of injustice, where the arrow of retribution, though it might seem to be speeding at a venture, would surely find its way. The higher movements of divine Providence include the lower. Sooner or later all particular, and for a time apparently anomalous cases are brought under its general rules; and he has read the history of the past with little benefit, who has failed to see how the giant machinery of that Providence, in the intermediate spaces of which there is ample room for the free play of human agency, takes up the results of that agency as they are wrought out, and applies them to the execution of its own uniform laws, and the accomplishment of its own predicted purposes. These purposes, as declared by those divine records whose prophecies have now become history, were often such as no human sagacity, looking merely at second causes, could have anticipated, such as no human power then existing could have effected. Still, they were wrought out in conformity with that higher, and uniform, and all-encompassing movement, with reference to which he who stands at the helm should guide the state, but to ascertain which, he must not take his bearings from the shifting headlands of circumstances, but must lift his eye to those eternal principles which abide ever the same.

On this subject there is written upon the walls of the past a lesson for statesmen that needs no interpreter. Look at Babylon. Who is it that stands before its walls and utters its doom? It is a despised Jew. And who is he that walks in pride upon these walls, and as he points

to that mighty city as the centre of civilization and power, as combining every advantage of climate and of commerce, mocks at that doom? It is a politician of those days. The voice of the prophet is uttered, and it seems to pass idly upon the wind. The eye of sense sees no effect. No clouds gather, no lightnings descend. But that voice was not in vain. The waters of desolation heard it in their distant caves, and never ceased to rise till they had whelmed palace and tower and temple in one undistinguished ruin. Even now that voice abides there, and hangs as a spirit of the air over that desolation; and the Arabian hears it, warning him not to pitch his tent there; and the wild beast of the desert and the owl and the satyr hear it, and come up and dwell and dance there. Look at Jerusalem. Who is he that stands upon Mount Olivet and weeps as he looks upon the city, and assigns, as the cause of his tears, that he would often have gathered her children together as a hen gathereth her chickens under her wings, but she would not? Ah! what political Jew would have thought of *that!* He would have turned his attention to the purposes of governors and the intrigues of courts. Into his estimate of the causes that might affect the prosperity of Jerusalem, the moral temper of the nation, as indicated by its rejection of Jesus of Nazareth, would not have entered. And yet, it was from this rejection, even in the way of natural consequence, from the want of those moral qualities which only a regard to his teachings could have produced among them, that the destruction of the Jews resulted. Nothing else could have destroyed their foolhardy confidence in God, or have allayed those fiendish passions which led contending factions to fill the streets of the city with dead bodies even in the midst of the siege. But they would not have his spirit; they would not have him to reign over them; and we know that from the moment the words dropped from his lips, "Your house is left unto you desolate," that was a doomed

city, and no political skill could have deferred the horrors of a siege and of a final overthrow, such as was not from the beginning of the world, no, nor ever shall be. And not only from Babylon and Jerusalem, but from the grave of every nation buried in antiquity, from Nineveh, and Tyre, and Edom, and Egypt, there comes a voice calling upon rulers to be "just, ruling in the fear of God." The true cause of their destruction was the attitude which they assumed towards the will, and worship, and people of God.

It is from these moral causes, between which and the result there is no immediate, nor, to the superficial eye, perceptible connection, that I fear most for the stability of our institutions. It is when the sun is shining most brightly, and the face of the sky shows, it may be, not a single cloud, that the elements of the tornado are ascending most rapidly; and it is when men are in prosperity and in fancied security that they become presumptuous, and that a disastrous train of causes is silently put in motion, as resistless as the tornado. Upon this point of security the eye of the true statesman is fixed. It is here that he sees the danger and provides against it; while the mere politician knows nothing, and sees nothing, till he begins, when it is too late, to see the lightnings and hear the thunders of embodied wrath.

Can then the rulers of this country, in disregard of the warnings of all past time, with a full understanding of the claims and of the controlling agency of the great moral principles of God's government, go on in obedience to men rather than God, and make laws in disregard or defiance of his will? If so, then, from the reciprocal influence of rulers and people, our experiment of self-government would seem to be hopeless. Then *must* God scourge this people as he has scourged others. Then are the untoward symptoms of the present time but as the white spot that shows the leprosy. Then will the altar

of liberty decay, and the fire upon it will go out, and there will be heard by those who watch in her temple, as of old in the desecrated temple of God, the voice of its presiding spirit, saying, "Let us go hence;" and that temple, towards which the eyes of the nations were turned with hope, shall become the haunt of every unclean thing, and shall only wait the hand of violence to leave not one stone upon another that shall not be thrown down. In view of such consequences, I cannot but feel that the solemn words of our Saviour are as applicable to legislators and rulers in their public as in their private capacity. "And I say unto you, my friends, be not afraid of them that kill the body, and after that have no more that they can do. But I will forewarn you whom ye shall fear: Fear him which, after he hath killed, hath power to cast into hell; yea, I say unto you, Fear him."

To His Excellency the Governor, these sentiments are addressed, as putting him in remembrance, as he stands upon the threshold of a new official year, of that which ought ever to be uppermost in the mind of the Chief Magistrate of a Christian people,—of the paramount authority of God, and of the necessity there is that all human legislation should coincide with the principles of his government. It is a great and a sacred trust which the people of this Commonwealth commit to their Chief Magistrate, and they expect it will be used in the fear of God and for the good of this whole people. That trust is in tried hands, and we rejoice in the belief that it is safely deposited. Especially, may I be permitted to say, does it give me pleasure to welcome to the chair of state one in whose civic wreath literary honors are entwined, and who can forget the toils and lay aside the dignities of office to cheer the young scholar on his way. Long may our literary institutions continue to raise up those who shall add to the dignity of office, the grace of learn-

ing and the sanctity of private virtue; and who, while they devote their labors more particularly to the good of their own State, shall be regarded as belonging to the Union and to the world.

To His Honor the Lieutenant Governor, to the Honorable Council and Senate, and to the assembled Representatives of the people, the sentiments of this discourse are addressed, as the descendants of those who showed, in the hour of peril, that they feared God rather than men. Following their example, you have come up, as you are about to enter upon your responsible duties, to present, in this venerable house, thanksgivings and supplications to the Lord God of our Fathers; and to do homage in the name of the republic, to His institutions. This is well. But that republic expects of you that you will imitate, not merely in form but also in spirit, the bright examples that are set before you; that you will act from principle; that you will "obey God rather than men." So doing, the Commonwealth will be safe, for it is the simple wisdom of goodness that alone is truly wise.

SERMON,

DELIVERED BEFORE THE PASTORAL ASSOCIATION OF MASSACHUSETTS,

May 30, 1843.

God is a spirit: and they that worship him, must worship him in spirit and in truth.—JOHN iv. 24.

IT is from the Bible alone, directly or indirectly, that we gain correct ideas, either of the natural attributes, or of the moral character of God. However distinctly we may trace the impress of his hand in his works when we already believe in his existence and true attributes, and however possible it might be for man, if his powers were unaffected by sin, to discover from the things that are made the eternal power and godhead of the Creator, yet the whole history of the race shows that, for this purpose, nature is not to man its own interpreter. Everywhere, and under all circumstances, men "have become vain in their imaginations, and their foolish heart has been darkened." If the great doctrines of the unity and spirituality of God did, indeed, glimmer in upon the minds of some of the heathen philosophers, yet no *people* of ancient times received and retained them except the Jews. Hence, when we pass from the heathen philosophers and poets to the prophets and poets of the Jews, we are in a new world as respects every thing that relates to God.

Here his being and attributes are set forth in the highest strains of poetry. And this poetry is also truth. It is philosophy transfigured, and therefore it never grows old. Even now, after more than three thousand years, after every discovery of science, it stands in all the original freshness and unapproachable majesty of the starry heavens.

But what they thus set forth in poetry, is disclosed in its simplest form by our Saviour. "God is a spirit: and they that worship him, must worship him in spirit and in truth." Probably few have read this passage without being struck by it. How simple the words! The doctrine stated—how great! yet how simply, and naturally, and incidentally introduced! The inference respecting the worship of God—how irresistible, and important, and all-comprehensive, and yet how entirely in opposition to the prevailing opinions both among Jews and Gentiles! Certainly if there is an instance in which the annunciation of a truth, in distinction from the manifestation of power, may be said to produce sublime emotions, it is this.

The text is naturally divided into two parts—the fact, or doctrine stated, and the inference from it. It is not my purpose, at this time, to dwell upon the doctrine; I propose rather to consider the characteristics of acceptable worship here stated; and the best means of promoting it.

The characteristics of acceptable worship, as given by our Saviour, are two. It must be, first, *in spirit*, and second, *in truth*.

What then is included in the worship of God in spirit, or in spiritual worship?

And first, I remark, that to worship God in spirit, we must worship him *as a spirit*, and without the intervention of any sensible form. In the present state of man, he does not readily form to himself the idea of a God

who is a spirit, infinite, eternal and holy. Accustomed to objects of sense, he seeks for something visible, or represents God to himself by the conceptive faculty, under some sensible form. Little aware of the distinction between a conception and an idea, or that the true *idea* of God *must* exclude any particular conception or imagination, he is ready to disbelieve in the existence of any thing of which he cannot conceive, and when he would think of it, there is a mere blank in his mind. When he would pray to God, he seems to be praying to nothing. He asks in substance the questions of a heathen, as recently given by a missionary,—"Why, how can I serve him without an idol? Where can I put the flowers? Where shall I burn the frankincense? How shall I bathe him?" He forgets that even in the natural world he is under the necessity of believing in the existence of many things, as magnetism, and gravitation, of which he cannot form a conception. He believes in the existence of these, he has an idea of them as forces, he reasons and acts with reference to them; but if they were intelligent and moral beings, and he were to attempt to address them, he would find the same difficulty that he does in addressing a pure spirit. But who would think of representing magnetism or gravitation under any material form? Who does not see that any such form must lead the mind from the true idea? But the idea of spirit requires the exclusion of all the positive conceptions that belong to matter, and the investiture of substance with qualities directly opposite. How utterly absurd then must it be to think of obtaining aid in our approach to a spiritual being by any material image, or any symbolical representation! By any attempt to represent, either to the eye, or to the imagination, "the high and lofty One who inhabiteth eternity," the true *idea* of him is not only perverted, but degraded; and all the purifying and elevating effects of worship are destroyed.

Nor is the case altered from the fact that God became manifest in the flesh, since it is not by the eye of sense or of imagination, but of faith, that any thing of what Christ did for our salvation can be perceived. Well has it been said by McLaurin, "Men may paint Christ's outward sufferings, but not that inward excellency from whence their virtue flowed. They may paint one crucified, but how can that distinguish the Saviour from the criminals? We may paint the outward appearance of his sufferings, but not the inward bitterness, or invisible causes of them. Men can paint the cursed tree, but not the curse of the law that made it so. Men can paint Christ bearing the cross to Calvary, but not Christ bearing the sins of many." If we would worship God in spirit, we must worship him as a spirit.

That God is a spirit, and that he is God, implies that he is infinite and eternal, and possessed of all those natural attributes which are necessary, not indeed as a cause but as a condition, to all our worship. It is not *because* God is omnipotent or omniscient that we worship him,—though if he could not see our worship, or could not do for us what we need, that worship would be vain;—but it is because of the moral character which is associated with, and controls these natural attributes. I observe therefore, in the second place, that the worship of God in spirit implies the worship of him as a *holy* God. By holiness of God I mean all those attributes and expressions of his moral character by which he shows that he loves righteousness, and hates iniquity. Here we find the central and indispensable element in the character of God which makes him the object of worship at all. This stands among the attributes of God, like mount Zion, crowned with the temple, among the mountains that were round about Jerusalem. The other attributes are majestic and venerable, but it is from their association with this. As God is great, he challenges our awe; as he is benevolent,

our love ; but it is only as he is perfectly holy, that we yield him that delightful reverence and entire moral complacency which is the frankincense of spiritual worship. It is only those exercises of the spirit in which we gain clear ideas of the moral character of God as manifested in his providence, and law, and gospel, and in which we are strongly affected with admiration and love of him as *such* a God, that can be properly called spiritual. If God were not holy, whatever external homage might be rendered, he could not receive true worship from any moral being ; and being holy, no moral being can render him true worship without complacency in his holiness.

But I observe, thirdly, that the worship of God in spirit, implies that we worship him *with* the spirit. True worship must be intelligent. Plainly we cannot worship God farther than we know him. This is indicated in the context, in which Christ says to the Samaritans, with implied censure, " Ye know not what ye worship." True worship must also be affectionate and from the heart. God makes himself known to us as a Father, and he asks of us a filial temper, that is, the exercise of love and obedience towards him. But knowledge, love, obedience, which comprise the whole of religion, are acts of the spirit, and of that alone. On this point I need not dwell. Every man knows that any external expression without the corresponding internal feeling, is only hypocrisy and mockery. How obvious then that a spiritual and rational creature can honor God only by knowing, loving, obeying, and adoring him ; and that no form, or ceremony, or rite, or offering can be acceptable, except as it expresses the state of the spirit. Hence, as we might expect if the scriptures are from God, we every where hear them saying, " My son, give me thy heart." ' To love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and thy neighbor as thyself, is more than whole burnt offering.' " They that worship him, must worship him in spirit and in truth."

The second characteristic of acceptable worship as stated in the text is, that it should be "in truth." Truth is supposed by some to be contrasted here with the ceremonial forms of the Jews; but the worship of God "in spirit," is quite as naturally contrasted with those forms; and as the idea of sincerity is certainly included in that of truth, I regard this as the more probable and important meaning. "God requireth truth in the inward parts." The importance of sincerity is so great, religion is so liable to be, and has been, so much perverted to purposes of interest and ambition, that we might reasonably expect that this characteristic would be specified by our Saviour. Entire sincerity—the worship of God for its own sake, from motives of duty and affection, from the perception of his glorious character and of our relations to him—this is the great privilege of man, the highest act in which he can engage, and without this no worship can be acceptable. Other things connected with true worship there may be, but this *must* be. "They that worship him *must* worship him in spirit and in truth."

Having thus stated what spiritual worship would *in*clude, I observe that it would *ex*clude, and radically destroy, every species of superstition. Superstition is one, in its principle; but, as opposed to spiritual religion, it shows itself chiefly, as the superstition of place; or of forms; or of priestly intervention; or of the substitution of offerings and bodily sufferings for moral qualities.

But that *place* cannot be important to spiritual worship is directly asserted in the context, and the supposition that it might be so, is that species of superstition that called forth the text from our Saviour. The idea that God might be worshipped in some places more acceptably than in others, has been among the most common forms of superstition, and was almost universally prevalent at that day. Men think of God as such an one as themselves. They do not easily conceive of him as infinite in

his presence. They have, moreover, sacred associations with certain places. Hence the shrines and pilgrimages of all ages, not simply for taking advantage of that principle of our nature by which, when we visit the place where interesting scenes have occurred, our conceptions and feelings become more vivid and intense, but because it has been supposed that God was really more present there, and more readily propitiated, and that there was something of merit and holiness attained by visiting such places. But the doctrine of the text sweeps away at once every idea of this kind. God is now known as filling heaven and earth, and as having his eye open, and his ear attent upon every place where worship goes up from humble and penitent hearts.

Nor, I will just say, does this give any countenance to those who withdraw themselves from church on the ground that they can worship God as well at home. Possibly they can, and better. But they cannot worship him there *publicly* and *socially*, nor hear the word of God dispensed by the living preacher; and it is because public and social worship, and the preaching of the gospel, are divine institutions, that men are bound to go to church, and not because the worship of an individual, considered simply and by itself, can be better performed there.

And what is thus true of place, is equally true of forms. All thinking and candid men agree now, that no form can be in itself of any value; and also, that when spiritual and true worship is really offered, it is equally acceptable to God, whatever the form may be.

I observe, also, that the worship now spoken of excludes all idea of worship by proxy; all intervention of any man, of any priest, of any church and its officers, between the soul and God. It makes religion an individual, personal thing. It brings every man directly to God. Even Christ himself, as mediator, does not, as some seem to suppose, stand between the soul and God. He came

to open a way through which we might come to God by him, and all that he has done will avail us nothing unless we ourselves come to God in that way. When will men learn that the fundamental idea of heaven is not that of an estate that can be purchased, or of a place to which they can be carried, but of a state of moral union with God, and of conformity to him! This is, perhaps, the most subtle and dangerous form of superstition of the present day. To say nothing of the papist, who so often does as he is bid and then transfers the care of his salvation to the priest and the church, there are many Protestants who think of *a* church, and especially of what they imagine to be *the* church, as possessed of some mysterious efficacy, and as able to afford them a security entirely beyond that which they would derive from their immediate relation to God and our Lord Jesus Christ.

The principle of what has just been said, applies so directly to the superstition of substituting offerings and bodily sufferings for moral qualities, that I need not dwell upon that.

Thus the simple words of the text, received by the church, would sweep away at once every form and vestige of superstition, and all hypocrisy. *Superstition* and *hypocrisy*—these have always been the great sources of corruption to the church. They always have come in, and they always will, just in proportion as spiritual worship declines; and it is only by promoting spiritual worship that they can be excluded.

And this leads me to inquire, as was proposed in the second place, how it is that spiritual worship may be best promoted. This is an important inquiry to us, because it is this worship that we, my brethren, as ministers of the gospel, are set apart to promote. It is important too, at the present time, because many seem to be departing from the simplicity of the gospel; and the spirit of form in op-

position to a spirit of faith and of power, seems to be gaining ground. Even in New England, there are not wanting indications, that the great principles of the Reformation will have to be re-asserted and re-vindicated.

The answer to this question must be drawn either from the Bible, or from the constitution of man. But these conspire in teaching us, that the worship of God in spirit and in truth can be promoted only by presenting to the mind the character of God, as a spiritual and holy being, as a Father, a Redeemer, and Sanctifier, in such affecting lights as to call forth suitable emotions and a right course of moral action towards him. All truly religious emotion must be called forth in view of some manifestation of the character of God, and it is only as that is presented directly or mediately, that any thing can be done to improve the religious character, or to promote acceptable worship. This is our great principle. Nature is religious only as it manifests God. The seat of religion is in the moral and religious nature of man; and as these are quickened by manifestations of the character of God, and are trained to act rightly towards God and duty, a pure and spiritual worship will not fail to be rendered.

But here the question arises, Are we required by the Bible, or by the nature of man, to address these faculties alone? May not other faculties and principles of our nature be cultivated in connection with these, not merely incidentally, as many of them must be, but systematically? Here we find the important philosophical question, in the solution of which there is so wide a difference among different sects. We shall touch upon the chief points, both of difference and agreement, if we consider, as I now propose to do, 1st, Whether true religion may not be promoted by addressing the senses and the imagination by means of forms and ceremonies; or, 2d, by an appeal to imagination and to taste through the fine arts; or, 3d, by an appeal to the principle of association; or, 4th, to the social principle and to the affections.

May true religion then, be promoted by addressing the senses and the imagination by means of forms and ceremonies? And here the first question evidently is, Does God prescribe for us, under the gospel, any forms? And if so, for what purpose? On these points there is little difference of opinion. No pretence can be set up that there is any form of worship prescribed in the New Testament, nor do I know that it is pretended by any sect that there is. The disciples met for worship and prayed; but nothing is said of any order of exercises, or of any ceremonies, or of any uniform attitude. The sacraments were indeed instituted; but the chief object of these was not to promote worship. Their objects are, first, to constitute a visible church and to form a bond of union to its members, and, secondly, to convey instruction and to affect the heart through the senses, by a language intelligible to all men. But as if to guard even these against abuse, the simplest possible actions were adopted, and nothing is said of the time, or form, or mode in which they were ordinarily administered.

But admitting that no form is prescribed in the New Testament, may not the church adopt certain forms, which, according to the constitution of human nature, will promote true devotion? Has not man a body as well as a soul, and in his present imperfect state may not such forms be important helps?

Concerning this I observe, that if any form could have been devised that would, on the whole, have been so adapted to human nature as to promote true worship, it would not have been omitted in the New Testament. I distrust altogether any compassion for the weakness of man, and any skill in overcoming it, that goes beyond those manifested by God. I know there are those who say, that these things are nothing in themselves, but that, in the present state of human nature and of intelligence among the people, they are necessary to attract attention

and to keep alive a suitable reverence in their minds: that for themselves they do not need them, but they are necessary for the people. But what is the state of intellectual and spiritual manhood for the race? Let us know this, and this whole question is settled. Is it one in which forms are abolished, and in which man worships his Creator in simplicity, in spirit, and in truth? If it is, then the proper mode of leading him to this is not through forms. For, let forms be once introduced, and we might certainly know that they would be retained, by selfishness and the love of power on the one hand, and by habit and association on the other; and thus either hold the race in perpetual childhood and imbecility, or greatly embarrass and retard its growth. If the young bird is to fly, let it be thrown into the air. If man is to worship God in spirit and in truth, he must not be encumbered with forms.

And what we might thus anticipate, all history shows has taken place. By means of forms and ceremonies, the mind has first been drawn from God; and then it has rested in them, so that they have been substituted for a Saviour and for holiness of heart. Thus it is in the church of Rome. By her forms she does the two greatest possible evils to true religion. She corrupts the simple and spiritual worship of God, and she substitutes a false ground of hope to man. These two are intimately connected; for it will be found that whenever works are relied on as the ground of salvation, they most often consist in the observance of those forms by which the simplicity of worship is marred and corrupted. These evils have always resulted from forms and probably always will. They cling, to some extent, around those that are simplest; and the danger is increased in proportion as forms are increased and rendered more imposing. The simple worship of God in spirit and in truth, in opposition to all superstition and hypocrisy,—and justification by faith

alone, in opposition to all priestly interposition and ceremonies of the church and penances and meritorious works, —are the two great points for which we are now to contend. These have always been inscribed upon the true banner of the church of God. Over our churches that banner still waves. Let us gather around it. Let us abide steadfastly by it, if need be, even unto death.

We now proceed to inquire, whether the pure and spiritual worship of God may not be promoted by addressing the imagination and the taste through the fine arts. Do not these blend with the movements of the religious nature, and become as the wings of devotion to raise the soul nearer heaven? No doubt here is one great secret of the power of the Romish church over the minds of her people. She has intimately associated all the fine arts with religion, so that while she has her forms and superstitions for the many, she has made the church, independently of religion, an agreeable place of resort for the refined. Men love excitement; there is a pleasure connected with emotion of almost every kind; but in the emotions awakened by the fine arts there is a high luxury. Let then these emotions be connected with the awe thrown around religion, and especially let them be made to soothe the conscience as a religious duty, and it is easy to see how strong the attraction they may constitute. But all this pleasure and emotion may arise in those who are entirely corrupt and worldly in their lives, or who are even infidel in their opinions. What men wish to avoid is, a holy God, a perception of his moral government, and of their obligations and accountability to him. They wish to have their fears and their consciences quieted by something like religion; and they are willing and pleased to have all those emotions of awe, and sublimity, and admiration awakened, which arise in view of the natural attributes of God in distinction from those that are moral, or, better still, to have

excited by the fine arts, under the name of religion, emotions kindred to these.

In the present moral state of the world, there will be something of this wherever the progress in wealth and refinement is considerable. For what can a man do who is cultivated, and lives in refined and fashionable circles, and who would keep upon good terms with himself and with the church or with the religious world, and who yet cannot submit to bring his conscience and his whole moral being into subjection to God? How can such a man spend his Sabbaths? Will he be satisfied to go to a plain house of worship and simply listen to devout prayers and to the truth? No. He will either take a walk, or a ride, or a sail, and talk of seeing God in his works—a God that, as he sees him in those works, has no moral law and does not speak to his conscience; or he will go to a church where there is architecture, and music, and it may be painting and sculpture, and where it is well if there be not a preacher whose preaching chimes in and harmonizes with all this. The same general tendencies which lead the hearer to seek gratification from the fine arts, will lead the preacher to cultivate elegant literature, and to become a general scholar and a fine writer, rather than a man of prayer and mighty in the Scriptures.

Would you then, it may be asked, exclude the imagination, and the class of emotions now referred to, from divine worship? I answer, *No.* But I would have them called forth by the attributes, and by the present or the remembered works of God, rather than by the works of man. If I cannot worship in the broad temple of God's works; if I cannot, like the Saviour, pray upon a mountain, where, it may be, the starry heavens are above me and the breathing stillness of nature is around me, or where, it may be, the voice of the tempest is in the top of the great oak by which I kneel, and its roar is among

the hills, while the lightning writes the name of God on the sky and the thunder speaks of his majesty; if I cannot stand by the sea-shore and hear the bass of nature's great anthem,—yet let no poor work of man come between me and the remembered emotions which such scenes excite, in the hour of my worship before the great and holy God, whose hand made all these things. "Where is the house that ye build for me?" says God, "and where is the place of my rest?" "Heaven is my throne, and the earth is my footstool." Far rather would I find in the simplicity of the place of worship a confession of its inadequacy to lead the mind up to God, than to find any beauty of architecture or any gorgeousness of decoration that would lead me to admire the work of man, and draw the mind from God.

Here, however, God has left man at liberty; and much is to be allowed for the influence of education, and constitutional peculiarity, and early associations and impressions. I have no sympathy with that state of mind which would prevent worship in a cathedral. God is there. But I would have it forgotten that it is a cathedral, and remembered that *God is* there. I would so magnify God, and bring his spiritual presence so near, that those things should be indifferent, and that in the cathedral, as well as in the plain church, or under the open heaven, men should equally worship God in spirit and in truth. There is, however, great danger that the excitement of what is poetical and imaginative in man by architecture, and music,* considered simply as music, and painting, and statuary, should be substituted and mistaken for the pure and holy worship of God.

* On no account would I say any thing to discourage the universal and high cultivation of sacred music. This differs from the other fine arts, because its appropriate office is not *im*pression but *ex*pression. Where it is regarded and admired for its own sake, it obstructs instead of promoting the worship of God.

On this point the simplicity of Puritanism has been regarded as austere. But so has the true worship of God always been regarded by the many. While therefore we find in our Bibles, and in the works of God, the motives and the media of worship, while we are willing and desirous that the fine arts should have their appropriate temples and be cultivated as they ought to be among a refined people, we yet remember that even under the old dispensation, the acceptable worship went up from an altar of unhewn stone; and we think it best accords with the spirit of the New Testament, and is shown by history to be safest, and is most conducive to the worship of God in spirit and in truth, that a chaste simplicity should characterize all the structures and all the forms of our religion. We think that the appropriate object of religious services is to cultivate the moral and religious nature, and that there should be no attempt to produce an effect upon the mind by forms, or to blend the emotions appropriate to the fine arts with those higher emotions that belong to the worship of God.

Perhaps our Puritan ancestors carried their feelings on these points too far; but we think it can be shown, from the nature of things, and from the developments of the times, that they were substantially right; *and we abide in their faith.* I would rather have joined in one prayer with the simple pastor and his persecuted flock among the glens and fastnesses of the rocks in the highlands of Scotland; I would rather have heard one song of praise rise and float upon those free breezes in the day when the watch was set, and the bloody trooper was abroad, set on by those who worshipped in cathedrals; I would rather have kneeled upon the beach with the company of the Mayflower when persecution was driving them into the wilderness,—than to have listened to all the rituals and Te Deums in every cathedral in Europe.

We next inquire whether we may not take advantage

of the principle of association to aid devotion, and especially of that well known fact that our ideas of things invisible become more vivid, and affecting, and permanent, when they are associated with sensible objects. Has not our Saviour himself taken advantage of this principle in instituting the sacraments? and may we not follow his example and carry out the same principle in other things? Will not a cross, erected or represented in the church, remind us of our Saviour's sufferings? Will not consecrated water at the door, remind us of our need of purification? Will not incense ascending, give us an affecting sense of the efficacy of prayer? Will not a relic of some ancient saint remind us of his virtues and lead us to imitate them? May we not usefully set apart, as they did under the old dispensation, a particular form of vestment in which the ministers of religion shall officiate, and which shall be associated in the minds of the people only with the solemn services of religion? May we not, in these, and in many more ways, employ this principle to aid true devotion?

It is not surprising that this should have been attempted. Probably it has been done in most instances from good motives, but the result has shown that "the foolishness of God is wiser than men." It might have seemed to the wisdom of man that to have the body of their great prophet buried among them, and a monument erected over it, would remind the ancient Israelites of their deliverance from Egypt, and of the law he gave. But God buried him where no man knoweth of his sepulchre till this day. He left no relic or vestige of him to be a source of superstition in other days. This shows His estimate of the principle; and the results where this has been attempted are such as to make us feel, that, though it may be sometimes innocent, it is always dangerous, and to lead us to observe only those forms which the Saviour instituted as necessary to the visibility of his church.

When we see, at this day, a whole city moved because a bone of a good man who died some fourteen hundred years ago, is, or is supposed to be found; and when we see the dignitaries of a church performing over it ceremonies and carrying it in pompous procession; and when we see the same people burning Bibles and persecuting those who would enlighten the people; we feel that we cannot be too careful how we take the first step towards a degeneracy and a perversion of the gospel so awful.

The question is not whether the principle of association shall operate in connection with religion. It will and must do so in connection with the visibility of the church in any form, and around that church associations the most tender, and hallowed, and enduring, will cluster. But it is whether we are to adopt the principle and act upon it as a system. No doubt it gives the church a strong hold upon the people. It enables her to fix a stamp early and firmly on the minds of the young; but that stamp is the mark of the beast, and not the seal of the Spirit. It is one great instrument by which the systems of heathen superstition are sustained and riveted. It always has led to superstition, and it always will. Paul said, "though I have known Christ Jesus after the flesh, yet now henceforth know I him no more." The religion of Christ is a moral and a spiritual system, and all attempts to associate its great truths with sensible objects, will bring the mind down to them, instead of carrying it up to those truths.

But, my brethren, if there are these dangers connected with the introduction of forms, and of the fine arts, and of the principle of association, neither is our simple mode of worship without its dangers. The danger on the one side is of formality and superstition; on the other, of indifference and want of reverence. This is often painfully evident in our congregations, to the neglect of what may be called expressive forms, and the natural language of the emotions. God has so connected the mind with the

body, that to every emotion there is a natural form of expression; and that the emotions connected with worship should not be expressed by some appropriate external sign, is both unseemly, and tends to destroy the emotion itself. In many of our congregations we are pained to notice during worship an entire want of uniformity of posture and of the appearance of devotion.

Another danger is, that worship appropriately so called, will lose its proper relative place. We meet in public for the purpose of social worship and of instruction, and every thing done may be said to consist of worship and of the sermon. In ancient times the great thing was the worship. When the gospel was preached, instruction evidently became much more prominent, but still worship is the highest employment. The object of knowledge is to lead to intelligent worship. I care not how high a place the sermon may hold absolutely; I would honor the preaching of the gospel as the great means appointed by God for saving men; but relatively the sermon should be subordinate to the worship. But without being formally stated, it has been practically felt, that in the simplicity of our worship, more must be done in the sermon to make the house of God attractive; and hence it is undoubtedly true, that the power of preaching has been more cultivated, and the relative position of the sermon has been higher with us, than with most other denominations. Perhaps this must be so to some extent. The sermon is the proper place for an address, not only directly to the understanding and heart, but also incidentally to the taste and the imagination; and while the irreligious man cannot be expected to join in the worship of God, he may be gratified and instructed by the sermon, and it would seem a matter of course that it should form the chief attraction for him. It is not of this that I complain, but that ministers themselves, and religious people, too often think more of the sermon than of the other parts of divine service,

and that there is among us a want of the proper cultivation of the feeling of reverence and of devotion in the worship of God. The house of God is not a mere place for preaching. This I am persuaded it is in the power of the pastors to remedy, not by neglecting their sermons, but by cultivating in *themselves* the spirit of devotion, and by proper instruction of the people.

But if we may not appeal to the people through forms, or the fine arts, or the principle of association, except incidentally, there is yet one principle to which we may appeal in sustaining religion, and one too, the power of which needs to be more fully brought forth in these latter days—I mean, the social principle and the affections. "Behold," said the heathen, in the early days of Christianity, "how these Christians love one another." When genuine love exists in a community towards a common object and towards each other, there will be no difficulty in bringing them together, and in making them efficient in action. Mightier far is this—love to the Saviour, love to their pastor, love to each other, love to a world perishing around them,—than taste, or imagination, or associations connected with any outward form. In this alone will the true ground of the efficiency of any church be found. Having this, they will meet together and sustain the institutions of religion, and labor, and pray, and give; and not having this, there will be the form of godliness without the power thereof.

It is one excellence of our religion, and an evidence of its divinity, that it not only regards man as related to God in his individual capacity, but that it takes into view his social nature, and fits him to be the member of a perfect community. Hence the social principle in all its forms, from the slightest manifestation of natural affection and neighborly kindness up to the peculiar love which Christians bear each other, ought to be cultivated in the church, and to be associated with the worship and the

institutions of religion. If the social principle could have free power in religion—if restraints and formalities could be broken away, and soul could commune with soul with the same freedom on this as upon other subjects,—I feel that one great barrier would be removed, and that the waters of salvation would flow more freely through all the channels of society. And the church is an institution admirably adapted to facilitate this. The proper idea of a church, is that of a body of men associated together for the purpose of aiding each other in mutual edification—that they may be more fully conformed to the Saviour, and may better serve God, and build up his kingdom in the world. But how is it now? When a man joins a church, does he feel that it is to be the means of cultivating his social nature? Does he feel and find that he is associated with a band of brethren who regard his best interests, and watch over them? Does he feel that he has entered into an association where his affections are to be called forth, and his energies are to be enlisted, as in a school of mutual improvement and for the purpose of doing good? How is it with the meetings of the church? Is any thing done for mutual improvement or social culture? Is there a free expression of feeling? Or are they cold and formal? My brethren, I put these questions, not knowing how these things may be in your churches, but with the conviction that the power of the church as a social institution is little known, and that one of its great energies is slumbering. This is a point to which I would gladly call the attention of this body because I think it vital to the interests of the church. Are church members sufficiently aware of their relative duties? In the pursuit of gain—in the contests of ambition—in the demands of fashion—perhaps sometimes in the calls of benevolent societies, are not the claims of the church and of the members of Christ's body neglected? May not the pastor do more in making it

felt that he is not simply a preacher, but a *pastor*, a leader of the church in spiritual activity, earnestly engaged in promoting the cause of Christ in every way, and that they are to co-operate with him? May not Sabbath schools, and Bible classes, and social meetings be instituted—let any man read the life of Baxter and he will see that they may—so as to engage the affections and associations of the young, and to call forth the zeal and activity of all? May not all be made to feel that they have something more to do in sustaining the cause of religion than simply to attend meeting? Let a church have its affections and its activity thus, or in any other way excited, and let them feel that their pastor is truly a pastor and a leader, and that they are co-operating with him, and they will go to the house of God, not to be entertained, but to worship Him, and will be glad to hear, in connection with His institutions, a plain sermon. They will seek to honor God's institutions, to learn their duty, and will cease to send their thoughts, with the fool's eyes, to the ends of the earth in search of great men. Then should we see, not simply individual Christians, in their closets, but whole churches unitedly, socially, worshipping God in spirit and in truth. I do believe that the spirit of activity, and of Christian affection, and of devotion, may be so cultivated that there shall be fewer itching ears, and fewer disastrous changes in the ministry.

From the subject as thus presented, I remark, first, That we see what it is that God values and seeks for, as his holy eye looks down upon the multitude of costly churches in Christendom, and upon the crowds that weekly assemble in them. It is upon the spiritual worshipper alone, however humble and neglected by the crowd, that he looks with complacency.

I remark, secondly, That the labors of those who would promote spiritual worship must be great. This must be

so in any form in which a church and its worship can be constituted, because it implies an opposition to the whole force of human corruption, and to that desire to get to heaven without holiness of heart, which is the very essence of popery and paganism and formality. But emphatically must this be so with us, as so much of the interest of the worship must depend upon the pastor. Very different is it in most other denominations. In the papal church the forms are every where the same, and one man can go through them as well as another. The preaching is relatively nothing. In the Episcopal church the prayers are composed by the church, and much of the duty of a clergyman consists in going through with a prescribed form. In the Methodist church the system of itinerancy prevents the necessity of mental labor for more than four or five years. Not so in the Congregational churches. In them the whole responsibility both of the worship and of the sermon comes upon the pastor, and he must appear from year to year before the same intelligent and thinking people. This is a burden which the Spirit of God, in connection with the prayers of the church, can enable a man adequately to sustain, and nothing else can. Into such a ministry few will enter that they may enjoy literary leisure; and,—though some may leave it, as we doubt not they do, from sincere conviction,—we do not wonder that the ambitious, the lovers of ease and pleasure, and those in whom the imagination preponderates, should go out from among us. But if our labors are arduous, or our sacrifices great, they are not such as were those of our great Master and of his Apostles. In their footsteps we think we follow. To them we look for an example. We claim for ourselves whatever there is that is venerable in an antiquity higher than that of the papal church. We are grieved and astonished at the forms and ceremonies and pomps and mummeries and priestly domination, that has assumed to be the religion of Him who was meek and

lowly; who went about doing good; who had not where to lay his head; who taught men to worship God in spirit and in truth. We would be of his spirit. We would teach men every where the great lessons that he taught; if it should be necessary in that mighty struggle, the foretokenings of which he must be blind who does not see, we would pray for strength to yield ourselves to the baptism with which he was baptized.

And this leads me to remark, finally, that those who would promote the spiritual and true worship of God, should themselves be spiritual and holy men. This is the one thing needful in the ministry of any church or under any form. This we would embrace in the arms of our affection wherever we find it. This can irradiate and beautify, as the sunlight the evening cloud, any form not contrary to the spirit of the gospel; and without this, all forms, even our own, will become but as the material upon which a false religion will be enthroned to the terror and corruption, or on which it will be gibbeted for the mockery, of mankind. But let there be a faithful, humble, holy ministry, and the word, and worship, and ordinances of God will be honored. From them there will go out an influence, such as can go from them alone, that will be felt for good in every interest and in every relation of society. God will set his seal upon their labors. Not more certain is the promise of seed time and harvest, than that "they that sow in tears shall reap in joy." There will be joy in heaven over repenting sinners; there will be joy on earth because "Zion shall arise and shine, her light being come;" and there will be joy when the chief Shepherd shall appear, and such pastors shall go up with their flocks to stand before him. Amen.

SERMON,

DELIVERED AT PITTSFIELD, ON THE OCCASION OF THE BERKSHIRE JUBILEE.

August 22, 1844.

And this is the Berkshire Jubilee! We have come — the sons and daughters of Berkshire — from our villages, and hill sides, and mountain tops; from the distant city, from the far west, from every place where the spirit of enterprise and of adventure bears men — we have come. The farmer has left his field, the mechanic his work-shop, the merchant his counting-room, the lawyer his brief, and the minister his people; and we have come to revive old and cherished associations, and to renew former friendships—to lengthen the cords and strengthen the stakes of every kind and time-hallowed affection.

And coming thus from these wide dispersions, under circumstances which must carry our minds back to the first dawnings of life, and cause us to review all the path of our pilgrimage; coming too as natives and citizens of a State on the eastern border of which is Plymouth rock; what so suitable as that our first public act should be to assemble ourselves for the worship of the God of our fathers and our God, and to do honor to those institutions of religion through the influence of which, chiefly, we are what we are, and without which the moral elements in which this occasion has originated could not

have existed. Coming thus to celebrate a local thanksgiving,—local in one sense, but extended in another, since this day our family affection is thrown around a whole county,—how fit is it, while we look back on all the way in which God has led us, while our kind feelings towards our fellow-men are awakened and strengthened, that we should suffer all the goodness of God to lead us to him—that we should adopt, as I am sure every one of us has reason to do, the language of the Psalmist, and say, "Return unto thy rest, O my soul; for the Lord hath dealt bountifully with thee."

This passage of Scripture, which I have selected as my text on this occasion, is the seventh verse of the 116th Psalm:

"RETURN UNTO THY REST, O MY SOUL; FOR THE LORD HATH DEALT BOUNTIFULLY WITH THEE."

These words assert a fact, and contain an exhortation based on that fact. We will first attend to the fact; and then to the exhortation.

The fact asserted is, "The Lord hath dealt bountifully with thee." And here, in accordance with what has already been said of the propriety of our assembling thus, the first thing which I notice is the agency of God in the prosperity of men. The assertion is, "The *Lord* hath dealt bountifully with thee."

The Bible differs from all other books in its recognition of God in every thing. There, we not only find it formally stated that in him we live and move and have our being, that not a sparrow falls to the ground without him, and that the very hairs of our heads are all numbered; but we find an incidental reference to him of all those events which are usually attributed to natural causes. There we find no personification and deification of the laws of nature, or of any principles or agencies, to come between the creature and God. There we find no identification of God with the universe on the one hand, and

no exclusion of him from it, under the pretence of exalting him, on the other. He is there represented, indeed, as in the midst of his works, but as distinct from them as the builder of the house is from the house. He is represented as the proprietor of all things, as sustaining and controlling all things, and as furnishing by his all-pervading agency the only conditions on which any subordinate agency can be exercised. Do the Israelites triumph in battle? It is God who gives them the victory. Does an enemy come up against them? It is God who brings him. Famine, and pestilence, and great warriors, are the scourges of God. It is *his* sun that *he* causeth to rise upon the evil and upon the good; and *his* rain that *he* sendeth upon the just and upon the unjust. "He hath made the earth by his power, he hath established the world by his wisdom, and stretched out the heavens by his discretion. When he uttereth his voice, there is a multitude of waters in the heavens, and he causeth the vapors to ascend from the ends of the earth; he maketh lightnings with rain, and bringeth forth the wind out of his treasures." His are the "corn and the wine, and the oil and the flax." His are the beasts of the field, and the cattle upon a thousand hills, and he exercises a providential control over all. What he giveth his creatures, they gather; "He openeth his hand, and they are filled with good. He hideth his face, they are troubled; He taketh away their breath, they die and return to their dust." If any are in adversity, it is because God tries and would correct them; if any are in prosperity, it is because God hath dealt bountifully with them. Is success the result of strength and skill? that strength and skill he gives. The most wise and skilful, not less than the most fortunate, has reason to render thanksgiving and praise to him.

It is this fact of the universal, absolute, and entire dependence of all creatures upon God, a fact elementary to

all true religion, which places us in the peculiar relation which we hold to God as a Father, which lies at the foundation of gratitude for the past and trust for the future, of which we would feel at all times, but especially at this time, a deep, abiding, and practical sense. Whatever of goodness and mercy have followed us; whatever of prosperity, and success, and enjoyment have been ours; we would to-day look back upon the way in which God has led us, and ascribe it all to him. We would say it is because "the *Lord* hath dealt bountifully with us."

Thus recognizing the agency of God, we next inquire for a moment, what it is for him to deal bountifully with us. This would seem to require but little explanation, but it must be noticed in connection with what has just been said of that agency, lest the evil which results from the negligence and folly and vice of men, should be imputed to the provisions and agency of God.

When God is said to deal bountifully with men, reference is sometimes had to the original endowments which he bestows upon them. Thus, if we compare man with the brutes, we find him possessed of a commanding intellect, and reason, and conscience, of which they are entirely destitute. These he has received from God, and God may be justly said to have dealt bountifully with him in bestowing them. So, also, if we compare men with each other, we find them possessing every variety of constitution and natural gifts, and of some it may be said emphatically and pre-eminently, that God hath dealt bountifully with them.

But in general, when we speak of God's dealing bountifully with men, we do not refer to the original endowments and capabilities with which they are furnished. These are taken for granted, and the bounty of God is made to consist in his bestowment of those external gifts by means of which all the faculties and capabilities of man are developed, and in which they find their true en-

joyment. Scarcely more dependent is the seed upon the rain and the sunshine to cause it to germinate and grow, than is man upon means and influences external to himself, and to a great extent independent of himself, for growth and enjoyment. God is an independent being. He suffices unto himself. He is infinitely happy in himself, and is dependent in no degree upon any external adjustment, or upon any correspondence to him of things without. Hence no accident can reach him, no change can affect him. In this respect his mode of existence is totally different from that of all created beings. Creatures, probably from the necessity of the case, are dependent upon God. It is the glory and happiness of rational and moral creatures that they are dependent upon him, directly and immediately, as the only object to which their faculties correspond, and which is capable of calling them fully forth and giving them complete satisfaction. But in many respects, we, and probably all creatures, are dependent, not immediately upon God, but upon other things which he has created and placed in certain relations to us, and upon God through them. "Every species of creature," says Bishop Butler, "is, we see, designed for a particular way of life, to which the nature, the capacities, temper and qualifications of each species are as necessary as their external circumstances." And I may add, that their external circumstances are as necessary as their capacities, tempers, and qualifications. "Both," he continues, "come into the notion of such state or way of life, and are constituent parts of it. Change a man's capacities or character to the degree in which it is conceivable they may be changed, and he would be altogether incapable of a human course of life and human happiness; as incapable as if, his nature continuing unchanged, he were placed in a world where he had no sphere of action, nor any objects to answer his appetites, passions, and affections of any sort. One thing is set over against

another, as an ancient writer expresses it. Our nature corresponds to our external condition. Without this correspondence, there would be no possibility of any such thing as human life and human happiness, which life and happiness are therefore a *result* from our nature and condition jointly, meaning by human life, not *living* in the literal *sense*, but the whole complex notion commonly understood by those words."

According to this view, the highest idea we can have of the bounty of God in his dealings with his creatures would be—not, as is commonly supposed, that he should give them large possessions that should be subject to the control of their will, not that he should give such possessions at all, "For a man's life consisteth not in the abundance of the things that he possesseth,"—but that for every internal want, susceptibility, faculty, there should be its corresponding external object, by means of which every want might be supplied, every susceptibility met, every faculty be trained to its highest expansion and receive the fullest enjoyment of which it was capable. The provision, with given faculties, of such external objects, is what we commonly mean by bounty ; and if the expansion and enjoyment of the faculties would flow from the relations in which they are placed spontaneously and without effort of ours, we are apt to think the bounty would be increased. Perhaps this would be so in a perfect state. Perhaps it will be so in heaven—and perhaps it will not. But it is not so here, and it cannot be in a world intended to be a place of probation or of discipline. Here God makes the provision, but man must apply it in accordance with those laws which He has instituted. God makes the provision, and how wonderful is it! How infinite, how varied, how exact are the correspondences between the susceptibilities and powers of living beings, and the objects around them! In no point of view does the universe of God present a

more pleasing object of study. Yes, God makes the provision, and though men should apply it unwisely, or not at all; though they should, as they do, pervert his gifts to their own unhappiness; yet it may still be said that "The Lord hath dealt *bountifully* with them."

We now proceed to the assertion on which I wish chiefly to dwell: "The Lord hath dealt bountifully with *thee*." In illustrating this, I shall be expected to dwell chiefly on those manifestations of goodness which are suggested by the peculiar occasion on which we have met. But these, as common to us all, cannot so touch the heart as would those more particular instances of the divine goodness of which we have had individual experience. In these we find the deepest and truest grounds of thankfulness. How affecting to some of us must the remembrance of these be! while there is not one, whether we have wandered abroad and now returned, or whether we have remained, who cannot adopt, each with an application peculiar to himself, the language of the verse succeeding the text and say, "For thou hast delivered my soul from death, mine eyes from tears, and my feet from falling." The remembrance of these individual mercies let us cherish; and I recall them now, that that remembrance may lie warm about our hearts, and give an interest to those more general instances of goodness of which I must speak.

I observe then, first, that God has dealt bountifully with us in the provision he has made for our physical wants. By this I mean, not merely that we have been free from actual want, and the fear of it,—that "bread has been given us, and that our waters have been sure,"—but I mean the supply and arrangement of all those substances and agencies by which the physical man is brought to the greatest perfection. How great is the variety in the same species of vegetables and animals, as they are sustained by different nutriment, and are sub-

jected to diversities of climate! How great, from the same causes, is the diversity in the races of men! Originally God made of one blood all nations, to dwell on all the face of the earth; but now we see the dwarfed Laplander, the small-eyed, high-cheeked, swarthy Tartar, the black and wooly headed Hottentot, the slender and delicately formed Hindoo, the tall lithe form of the American Indian, and our own fair race before whom those Indians have melted away. Of these varieties of the human race, some, whether beauty or power be regarded, come nearer the standard of a perfect physical organization than others. Some climates, some articles of food, some modes of life, are more favorable than others to the full growth and perfection of the animal frame. A temperate climate, pure mountain breezes, clear springs of water and running brooks, and an abundance of nourishing food, which is yet yielded only to the hand of an industry that fully develops and compacts and hardens the frame, seem to be the chief conditions of its perfect expansion. And which of these is wanting to those who dwell in these vallies and upon the sides of these hills? We can indeed boast no superiority here over many others. In some respects, and at some seasons, others may have advantages over us. We hear them speak of the sunny south, and of the milder and more fertile west and southwest. But the bounty of God as bearing on the physical frame is relative, not merely to passive enjoyment, but, from their reaction upon that frame, to habits of active industry and of virtuous self-denial; and history furnishes no example of a people possessing a soil more fertile and a climate more bland than ours, who have not degenerated and become luxurious and effeminate. No doubt the landing of the Pilgrim Fathers where they did, was ordered of God. If they had landed at New Orleans, the result would have been widely different. Nor does it follow, because those

who go out from us to regions of greater ease and more abundant wealth say they would not return, that it will be as well for their children of the second and third generations. But without attempting to measure with exactness that which does not admit of it, we are so favored that I suppose there is no where a spot, where an occasion like this would draw together a company of people who would, on the whole, be superior to those before me, in their physical aspect and organization. No doubt there is room for improvement. The physical man is not here or elsewhere what it will be, when men universally shall learn and obey the laws of temperance in all things, the great organic laws of God. But let *us* do this, and we are within that range of agencies through which the highest perfection of man may be reached, and if so, it may be truly said that "God hath dealt bountifully with us."

I observe again, that God has dealt bountifully with us in granting us those aspects of nature, and those influences of society, by which we have been surrounded. Nature and society—these, next to the Spirit and word of God, are the two great agencies for calling forth that higher life of man, that life of thought and emotion, of taste and affection, which comes forth from the lower animal life, as the flower from the stalk and the enfolding leaves. Each of these has its appropriate office, and compared with these, what is technically called education, is comparatively inefficient.

Man is not thrown into the lap of nature simply that she should supply the wants of his animal frame. No, she has voices in which she speaks to him, and a countenance of varying aspects upon which he may look. To these voices and aspects there are spirits that are attuned, and the child is to be pitied who is shut out from nature, or who has not felt a wild and undefinable delight, as he has entered the deep woods, and heard the note of the wood

bird, and gathered moss and strange flowers; as he has seen and fled before the coming storm; as he has looked at the rainbow spanning the heavens; as he has climbed the mountain top and gazed on the wide prospect beneath. To such an one, rightly educated, there is not a single aspect or mood in which nature can be found, from the quiet reverie of her summer noon, to the passion of her storms and tornadoes, in which his spirit does not sympathize.

But while nature has sounds of melody and sights of beauty for all, how diverse are those which she presents by the shore of the ocean, on the level or rolling sea of the western prairie, among the wild and desolate rocks of the White Hills, or among the green mountains and hills and vallies of our own Berkshire? Nor is it possible, where there is mental development, that this diversity should be without its effect upon it. From the variety of soil and climate which it involves, this diversity will not only produce a difference in the habits and ocupations of life, but also in all the associations, and so far as the conceptive faculty is concerned, in the whole web and texture of our mental being. From what can our ideal world of forms and colors be framed but from the little actual world that surrounds the horizon of our childhood? No doubt there are those upon whom, from the hard pressure of animal wants, or the withering effects of oppression, or from early absorption in the rounds of fashion, or from sensuality and vice, the finest scenery makes no more impression than the shadow of the cloud as it passes over the rock. It is melancholy to hear the author of "Letters from Abroad," saying, "I have never seen people that seemed to me merer animals than the Swiss peasants amid their sublimest scenery." Still, there will be those every where, and where culture is general there will be many, from whose minds the tinge and coloring given by early scenes can never be entirely removed.

And when these scenes are remarkable for grandeur or beauty, how strong is the impression which they often make! How does it become incorporated into our very being, and the love of them become a passion! So has it been in Switzerland: it has been the Swiss soldier alone whom "home-sickness" has unfitted for duty; in his regiments alone, has it been forbidden to play the air that reminded him most of his native mountains and vallies. So it has been among the Highlands of Scotland; and so, to some extent, has it been with us. No doubt the call for this meeting has originated, in part, from a yearning to behold again these familiar scenes—because the hill-side, and the old house, and the tree by it, and the encircling mountains, had become a part of our being, and would come back in our sleeping or waking dreams. I know how it is with you, my brethren from abroad. You wanted to see again these old mountains. How often have I heard those who have gone from us to the west, say "how they longed to see mountains."

And here certainly, in the scenery of the county, God has dealt bountifully with us. I am willing to make every allowance that ought to be made for our own feelings; I am willing to confess that this scenery is more beautiful to us because it is ours. I should be sorry if it were not so. I envy not that philosophical generality which would root up all the early green of the soul, and if there are any here who bless themselves in having done so, I wish no communion with them. But making every allowance that ought to be made, it must be conceded that in no county in the State, and in few in the Union, will there be found more fine scenery than in this of ours. On its southern border we have Taghcannic mountain with its Bashbishe. Then we have those "gray old rocks,"

> "That seem a fragment of some mighty wall
> Built by the hand that fashioned the old world
> To separate the nations, and thrown down
> When the flood drowned them."

And then we have Gray Lock, the highest point in the State, giving a view that for vastness and sublimity is equalled by nothing in New England except the White Hills. And then how much of beauty there is in a ride through the length of the county, whether it be when the green of summer is in its full freshness, or when

> "The woods of autumn all around our vales
> Have put their glory on."

Probably most of us have read, for it used to be in a New England school book, of that journey of a day that was the picture of human life. And if it were given to us to make the journey of a day that should be, not in its events, but in its scenery, the picture of our lives, where should we rather choose to make it than through the length of our own Berkshire? What could we do better than to watch the rising sun from the top of Gray Lock, and his setting from the Eagle's Nest?

It is in connection with such physical conditions, and such scenery as this, aided by our New England institutions, that there has sprung up a race of men of whom we are justly proud. Here, to mention only those now in office, originated the present chief magistrate of the State, and one of the judges of its supreme court. Here, those many distinguished and useful men from abroad, whom we welcome to-day. Nor have those been wanting who have illustrated the literature of our country. To say nothing of others, it is perhaps remarkable, secluded as this county has been, that the three American writers most widely and justly celebrated in their several departments, have lived and written here. It was in the deep quiet of these scenes, that the profoundest treatise of our

greatest metaphysical writer was produced; it was here that the powers of our "truest poet," one who in his own line of poetry has not been excelled since the world stood, became known and came to their maturity; and here are still entwined, greener by time, the home affections of one whose social qualities have given her a place as eminent in the hearts of her friends, as her power and grace of style, and her universal sympathy with all that is human, have given her as an author in the public estimation.

But however much there may be in nature of companionship and instruction for man, she yet does not meet the demand, which he cannot but feel, for sympathy, and affection, and rational discourse. If man may be said to sympathize with her, she cannot be said to sympathize with him. If man speaks to her, she does not answer him. She continues evermore working over and over again the same processes; she walks on in her perpetual round, and heeds not the wants, or the woes, or the joys of her children. The cry and the smile of infancy, the laugh of childhood, the twilight voice of plighted love, the desolation of the widow and the fatherless, the bridal party and the funeral procession, are alike to her. She heeds them not. Alike in the forest where no eye sees her, and by the human habitation, she paints the flower, and plies the "tiny shuttle" with which she weaves the web of the leaf. When the eye that has looked upon her with the most enthusiasm is closed in death, she does not weep. Man needs something more than this; and how different from this is that countenance of the mother into which the child that lies in her lap looks up! How different from those inarticulate voices of nature which we are so slow to interpret, is her voice that so early finds its way into all the chambers and recesses of the soul! Here is another world, which is not only comprehended by us, but which comprehends us. Here opens upon us that great theatre of human life, where the turbulent desires,

the stormy passions, the thousand sympathies and hopes and fears, and the beautiful affections, of the soul of man, are called forth.

But far less diversified is the face of nature in its action upon the spirit of man, than is that of human society. As the land and the water are divided into continents and oceans, so there are general divisions of mankind into races, marked by features differing scarcely less than those of the frigid and the torrid zone. These races are again divided into nations, having characteristics which cannot be mistaken, and these nations are subdivided into provinces, states, counties, neighborhoods; and in each of these a nice observer will find, however difficult it may be to express it, a difference of character, which must become a condition of growth and a ground of diversity for those who are formed under its influence. This diversity is indeed continued to individuals, so that no where do we find a more striking manifestation of essential unity appearing under the forms of an infinite variety, than in character. Not, I will just say here, that I believe it is circumstances alone that make the man, but the cause of this diversity is to be found in the action and reaction of the free and personal powers and of the circumstances in which they are placed.

And if God has deal bountifully with us in respect to the physical conditions and aspects of nature, so has he in respect to the great features of that society by which we have been surrounded. These great features are those which belong to the society of New England. We are it is true upon the border of New England, but we are of it, and we cherish a love for it no less ardent than those who dwell around the spot where it was first peopled, and where its great heart beats. We are of New England. We love her soil, we love her institutions, we love her people. We think that the great features of her society both presuppose and tend to cultivate the highest powers of man more fully than any others.

Among these are, first, that absolute equality of right which is declared by the Declaration of Independence to belong to all—the right to use our faculties and pursue our happiness in any way we may choose, so long as we do not interfere with the rights of others. Secondly, a security of every man, however humble, in the enjoyment of this right and of the results of his own labor, such as has been rarely enjoyed; which never can be enjoyed under a despotic government; nor under a government like ours, if the public morals should deteriorate, or agrarian principles or mob law should become prevalent. Thirdly, a great practical equality—the possession of the whole country by freeholders in farms of a small or moderate size, and the absence of any social distinctions which can prevent any young person from finding his true position. Labor is honorable, and if some are degraded by ignorance, indolence and vice, it is their own fault or that of their friends, and not of our institutions. A fourth feature, which is also one of the causes of those preceding, is a universal diffusion (theoretically universal and to a great extent practically so) of the education of common schools, and, to as great an extent as practicable, of the higher and of the highest means of intellectual culture. A fifth feature, and one which has been more operative than any thing else in giving its peculiarities to New England character, is the religious element infused into society by the Pilgrim Fathers, and which has come down from them. Of this element the prominent characteristic, as it seems to me, was, the cultivation of reverence towards God and the state, without a nobility in the state, and without forms in religion.

Berkshire was not indeed wholly settled by the descendants of the Puritans, but it was chiefly, it was sufficiently so to give direction, and tone, and character to society. In almost every town there was a Congregational church and no other, and according to the simple rites of that

the people worshipped. In connection with this worship there was a deep and pervading reverence in society for the worship and the institutions of God. The ministers of God were reverenced; the Sabbath day was reverenced; parents and the aged were reverenced. The young were taught to "rise up before the hoary head, and to honor the face of the old man." There was great purity in families, and family government was efficient. There the young were not merely taught their duties theoretically, but, what is of far more importance, those *habits* of obedience and of industry were formed which are necessary to make good men and good citizens. Then the laws were reverenced; they were made by the people; but the idea was unknown that any irregular assembly of people could be above law, or that they could abrogate it except by constitutional forms. With the existence of individual property and the family state, it is impossible to conceive of institutions of government or of religion more simple, or attaining their end more effectually; and it is impossible to adduce another instance in the history of the world, in which the principle of reverence has been equally developed from an intellectual apprehension of the simple majesty of those things, which all forms are intended to represent, and an impression of which all appeals to the senses are intended to produce.

Here it is that we find the true dignity of the Puritan character. There is that in God and his works—as man stands here with the cope of heaven above him; as he looks out into a peopled universe, and into infinite space; as he sees the mountains lifting up their heads, and the heaving ocean—which, in a mind rightly constituted, must produce reverence; and the same feeling is appropriately called forth by the manifestation of magnanimity and goodness; by whatever is noble, or venerable, or godlike in man. Without this feeling, man, in this world of God, is like an animal with horns and hoofs turned loose in a

well furnished and well arranged house. He has no perception of uses or proprieties, and you must either restrain him by fear, or influence him in some way by the grosser perceptions of sense. This feeling is then manifested in its purest and highest forms, when, without the intervention of any superstition, or merely human rites, or pomp of art, man is brought into the nearest and most intimate communion with God and his works, and worships him in spirit and in truth. With this feeling our Puritan ancestors were deeply imbued. Rising above the ordinary objects of ambition, wishing for no power except that which is connected with the simplest organization by which the objects of society can be realized, they found their dignity and happiness, not in what they possessed, or in the power of their will over others, but in what they were as the creatures of God, in the reverent cultivation of their affections as before him, and in the prospect of immortality; and thus they became, in the great features of their character, specimens of the very highest style of man. Looking at a people, not simply as possessed of refinement and civilization—a high degree of which may consist with heathenism—but as truly cultivated in those faculties which are distinctively human, I think the highest point is reached when a pervading reverence, and the principles and affections necessarily connected with that, are called into action by spiritual objects and their relations, with the least possible appeal to the senses.

Since their day we have made great progress in the arts, in refinement and civilization, but have probably receded in that in which consists the true dignity and the highest culture of man. God seems to have raised them up for a special purpose—to infuse a leaven into the whole fermenting mass of this continent; and as a mighty wave, when the tide is coming in, flows on far beyond the rest and then recedes, so they, in the agitations of those times, seem to have been borne up to a point, which,

from the general level of spiritual culture in the world, could not be retained. Accordingly the ebb came; perhaps it is the ebb tide that is flowing yet; but we look for a mightier movement, when the waters of salvation shall rise and overflow, and lie as a quiet sea reflecting the image of heaven.

It is, indeed, the fundamental question of the present day, whether the principle and the reverence that are necessary to the greatest strength and beauty of society, can be preserved in connection with the simplicity of our civil and religious institutions. Men will not be trampled upon, nor will they have their sensibilities and their taste outraged. If there is not a general state of things that will secure them against this, they will retire behind a standing army and behind forms. Relatively to certain states of society, these may be necessary; and we ought to choose them for the sake of the liberty and the religion which may exist in connection with them. But in such a state of things, we should feel that the highest ideal of society was not reached, and we should be constantly apprehensive that both liberty and religion would be, as they have so often been, overlaid and crushed by that which ought to nourish and protect them.

But whatever the future course of events may be, the past is secure; and God has dealt bountifully with us in permitting us to live, to the extent we have, under the influence of such a past. It has been shown, and nothing can falsify the record, that man may become so capable of self-government—that is, of immediate subjection to principle and to God, both in state and in church—as to accomplish, as fully as they have ever yet been, all the legitimate objects both of the church and the state.

Nor has this county been behind the general standard of New England, or of our own State, in the fruits which might be expected from such a state of things. Here there have been general intelligence, security, and order.

Here have been churches that have walked in the faith and order of the Gospel. Here have been Christian pastors who have done honor to their profession, and been models in it. Where shall we find more able divines, or better pastors, or men of a wider and holier influence, than Edwards, and Hopkins, and West, and Hyde? No where has the standard of ministerial character and acquirement been higher. Here too there has been a spirit of benevolence most diffusive, and unrestricted by a regard to sect. It is well known that if means are needed to carry on the great cause of education, or of benevolence generally, there is no place to which men come with the same confidence, and the same success, as to New England. It is chiefly among her hills that those streams rise that flow over the West, and over heathen lands, to make glad the city of our God. In this respect, so far as I have the means of comparison, this county hath whereof to glory, though not before God. The Berkshire and Columbia Missionary Society was formed February 21st, 1798, and, so far as I know, was the first missionary society formed in New England, if not in this country. The Connecticut Society was formed in June of the same year, and the Massachusetts Society in May of the year following. The formation of these societies so near the same time, shows that the spring had come over the land; but the fact that this was formed first, shows that Berkshire was among the earliest and most sunny spots. This society existed and was efficient till within a few years, when it was absorbed in larger societies. This was a Home Missionary Society, and when it is remembered that here was formed the first Foreign Missionary Society, and, I may add, the first Agricultural Society, it will be seen that important movements have originated among us.

The statistics of benevolence, except in connection with the Bible Society, I have not the means of ascertaining. From these it appears that the *donations* of the Berkshire

society to the parent society, have been larger than those of any other society, whether of a county or of a State, with the exception of the State society of Virginia, which exceeds it by between two and three thousand dollars only; and, with the exception of four State societies and those in the city of New York, the whole remittances of this society are larger than those of any society in the Union. In some, and indeed in most of the States, there are county societies formed, but this society has given more as a donation to the parent society than the whole State of Vermont. And these facts are the more remarkable, when we remember that all this has been done without any expense of agencies. The parent society has sometimes been represented at the annual meeting, but has never had an agent to traverse the county. I can hardly suppose it would be, and yet I know of no reason for supposing that the comparison would not be as favorable to the county, if we had the means of comparing the statistics of the other great benevolent operations of the day.

This may seem more immediately to concern those who have remained in the county; but I am speaking of the results of those influences under which we have been nurtured; and it is not to be doubted that our brethren who have gone out from us have been equally liberal. And if we have been blessed with the means of giving, and have been practically taught the great truth that "it is more blessed to give than to receive," how could God have dealt more bountifully with us? How much better it is to be nurtured among a plain people who give liberally for the objects of benevolence, rather than among those whose resources are either hoarded, or spent in the selfish ostentation of fashion! The heavens give their rain as they form it, and the noblest use of wealth is to dispense it as it is gathered, to refresh the waste places of the earth.

The features of society, and influences from it, of which I have now spoken, we share in common with much of New England. There are others which belong to us as the inhabitants of Berkshire. Unlike most counties, Berkshire, having a peculiar geological formation, is a place by itself, separated from the rest of the world by natural boundaries; it has also been a good deal secluded; and while we have been a New England people, our business intercourse has been with New York. Each of these circumstances has had its influence upon us, so that between us and our fellow citizens of the eastern part of the State, there is a perceptible difference. To the first two circumstances mentioned, together with the beauty of our scenery, is owing that county feeling in which this occasion originated; and in connection with these, if not in consequence of them, there has been extensively among us that happy combination of a cultivation and taste and refinement no where exceeded, with genuine simplicity and heartiness of character, which gives to society its highest charm.

But that the whole influence of these circumstances has been favorable, I would by no means assert, nor would I represent the aspect of society as better than it is. Seclusion is not always connected with innocence and simplicity. On the contrary, there may often be found in such situations, ignorance, and narrowness, and inveterate prejudice, and low vice. Small and secluded villages, little clusters of houses among the mountains with some place where intoxicating drink is sold, are often, if we except the dens in the cities, as wretched and hopeless places as are to be found on earth. These we have had, and still have. They are as remote bays, into which the current of reform and improvement sets back slowly. Owing in part to the influence of these places, we are behind some others in the great temperance reformation. That cause has made encouraging progress here, and its present

aspect is hopeful, but I blush to say that there are still those among us who seem bent on continuing a traffic which, in enormity and moral turpitude, may fairly be ranked with the slave trade. It is owing in part to our seclusion, also, that the recent movement in favor of our common schools has been more tardy and inefficient than it should have been.

But while we feel and regret these and other evils, which a strange or an unfriendly eye might notice, we feel that they are slight in comparison with the bounties of Providence and the civil and social blessings with which we are surrounded. We still rejoice to feel and say

"This is our own, our native land."

These are our fathers and mothers, our brothers and sisters, our wives and children, our schools and churches; these are our mountains, and vallies, and lakes, and streams; our skies, and clouds, and storms; and we feel that in casting our lot among them, God has dealt bountifully with us.

We now proceed to the second part of the subject, and consider the exhortation—"Return unto thy rest, O my soul." There is, my friends, a rest to the soul. Rest, rest—O! said one, that I had wings like a dove, then would I fly away and be at rest. And who has not said thus;—at rest from turbulent passions and uneasy desires, from perplexing doubts and anxious fears; at rest from the annoyances and evils that come from the misconduct of others; at rest, not in mere quiescence, but in full fruition:—and this rest is in God alone.

I have stated in the former part of the discourse how it is that our enjoyment arises, not independently from our constitution taken by itself, but from relations and correspondences between that and other things which God

has created. He has constituted a relation between the organ of taste and food, between the ear and sound, between the eye and light, between the atmosphere and the lungs, between the whole animate and inanimate creation and the capacities and wants of man; and from these sources man may derive, and, in proportion as he conforms himself to the constitution of God, will derive, a subordinate and temporary good. But as an ultimate good, there is no correspondence between the soul and any created thing. In them the soul cannot rest. As to containing a true and permanent good, they are all as broken cisterns that can hold no water. No, God did not make us to be satisfied with the creature. In the fullness of his condescension, in the richness of his benevolence, in the yearnings of his paternal love, he would take us to his arms; he proposes himself as our true good and final rest. It is, indeed, a pleasant thing to behold the sun; very glorious is he as he cometh out of his chamber, and bathes earth and heaven in his light; but upon the soul that knows God and rests in him, there shines a light that is above the brightness of the sun. To him there is another morning risen upon the high noon of all created glory. That glory must fade. The sun himself must be quenched; but, as the eye of filial love is strengthened to behold them, the splendors that surround the throne of God increase and brighten, and shall do so forevermore. Around that throne the noontide of glory eternally reigns, and as the eye of the child of God drinks it in, his peace will be as a river, and he will exclaim, This, this is my rest. Such is the rest of the soul. To such a rest we are invited.

It is this great and fundamental truth—that there is no true rest for the soul of man except in God—that needs to be proclaimed at all times and every where. Look at the restlessness of individuals and of society, look at the billowy ocean of the past as seen in history, and what

does it indicate but that the true rest of man has not been found? See the world busy in letting down empty cups into wells that are dry, or drinking to "thirst again;" see individuals passing through all the stages of poverty and of wealth, of neglect and of distinction; see states assuming every form of government, from the freest democracy to the most absolute monarchy; and yet there is, and there will be "overturning, and overturning, and overturning," till men find the true rest of their souls, and he whose right it is shall assume his spiritual and perfect reign.

Yes, it is to such a rest that we are invited; and how affecting is the motive by which the invitation is urged! "For the Lord hath dealt bountifully with thee." And my friends, in view of what has been said, may I not urge this motive upon you? How much more when I call to your remembrance his Redeeming Love! In the reason here given, we see how different is the temper of a good man from that of the children of the world. How common is the feeling that in our adversity we must go to God—that we will, when we have nothing else left to enjoy, seek him; but when we are in prosperity, how apt are we to lose sight of God, and to rest in the enjoyment of his gifts! This is the great practical mistake, the infinite guilt of man, and the world never can be in a right state, till men can not only enjoy God in himself, but in his gifts; till they learn that the good gifts of God are best enjoyed, and then only answer their true end, when they lead us to him. Nothing can be more utterly false, or more disastrous, than this separation of cheerfulness and rational enjoyment from the remembrance and the presence of God; nothing can more dishonor him, whose smile brightens creation, whose presence makes heaven. But thus is He dishonored. A necessary condition of the pleasures of the world is forgetfulness of God. Like our first parents in the garden, men would hide themselves

from him. The consciousness of his presence in the midst of such pleasures as they choose, would be to them "as the shadow of death." His religion, the blessed religion of Christ, instead of being, like the light, not indeed always the direct object of thought, but as an element pervading and irradiating all social intercourse, is regarded by them as the antagonist of their chosen enjoyments. From enjoyments of which this is the spirit, whatever may be the form, men who would be Christians, truly such, must separate themselves. They must find God in his mercies; when he deals bountifully with them, their souls will return unto their rest. They can seek no enjoyment upon which they cannot ask the blessing of God. They can mingle in no scenes in which the remembrance of him would be unwelcome, and they must labor, and pray, and be content to be regarded as over strict, till there is such a change in the moral elements, that reason, and conscience, and the affections, and taste, shall predominate over the passions and appetites of men, and till men can enjoy the good gifts of God as dutiful children under the eye of an affectionate parent. It must be made to appear, it *will* be made to appear, that there is no antagonism between the temperate use of God's gifts and the highest social enjoyment.

It was in the hope that this occasion might do something towards bringing forward a consummation so desirable, that I was willing to take part in it; that, in connection with this sacred service, I was willing to be the organ of my fellow-citizens to welcome home those who had gone out from us. And this I now do. Natives, and former citizens of Berkshire, I welcome you—not to bacchanalian revels, not to costly entertainments, not to the celebration of any party or national triumph, but to the old homestead, to these scenes of your early days, to these mountains and vallies, and streams, and skies, to the hallowed resting places of the dear departed; I welcome

you to the warm grasp of kindred and friends, to rational festivity—to the Berkshire Jubilee.

So far as I know, this gathering is unprecedented. More than any thing else in modern times, it reminds us of those gatherings of ancient Israel, when the tribes went up to Mount Zion; and if we look to the future, it cannot fail to remind us of that greater gathering, of that better home, of those higher joys which there shall be, when "they shall come from the East, and the West, and the North, and the South, and shall sit down with Abraham and Isaac and Jacob in the kingdom of God." With that great assembly may we all be gathered. Amen!

SERMON,

PREACHED BEFORE THE ANNUAL CONVENTION OF THE CONGREGATIONAL MINISTERS OF MASSACHUSETTS.

May 29, 1845.

For we know that the whole creation groaneth and travaileth in pain together until now. —— For the earnest expectation of the creature waiteth for the manifestation of the sons of God.—Romans viii. 22 & 19.

We live in a universe composed of mind and of matter. The first of these, in the divine nature, we suppose to be self-existent, infinite, eternal; the second, to be created, finite, dependent. Matter in itself, and in its forms, can have no value, except as related to mind. As thus related, it may have value, but mind alone has true worth.

Whether this point of view could have been reached by the unassisted human powers, is doubtful; but it is the starting point, and one of the fundamental positions, of revelation. That declares to us, that "In the beginning, God *created* the heavens and the earth." The time was—for in our imperfect forms of speech we must speak of time when as yet time was not—the time was, when the Infinite Being dwelt alone. O how does it rebuke that pride of reason which would seek to comprehend God, when we place ourselves at the point when the work of creation commenced, and look back into the depths of that eternity which must have been already

past! How fathomless those depths! Their secrets, what created being shall ever know! But such a point there was, and then, "through faith we understand that the worlds were framed by the word of God." "He spake and it was done, he commanded and it stood fast." Matter in all its forms, in all the modifications of which it is capable, was created by a Being of infinite wisdom and goodness.

We often conceive of matter as holding the same relation to God that the materials of the architect, ready prepared, do to him; but it is far otherwise. It is not by accident that the air, and the water, and the earths, and the fire, and light, and the invisible agents of electricity and magnetism are constituted as they are. No, that is a very limited view of the divine wisdom and goodness which is ordinarily taken, and which supposes that these attributes are chiefly shown in the organized forms which matter is made to assume; whereas there was not less wisdom and goodness in originally constituting and endowing matter so that it could assume and sustain these forms. By an examination of no part of the creation may we be more fully impressed with the consummate wisdom of God than by that of the elements. It is not merely by the arrangement of materials, but by the original creation of matter in such forms, by its very constitution and capabilities, that the wisdom and goodness of God are seen. All are not only arranged, but were originally created and caused to be *such* matter, with reference to the well-being of a sensitive and a spiritual creation.

With such a view of matter as created in subordination to the spiritual world and with a pre-conformity to its wants, we should naturally suppose that it might reflect the aspects and follow the fortunes of that world. We might naturally suppose that where moral order and the highest form of good reigned supreme, there the homage and subserviency of matter would be manifested by the

repose of its elements, and the beauty of its forms. Where vice, and consequent misery had complete ascendency, if such a world there might be, we should suppose there would be gloom, and elemental strife, and forms of horror; and where there was a mixed state, a state of probation and of struggle, the light however dim still increasing, we might expect that there would be struggle, and alternation of condition, and diversity of aspect among the material elements, and a state of things which would be fitly described in the words of our text,—"For we know that the whole creation groaneth and travaileth in pain together until now."

That there is the general sympathy of matter with mind of which I have now spoken, I suppose to be implied in this passage of Scripture; and I propose to show from it at this time,

First, That the present condition of the physical world may be said to be one of groaning and travailing.

Secondly, That this is in correspondence with the moral state of man.

Thirdly, To show some of the reasons why this correspondence should exist.

And Fourthly, To speak of the happy termination of this state.

First, then, the present condition of the physical world may be said to be one of groaning and of travail.

But is this indeed true? Is not nature permanent? Does not every circle in her rounds perfectly meet? Is she not, and as the work of God too, the object of constant admiration? Do not apparent disorders and evils, on a wider survey, result in good, and become necessary to the universal harmony?

In answer to these inquiries, I observe first, in the language of Butler, that "the earth, our habitation, has the appearances of being a ruin." It is indeed permanent

in its orbit. Its relations to the heavenly bodies have not been disturbed, but no one can look upon its surface without seeing that its present state must have been the result of forces that have acted, not harmoniously, but with dreadful violence and convulsion. Here we stand and look upon a sea of mountains. Was it that the solid earth was once fluid, and was tossed as the ocean with a tempest, and was suddenly congealed? Was it that this surface was once even, and that by the action of internal fire these mighty masses were upheaved from the centre? We can hardly form any other supposition; but in either case who can conceive of the sublimity and terror of the scene, or of the violence and struggle of those agencies by which such effects were produced? Here we see the sides of the cleft mountain with face answering to face, and the river running between them, and if we examine the strata, we find them not only upheaved, but, perhaps, contorted and deflexed. Here we see, over a whole continent, and on the very tops of the mountains, the rocks furrowed so as to show that an immense body of water has swept over them, bearing huge icebergs and even rocks in its course; and here, where the wheat-field waves, are organic remains which show that the whole land, not only its vallies, but its wooded hills, were once the bed of the ocean.

I do not move here the question of time. It matters little whether these effects were strictly the consequence of sin, or were in anticipation of it—a preparation, through long ages, for the dwelling-place of just such a creature as man was to be. It is sufficient for my purpose that these powers, thus working, have left their impress, and a stern and sometimes awful expression, on the face of nature. It is true, indeed, that, connected with it all, there is beauty and sublimity; but it is only as the rainbow spans the thunder-cloud—it is beauty mingled with terror. Not such an aspect would a world have borne,

which should have been purely the product of love and of skill careful for the wants of those towards whom no displeasure ever had been or should be manifested.

I remark secondly, that the present state of the earth and the elements corresponds with this state in which the earth was left.

The earth itself is not quiet. Ever and anon it gives evidence that those forces which of old heaved up the mountains still slumber within, and when they are aroused but a little, the earth heaves, and literally groans and quakes. It expresses a state of unrest; and, if any thing can, indicates either dissolution, or the coming on of the throes of a new birth. How could the enormous bulk of the earth more significantly indicate that it was groaning and travailing in pain? How better could it show itself indignant and impatient at the thought of bearing up, in the sight of heaven, such a load of ingratitude and sin? How better could it testify its reluctance to furnish from its stores the materials of pride and of lust? Tardily, scantily, to the hand of labor only, does she yield these materials; and then she groans and is in pain at their abuse. But in these expressions of discontent the earth is not alone. The very air seems to know that it was never made to bear on its bosom the song of voluptuousness, or to be breathed in profaneness and blasphemy; and it testifies its sense of this abuse by the wild shrieks and howlings of the tempest, and the desolation of the tornado. And not only so, but it collects within its bosom the artillery of heaven. It utters the low muttering and unfurls the banner of the coming storm. It piles the thunder-caps in its dazzling heights. It musters and urges on its thronging battalions. It covers the heavens with blackness; it sheets them in flame; it smites the earth with its bolts; the peals of its thunder cease not, and it pours down its hail. True, it is the breath of life to man, and at times seems to perform

this office with cheerfulness; but then again it loads its wings with the pestilence, and thus avenges its quarrel. The fire, too, which man compels into his service in fashioning the weapons of death, is not a servant that can be trusted. How does it seem to watch its opportunity to break loose, to sweep over the prairie, to range its long lines upon the mountains, to burst forth in the city, and to leave the habitations of man and the abodes of commerce a heap of smoking ruins! How does it heave its sulphurous billows, and toss itself, and groan in the volcano! So, too, the water, though the servant and the friend of man, yet it finds its hour to spurn that service. Is the ocean compelled to furnish from its broad bosom the showers and the dews which water the earth, causing the blossom, and the fruit, and the fountains of water for man? It too has heard of his ingratitude; and when it finds him in its power, how does it toss and lift its waves to heaven, and shake him from itself, and wrap him in its sea-weed!

Thus, though the earth, and the air, and the fire, and the ocean, are the servants of man; though they seem at times to smile and be cheerful in that service; yet again, their aspect is changed; man trembles before them; they seem disposed to shake off his service, and though still compelled to submit to it, yet they do it reluctantly, groaning and travailing in pain together.

But it may be inquired, Is not all this necessary to the universal harmony? Are not these all real kindnesses, though bestowed with a forbidding aspect? Is not the labor to which the earth compels man salutary? Does not the lightning disengage, in its passage, materials useful in vegetation? Does not the storm purify the air? As it lifts by its white locks the wave that dashes the ship in pieces, does it not yield to the waters those elements of death which it had borne on its wings? Now, I would welcome every smile of nature, I would read every bright

lesson, and spell out every obscure lesson of goodness and mercy, written on her pages; but if she has other aspects and voices, I would see and hear them too. Perhaps there is a fashion at present, a form of sentimentalism, which leads some to see only what is beautiful and sublime and useful in nature; but surely, if it exist, it is well that we should behold not only the "goodness," but also the "severity," both of nature and of God.

But that there is not only seeming but real evil in the system of things with which we are connected, has been the sentiment of the race, as is evident from their mythologies. Hence, the Ahriman of Persia; hence, the Typhon of Egypt, "who tears his mother's side at the moment she is giving him birth, and is afterward united to Nephthys, that is, perfection, or consummate beauty, thus producing the mixture of good and evil which is, as it were, the essence of this world." Hence, the essential evil connected with matter in the system of Plato, and hence, too, the Demiurgus of the Gnostics. Nor is the difficulty removed by any explanations or discoveries of modern philosophy. If they show that in these conflicts of the elements evil is removed, they do it by involving the admission that there was evil to be removed. Does the storm purify the atmosphere? Then the atmosphere needed to be purified. These explanations only show that God has confined evil within such limits that it shall not be destructive of the system; and they discover the wisdom of those means which he has taken thus to limit it. Here is the human body. It has all the wonderful mechanism and beauty of its original structure; but it is suffering under an attack of the gout. This is not a fatal evil. The system still goes on; and not only so, but this very evil may, and often does, prevent a fever that would be fatal. Is therefore the gout no evil? Will the system of him who has it groan and travail in pain the less for this? Thus, and thus only, does or can any physical

philosophy eliminate real evil from the system, or make that which seems so a part of a higher harmony. No: in the midst of all the good with which God has surrounded us, there is still essential evil. This is the awful, the unaccountable fact. Of this, the physical system bears evidence both in its state and in the working of its agencies; so that the doctrine of the text is fully sustained, that the whole creation groaneth and travaileth in pain together until now.

We pass then to the second proposition, which is, that this state of the physical creation is in correspondence with the moral state of man.

By the correspondence in general of matter with mind, I mean simply that every feeling, whether glad or sorrowful, whether of remorse or of moral approbation, every state of mind, shall find in nature something that shall be felt to have a correspondence with it. I know the mind creates its own world within certain limits, and gives its own hue to surrounding objects, still there is that in the sunshine which naturally corresponds with cheerfulness, there is that in a lowering sky and in darkness which corresponds with gloom, and so is there a natural correspondence between every state of the mind and some aspect, or movement, or voice, of animate or inanimate nature. This is a correspondence that is so elementary that we regard it as a matter of course, and like that of light to the eye, or of the air to the lungs, it fails to excite our wonder till we begin to learn that both in the mind and in the body those adaptations are the most wonderful which are connected with the earliest and most essential processes of animal and of mental life. How extensive and minute this correspondence is, will perhaps be best seen if we observe how that part of human language originates which is employed to express the affections of the mind. It is a received doctrine among men learned in this department, that all words of this description had first a meaning

purely physical, and that this meaning was afterwards transferred to express some affection of the mind analogous to the physical condition or act. Whether this is strictly and universally true or not, it certainly is true that the great mass of words of this description are thus formed; and if so, then it will follow that for every mental state, act or affection which we can express in words, there must be some analogous state, act or affection in the physical world. Who then can sufficiently admire that adjustment and correlation of parts by which mind and matter almost seem to be a part of one organization? But if this be so, and if it be proper to say of man that he groans and travails in pain, then we may be sure that these terms may be applied, without a stronger figure than the laws of language will allow, to the physical creation by which he is surrounded, for they merely express a condition of things which lies at the foundation of a whole class of figures, the use of which we cannot avoid.

Is it then true of the rational and moral creation that it groans and travails in pain together? This question, in a world like this, it cannot be difficult to answer. Let the wrecks of nations whose governments have been badly constituted and badly administered, answer it. Let the groans of the hundreds of millions who have perished on the field of battle, and the sighs and tears of their widows and fatherless children answer it. Answer it, ye countless hosts, the victims of idolatry and superstition, who have sought the living among the dead. What say your pilgrimages, with their paths bleached by the bones of millions left to be the prey of the vulture and the hyena? What say those who have swung upon hooks, and been sacrificed on the funeral pile? Answer it, yes, come up in long procession ye who have dragged out, and are still dragging out your wretched lives in bondage under the lash, and say if ye have not been, and are not groaning and travailing in pain together? Answer it, ye unnum-

bered devotees and victims of sensuality, ye inebriates and licentious, who have eaten the apples of Sodom, and have received in your own bodies the recompense that is meet. Answer it, every child of Adam who has felt the thirst for happiness, and has attempted to slake it at the fountains of earth. Yea, thou very church of God, whose emblem on this earth is the bush that was in the fire and was not consumed—church *militant*, answer. Here certainly we find the fullest and most intense meaning of the words of the text. There are indeed storms of the elements, and sighings of the wind, and groanings of the earth, and the death of the year, but what are these to the storms of passion, and the sighs of grief, and the groans of despair, and the death of man?

Is there not then the correspondence of which I have spoken? Would the system be one and harmonious, if there were not? And though some distinguished commentators have been disposed to limit the application of the text to the rational and moral creation, may we not properly say of the whole, that it groaneth, and travaileth together in pain until now?

I am next to show some of the reasons why this correspondence should exist.

Perhaps one reason is to be found in what has already been referred to—the necessity of this for the formation of language. I would not limit the resources of God, but constituted as the human faculties now are, it would seem necessary if they were to be fully developed, that words originally applicable to natural objects should be capable of being transferred so as to express the whole range of thought and emotion, and this would be impossible without the correspondence of which I have spoken. As it is, we speak of the light of knowledge, and the darkness of ignorance, and the sunshine of joy, and the night of grief, and the storms of passion, and the devious paths of error, and the pitfalls of vice, and we scarcely reflect that we are

speaking in figures, or that the flowers of rhetoric, not less than the flowers of the field, have their origin in a material soil. Constituted as man now is, we do not see how he could have been furnished with the symbols of thought, the materials of language in any other way.

But a second and much more important reason is, that without this correspondence, the moral government of God would be much impaired in its force, if not destroyed. That this is so, I think will be made obvious if we imagine a state of things in which this correspondence should not exist. Let us suppose, man continuing as he now is, that there were no lightning, or thunder, or earthquakes, that there were no storms, no darkness, no cold, no deserts, or precipices, or swamps, no poisonous plant or venomous reptile, or devouring beast, in short that the earth were a paradise producing spontaneously every thing necessary and gratifying to man, that it should wear the smile of a ceaseless sunshine and the verdure of a perpetual spring, and who can believe that any word of God threatening future misery to those upon whom he was thus continually pouring out his unmingled favors, would produce upon them a salutary impression? How could he wean such beings from such a world? How could they estimate the probability, or conceive of the elements of "the wrath to come"? The providence and the natural government of God, if they did not actually contradict, would yet have a natural and necessary tendency to counteract, the effect of his word. There would be no "Analogy of Revealed Religion to the constitution and course of Nature."

As it is, though men so often suffer, though they see themselves endowed with such capacities for suffering, though they see the elements around them which might be let loose to test those capacities to the utmost, yet how slow is man to consider and to be wise? Notwithstanding all the miseries of the present life, and the dreadful and

humiliating form in which death comes to man, how do many persist in seeing in all this only the manifestations of simple benevolence, and fail to receive those words of our Saviour which speak of "the worm that dieth not," and of "the fire that shall not be quenched!" And if this is so now, when nature seconds, with the energy of her mightiest convulsions, and with an almost articulate distinctness, the utterances of the word of God, how much more would it have been the case if she had been a fascinating Delilah calling upon man to sleep in her lap? If, on the other hand, those evidences of goodness with which nature abounds were withdrawn, if she were to become more stern and rugged till man was able to drag out only with extreme toil a painful existence, would he not hear in the howlings of the tempest around him, and see in the aspect of every thing God had made, a contradiction of those promises which should speak of "sweet fields beyond the swelling flood"? What would he know of sweet fields? Where could he find the materials out of which to construct the image of heaven? There would be no likeness or affinity between his present state and that to which he was invited, and this would be no fit place for a preparation for such a state.

But as it is now, we have the materials from which to construct both heaven and hell. We have light and warmth, and beauty and sublimity; we see the bright star, the flashing waters, the green fields and the flowers, the pure gold and the precious gem, we see the lamb and the dove. We have also the darkness and the cold, the deformity and corruption, the fire and the brimstone and the gnawing worm, the serpent and the vulture, and we have only to separate and combine these elements anew, and the threatenings and the promises of Scripture are realized at once. As the earth was to be a place of preparation for two different states, so it was necessary it should contain the image of both. By the amazing

wisdom of God, the elements of these are blended together in a strange harmony, constituting a spectacle which has perplexed the mind of man in all ages, and which is capable of no satisfactory solution except in the light in which we are now viewing it. The good and the evil, the wheat and the tares grow together, and their roots are so intertwined that no human hand, no, nor the hand of an angel, can root up the tares without rooting up the wheat also.

In this view of it then, the beauty and the glory and the joys of earth are not for their own sake—they are the smile of Him who would invite us to an eternal home, where all tears shall be wiped away, where there shall be no more death, neither sorrow nor crying, neither shall there be any more pain. Nor, on the other hand, are subterranean fires, and whelmed cities, and mildew, and frosts, and pain, for their own sake. They tell us of the possibility, may I not say of the probability, of an accumulation of the elements of wo, of a state of concentrated and unmitigated evil, that shall be the fruit of sin. They are witnesses for God; they speak in his name.

How easy is it then to see that the present constitution of nature seconds the moral government of God? It may indeed be true, it is true to a melancholy extent, that men having eyes see not, and having ears hear not; but it is also true that when the conscience becomes aroused, when the spiritual nature is quickened, when man will see and hear, then nature, illuminated and interpreted by the word of God, is full of sights and of voices teaching him a divine wisdom, inviting him to a peaceful home, warning him in tones of terror to avoid the consequences of sin. If a scene of probation were to be devised, the object of which was to convey blended invitation and warning, we cannot conceive, if it were to consist simply of material elements, that the handwriting upon its walls should have been plainer, we cannot conceive that it

should be more perfectly accomplished, than it has been in the constitution of this world. And if this be so, then have we found a sufficient reason for the present state of things. Then have we found its true solution. It is required by the moral government of God as exercised towards such a creature as man.

If we add to the reasons already mentioned the natural fitness and congruity of such a correspondence, and that without it matter would be mere lumber of no assignable use, but rather a clog and an obstruction in the universe, we may perhaps see sufficient reasons why it should please God to make the creature subject to vanity. It was not so originally, it did not become so willingly, but was made so for a temporary purpose "by reason of him who hath subjected the same in hope."

And this leads me, in the fourth place, to speak of the happy termination of this state of things.

And here, as the Bible represents the relations of man to the material universe as having been changed by the fall,—for before that he was in paradise, and the ground had not been cursed,—so does it now represent the restoration of that universe to its primitive order and glory, or perhaps to something even beyond this, as taking place in sympathy with a great moral event called in the text "the manifestation of the sons of God." This event is represented as the consummation of a long series of events, and as the signal and commencement of a new order of things. It is to be referred to that time spoken of in the Revelation, where it is said, "Behold I make all things new." For this event the whole creation is represented as waiting with earnest expectation. The expression of the text is very strong, and if it had been the purpose of the apostle to magnify and exalt the event, we do not see how he could have done so more fully. What an event must that be, for which the whole creation has been for so long a time travailing in birth, to which it

has looked forward with such earnestness and expectation! Then will be exhibited the grand result which has for ages been working out in this mixed and most perplexing state of things. That result will be the completed number of the sons of God. For them the Son of God had come and suffered and died and risen again; for them the Spirit had striven, for them all nature had stood. They will be as the wheat after the ingathering of the harvest, when the chaff is blown away. And when the whole number is complete, when the last child of God is gathered in, "then will the end be." There had been a revolted province; there had gone out from heaven the Son of God for the recovery of those who should be a peculiar people; for six thousand years that province had stood the field of strife for three worlds; there had been shed the blood of the Son of God, there he had risen again, there his angels had ministered, there his church had been persecuted, there his martyrs had suffered; there the whole plan and purpose of God had been set at nought, and the blood of his covenant had been counted an unholy thing. All this had been, but then the time will have come when the character of God shall be vindicated in a completed redemption; when it shall be gloriously illustrated; when all murmurings growing out of this strange state of things shall cease forever; when the sons of God shall be *manifested.* These sons of God—where are they now? Unknown, despised, hidden. Christ himself was unknown and despised, and it is sufficient for the disciple to be as his Master, and the servant as his Lord. Where are they? They are scattered here and there, perhaps more of them than we suppose, following, in meekness and lowliness, in purity, in benevolence, in prayer, through good report, and through evil report, their divine Master. Where are they? They are buried in the darkness of the grave. They have gone down by myriads to the tomb, and an unbelieving world has thought

them lost; but no, they were only hidden there; and then they shall be brought out as the hidden ones of God and manifested. Every one shall be there. In the ingathering of the harvest of the world, not one grain of wheat shall be lost. Every true lover of God, every sincere follower of Christ, however humble, will be there, and it will be a part of the purpose of God to manifest him.

And before whom shall this manifestation of the sons of God be made? We are told that when the heavens and the earth were finished, the morning stars sang together and all the sons of God shouted for joy. They came to see—*all* the sons of God—this new product of the skill and power of their God. And will it not be so then? Will they not come in from the remotest depths of space, from the farthest star that hangs on the outmost verge of the creation? I would not extend unduly the meaning of terms, I would not make too much of those incidental hints which are thrown out on this subject in the Scriptures; but when we remember that the material creation, vast, and to our limited conception infinite as it is, is yet all one system, bound together by influences which cause each part to be dependent upon every other part, and as I may say interested in it; when we remember that the questions involved in the forgiveness of sin are among the very highest that can possibly belong to the moral government of God; when we remember what a transaction that was by which forgiveness became possible, and the very peculiar and amazing manifestations which are made through it of the character of God—it would seem not unreasonable to suppose "that unto the principalities and powers in heavenly places might be known by the *church* the manifold wisdom of God, according to the eternal purpose which he purposed in Christ Jesus our Lord;" and no one can say how wide may be the expectation of this event in the creation of God. And what is thus accordant with reason, is confirmed by

all the intimations and representations of the Scriptures. They represent this event under the figure of a marriage, to which, as we know, all the family, in its remotest connections, are often invited, and to which they look forward. When such an event takes place, no expense is spared in respect to outward decoration. Then, whatever can be commanded of the products of nature and of art, whatever can please the taste or the senses, is put in requisition. And why should not the whole family of God be invited, in the day when "the marriage of the Lamb is come, and his wife hath made herself ready"? Why should not the old mansion be taken down, and all things be made new? Why should not the treasures of the universe be put in requisition, to make the external splendors of that day correspond with the infinite gladness and spiritual glory of the event? So the Scriptures represent it. In no case does their language intimate more fully the participation and sympathy of the whole creation. "And I heard," says John, "as it were the voice of a great multitude, and as the voice of many waters, and as the voice of mighty thunderings, saying, Alleluia! for the Lord God omnipotent reigneth." But what is the result of that reign, and the great event under it, which is the ground of these acclamations? The apostle immediately adds, as a part of the same song, "Let us be glad, and rejoice, and give honor to him; for the marriage of the Lamb is come, and his wife hath made herself ready. And to her was granted that she should be arrayed in fine linen, clean and white, for the fine linen is the righteousness of saints. And he saith unto me write, Blessed are they which are called unto the marriage supper of the Lamb." And then how glorious is the representation of that city where this event is to be celebrated, whose foundations are of precious stones, whose gates are pearls, and whose streets are pure gold! How then, shall they come, in myriads upon

myriads, to share in the holy and joyful solemnities of this festal day of the universe, and to witness the manifestation of the sons of God! There, in radiant beauty, shall appear the redeemed. To them, all eyes shall be turned,—not for their own sake, but because, as we are told in another place where this event is described, it is the Saviour himself who shall "be glorified in his saints, and admired in all them that believe." Then shall he "present to himself a glorious church, not having spot or wrinkle or any such thing; holy, and without blemish." Oh, how bright must that beauty be, which shall fit the church to be represented as the *bride*, on an occasion like that! Who can speak the joy, and wonder, and thanksgiving, and praise, with which she shall look back upon all the past, and look up to her Redeemer, and look around upon an admiring heaven, and look forward to an eternity of love, and peace, and joy? Surely, she who is thus redeemed shall find no jarring external element—surely, she shall dwell in the palace of God!

We see from this subject, first, how extensive are the relations, and how dreadful is the nature of guilt.

In our present familiarity with sin, in our sense of the frailty of man, in our great want of a true perception of the holiness of the character of God, we have but a very faint impression of what it is for an intelligent and moral being to rebel against its Creator. The principle of rebellion is really involved in all sin. This is evil in itself, and the only thing in the universe that is always and necessarily so. Give the principle which lies at the foundation of all sin, of those which we call small sins, free scope, and it would dethrone God; it would overturn the foundations of all moral order, and make the universe a hell. That which would do this is evil in itself, and from it all other evil springs. If we suppose the universe to have been perfectly free from sin up to a certain point,

what would have been an adequate expression, on the part of a holy God, on the occurrence of the first sinful act, however slight in itself—on the birth of such a principle? What might have been expected from him on the occurrence of the first such act in a world which he had created? It was such an act, in the apostacy of our first parents, that came between this world and God, and has caused it to wade in an eclipse, and in disastrous twilight, till the present time. This it was that has caused it to groan and travail in pain together until now. And when we see how great a system this of nature is, and that the adjustments and balancings and combinations of its elements are all different from what they would have been if sin had not entered, and that the whole derangement was consequent upon a single moral act, then we see the true dependence of the physical upon the moral creation, and that, in the highest philosophy, the fact of *guilt* is the great fact which we need to know in order to account for the present state of things. Precisely *how* these physical evils were introduced in consequence of guilt, we do not know.

> "Some say He bid his angels turn askance
> The poles of earth twice ten degrees or more
> From the sun's axle."

But whatever the physical cause was, the true cause of these disorders is to be found in the great fact of the entrance of guilt.

But though it was for the first sin that the earth was smitten with a curse, yet even that, dreadful as it was, and extensive as were its relations, did not adequately express the feelings of God towards guilt. The earth reeled under it, and all its foundations have since been out of course; but mercy interposed, the earth was arrested midway in its fall, the mediatorial system was ushered in, and thenceforward, if we would look for an

adequate expression of the feelings of God towards sin, we must look at the bleeding victim and the smoking altar, and at what these typified, the cross of Christ. If a mediatorial, and under that a probationary system were introduced, then it is plain that the true feelings of God in regard to guilt must be suspended for a time in their direct expression, and the measure of those feelings must be looked for, not in those consequences which come under our observation, but in that mediatorial system. It is to that, while this system stands, that God can point for the vindication of himself as a holy God. While he can point to that—till this system is consummated, and God shall be all in all—he can carry on a providential system, in which his sun shall arise alike upon the evil and upon the good, and his rain descend upon the just and upon the unjust. But when this kingdom shall be delivered up unto the Father, and God shall be all in all, then, having never shown the least favor towards the wicked as such, he can no longer continue to do them any good; then, it will be "a fearful thing to fall into the hands of the living God;" then, upon those who remain incorrigible, there will fall the whole energy of that expression by which an infinite and holy God would indicate his hatred of sin; then, and not till then, will it be fully seen how extensive are the relations, and how dreadful is the nature of guilt.

But I observe, again, that we see from this subject the greatness of the redemption by Christ, and the glory of that gospel which we preach. The true greatness of the work of Christ is to be found in the manifestations which are made through it of the character of God, and in its effects upon the intelligent and moral creation. It is a moral and a spiritual glory. This is the orb of its brightness. But this, as it is in itself, we do not readily apprehend; and though, in accordance with the whole tenor of this discourse, we have reason to believe that its bearings

upon the material creation are entirely subordinate, and comparatively unimportant, yet it is through them that we may, in our present state, attain some of our most affecting views of what that redemption is in itself. Into the train of this great event the material creation seems to fall, as the clouds into the train of the setting sun; and it is by the glories reflected from that, that we may gain some of our highest views of the glory that excelleth. Christ came chiefly to destroy the works of the devil, to put an end to sin, and to bring in everlasting righteousness. His mission involved the principle of restoration from a fallen state under the government of God; and in connection with this we have reason to suppose that all there is of restoration under that government will take place. In the progress of this mission, the material creation was not only subject to him, so that he could say to the waves, "Peace, be still," but it sympathized with him. It is in beautiful harmony with the general doctrine of this discourse, that the rocks rent, and the earth quaked, and the sun was veiled, during the agony of their expiring Lord; and if the heavens and the earth thus sympathized with him in his agony, shall they not also sympathize with him on the day when he shall place the top-stone upon the great work of redemption, and all the intelligent universe shall cry, "Grace, grace unto it"? Since it was through guilt that the physical creation was despoiled of its glory, it was fit that the great Conqueror of guilt and death and hell, when he made an excursion into those regions which had been ravaged, should eliminate perfectly the elements of evil, and place them by themselves beyond the impassable gulf; and should restore to its original brightness, and perhaps even more, every thing which guilt had marred or deranged. It was fit that when Satan should be cast out, not only from heaven, but from all the works of God, into the place prepared for him and his angels, and when all his adherents

and abettors should be gathered with him, that all the consequences of guilt—every trace of its former presence —should be obliterated there. This, He who is the great Restorer shall do. Not the least shred or vestige of all the works of evil shall be left, and never shall there be any more any thing to hurt or to offend in all God's holy mountain. And what work is there that was ever undertaken since the universe commenced, that could be compared with this? Of the work of creation, we know, and can know, nothing. But here is a moral work—a work in which means are adapted to ends, which can be studied —which has a relation to all that is most intimate and essential in the nature, and dear in the interests, of immortal beings,—a work entering into the counsels of eternity from the first, and which shall come forth in grandeur and loftier proportions, as the ages of that eternity shall roll on.

Nor, if it could but be fully carried out, would the bearing of this work upon the present well-being of the human race be less striking. Aside from physical suffering, which is the consequence of guilt, it is guilt itself, and not mere imperfection, that causes the suffering of our world. This is the immediate cause of the social and political evils that exist, and these evils will cease only when their cause ceases, and this will cease only as it is removed, in itself and in its consequences, by the gospel of Jesus Christ. At this point it is, my brethren, that we are led to feel that, while we are laboring for the eternal good of men, we are also laboring in the most effectual way possible, for their temporal good—that that doctrine which we preach has the promise of the life that now is, as well as of that which is to come. At this point we are at issue with the wisdom of this world. That points the finger of scorn at a few unprotected missionaries, going to a heathen shore, without a knowledge of the language, to remove the evils and degradations of heathenism; but

how soon do the islands of the sea, redeemed and taking their place among the nations, show that the foolishness of God is wiser than men! Human wisdom builds dykes and barriers. Upon these, its philosophers and its statesmen have labored; in these they place the hope of the world. But, after all possible labor and expense, how often do the waters of evil break through and overflow! We will not, however, disparage their labors. Let them watch their barriers well; let them rally at every breach to prevent the rush of the waters; but let them not despise us, if we pursue another method—if, acting under the direction of the wisdom of God, we find our way to the fountain-head of those waters, and seek to dry that up. Let us do this as fully as a perfectly applied Christianity would do it, and their dykes and barriers would be useless; let us succeed in part, and just so far the pressure upon them will be removed. This is divine wisdom. Thus, and thus only, can any thing truly great and good be accomplished for human society.

And if these things be so, then how great is the glory of that gospel which we preach! Is it not indeed the glorious gospel of the blessed God? And here, my brethren, in the fact that we preach such a glorious gospel, do we find our strength and consolation. Whether I have given the exposition of my text which its author would have given, is not for me to say; but I cannot be in a mistake respecting the purpose for which it was written. That appears plainly, from the connection, to have been, to encourage and strengthen Christians under their sufferings, by showing the glorious results and termination of that system which they had embraced. "For I reckon," says he, "that the sufferings of the present time are not worthy to be compared with the glory which shall be revealed in us. For the earnest expectation of the creature waiteth for the manifestation of the sons of God." We are not indeed in the circumstances of the early Christians;

but in this day of coldness, and worldliness, and confusion, to what minister of the gospel who rightly appreciates his position and his duties, can these supports be unneeded or unwelcome? Where else can we look? We are not to expect the sympathy of the world, in preaching this gospel. The world does not approve of its methods, and has no faith in that glorious and far-reaching system of which I have spoken. Those who have been faithful preachers of the truth, from the time of Noah, and of our Saviour, downward, have never had much of the sympathy of the world. They have drawn their support from a higher source; and we, if we would preach the gospel faithfully; if we would show that it must wound before it can heal, that it is only those who are dead that it can make alive,—must, many of us, not only engage in a spiritual warfare, but encounter great external difficulties. To many whom we would benefit, we must be content to seem as those that dream; from others, we must expect ridicule and contempt; our motives will be misrepresented, and our labors perverted. Many of us must labor on in poverty, and be content to leave our widows and children, under God, to the aid of that charity, the means of which we hope to see this day augmented. And how, under labors and trials like these, when they become severe, and darkness seems to gather around us, are we to be supported, so that we can say with Paul, "None of these things move me;" but by consoling and strengthening views of that gospel which we preach? How else, when our urns of light become exhausted, shall we have them replenished, but by going to the great source of light?

But if we do indeed apprehend rightly the glory of this gospel, and the grandeur of its termination,—then how high the privilege of being permitted intelligently to take part in labors tending to such a result! Guilt it is, and that alone, that shrouds the moral universe in night. Just

so far as we can be instrumental in preventing guilt, or in leading men to Him who alone can avert its consequences, we restrict the dominion and relieve the darkness of that night. Sometimes we are permitted to see and be encouraged by the immediate and manifest effect of our labors; at other times we must walk by faith, and not by sight, and then we need to realize, though for the time its beams penetrate so slightly the darkness that surrounds us, that the sun of that gospel which we preach is still walking the heavens in its own brightness, and shedding its beams over the moral universe of God. Then we need to look back to that love of God in sending his Son, which found its highest expression upon Calvary, and forward to the time when the great purposes of that love shall be consummated—when the sons of God shall be manifested—when the groaning and travailing of the creation shall cease, and, instead thereof, there shall come up from all the holy universe the voice of song, saying, "Alleluia!"—when the multitude of the redeemed shall listen to the high praises of the original dwellers in heaven, who never fell; and they, in turn,

> "On their harps shall lean, to hear
> A sweeter note, that ours shall bear."

> "Oh, may I bear some humble part
> In that immortal song;
> Wonder and joy shall tune my heart,
> And love command my tongue."

SERMON,

BEFORE THE AMERICAN BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS FOR FOREIGN MISSIONS.

September, 1845.

Cast thy burden upon the Lord, and he shall sustain thee: he shall never suffer the righteous to be moved.—PSALM lv. 22.

SCARCELY do we find in the Bible stronger expressions of anxiety and distress, than in the Psalm from which the text is taken. "My heart," says the Psalmist, "is sore pained within me, and the terrors of death are fallen upon me. Fearfulness and trembling are come upon me, and horror hath overwhelmed me." This distress was caused by the hypocrisy and treachery of others; especially of those who were professors of religion, and who had a high standing in the church. "For it was not," says he, "an enemy that reproached me; then I could have borne it; neither was it he that hated me that did magnify himself against me; then I would have hid myself from him; but it was thou, a man mine equal, my guide, and mine acquaintance. We took sweet counsel together, and walked unto the house of God in company." Sometimes he speaks of the cause of his trouble as if there were several, as when he says, "They cast iniquity upon me, and in wrath they hate me;" and sometimes as if there were but one. But he was evidently surrounded by

artful, malignant and hypocritical persons, who, while they professed great regard for his welfare, would not suffer him to pursue his duties quietly, or to be at peace. "He hath," says he, "put forth his hands against such as be at peace with him: he hath broken his covenant. The words of his mouth were smoother than butter, but war was in his heart: his words were softer than oil, yet were they drawn swords." These persons were doubtless types of a class who have been in the church in every age. Sometimes they have remained concealed; then again they have been drawn out, and become conspicuous; but they have always been among the severest trials of the people of God, and the greatest hindrances to his cause.

Thus troubled, two sources of relief occurred to the Psalmist. His first impulse was to free himself from the annoyances occasioned by the wickedness of others and the responsibilities that were laid upon him, by fleeing away and remaining in solitude. "Oh," said he, "that I had wings like a dove; for then would I fly away and be at rest. Lo, then would I wander far off, and remain in the wilderness." We here see in him those germs of the monastic system which belong to our nature, and which, in after ages, were so fully and so disastrously developed. But better counsels prevailed. Instead of casting off his responsibilities and fleeing from his troubles, he was led to see that there was a God on high, who was able to sustain him under the one, and to deliver him from the other; and to go to him in earnest and confiding prayer. "As for me," says he, "I will call upon God: and the Lord shall save me." Having thus found the true source of relief and strength, he invites others to share it with him, in the words of the text,—"Cast thy burden upon the Lord, and he shall sustain thee: he shall never suffer the righteous to be moved."

It will be observed that the former part of this passage

is limited by the latter. The doctrine, therefore, which it contains, and which I propose to illustrate in its application, first to individuals, and then to this society, is, that the *righteous*, who cast their burden upon the Lord, shall be sustained.

These words, so far as they imply the existence of a burden of some kind, are applicable to the whole human race. There are none who do not find that in their condition, or character, or prospects, or duties, which gives them anxiety, and which may be regarded as a burden.

But the burdens which are borne by men are of two kinds. There are some, such as physical suffering, and oftentimes poverty, which are laid upon us by the providence of God, which we do not at all voluntarily assume, and to free ourselves from which it is right that we should make the most strenuous efforts. These come upon us as passive subjects of that course of events which is ordered by God, and when we cannot free ourselves from them, our duty is—not mere submission, but cheerful acquiescence, and a full exercise of those passive virtues which are among the most efficient means of moral discipline. We are bound to believe, we do believe, however unequally these burdens may be distributed, however mysterious it may seem that they should exist at all, that they are all apportioned and laid upon us by the hand of a Father; and though we may say at the time, with Jacob, that all these things are against us, yet, if we have a filial spirit, we shall find in the end that God meant them unto good. The basis of our submission is our confidence in him, that his government is perfect; and while we know that "he does not afflict willingly nor grieve the children of men," it is ours to feel and to say, "Though he slay me, yet will I trust in him."

But there is another class of burdens which belong to

us as active and responsible beings, which are not so much laid *upon* us, as laid *before* us, and which it is optional with us to assume or not. These are those great duties of piety towards God, and of reciprocity and benevolence towards men, the burden of which has been fully taken up and perfectly sustained but once in the history of our world. God is carrying forward his purposes, in the accomplishment of which we believe he is working out the highest good of his universe. In doing this he makes use of the voluntary agency of his intelligent and accountable creatures. He has made them capable of recognizing and appreciating those ends which he proposes, and of becoming intelligently co-workers with him. Here it is that we find the true dignity of man, and the highest point of union between him and God; for, as man is great in intellect only as he comprehends the thoughts of God, and great in suffering only as he submits to the will of God, so is he great in action only as he labors to accomplish the purposes of God. But the present constitution of things is such, that, in doing that part which God has assigned to us—which is truly ours—in the accomplishment of these purposes, self-denial and suffering are often involved.

So far as we can judge, if sin had never entered, no duty would have been regarded as self-denial or a burden. Obedience to a perfect law would have been perfect liberty, and the result of this union of liberty and law would have been a happiness limited only by the capacity of its subject. But sin entering, necessarily became the cause of burden-bearing, both to those who were under its power, and to those who were not. In itself, and to those who are under it, it is the greatest possible burden. There is no slavery like that of sin, and that too, whether its subjects do or do not struggle against it. So far as holy beings have intercourse with those that are sinful, as when the archangel contended with the devil, it must

be a grief and a burden; and then, if any are to be recovered from the power of sin, as it has in itself no recuperative energy, whatever is done for them must originate in an influence from without; and the great law of the universe for their recovery, seems to be that of vicarious suffering. Of this we have the great example in our Lord Jesus Christ. He, and he only, "made his soul an offering for sin." He alone "bore our sins in his own body on the tree." His sufferings only constitute an atonement, and lie at the foundation of human hope. Still, it was necessary that the apostles, and those who came afterwards, should be "partakers of Christ's sufferings," and "should fill up that which was behind of the afflictions of Christ." He laid the foundation, but the superstructure is to be carried up, and this can be done only by the same spirit of self-renunciation and of burden-bearing which actuated him.

Enlightened benevolence is essentially and uncompromisingly opposed to all wickedness; and the more intense the benevolence, the stronger is this feeling. Let then a benevolence, so enlightened that it is opposed to nothing but sin, so free that it is willing to do all things but to commit sin, move forward to the accomplishment of its purposes in a world like this, and a point will be reached, even though every thing be done with the meekness and gentleness of Christ, where there will be conflict, where all the possible power and art of selfishness and malignity will be arrayed against it, and where, if it goes forward at all, it must be into the fires which the rage and malice of its enemies have kindled. Let it be now, that the cause of God requires it, and it will go into those fires. So it was with Christ. He excited no unnecessary opposition. There was nothing in his manner that justly gave offence; but by simply taking up the burden which his mission required, he came under a pressure of agony which rendered necessary every drop of the bloody sweat;

he came to a point where he must wear the purple robe and the crown of thorns, and where he might not hide his face from shame and spitting. He came to a point where the cross was laid upon him so long as he could bear it, where the nails were driven, and where the accursed tree, as it was raised up and fell with a shock to its position, caused every fibre in his frame to vibrate in agony. There, suspended between heaven and earth, lifted up that he might draw all men unto him, he hung for six long hours, enduring those agonies of expiring nature that could not have been greater and that might not be less. The burden that was upon him bore him down to death; and at no point could he have withdrawn from it, so as to spare himself a single pang. So was it with the apostles. They were willing to become all things to all men, so far as they might. But not so could the crest of the serpent be smoothed down, and his envenomed bite be prevented. It was necessary that they should hunger and thirst, and be naked and buffeted, and have no certain dwelling-place, and be reviled, and persecuted, and defamed, and made as the filth of the world and the off-scouring of all things; and finally, that they should lay down their lives, as the highest example they could furnish of the grandeur of faith, and as their strongest possible attestation to the value of those purposes of God which they were laboring to carry out. So was it with those ancient veterans in virtue mentioned by the apostle in the eleventh chapter of Hebrews; and so has it been with the martyrs and faithful servants and missionaries of Christ down to the present time. These have all recognized the great principle, that burdens were to be assumed and borne, if good was to be done; and in bearing them they have all been actuated by one spirit.

This principle we must recognize; this spirit we should consider well. It was not, properly speaking, an anti-spirit. It was a positive principle, striving after a great

and glorious object, and going forward to the attainment of that in a spirit of love; quietly, but resolutely, bearing every burden which the accomplishment of its purpose necessarily involved. It was not a vain or ostentatious spirit, for it sacrificed reputation among men; it was not an enthusiastic spirit, for the object in view justified the highest feeling and effort; it was not a fanatical spirit, for there was no malignity; it was not a superstitious spirit, for they followed Christ and paid little regard to organizations and external forms; it was not a selfish and ambitious, nor a self-willed and factious spirit, for they had no personal object to accomplish, or personal feeling to gratify. If they could but preach Christ and him crucified, and exalt him as a Saviour from sin, it was enough. It was by prayer and effort and suffering that the cause of Christ was borne forward, and souls converted, in the early days of the church. Paul knew what it was to "travail in birth" for souls, to be in constant heaviness for them, to agonize for them in prayer; and wherever, since that time, souls have been converted, wherever there have been revivals of religion, there have been those who have known what these things mean. They may have been few, and perhaps unknown; but they have been God's burden-bearers in the great work of building his spiritual temple; and it is because these have been so few that that work has gone so slowly forward.

Our business then, as individuals, is to follow Christ and his apostles, both in the recognition of this principle, and in the spirit in which we bear those burdens which properly devolve upon us; and thus doing, we shall be sustained.

But while we ask, as individuals, the simple question, 'Lord what wilt thou have us to do?' and should be ready to do and to suffer all that might be required by its true answer, we are to remember that we are liable to assume burdens that do not properly belong to us, and to bring

upon ourselves troubles which we may properly, and which we ought to avoid. The words of the text are—"Cast *thy* burden upon the Lord, and he shall sustain thee." At this point cases often arise which it is difficult to decide. No doubt it may happen that a man, passing by and observing men at strife, could interfere with advantage; and yet we are told that "he that passeth by and meddleth with strife belonging not to him, is like one that taketh a dog by the ears." It is a great thing to pass through life wisely, knowing our own duty and doing it; and not interfering with those things which do not belong to us. The character of men may often be tested as much by what they let alone, as by what they do. It cannot be doubted that a large portion of the burdens which men take upon themselves, of the cares and anxieties which trouble them, are such as they have no right to have, and as are in no proper sense theirs. It is not the ambitious, the covetous, the fashionable and worldly, pressed down as they often are with their burdens, that are invited to cast those burdens upon the Lord. No; God will sustain no man, in the sense in which that term is here used, under such burdens as these. As I have already said, the last part of the text limits the first. It is the righteous only who are here invited to cast their burdens upon the Lord; and only as they are righteous, that they have any right to expect to be sustained.

But as there is nothing so difficult to reach and to maintain as the simple and unostentatious, and yet energetic benevolence of Christ and his first followers, there is a constant danger, even to the righteous and those most directly engaged in his service, of turning into some by-path which seems to lead in the same direction, of putting that which is subordinate before that which is primary, of making false issues and turning aside to vain jangling; and thus becoming involved in perplexities and cares which never could have come upon them, if they had

pursued the simple line of duty. Oh, how many of the cares connected with rites and ceremonies, and with the maintenance of sectarianism in its various forms, are of this character! How do these cares often dwarf the growth and deform the proportions of religion itself! And can the burden of these be brought to God with the expectation that he will sustain us under them? No. They are to be repented of, and cast off altogether, and never resumed. The only duty we have respecting such cares and burdens is, not to have them at all. They are all sinful in themselves; and they are injurious, as exhausting that energy which ought to be given to the support of those burdens which are truly ours. It is these burdens, and these only, which we have a right to cast upon the Lord—not to free ourselves from responsibility—for the language is, "Cast thy burden upon the Lord, and he shall sustain"—What? The burden? No, but "*thee.*" The promise is that God will sustain us under our burdens, however heavy they may be, if they are the burdens of the righteous; that is, if they are such, not as we have wickedly and wantonly taken upon ourselves, but such as he has appointed for us, and as are assumed out of a regard to his cause.

But perhaps some one may ask at this point, how God can be said to sustain those who are overborne by wickedness, and who finally die in consequence of their burdens, and under their very pressure. How little does such an one know of the range of the spirit, and the power of faith, and the preciousness of the promises, and the consolations of God! I would answer such an one as Christ would have answered one who should have asked him to reconcile what he said about his yoke as easy and his burden as light, with what he said to the same disciples of their being hated of all men and persecuted and killed, for his name's sake. I answer in the words of one who reckoned that the sufferings of the present time were not

worthy to be compared with the glory that shall be revealed in us; who, while he looked at the things which are not seen, could count every affliction which was but for a moment, light, because it was working out for him a far more exceeding and eternal weight of glory; who could say of the Christians in his day, "that though they were killed all the day long, and were counted as sheep for the slaughter, yet that in all these things they were more than conquerors through him that had loved them."

Thus we see precisely the position which every true servant of God must wish, as an individual, to take. He must wish to have the spirit of Christ, to put himself under the great law of love, and then to do and to suffer just all which that law would require. He would wish to accomplish the greatest amount of good within his power; and whatever sacrifices or sufferings he might make or endure, as necessary to this, he would say, in unpresumptuous imitation of Him whose follower he is, "The cup that my Father hath given me, shall I not drink it?"

And what is thus true of an individual Christian, must also be true of a body of Christians, associated for the purpose of promoting any one of those objects which they believe it to be the purpose of God to accomplish. This is the position which this Board of Missions, and every true friend of this blessed cause, must wish to take. For a long time the church neglected to take up this burden. Awakened by the call of Mills and his associates, our predecessors were aroused to a sense of their responsibility. They put their shoulders under this burden. We think they were called upon by God to do it. We do not think that any one of them—no, not even the most devoted missionary—has followed too closely in the footsteps of the Saviour, or borne a burden that was too heavy. If Mills, or Hall, or Evarts, could speak to us to-night, we

do not think that one of them would regret that he had labored or suffered so much. But they have gone, and have transferred the burden to us; and now, as we are true to our trust, our wish is to do and to suffer all that God would have us do and suffer, that the gospel of his Son may become "a light to lighten the Gentiles, and a salvation to the ends of the earth."

The question then arises, what the precise burden is, which God would lay upon us as a Missionary Society.

The importance of this question, and the reason why it presses upon us particularly at this stage of our operations, may be seen, if we compare the present movement with that which took place in the early period of Christianity.

When this movement commenced, it evidently had something of the spirit which actuated the disciples of primitive times. The burden which was felt, arose, not chiefly from a view of the temporal misery and degradation of the heathen, but from their wickedness, and their consequent exposure to eternal death. It was the interests of the soul, in its relations to death and judgment and eternity, that burdened the spirit, and gave energy to effort, and weight to appeals, and which led men to feel that they must, at all hazards, preach "Jesus and salvation" to dying men. It was felt that there was a moral pestilence raging in those regions, which was going on unchecked to its awful issues, and the cry of its victims was ringing in their ears, that they should bear to them the balm of Gilead, and make known the physician that is there. So was it with the primitive Christians. The love of Christ constrained them. Their desire and prayer to God for men was that they might be saved. They were willing—thus illustrating the true and only harmony between a stern regard to principle and a wise regard to expediency—to become all things to all men, that they might *save* some. It was because the gospel of Christ was the power of God unto *salvation*, that they were not

ashamed of it. They felt that they were sent unto the Gentiles, "to open their eyes and to turn them from darkness to light, and from the power of Satan unto God, that they might receive forgiveness of sins and inheritance among them which are sanctified by faith that is in Christ." It was true, indeed, that their doctrine would revolutionize and radically transform society; but as they looked with the eye of faith upon the interests of eternity, the relations and interests of time dwindled into insignificance; and with fearlessness, with simplicity, and with great power, gave they witness to the central and incontrovertible fact of the resurrection of Christ, and to the freeness and preciousness of the salvation that is in Him, and left the event with God. Pursuing this course, Christianity was aggressive and triumphant; and continued to be so till the simplicity and grandeur of their object were lost in those questions which gave rise to sects, and which spring out of the relations of Christianity to the interests of man in the present life. Then the deep waters which had begun to flow, instead of rolling on to fertilize the whole earth, were drained off into the marshes of controversy, and became stagnant; and a region which ought to have been like the garden of God, became the fitting haunt of those apocalyptic frogs which came out of the mouth of the dragon, and of the beast, and of the false prophet. And what thus took place in that wider and mightier movement, it is to be feared may recur in this of our day. As this cause makes progress, it is found to bear upon literature, and science, and civilization, and commerce; and to become complicated, as few would suppose, with questions of church government, and of politics, and of social organization; and there is danger that a desire to promote civilization, and literature, and science, and to remove directly specific forms of evil, moral, social and political, will take the place of the

simple desire to preach Christ and him crucified, and to save men.

The question then recurs, What are the burdens which God would lay upon us?

I have already remarked, that when we, as Christians, undertake to promote an end, we do it because we suppose God intends to accomplish that end, and thus become co-workers with him. The responsibility and burden, therefore, which we assume, must be determined by that purpose of God which we propose to accomplish—that particular result and triumph of his truth which we hope to accelerate, or to augment. But if, guided by revelation, we transport ourselves forward, and take a position where we can look back on the great drama of time as completed, we shall see that the grand results which God has been working out are two; one of which, however, is subservient to the other. The first of these is to have its theatre on this earth, and will involve the full and perfect triumph of Christianity over every thing that opposes itself to it. The stone that was cut out without hands, must become a great mountain, and fill the whole earth. "The earth shall be filled with the knowledge of the glory of the Lord, as the waters cover the sea." Sooner or later, in one way or another, the time must come, when the evils which now provoke the vengeance of heaven and curse humanity, shall come to an end; when wars, and intemperance, and licentiousness, and fraud, and slavery, and all oppression shall cease; when men shall show a true love to themselves by obedience to all the natural laws of God, and a true love to each other and to God by an obedience to all his moral laws; when all the energies of society, instead of being wasted in indolence, or dissipated and palsied by vice, or misdirected by ambition, shall be called out under the direction of a science that can avail itself of the agencies of nature in a way now wholly unknown, and shall be employed in

beautifying the earth and adding to the comforts of man; when family jars, and sectarian zeal, and party spirit shall cease; and, through the transforming influence of Christianity, there shall be a condition of society as perfect as we can conceive of in the present state; when the kingdom of God shall be set up, and his will shall be done on the earth. It is from partial glimpses of this state, and an attempt to remove particular evils which are supposed to be the chief obstacle in the way of its advent, without any perception of the deep-seated and radical difficulty in the very nature of man, which nothing but the religion of Christ can remove—the plague-spot that his blood alone can cleanse—that there are so many reformers of the world crying, Lo here! and lo there! whom we are not to go after nor to follow.

But if it is specifically for *this* state that we are to labor, then we can make no difference between what is, and what is not, missionary ground. There is no city, or village, or family, on the face of the earth, where this state is commenced; and when we look at nominal Christendom, and see how utterly alien from the spirit of Christ are its general maxims and its current of feeling; how its energies and resources flow in channels that were never marked out by the finger of God, and that the little portion of those energies and resources that is devoted to Him and his service, is but as the light mist which ascends from the surface of the river, to the great body of its waters; when we see its religious divisions and animosities, and these too growing more broad and inveterate, and its deep-seated moral corruptions; when we see how much there is of faithful preaching of the gospel, and how general and systematic is its rejection; we feel that there is on every side of us a call for Christian labor, and that, unless there shall be brought about another proportion altogether of the aggressive and the resisting forces, the new order of things can never come. To labor for the

accomplishment of this object in his family and neighborhood, is the business of every individual Christian; it is the business of every church to labor for it in its vicinity; and in doing this there is no vice or form of evil which they must not approach and attempt to remove; not a weed, great or small, is to be left standing in the garden of God. But this is not missionary labor; it is but as the farming and gardening of our thickly settled States, while the axe of the missionary startles the ear of silence in the unbroken forest.

But there is another result which God has in view, to which this, of which I have now spoken, is but as the widening of the river at its mouth, to the ocean into which it flows. This is that which lies beyond the general judgment. This, eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, nor hath it entered into the heart of man to conceive. Every thing relating to this is vast beyond our thought. Those simple words, "Eternal life;" those words of our Saviour, "Then shall the righteous shine forth as the sun in the kingdom of their Father;" the capacities of the soul, and the endless duration upon which it enters; the joy of angels on the conversion of one sinner; the coming and sufferings and death of the Son of God—all show that this result, even in the case of a single soul, far transcends our conceptions. It is salvation! "Salvation which is in Christ Jesus, with eternal glory"—salvation through the blood of the Lamb! And then, when we look at the numbers without number of the redeemed, every one of them circling nearer and nearer the eternal throne, till he is lost in a brightness which our present vision cannot penetrate; and at the wonderful revelation of the glory of God, of his mingled justice and mercy, which is made, and shall be forever, in every one of these—we see a result worthy of this strange scene of six thousand years; of its central figure, the cross of Christ; and of its closing scenes, the final conflagration, and the general judgment.

Now every soul that becomes a partaker of this salvation, though he may have contributed nothing to the perfection of society on earth,—though, like the dying thief, it may have been in the hour of his last agony that he turned an eye of faith upon a crucified Redeemer,—will yet swell the glory of that result.

It was this salvation, that he, whom, without irreverence, we may call the First Great Missionary, came from heaven to provide and to publish; it is the fact that there is such a salvation, that lies at the root of missions, and supplies the circulating sap of all their vitality. This salvation it is our business, as a missionary society, to make known to the ends of the earth, to preach it to every creature, to proclaim it in every place, till the message shall find such a lodgment as to give us assurance that it will continue to be proclaimed there; and then, having, like the great apostle, no more place in those parts, to pass on to places where Christ has not been named. Certainly there ought to be an agency for proclaiming these glad tidings every where, simply as tidings, to all classes of men, however wicked and debased; and giving them an opportunity to embrace this salvation, without waiting to perfect society, or to adjust the nicer questions of theological controversy. Certainly, for the sake of the church itself, there should be enterprises like this; in which Christians, who may still differ in many things, may unite, as brethren, their prayers and efforts; and which may be as cope-stones along the arch of the spiritual temple, where the tracery that springs from different points and adorns its sides, may intertwine its branches, and give unity and symmetry to the whole. This gives us the distinction between missionary labor and all other; this gives us our principle, however difficult, in particular cases, its application may be.

Our object thus being the salvation of men, the burden which rests upon us, is not simply a proclamation of the

gospel among the heathen, but *such a proclamation of it as shall save the soul.* If we fail of this, we fail of our object altogether. I do not say that we do no good, but we fail of the object we have in view—of that which is the very soul of our enterprise. We are not a society for promoting civilization, or literature, or the arts; but for saving men; and the great reason why this is not more fully accomplished, is because our missionaries and our Board, and the Christian public who act with us, are not more ready to take up just the burden that is necessary to accomplish this. This is not the giving of money. Money cannot convert a soul. Any amount of this may be given, and nothing be effected, except that a certain sum has changed hands. Money! why the heathen give far more money for the support of the pomps and follies of their religions, than we do for the spread of ours. It is not the establishment of seminaries, or of printing-presses, or of any external apparatus. No; but it is that constraining love of Christ, and that sense of the infinite value of salvation, which leads the missionary to *preach the word*, in season and out of season; to testify publicly and from house to house of the grace of God; which would lead our missionary boards and the Christian public to sympathize with their missionaries in these feelings, and to sustain them constantly in the arms of faith and of prayer; which would fill the monthly concerts all over the land, and cause those who were there to plead earnestly with God, and, like Jacob, say to him, 'We will not let thee go, except thou bless us.' It is one thing to give money, and print reports, and go across the ocean and establish a station, and print books, and tell them something of the Christian religion, and how it differs from theirs; and quite another to go to them as Brainerd did to his poor Indians, as those who are under the wrath of God, who must accept of his mercy in Christ or perish; and by the very agony of prayer, and the earnestness of

preaching connected with it, to be the means of such outpourings of the Holy Spirit, and of such manifest and surprising conversions to God. Those Indians have probably had no agency in perfecting society upon earth; their very tribes have perished; but they now shine as stars in the crown of their Redeemer; and those conversions were worth more than all the results of great meetings, and speeches, and munificent donations, from which the spirit of prayer and of God is absent, and which are not connected with the salvation of the soul. There was connected with them more true missionary labor.

That we have failed, and that this has been our great failure, of taking up this burden as we ought, there can be no doubt. Whether wrong principles have in any case been adopted in pursuing things incidental too much, I cannot say; but they certainly have been pursued too exclusively. There has been a withdrawing of the spirit from those higher regions of spiritual sympathy, and struggle, and communion with Christ in the fellowship of his sufferings; and all the channels of that sympathy have been left empty and dry; and so while there has been external activity, and some good has been done, there has yet, around many of the missionary stations, not been the greenness and verdure which we hoped to see. So has it been; so is it now. And unless this Board and its friends come together with the confession of their sin in this, and with a readiness to assume this burden more fully for the future, and to cast themselves upon the Lord, that they may be sustained in bearing it, then that which is really the cause of missions will go backwards, and we shall have perplexities and burdens come upon us as judgments, and under them God will not sustain us.

But, it may be asked, are we to neglect literature and science, education, and forms of government, and civilization? Are not these valuable in themselves, and are they not important aids in promoting Christianity? Are

we to narrow our views to a single object, and not rather to take those that are comprehensive and enlarged?

The general question here involved there is not now time fully to discuss. From the first there have been two theories of missions, according to one of which we are to introduce Christianity at once, as a means of salvation, and to leave other things to follow in its train; and according to the other, we are to introduce other things as the means of introducing Christianity. I do not mean that missions have been established distinctly and avowedly on these two principles, but that in the minds and in the labors of some, the spirit of the first method, which may be called the method of faith,—and in the minds and the labors of others, the spirit of the second method, which may be called the method of philosophy, has predominated. Now we believe in the method of faith. We believe that the greater will include the less—that, as a general thing, under God's government, and more especially where, as in a tree or an animal, or a human being, or in the social state, our object is to be reached by a process of development, the attainment of the highest end must ultimately involve that of all others. We believe that the religious nature of man is that which is deepest and most radical in him; and that it is only as that is quickened, that motives of sufficient power to induce him to break away from the vices and degradations which are opposed to a high civilization as well as to a true religion, can be brought to bear upon him. We believe that, except as this nature is quickened and directed and strengthened by Christianity, any form of civilization that may exist will fall in by its own weight; that literature will become corrupted and a curse; that social life will be full of jarring elements; and that inventions in the arts, and those improvements which facilitate the intercouse of men, and every thing which gives an accelerated movement to society, will be but as the laying down of the

iron track, and the concentration of energy in the iron horse, that shall prepare the way for the shocks of more awful and destructive collisions. We do not find—and the fact is to be noted—that Christ or his apostles made any inventions or discoveries in the arts and sciences, or sought directly to promote literature. We believe that the preaching of "Christ and him crucified," and that only, is "the wisdom of God and the power of God unto salvation;" and that, if we can so plant and water the tree of life that we shall have the fruit that is unto eternal life, we shall have also the green leaves, and the fragrance, and the broad shade of a right social state; and we think but lightly of that kind of enlargement and liberality of view, which would lead any one to leave his appropriate work at the root of this tree and be looking all over the branches, and spending his minute and fruitless labors around its individual fruit-stalks, and the pedunclcs of its leaves. The principle here indicated we hold to be essential in the first planting of Christianity; and even after it is established, it may be doubted whether it will not be found that those who attempt to carry society forward on any other principle, will "labor in the very fire, and weary themselves for very vanity."

We see then, distinctly, what our object is; and what the great burden is which we must assume, if we would accomplish it. It is one which the world knows nothing of; which none but those who sympathize with Christ in that spirit which brought him to this world can know. But as we move on under this, we find, at different points, individual burdens which often press upon us with great weight. Such have, at times, been the want of suitable men as missionaries; the removal by death of able and distinguished helpers; the interference of popery; persecutions among the heathen, and perhaps defections among those, who, it was hoped, would stand firm; a

want of pecuniary means, and revulsions in the commercial world. Of this class of burdens, which must vary at different times, I shall at present speak of only two.

The first is, the state of the churches at home—the alarming and general suspension of divine influences, and the consequent evils that are every where creeping in. The apostle well understood his subject when he compared a Christian community to an organized body, in which, if one member suffer, all the members suffer with it. Water cannot rise higher than its source. If Christianity is to go out from us, we can send only such as we have. If our churches are in a degenerate, and languid, and worldly state, and have little care for the conversion of men around them, they will have still less for that of the heathen. Prayer will cease; the contributions will fall away; missionaries of the right stamp cannot be had; unexpected obstacles will arise; the hands of those in the field will be weakened; the strength of the bearers of burdens will be decayed, and there will be much rubbish so that they will not be able to build the wall. We are indeed assembled to deliberate for the salvation of the heathen; but when we see the wo of Bethsaida so dreadfully incurred by our own congregations, and that gospel which we would send far away, apparently so powerless as it is preached at home; when we see our young men growing up, and those who are educated going into the world, without religion; and when we look at the immediate and more remote bearings of all this upon the cause of missions, we must feel that this state of things is pressing as a heavy burden upon us. Oh that this great and solemn convocation might so feel this burden, and so cast it upon the Lord, that a spirit may go forth from this place that shall revive the waste places of Zion, and cause the wilderness and solitary place to rejoice!

The second burden of this kind which I shall mention,

is one which probably would not exist with much severity of pressure, were it not for the first. It is, that the friends of missions are not altogether agreed among themselves respecting the true burdens, which, as associated together in this enterprise, they ought to assume. There is doubtless an honest difference of opinion among good men, true friends of this cause and of the Redeemer's kingdom, more particularly on the subject of slavery, how far we ought to go, and what precise course we ought to adopt. This subject I mention here, not for the purpose of discussing it, for this is not the place; but because it is a great and difficult subject, and many, and perhaps all the friends of this cause, have come together feeling that it must press as a peculiar burden upon this meeting of the Board. God forbid that this Board should not assume fully every burden on this subject which the God of missions would lay upon them. I hope and believe it is their desire to do so. God forbid that they should do any thing to countenance or to sustain the curse of slavery, or that in their own onward movement they should create backwater that would retard the vessel freighted with any other benevolent enterprise. But then, on the other hand, there are evils equally obvious, and perhaps equally great, which must ensue, if this body should turn aside from its appropriate work—if elements should enter permanently into its discussions and counsels, which must, in a body constituted like this, become the elements of distraction, and of disaster to the heathen world; but which might be appropriately and successfully controlled by organizations formed for the purpose, and be combined to issues that should be for the glory of God, and the good of the slave.

And while there are these dangers on the one hand and on the other, such as nothing but the wisdom and grace of God can enable us to avoid, the heart bleeds at the thought, that, in a day like this, Christian brethren cannot

agree to labor together in sending the gospel of peace and love to the heathen. That in this day,—when divisions are extending so widely; when the dragon of popery is pursuing the church wherever she goes into the wilderness of heathenism, and stands ready to devour every child of her missions that may be born; when the malaria that comes up from his seat is borne on every breeze across the ocean, and is beginning here and there to render thick and stifling the free air to which we were born; when the missionaries are struggling and dying in the field for want of help; when the whole heathen world is open to us, and from its length and its breadth the Macedonian cry comes up; when it doth seem that if we all would but unitedly put our shoulders under this ark of God, (for under this dispensation he has made us all priests unto Him,) and bear it forward, the Jordan of our difficulties would open before us, and we might go in and possess the promised land;—that in such a day there should be danger that that union which is strength will be dissolved—that on any ground those who have labored and have loved to labor together in this good cause will fall out by the way, and bring reproach on the name of Christ, in the sight of the heathen and of those who watch for our halting—is a thought that cannot fail to be as a heavy burden upon every heart that loves the cause of God. May that God who has hitherto interposed in behalf of this cause, prevent it!

But whatever may be the burdens now resting upon us, I may remark here, that probably they will not, as a whole, be less in time to come. There are some who suppose that we are on the borders of the millennium, and that obstacles are to give way of themselves; that as the church begins to move upon the old strong holds and fortresses of sin, she will find them dismantled, and the gates wide open, and those who had hitherto defended

them waiting with open arms to receive her. But that law under which the love that would reclaim men and bring them back to God was of old espoused to struggle and suffering, has not been repealed, and is not likely to be in our day. The great adversary of God and man is not asleep; and we may be sure, if some fortresses seem to be weakened or abandoned, and some batteries to be quiet, that it is because there are masked batteries preparing, and mines dug, and trains laid, it may be under our very feet. He must have read history and man to little purpose, and know little of the deep-seated opposition of this world to the cross of Christ and his simple and spiritual religion, who sees any thing in the improvements or enlightenment, or in what is called the liberality of the nineteenth century, which is to prevent the fires of persecution and the agonies and triumphs of martyrdom. He must have looked upon passing events with but a listless eye, who has not seen indications that such things are on their way. Some of these are to be found in the tendency to unchecked democracy and the spirit of mobs; in the prevalence of infidelity; in the increase and power of popery; and in the relations of these to each other.

There is evidently a kind of worship of democracy, and even an endeavor on the part of some to identify it with Christianity, without reference to the materials of which it is composed. But while a democracy in which every man should obey God, and love his neighbor as himself, would be well; an infidel and atheistic democracy, manifesting, as it certainly would, the animalism of the brute with the art and malignity of the fiend, would give us the most vivid image of hell upon earth of which we can conceive. That there is, through the prevalence of this spirit, a gradual lowering down of authority, and a loosening of restraint, and a tendency to mobs, and a feeling of insecurity, cannot be denied; and than such a spirit, not all the art this side the pit, no, nor in

it, could have devised a more appropriate agency to be made ready to the hands of the Jesuit, by which, in the very name and under the guise of liberty, he might heave from its base, and cause to go down in a sea of anarchy and blood that standing point, which, in the name of humanity, we had reached—that που στω which we fondly hoped we had found, where we could place the lever that should lift a fallen world to freedom and to God. This, Rome and despotism well understand, and they are pouring in the materials of which mobs are made. Then there is the spirit of infidelity in its various forms, more extensive than many suppose. There is the coarse and brutal infidelity of ignorance and vice, that bandages its own eyes, and, under the goad of passion, rushes into sin as the horse into the battle; then there is the more refined and plausible infidelity, that would fain pluck leaves from the tree of science to cover its nakedness; and then there is that, perhaps not less dangerous and envenomed, which may be found coiled up under the broad robe of latitudinarian charity with which some Christian sects choose to cover themselves; and between this, too, in whatever form, and popery, it will yet be found that there is a deep affinity. They have need of each other. It is upon such forms as those of popery, that, in those hours of misgiving which it often has, infidelity loves to pillow its head; and then, with her penances and superstitions, the arch-sorceress well knows how to drug into stupidity the little conscience it had left, and, in the name of God, to put into its hand the dagger of persecution with which to stab the vitals of liberty and true religion. And when we remember how rapidly popery is increasing, and that it has lost none of its art, or of its blood-thirsty spirit, we cannot fail to feel how ominous it is that, on such a wonderful theatre, these three elements are beginning to come into such close and extraordinary contact. It would not be surprising, if, as

they mingle, scenes should be revealed which may find a parallel only in the French revolution. And then, when we remember the materials of hate between the native and the foreigner, between the capitalist and the laborer, and hear the low growl of agrarianism; when we remember sectional jealousies, and the distracting relations of slavery; and see how easily the standard of a civil and a servile war might be unfurled; we cannot feel that the burden that rests upon the church in reference to the cause of Christ here, or in foreign lands, is likely to be diminished in our day. No, it will be increased. The call for prayer, and contributions, and effort, will be more and more urgent, till, under the pressure of such a burden, we can only go and cast it upon the Lord.

And this, Fathers and Brethren, I now invite you to do. Your burden is great. To you the churches are looking, to you the missionaries, to you the heathen. Upon you are dependent thousands and tens of thousands for the bread of life, and from stations upon which the sun never sets, that gleam amidst the darkness of heathenism, along the continents, and the islands of the sea, they turn their eyes to you, and they beseech you, by the love and example of Christ, not to "fail or to be discouraged till judgment shall be set in the earth, and the isles shall wait for his law." But great as the burden is, cast it upon the Lord, and he shall sustain you.

I cannot but think that, in this simple principle of taking up just the burden that God would lay upon us, and then casting it upon Him, we find our true position—the only position of true dignity, of usefulness and peace. Thus doing, it is evident that the simpler and more spiritual is our object, the less embarrassed and the more efficient may be our action. But whatever object we may feel bound to adopt, we shall never become committed to any thing but to the cause of God. Thus shall we be

saved, both from embarrassment and from disappointment. We shall never become committed to any former course of action. Our prejudices and pride of consistency we shall sacrifice before this principle. Dear as this Board is to us, we shall not be committed to it, except as its cause is the cause of God. Dear and cherished as other objects may be, we shall not wish to press them here, except as by so doing we may promote the cause of God. This principle will teach us where to yield and where to be firm; and while we are careful to take up, each one his own burden, it will lead us also, in meekness and forbearance to "*bear one another's burdens*, and so fulfil the law of Christ." Thus doing, the embarrassments and complications that grow out of selfishness, and pride, and a desire to promote personal objects, will be removed, and we shall all hear the one voice of the Captain of our salvation as he leads his hosts to the conflict, saying, "FOLLOW ME."

Fathers and Brethren, in thus calling upon you to cast your burden upon the Lord, I cannot forget that I am speaking to those who have long known what it is to bear burdens, and to cast them upon Him—yes, and *to be sustained too.* I speak to some upon whom the burden of this cause lay in its infancy. Do you remember, venerable men, how heavily it pressed upon you then, when you had small means, and no experience, and all was dark? And where did you go? Do you remember when you saw the sails expand and lessen in the distance, that bore the first missionaries from these shores? And where did you go then? Do you remember when your missionaries seemed to be shut out from the whole heathen world? And where did you go then? Do you remember, Fathers and Brethren, more recent days of darkness, and how you went to God, and how he removed you out of a strait into a large place, and compassed you about with songs of deliverance? Do you remember the dark-

ness that might be felt when the commercial pressure was on the nation; and when, as the burden was cast upon God in prayer, his Spirit came down into the special meeting, and made the place as Goshen, where there was light? Did we ever, in all the history of this Board, cast our burden upon the Lord, and find his promise fail? No, never; and we never shall.

To thee, then, O thou God of missions, according to thy command, we unitedly come and plead thy promise. This is not our cause, but thine. Thou knowest perfectly the burden that is pressing upon us in bearing it forward. That burden we cast upon thee. SUSTAIN THOU US.—Amen.

SERMON,

DELIVERED AT PLYMOUTH AT THE ANNIVERSARY OF THE LANDING OF THE PILGRIMS.

December 22, 1846.

And all ye are brethren.—MATTHEW xxiii. 8.

WHEN Columbus spread his sails to explore the western ocean, it was his theory, and his hope, that he might find in that direction, a passage to those Indies which had been already discovered. He little dreamed that, in accomplishing this, he should become the discoverer of a new world. We honor the sagacity and the enterprise of the great navigator; but we also adore that Providence, which, through the mists of his uncertain and imperfect theories, not only revealed a new hemisphere, but brought to light the figure and extent of the globe on which we dwell, and freighted his ships with its moral and political destinies. Highly and justly as we honor his name, how little did he comprehend those results of his voyage which even yet but begin to be realized, and which must swell in interest and in magnitude till the end of time! He had in view the extension of commerce and of science; but God had in view the discovery of a refuge to which his church might flee when she should be persecuted, the extension of human liberty, the subversion of thrones and dynasties, and the transfer of the seat of empire.

When our Fathers, with no less of fortitude and of sagacity, in the midst of prayers and of tears, with their wives and their little ones about them, started not on a voyage of discovery from which they hoped to return laden with glory, but intentionally severed forever the ties which bound them to their country, and sought, beyond the ocean, a wilderness for a home, they had in view religious freedom, the right education of their children, and the extension of the true religion among the savages. Little did they think, that out of their sacred sense of obligation to instruct their children, there should extend among millions a more equal diffusion of knowledge than the world had ever seen—that by the side of that religious liberty which they chiefly sought, and springing from the same root watered by so many tears, there should shoot up a tree of civil freedom, which should refresh a continent by its shade—that with the extension of their principles and institutions, there would be new combinations of the political and social elements, which should test and establish the capacity of man for self-government; in which the glare of all adventitious distinctions should disappear before the rights and the worth of individual man; in which the great principle of equality—equality before God through the one Mediator, and equality before the eye of impartial law—should be established; and in which there should be an approximation in society more near than had ever been known before, to that brotherhood of the race, that state of equality and affection which is the only one suited to Christian people, and which is indicated in that far reaching annunciation of the text, "And all ye are brethren." Columbus sought a passage to the Indies, and God revealed to him the whole rounded inheritance which he created in the beginning, and intended for the use of civilized man. Our Fathers sought for religious freedom, and God led them on to the practical recognition of those

principles laid down by Christ, in accordance with which alone man can obtain that political and social and moral inheritance of which his nature is evidently capable, and which we believe God intended for him.

It is not, therefore, merely to honor men, that we celebrate this day. We look back to the event it commemorates as a great historical epoch—the opening of a new era to this continent, and to the world; and much as we honor the agency and the persons of the Pilgrims, we see far higher reasons for recognizing the hand, and celebrating the agency of the Pilgrim's God. Well then may we come, in sympathy with the spirit of our Fathers, to a *religious* celebration of this day; and far distant may be the time, when, under the pretence of honoring their virtues, it shall be desecrated by those scenes of sensuality and of frivolity into which such occasions sometimes degenerate, which would offend even the piety of the present day, and which we might almost expect would stir the bones of those godly men, and call them up from their rest of centuries to rebuke the degeneracy of those who should claim to be their descendants. If, however, such a time should ever come, it would not be the first instance in the history of the world, in which the tombs of the prophets have been built, and the sepulchres of the righteous have been garnished, by those of a very different spirit.

And not only do we wish to celebrate this day in the spirit of the Forefathers, but, followed as we are by the representatives and spiritual descendants of those who persecuted them and drove them hither, and told as we are by them, that our churches are no churches, our ministers no ministers, our sacraments no sacraments, our marriages no marriages, and, while they lack as yet that power of persecution for which their system has such an affinity, only given over to the "uncovenanted mercies of God," we wish to reaffirm, on this consecrated spot,

the principles of the Puritans, to thank God that their blood runs in our veins, and to encourage each other to stand fast in that liberty wherewith Christ hath made us free; while yet we would learn, in their application to those who vilify us as well as to others, the full import of those words of our Saviour, "And all ye are brethren."

The term brethren, as used in the text, indicates equality and affection, and the proposition which I suppose it involves, and which I propose to illustrate, is, that the form of society contemplated by Christianity as best adapted to the nature of man, its ultimate and most perfect form, whether manifesting itself through the church or the state, will be one of which these two elements shall form the basis. This topic I regard as appropriate to the present occasion, because a state of society which should be moulded under the full influence of these principles, would be the matured fruit of which the enterprise of our Fathers was the bud. Without themselves seeing their full extent, or admitting all their consequences, these seem to have been the great guiding ideas under the influence of which they acted.

In considering the proposition, that equality and affection must form the basis of a perfect society, the main inquiries will be, first, how far it is sanctioned by the Scriptures; and secondly, how far it is in accordance with the nature of man. Before entering upon these points, however, it may be well to ascertain what we mean by equality, as here used. And first, we mean by this nothing that will imply a disregard of any relation constituted by God. The family state is an ordinance of God, intended to train men for society here, and for heaven. The inferiority it implies is inevitable, and is under the guardianship of a natural affection which would make the highest good of the parent and the child identical, and would secure that of both in the most effectual

way. The more perfectly the rights and duties growing out of these relations are regarded, the better will those who are, not so much members of society, as in a state of training to become so, be qualified to enter upon their wider and more responsible duties in such a way as to guard and perpetuate a true equality. Of this relation of the family to the state, and of family subordination to ultimate equality, our Fathers were well aware; and hence their great care in family instruction and government. Nor, again, does equality imply any disregard of natural endowments, or of eminent qualities; any want of perception of those varieties of character on the ground of which, while we are to treat all men with benevolence, we are yet to have a higher respect for some than for others. It would be as easy to stop the flowing of the tides when the moon draws them, as to stop the tide of honor and respect which sets towards true worth in a free community. Nor, will equality imply that every man shall have an equal amount of knowledge or of property. These, aside from moral character, are the great means of influence; but if we make men equal in these to-day, they will either cease to be so to-morrow, or you must put cramping irons upon society that would destroy all freedom. Equality of condition could result only from the most arbitrary rule, and the grossest injustice.

What then does equality imply? Simply that every man shall have an equal right to use the faculties and means of happiness which God has given him, as he pleases, provided he does not interfere with the rights of others. It would imply the largest liberty of the individual that would not make liberty minister to anarchy and injustice. It would also imply in the constitution of society the absence of any thing artificial, whether an order of nobility constituted by the state, or a self-constituted secret society, which should divert the currents of wealth or of influence from those natural channels in

which they would otherwise flow. This would open a career to every man, would leave every man free to shape his own destiny, and would enable him to find his true place in society. This, too, would bring individuals together by affinities that would most beautify and strengthen society, just as matter will crystalize into its most beautiful and compact forms only when its particles can move freely among themselves. We cannot suppose it was intended that society should lie in regular and unchangeable strata one above the other, with here and there a monarchical elevation upheaved ages ago by some political earthquake. Equality would rather require that each individual should be as a separate drop of water mingled with a homogeneous mass, in which each particle is subject to the same laws, and each finds an equal facility in coming up to the light and warmth of the surface. It would not be necessary that each particle should actually be at the surface an equal length of time, but we would have no horizontal partition drawn through the ocean to prevent the drops beneath from rising; nor would we have the surface congealed into an aristocracy, to prevent the free action of the waters below and the access to them of the air and the sunlight.

The idea of equality, then, would simply require the largest liberty to the individual that would be compatible with the good of the whole, and a constitution of society which should present no obstacle to an interchange of places among its members, when that would be produced in consequence of the honorable efforts, or of the character and personal qualities of individuals.

Equality thus understood, is the democratic and centrifugal element in society, and it is the great mistake of many to suppose that the attainment of this is all that would be necessary to its perfect state. Demagogues flatter the people, that nothing more than this would be necessary to bring in a political millennium. But cer-

tainly nothing could be worse than this, without some aggregating force, either from without to press, or from within to draw, individuals together. It is the right centripetal and constituting force that is chiefly needed, and if one can be found which shall not only be compatible with individual liberty, but which shall be strong as a bond of union just in proportion to the enlargement of that liberty, then the great social problem of the harmony of individual freedom with the unity and efficiency of governmental and social action, will be solved. But the solution of a problem whose conditions are so apparently incompatible, was not left to human wisdom. It furnishes another example of the simple yet exhaustless wisdom of Christ. In the affection and brotherhood everywhere inculcated by him we have precisely such a principle, and the only one possible. It must be borne in mind, therefore, in our discussion, first, that it is not every kind of equality for which I contend; nor, secondly, any kind of equality standing alone; but an equality of rights balanced by an affection based upon principle, which should constitute society a brotherhood.

We are now prepared to inquire how far such a state of things would be either required, or permitted, by the Scriptures.

And here we are ready to say, that we do not suppose that the Scriptures have laid down, as indispensable, any one form of government, either in church, or in state. This they could not have done wisely, because different forms must be required as the individuals composing society have greater or less power of self-government. The general method of the Scriptures is to make the tree good; to strike not at this or that particular form of wickedness, but at its root in the alienation of man from his Maker: and they take it for granted, that when they have made all the individuals who compose society, honest, and be-

nevolent, and pure-minded, and disposed to submit to all lawful authority as ordained of God, the forms in which that authority will be administered will be brought, without difficulty or violence, into a correspondence with the pervading spirit of the community. Hence, while we are to look for no specific form of government as laid down in the Bible, we may properly inquire what form would be most congenial with the spirit which it inculcates, and with its ultimate aims.

But, on this point, can there be a difference of opinion? What can be the meaning of the text, taken in its connection? "But be not ye called Rabbi; for one is your Master, even Christ; and all ye are brethen. And call no man your father upon the earth; for one is your Father, which is in heaven. Neither be ye called masters; for one is your Master, even Christ. But he that is greatest among you shall be your servant." It may, indeed, be said, that this was addressed to the apostles only, and that it proves nothing more than the doctrine of ministerial parity, and the utter incongruity there is between both the letter and spirit of the New Testament, and that assumption of authority, whether spiritual or temporal, by which those who have claimed to be the ministers of Him who was the impersonation of meekness and love, have domineered over, and persecuted his church. But if we suppose this passage to refer more particularly to ecclesiastical relations, let us turn to a passage in the twentieth chapter of this same gospel, which certainly does not refer to these, and both together will cover the whole ground. We there see, in two of the disciples, the anxieties and intrigues of a spirit which was looking forward to temporal power. This was the object they had in their thoughts, and must have been the object our Saviour had in view in his rebuke to them, and in his more general instructions. Hear, then, the words of our Saviour, spoken under circumstances to give them special weight, for we are told that he

called them unto him, and said, "Ye know that the princes of the Gentiles exercise dominion over them, and they that are great exercise authority upon them. But it shall not be so among you: but whosoever will be great among you, let him be your minister; and whosoever will be chief among you, let him be your servant: even as the Son of man came, not to be ministered unto, but to minister, and to give his life a ransom for many." Here we find the true foundation of the highest greatness, and a perception, which can be accounted for only on the supposition of a divine wisdom, of the true relations of the governing and the governed.

But if any one should still choose to say, that Christ had no reference in any case to political regulations, that he abstained wholly from all connection with civil government; yet no good reason could be assigned why the same principles which are wisest and best in one relation, should not be carried out into others. Why should not a Christian state, if indeed the church would not become the state, be fashioned after the model of a Christian church, as Moses was directed to make the earthly tabernacle after the pattern showed him in the mount? Doubtless our Saviour looked forward to the time, when there should be, what there are not now, and probably never have been, Christian governments, whose acts should express the will of a nation of Christians; when there should be the only union of church and state that would be desirable, when every magistrate, and every subject, should be a true member of his church, and thus the laws of his house, and the affection of Christian brotherhood, should comprehend and modify the relations of ruler and people. In that case society would become instinct with the power of self-government, virtually a theocracy, whose *Shekinah* would take up its abode in the conscience of every man; and whose civil government, when its functions should be required, would be simply the organism

which the public life would form for itself, not for the protection of rights, or for internal control, but for the accomplishment of public ends. In the nature of the case, a true religion, doing its work fully upon each individual, must pervade every thing by its spirit. When the waters of the sanctuary, which are now but to the ankles of society, shall rise and swell as they must, they will become an ocean for it to swim in. (Ezek. xlvii.)

Without, therefore, going into an extended and critical argument from the Scriptures, inappropriate to the time, and to the occasion, suffice it to say, that they contain nothing contradictory to the spirit of the passages which I have now quoted. In them the assumptions of popery, and the spirit of high-churchism in all its forms, find no countenance, and they are mentioned only to have placed upon them the ban of prophetic denunciation. Coming to individuals, and doing its great work upon them as the subjects of God's government, and doing a similar work upon each, by which all become actuated by similar motives, attached to similar objects, and assimilated to one great model, Christianity will necessarily constitute a strong bond of union, and promote a spirit of brotherhood and equality among men. If, therefore, we may not say that the Scriptures require, we are entirely safe in saying that they permit, a state of society which should be based on equality and affection, and that this would best harmonize with their general spirit.

We are now prepared to inquire, how far the proposition laid down as involved in the text, is in accordance with the constitution of man.

When I speak of the adaptation of a form of government, or of society, to the constitution of man, I mean by it, its adaptation, not to aggrandize individuals or classes, not to promote any selfish end, but to call out his faculties most fully, and to promote, in the highest degree, the

individual and social good of the whole. That different forms of goverment are required by man in the great variety of states in which he is found, I readily admit; I admit also that there is in him a great flexibility and power of adaptation to these forms, so that individuals may perhaps reach equal perfection under them all; but it is hardly probable that any two will be equally favorable to the highest culture and best good of a whole people.

I observe then, first, that that form of government would be most in accordance with the constitution of man, which should best secure those conditions, in connection with which individual and social man may attain most fully his end.

Government is not an end, but a means; and no government can be a good one, which does not propose to itself, and secure, the true ends for which a government ought to be instituted. It is not among the chief of these ends, to promote, directly, the prosperity of a people. That must arise from the active principles of their nature rightly directed—from their intelligence, and industry, and virtue. Where these are wanting, there can be no prosperity; and it is the business of government to secure those conditions through which these shall be most fully elicited, and have the widest scope. Any government which does this, whatever its form, may be regarded as a good one, and any one which does not do this, is not a good one.

The conditions which a government ought thus to secure, I suppose to be, first, the personal liberty and equality of which I have already spoken. This would involve the tenure of property by freehold, and an absence of all enactments in regard to both property and rank, which should prevent these from following their natural laws, as dependent upon individual character and exertion.

A second condition would be, a general, and as nearly as possible, an equal diffusion of knowledge in the community.

A third condition would be, security. It is not enough that the persons and property of men, may be, and perhaps as a matter of fact, are, let alone. What is needed is, a feeling of security that they will be thus let alone while men demean themselves as good citizens. This feeling may be destroyed quite as effectually by the spirit of mobs, as by the caprice, or avarice, or tyranny of a single individual. There are indeed numerous reasons why one tyrant is to be preferred to many.

A fourth condition is, a cheap and prompt administration of justice, when the rights of person or of property are violated.

I mention as a fifth condition, religious freedom—the practical recognition of the great doctrine that God is the sole lord of the conscience. This may be said to be involved in the condition first mentioned; but on this spot, on this day, as well as from its intimate connection with civil liberty and all high culture, it demands a separate place. Religious Freedom! This has been the starting point and support of civil freedom, from the day when an apostle uttered those memorable words, "We ought to obey God, rather than men," until now. Where this is, in connection with the free circulation of the Bible, there civil liberty will be. Where this is not, there, in this age of the world, civil liberty will not be. The power that can bind the conscience, that strong man of our nature, will enter in and spoil the whole house. Religious Freedom! The rights of conscience! Even yet so little understood, so partially enjoyed! For this it is that the race now sighs and waits, and the birth-throes of which, for the whole world, shall be the next general convulsion of the nations.

Let these conditions exist, and if a people do not become

prosperous and happy, no earthly power can make them so. But while I admit that these conditions, or the most of them, are possible under widely different forms of government, and of course that these, and not the forms, are to be mainly regarded, it is yet clear that they would be much more likely to exist in connection with some forms than with others. How has this been hitherto? Have these conditions been secured to the mass of men by the governments that have existed? Let history answer. Nothing can be plainer, than that the interests of the governments and of the people, have been regarded, not as identical, not as merely separate, but as opposite. The end of governments has been, either to strengthen themselves against the people, or to make them subservient to their plans of avarice or of ambition. The great cause of this, undoubtedly, has been that general corruption of our nature, and proclivity of it to evil, from which it results that the characters of men are so much more generally formed by their temptations than by their duties. While this remains, no perfect remedy can be found, and hence we are never to forget, that our most hopeful labors are those in which we seek to change the character of the mass, by casting in the leaven of Christianity. Still, as a wheel can be so made as to turn under water by the force of that very water which we should suppose would prevent its motion, so something may be done by wisely balancing against each other the natural principles of action, and by such adjustments, that even selfishness itself shall often bring its weight to bear at the same point with patriotism, and thus aid in giving to the wheel of government an energetic and equable motion.

This point must certainly be most fully reached in a *republic*, where the people choose their rulers for a limited time, and where the rulers are not only responsible to them, but return to mingle with them, and to be themselves subject to the laws which they have made. It is

as if every physician should be obliged, after having prescribed for his patient, to take the same dose himself. This might not increase the amount of virtue in the profession, but it is very possible that it might sometimes modify the practice. Hence, while monarchy, with its necessary subordination of ranks, would foster throughout the community a love of irresponsible power, and would facilitate its abuse, a republican equality, when once sufficient intelligence and virtue can be reached by the people to base their government upon it, will hold that dangerous passion in check. Hence, too, while this equality would seem to be the state towards which the elevation of the mass must tend, and which must be reached in a perfect state of society, it would also seem most likely to secure those conditions on which the progress of society towards such a state must depend, and therefore to be most in accordance with the constitution of man.

I observe in the second place, that that form of government will be most in accordance with the nature of man, which shall, as far as possible, control men by an appeal to the higher, rather than to the lower principles of their nature.

Plainly there are two methods by which men can be controlled. The one is by fear. This has been adopted by most governments hitherto. By appealing to their immediate and supposed interests, the rulers have attached to themselves in the form of standing armies, a portion of their subjects, and these they have employed to keep the remainder in fear. But where fear and interest are the highest motives known, the action of the government can have no tendency to elevate the people. Fear is a principle which man has in common with the brutes; but if man is to be governed as man, it must be by an appeal to his distinctive nature—to those faculties which make him man. Hence the second method of controlling men, is

through their affections, acting in subordination to their rational and moral nature. Fear is a force that presses from without, and in this respect finds no analogy in any of those agencies by which nature builds up her beautiful and organized structures, or carries on her grand operations. It is attraction, that forms the crystal, that keeps in its place every particle of the body, and that holds the orbs of heaven in their appointed path. But affection is the attraction of the moral world; and if any government is ever to move on with the harmony and beauty of the planetary system, it must be by a central force drawing the affections of the people to itself, and holding every man in a bright path of patriotism from which he would not willingly escape. Let a government share the warmest and best affections of the people, and who does not see that it would be the strongest possible, and would call into activity for its support, and strengthen, the best powers of our nature? How then can a government become thus strong in the affections of its people? Not through names, and forms, and preambles, and written constitutions; not by the right of ignorance, and corruption, and scoundrelism, to choose their own rulers in their own likeness; not even by that inalienable right of good men to believe professions before election and to be disappointed afterwards;—because every government has been, and will be, far more a government of men than of constitutions. It can only be, by having for rulers, great men after the type of greatness indicated by our Saviour, and thus establishing the true relations between the rulers and the ruled.

Hitherto the world has called those great men, who have attracted attention to themselves, and accumulated in their own hands power, and wealth, and influence. He who could command the admiration of men for his prowess or his talents, who could control, by fear, large masses, has been called great. I will not deny that he is

so; but there is a greatness of another order. It is one which takes for its principle and motive, not the attracting to itself of the objects of ambition, but, in the forgetfulness of self, the diffusion of benefits. It is one which will not hesitate to make sacrifices, and to lay down life itself for the good of others, "even as the Son of man came, not to be ministered unto, but to minister, and to give his life a ransom for many." Now when a disposition to make sacrifices and to do extensive good, instead of skill and power to appropriate what is good to themselves, shall be taken as the standard of greatness, and when great talents shall find their highest exertions in this direction, then the people will see in such men an impersonation, not merely of the principles of their constitution, but of the goodness of God, and millions will be ready to bare their own bosoms to danger, before they will suffer a hair of the head of such an one to perish. This affection would evidently be the strongest where the benefits and the liberty conferred were the greatest; and thus the problem would be solved—to construct a government that should be strong and efficient in proportion as it should be free. The feeling which has existed in this country, and still exists, towards Washington, is some illustration of the affection which would be given to a government administered for ages as he would have administered it. Who can estimate the strength of those bonds which would hold a virtuous people to such a government? Who will say that a government so constituted, would not be in accordance with the nature of man?

But however fully governments may secure the conditions specified, and with whatever affection they may be regarded, still, as institutions by which character is to be moulded, and the powers of the intellect are to be called forth, there may be great room for choice among different forms. Hence, I observe once more, that that

form of government will be most in accordance with the nature of man, which shall tend most fully to quicken and invigorate the intellectual powers.

These faculties acquire strength only by activity—and it cannot be a matter of indifference whether all the complex questions relating to the structure and administration of government shall be thrown before the people for their free and practical discussion, or whether the movements of the government shall either be veiled in mystery, or, at best, be like those of the stars, which the speculative may study and admire, but concerning which they have no responsibility, and over which they have no control. Whether, therefore, we consider the nature of the questions involved in the theory of government and in practical legislation, or the immediate interest of every man in those questions, nothing, except the Christian religion, can be better fitted to quicken and strengthen the intellect, and to elevate a people in general intelligence, than a free and full discussion of those questions by each individual, under the responsibilities of one whose vote may turn the scale in their practical decision. Hence, a government like ours is not merely a government, but a great school for the discussion of questions relating to the interests, and rights, and duties of social man. And these discussions will not be those of the philosopher in his closet, who regards every lever in the machinery of government as inflexible, and the ropes in its pulleys as having no friction, and who will persist in attempting to make his theories fit the actual condition and wants of the people when they will not fit; but they will be the discussions of earnest, practical men, who know their own wants, and who, though they may be mistaken for a time, will not be likely to sit down quietly under a system that does not practically work well. They may consent to be bound for a time with the new ropes and green withes of political abstractionists, and of

party organization; but when the cry of interest or of want rings in their ears, they will break them "as a thread of tow is broken when it toucheth the fire." All this may, indeed, tend to turn the attention too much to what is sometimes regarded as alone practical—to the material and sensible interests of society; but where a pure Christianity prevails, the higher nature of man will assert its claims, and thus all our wants, as intellectual beings, will be met. The English and American character is undoubtedly what it is, in practical power, and in its leading and growing influence among the nations, because it has been formed in such a school. How very different is this character from that of other nations! How different from what it would have been, if the people had had no part in the government; and if, as is generally the case where they have not, they had not been allowed a free discussion of its measures!

Whether, then, we consider the conditions it secures, or the principles to which it appeals, or the faculties it excites, I think we may say that a government and state of society based on equality and affection, would be more in accordance with the nature of man than any other.

In presenting these views, I advocate no theory of abstract right, and no application of any principle to society in its present state, farther than would be warranted by a sound discretion. Let not the child encumber itself, and incur ridicule, by attempting to wear the garments of a man. Let not society be allured to part with any available safeguard, or practical good, for the outward forms of a perfection, the reality of which can become possible only through changes of individual character. But while there are tendencies on the one hand towards an impracticable and jacobinical equality, unbalanced and uncemented by principle and affection, and while, on the other, it is painfully evident that those principles which lie at the foundation of the different

ranks in church and in state in the old world, are active here, so that those are not wanting who would prefer that order of things,—my wish would be, that those who guide the vessel that embosoms all our hopes as a nation, might lift up their eyes to that beacon light kindled by the Bible, which was seen so clearly by our Fathers, and which alone can guide us to a land where the people may "dwell in a peaceful habitation, and in sure dwellings, and in quiet resting places." When will men learn, that it is only "the work of righteousness" that shall be "peace," and "the effect of righteousness" that shall be "quietness and assurance forever"?

But, to the form of government and of society here presented, it is objected that it would be incompatible with the right culture of a spirit of reverence, and loyalty, and subordination; and also that it must produce a dull and prosaic level of society unfavorable to the development of any high poetic feeling. Each of these objections, would the time permit, might well demand a separate answer; but since reverence and poetic feeling are often excited by the same qualities, or by those which are allied to each other, the same general remarks may apply to both.

Far be it from me to say any thing that would diminish aught from the genuine reverence which any human being might otherwise feel in the presence of God, or his works, or towards those institutions of society which were ordained by Him; or that would despoil society of one grace which the unperverted eye of a poet might find there. Far rather would I add to these, till the fittest emblem of life should become the hymn, in which the highest worship is blended with the highest poetry. Are, then, these objections valid? In my view, it might as truly be said, that the destruction of idolatry and polytheism, and of the old mythology, tended to destroy the principle of reverence, and to diminish poetic feeling,

as that the destruction of any artificial form of society must necessarily do this. Indeed I cannot help feeling that there is an analogy between these two cases which deserves attention, and that what the spiritual system of the Bible, and the Newtonian system of the universe, are to the old system of heathen mythology, just that are our simple forms of worship, and society, and government, to those in which there are pompous rituals, and hereditary distinctions, and entailed property, and orders established by law.

Let us look at this. How beautiful was that mythology! How adapted to inspire reverence! How did it people heaven, and earth, and ocean, with its creations! How did it give sanctity to every grove, and hill-top, and fountain, and garden, and fireside, by enshrining there some god or goddess peculiar to the place! How did it furnish materials for sculpture and painting, and enable poetry to clothe its conceptions of the powers of nature in forms available to the imagination, so that men are found even at this day, and those too who have read David and Isaiah, who think it necessary to defend the works of God as if they might not be as well adapted to poetry as these fables! Again, how adapted, in one sense, was all this to human nature? Look at the antiquity and extent of the system. See the ancient people of God forsaking his altars, and going up to the groves and high places. See the whole world, from the polished Greek, to the equally polished Hindoo with his three hundred millions of gods, going after this system, and only the remnant of a single nation holding fast to the spiritual worship of the one God. Was not this conclusive evidence that the one was adapted to human nature and the other not? Was it possible, then, to give up such a system as this, that had woven itself in with all the time-hallowed associations, and kind feelings, and joyous occasions of life, for Christianity, that had no

temple, no altar, no priest, no sacrifice, no incense? What votary of taste, or of the muses, could endure the thought? But Christ and his Apostles, who knew what was in man, and what was truly adapted to his nature, seem to have been utterly unaffected by all this fine sentiment and fine reasoning. They struck down the false system, and in the shock of its fall, if never before, were revealed the loathsomeness and corruption which had been concealed, with Satanic skill, under the forms of poetry and of art.

But see the affinity of human nature for this system still—greater even than that which it has shown, and is still showing for monarchy and caste in its various forms. No sooner had Christianity triumphed, than precisely the same system, under different names and forms, was introduced into the Christian church. The identical image of Jupiter became the image of St. Peter, and the Virgin Mary and the saints took the place of the local divinities, the Christian teacher degenerated into a priest, and the sacrament of the supper became a sacrifice. Certainly there is a sense, a bad sense, in which this system is adapted to human nature, and so adapted that I must think that that nature would have been forever crushed beneath its weight, but for the direct interposition of God. In the Reformation that interposition was manifest; it was manifest in the event which we celebrate to-day; and now we can see how infinitely superior is the foolishness of God to the wisdom of men—how infinitely higher, and deeper, and purer, is that reverence which connects itself with the simplest forms of Puritan worship, in which man goes directly to God through the one Mediator, than that which is connected with bells, and incense, and burning lights, and relics, and pictures, and changes of vestments.

But precisely the same arguments, in their basis certainly, and often in their form, which may be and have been used for the old and the new forms of paganism and

idolatry, are those which are used in favor of monarchy, and of a distinction of ranks in society. Is one of these adapted to human nature? So is the other, and in precisely the same way. Has one, antiquity and the example of the mass of the race in its favor? So has the other; and the arguments for both are based on the incapacity of the people to preserve the spirit of reverence, and to perceive beauty in connection with simple forms, and without constant and imposing appeals to the senses, and to the principle of association as connected with sensible things. Of course these systems are allied to each other. Everywhere, except indeed in this country, established religious orders have favored or upheld established orders in the state; and monarchy was never truer to its instincts than when it uttered the sentiment, "No bishop, no king."

Was it then possible, that at the word of one who had not where to lay his head, and who expired on the cross, the magnificent system of the Jewish hierarchy and temple worship should come down; and that by the same word the temples, and rites, and priesthoods of heathenism should disappear; and yet the principle of reverence be safe? So thought our Saviour. And shall we fear for it because our Fathers followed his example, and so attempt to prop up the spiritual heavens which he has created? Shall we fear for that principle in the state, because the venerable form of Law, despoiled of none of her divine beauty, but with added benignity on her brow, comes to us as the expression of the concentrated wisdom of the state, rather than as the irresponsible mandate of an individual seated upon an hereditary throne? No; let a religious people find themselves blessed by the power and presence of God in their religious institutions; let an intelligent people find themselves protected in their rights by their civil institutions; let a social people find themselves united in their affections as neighbors and

fellow-citizens ; and the plainer and simpler the garb in which the forms of these divinely appointed institutions shall be clothed, the more will they venerate those great realities which the forms express, and see in them an analogy to those simple but mighty energies by which God governs his physical creation. Our Fathers never went against the principle of reverence. They sustained it most fully. No man can better understand the danger to which institutions like ours are exposed in this direction, or the true principle of their safety, (that is, the recognition of God in them,) than did that remarkable man, the Rev. John Robinson. Hear him in his advice to those who first came over. "Lastly, whereas you are to become a body politic, using amongst yourselves civil government, and are not furnished with any persons of special eminency above the rest to be chosen by you into office of government, let your wisdom and godliness appear not only in choosing such persons as do entirely love and will diligently promote the common good, but also in yielding unto them all due honor and obedience in their lawful administrations, not beholding in them the ordinariness of their persons, but God's ordinance for your good ; nor being like the foolish multitude, who more honor the gay coat than either the virtuous mind of the man, or glorious ordinance of the Lord. But you know better things, and that the image of the Lord's power and authority, which the magistrate beareth, is honorable, in how mean persons soever. And this duty you both may the more willingly and ought the more conscionably to perform, because you are, at least for the present, to have only them for your ordinary governors which yourselves shall make choice of for that work." The great principle of this advice New England has always adopted. If we distinguish reverence from blind submission and superstition, there is no country on earth where this principle has been so well sustained. But then

we think there are some things which are so great, that they make their highest impression when they stand most alone. We do not think that a crown placed on the summit of Mount Washington, would add any thing to its sublimity ; far less do we think it would have added any thing to the simple grandeur of the character of him from whom that mountain has its name. We believe that there is enough in God and his works, seen as they are ; in the institutions of society, regarded as his ; and in men fairly estimated ; to keep alive the principle of reverence ; and we are willing to leave intelligent and Christian men to make their own estimate.

Reverence and order being thus secured, we have no fears that there will not be enough of variety, and of poetic feeling. We should as soon fear a want of variety in the circlings and movements of a flock of swallows thrown into the free air ; and poetic feeling, whatever form it may assume, will live and find expression wherever freedom is, while nature and man remain the same.

The civil institutions of our Fathers having attained the ends of government, no one now questions their legitimacy. It is fully conceded, that a body of men associated for the purposes of government, and attaining its ends, is a State. But it is not conceded by all, that a body of Christians associated as a Church, and, so far as man can see, attaining its appropriate ends, is a Church. Hence the course of our Fathers is objected against as schismatical. But on what principle were they schismatical ? As we understand it, on the same principle with some of old, who determined to serve God without regard to the abuses and corruptions of a national church, and who, in consequence, " had trial of cruel mockings and scourgings, yea, moreover, of bonds and imprisonment ; they were stoned, they were sawn asunder, were tempted, were slain with the sword : they wandered about in sheep-skins and goat-skins ; being destitute,

afflicted, tormented; (of whom the world was not worthy:) they wandered in deserts, and in mountains, and in dens and caves of the earth." These men were not persecuted by the heathen, but by the nominal church—the established church—by that people upon whom came "all the righteous blood shed upon the earth from the blood of righteous Abel unto the blood of Zacharias, son of Barachias, whom they slew between the temple and the altar." Ah! that is the place—as it were between the temple and the altar—where many a righteous man, under the name of a schismatic, has been slain in the name of God, by the scribes, and pharisees, and hypocrites of his day, who have claimed to be the only true church. Between the case of these men and that of our Fathers there is a striking analogy, and we wait for a definition of schism that would make our fathers schismatics, and would not make these worthies equally so—that would not make Christianity itself, and the Reformation, schisms—that would not make schismatics of all the martyrs with whose blood the Romish church has been drunken all down the ages—that would not make schismatics of the English martyrs under the bloody Mary. No idea can be more utterly baseless than that of any one organization which can be called *the* church, from which, when it should become greatly corrupt, it would be a sin for true Christians to separate, that they might associate on the principles of the Bible. The sin of schism consists in causing divisions in single churches, and not at all in coming out from a corrupt general organization not recognized by the Scriptures, for the purpose of following Christ.

Allied to the objection just mentioned, is another, that our Fathers had not sufficient regard to the historical development of the church—that they went directly to the Bible, and back to primitive times, and made no account of the experience and progress of the church for

seventeen centuries. There is a class of thinkers who seem to suppose that the great object for which the world stands, is what they call progress. By this, they do not mean the progress of a great experiment upon human nature, by which its corruptions and opposition to God, and the great goodness and forbearance of God, are brought out in every conceivable form ; but they mean something, it would be difficult to say precisely what, that would be compatible with all the awful and long-continued defections and corruptions, both of the Jewish and of the Christian church. It is true that our Fathers received the Bible alone as authority, and regarded the apostolic age as the purest age of the church. But few men ever lived, as it would be easy to show, of a more truly liberal and catholic spirit than Robinson. Neither he nor his church intended to separate from any thing good. They believed in the unity of the church, they wished communion with all true Christians, and though they may have misjudged in some things, yet they rejected nothing rashly and fanatically, which had been handed down by history or tradition. These principles on which they thus acted, we regard as the true principles ; we adopt them, and intend to abide by them.

The institutions of our Fathers, then, having for their basis, both in church and in state, the idea of brotherhood — of equality and affection — not only exist, but have a right to exist. They have been tested, now, in various forms, on this soil, for more than two hundred years ; and imperfectly as their true spirit has been perceived and exemplified, and great as have been the disturbing forces from the continual and prodigious influx of incongruous elements, we are willing to bring them to the scriptural test, and to judge them by their fruits. Where has God been more generally feared and worshipped ? Where has the Sabbath been better observed ? Where has education been more generally diffused ?

Where have the people been more enterprising, or accumulated wealth more rapidly? Where has there been greater security of person and of property, and more kind neighborhood? Where has justice been more ably and impartially administered? Where have the triumphs of invention and of the useful arts been more signal? Would it not have required all the faith of our Fathers to believe it, if by some magic glass, the summit of Saddle mountain, more than two hundred miles distant, had been pointed out, and it had been revealed to them that these triumphs should be so great, that in a little more than two hundred years, one should start on the morning of the shortest day in the year from beyond the base of that mountain, and the next morning be on Plymouth rock, joining in the celebration of the event of their landing? Where have the poor, and the blind, and the insane, and the imprisoned, been more kindly and wisely provided for? Where, finally, has there been more enlightened and self-denying labor for the conversion of men, and for their spiritual good, and more benevolent activity in sending the gospel over the world? How different are these from the fruits realized in any Catholic, or despotic country!

And if such have been the fruits of these institutions hitherto, how does it become us to understand their spirit, and to see that they are sustained in their purity! In the nature of things the capabilities of these institutions for good or for evil, are greater than those of any other. I take a single man. I see him an intelligent, virtuous, Christian man, able to control himself, and disposed to do unto others as he would that they should do unto him. I see him looking up to the heavens above him, awed by their greatness, and regarding the whole of this framework of nature as one august temple for the worship of Him whose presence fills it all. I surround this man with a family. I give him a wife suitable for such a

man—one whose object it has been, not to attract admiration to herself, but who, while she has seen in the expanding flower, that opens every petal to the sun and sends from every one its fragrance, the duty of cultivating and bringing out every latent capacity, has yet done it for the glory of Him who gave those capacities, and that she might make others happy. I see their children around them, affectionate, obedient, well instructed. I see them, when the glad Sabbath comes, going up to the house of God together, with the common feeling that they are strangers and pilgrims here, and that they seek a city which hath foundations. Are there such families? I think there are. I know it is within the capabilities of our nature that there should be. But if there may be one such family, there may be two; and if two, then a neighborhood, then a town, then a county, a state, a nation. A nation of such men would realize my idea of the people. Let such a people be organized as their wants might require, for the expression of their opinions, and the exertion of their united energies for great public ends, and there is no object in nature, not even the heaving ocean, so sublime as their intelligent, deliberate, united, constitutional action. Such a people could never need, could never suffer the exertion of arbitrary power. Such is the picture which hope paints for the future, when she looks at the capabilities of our institutions, and at the power of God through his gospel.

But there is another picture, the reverse of this. In that, instead of a people, you have a populace. Let now, among an unprincipled populace, the sense of religion either degenerate into a mad superstition, or all idea of any thing to be truly reverenced become a mockery; let the Sabbath be disregarded, and of course become pre-eminently a day of wickedness; let the marriage tie become virtually dissolved, and family affection cease; let selfishness, and dishonesty, and sensuality, and hate, find

none but outward restraints; and suppose a nation of such men shouting the watchwords of liberty and equality, with no power to come between their will and its accomplishment, and you have a state of things compared with which the worst monarchy that ever existed would be a blessing.

This is the picture which despondency points at when she sees iniquity in high places; when she sees slavery yet wielding its lash, and extending its area in this land of professed freedom; when she hears of the increase of crime, especially among the young; when she sees the pertinacity of many in tempting and ruining their fellow-men for the sake of gain; when she hears ignorant and foolhardy boastings about a democracy which some would either identify with Christianity or substitute for it; when she sees the narrowness and madness of sectarian and party feeling and strife.

Which, then, of these pictures, shall be the true one? Perhaps neither, in all the depth of its coloring; but which shall predominate in its leading features? If the former, I believe it can be only because the descendants and representatives of the Puritans shall hold fast, I will not say to Puritan principles, as if they belonged exclusively to them, but I will say to the principles of the Puritans. Let us seek no other basis for our institutions. Let us all, high and low, rich and poor, learned and unlearned, in the fear and in the love of God, seek to carry out this great principle of brotherhood. Whatever is incompatible with this in the spirit and forms of our institutions, let us seek to remove. It is this which has swept slavery from the soil of the Puritans, and which we ought to labor with every energy to infuse, till it shall sweep every vestige of that dreadful curse from this land. It is this which will open the heart of the rich when he remembers his poor and struggling brother, and which will send unasked relief. This it was that dictated the following

extract of a letter dated just one year ago this day, from one who has done many greater things, but few more characteristic. "This splendid morning," says he, "opens upon us with such lessons as should make us of the old Puritan, Pilgrim stock read, reflect, and act upon them as their descendants, that when we are summoned hence, the word may be, 'Come up.'" This letter enclosed one hundred dollars to aid poor students in those unseen struggles with which so few prosperous men sympathise. This deed, both in its benevolence, and in the regard it indicates for education, was truly Puritanical; and springing as it did from influences originating on this spot, I think it proper to mention it on this spot, as an example of that spirit of brotherhood which the text would inculcate. Let the spirit of this act prevail among the different classes of society, and it would be as oil upon the agitated waters; the chief evils connected with the necessary diversity of condition among men would cease; and everywhere, and always, men would meet each other as men, and as brethren.

And now, my friends, is not the star of hope which we see in this direction, a beautiful star? It is no meteor of a fervid imagination, or of a false philosophy. It is that great idea of a universal Christian brotherhood, pointed out by Christ, not in the text only, but everywhere, as an inherent part of his system. This star our Fathers saw, and is it any wonder, that under its inspiration and guidance, they should come across the ocean? Literally they found a landing here; but figuratively, the vessel which they launched is yet upon the deep, the multitude of their descendants is on board, and we too catch glimpses of the same bright star above the troubled waters. It may be that this vessel is not destined to reach the port. We hear moanings of the tempest, and see aspects of the elements, which lead us to tremble for her. But where the bright image of this star has once fallen, it can never

be effaced. This is our star. To it let the prow of our vessel be turned. Let every man be at his post, never ashamed of the plain rigging of his good ship, but always hearing that voice of duty, and of the God of our Fathers, which will speak above the roar of every tempest; and then, if our ship must go down, the will of God be done. But *then* she will not go down. Then the hand that guided the Mayflower, will guide her. Then will there be One on board, as we believe there always has been, who, though he may seem for a time to be asleep in the hinder part of the ship, will yet come, when the winds are loudest, and the waves are highest, and say, "Peace, be still."

SERMON,

DELIVERED BEFORE THE AMERICAN AND FOREIGN SABBATH UNION.

May, 1847.

If thou turn away thy foot from the Sabbath, from doing thy pleasure on my holy day; and call the Sabbath a delight, the holy of the Lord, honorable; and shalt honor him, not doing thine own ways, nor finding thine own pleasure, nor speaking thine own words: then shalt thou delight thyself in the Lord; and I will cause thee to ride upon the high places of the earth, and feed thee with the heritage of Jacob thy father: for the mouth of the Lord hath spoken it.—ISAIAH lvii. 13, 14.

IT is plain, that the purity and perpetuity of the civil institutions of the *Jews* depended on their keeping the Sabbath. Nothing can be more explicit than the promises and threatenings of the Bible on this point. It is not in the text alone, that the Sabbath is singled out, and that national blessings are made to depend solely upon the performance of its duties. The same thing is stated even more explicitly by the prophet Jeremiah. "And it shall come to pass, if ye diligently hearken unto me, saith the Lord, to bring in no burden through the gates of this city on the Sabbath day, but hallow the Sabbath day, to do no work therein; then shall there enter into the gates of this city, kings and princes sitting upon the throne of David, riding in chariots and on horses, they, and their princes, the men of Judah, and the inhabitants of Jerusalem: and this city shall remain forever." "But if ye will not hearken unto me to hallow the Sabbath day, and not to bear a burden, even entering in at the gates of Jerusa-

lem on the Sabbath day; then will I kindle a fire in the gates thereof, and it shall devour the palaces of Jerusalem, and it shall not be quenched." So we find this subject was viewed by Nehemiah. He fearlessly and vigorously sustained the Sabbath, in his capacity as a magistrate, and expressly assigned as a reason, its connection with the perpetuity of their civil institutions. "In those days," says he, "saw I in Judah some treading wine presses on the Sabbath, and bringing in sheaves, and lading asses; as also wine, grapes, and figs, and all manner of burdens, which they brought into Jerusalem on the Sabbath day: and I testified against them in the day wherein they sold victuals. There dwelt men of Tyre also therein, which brought fish, and all manner of ware, and sold on the Sabbath unto the children of Judah, and in Jerusalem. Then I contended with the nobles of Judah, and said unto them, What evil thing is this that ye do, and profane the Sabbath day? Did not your fathers thus, and did not our God bring all this evil upon us, and upon this city? Yet ye bring more wrath upon Israel by profaning the Sabbath." In the Chronicles, we find it assigned as the object of the captivity, that the land might enjoy her Sabbath; "for," it is said, "as long as she lay desolate she kept Sabbath." In these passages the Sabbath stands alone; in others, we find it associated with the highest moral duties, and sustained by the same sanctions with them. Thus, either through the natural laws of God, or by his direct interposition, there was a peculiar connection between the national prosperity of the Jews and the keeping of the Sabbath.

But the duties of the Sabbath grow out of no peculiar relation of the Jews to God; the promises and threatenings connected with it are such as we never find connected with any mere ritual or ceremonial observances, and show conclusively that he who uttered them regarded the law of the Sabbath as of equal authority with the

rest of the decalogue; and we believe that the history of God's providence, both with regard to individuals and to communities, will show that this law is still unrepealed. Well then may we consider, as we now propose to do, "THE IMPORTANCE OF THE SABBATH TO THE PURITY AND PERPETUITY OF FREE INSTITUTIONS"—those under which we live, and in the success of which all the hopes of our country are placed.

And here the first point to be noticed is, that the perpetuity of free institutions must depend on their purity. It would not be honorable to the providential government of God, nor for the best interests of man, that corrupt institutions, under whatever form, should be permanent. Corruption, seeking to work out its own ends, must come into collision with every principle of the virtuous, and with every instinct of society for self-preservation; and such a state of things neither can, nor ought to be, quiet, or permanent. There will be, and we say, let there be, overturnings, and overturnings, till He shall come whose right it is to reign, and who will reign rightly. But free institutions, just in proportion as they are free, must furnish scope for this corruption to do its work, and this can be prevented only by keeping them pure. The danger to such institutions *now*, is not from without, but from corruption within, working in the name and under the forms of liberty—wearing her garb, and using her watchwords.

What then do we mean by the *purity* of free institutions? This must refer both to the spirit in which they are administered, and to the ends which they secure. The administration of free institutions in their true spirit, implies a right state of the moral nature; a choice of right ends, and of the means of attaining them, implies an enlightened intellect; and hence *free institutions will be pure, only when all who vote, and all who hold office, shall be intellectually qualified to perform those functions well, and when they shall perform them from proper*

motives. Thus, and thus only, can these institutions be rightly administered, and their legitimate ends be secured. This is only another form of affirming the necessity of knowledge and virtue in the individuals composing a free community—the necessity, not certainly, as is often supposed, of all knowledge, but only of that knowledge of rights and of duties which is indispensable to virtue and subservient to it.

If this idea of the purity of free institutions be correct, we are thrown back, for every rational ground of confidence in their perpetuity, upon the elevation and purity of individual character. That this is the true foundation of institutions really free, the only condition on which they can be enjoyed, or be permanent, was clearly seen by our Fathers; and is in accordance with the plainest principles of common sense, and with the methods by which God accomplishes ends in his natural government. In estimating the duration of a house, does common sense regard chiefly its form, or the nature of the materials and the manner in which they are united? In holding this globe together, does God hoop about a vast mass of loose particles by an external force? or does he bestow gravitation upon every individual particle, and thus secure the permanence of the whole by the qualities of the individual parts? The attempt to effect any radical improvement in society, merely by different forms of association, is an attempt to make particles of sand adhere together by changing their position. Remaining as they are, they will not adhere, and it will avail nothing to put them in the form of a triangle or a square or an octagon. No, if mortar is to be made of sand, it must be done by adding lime, and when every particle shall have thus acquired an adhesive property, a solid body may be formed that shall endure for ages. This condition, so clearly seen by our Fathers, we ought to see and cheerfully to accept. We ought to regard it as a high distinction of free institu-

tions, that they become pure and perfect only as those for whom they are administered advance towards their true dignity and end, regarded as members of the higher economy of God's government.

From what has now been said, it will appear, that in considering the importance of the Sabbath to the perpetuity of free institutions, we have only to regard its effect upon their purity, that is, virtually and ultimately, upon individual character.

Nor, in considering this, is it to be supposed that the purity of free institutions will depend solely on any one thing. The life of man, simple as it seems in itself, does not depend upon warmth alone, or upon air or food alone, but upon the combined agency of them all, and if any one of them should be removed, life would cease. So there may be, and we suppose there is, a circle of agencies each of which is indispensable to the life of a free people, and it becomes a question for the philosopher and statesman, no less than for the divine, to ascertain what these are. Now what we say is, that the Sabbath, suitably observed, comes within this circle. We would not exaggerate its influence; we would detract nothing from the value of other agencies—of family government—of popular education—of a purified literature. These, and other agencies, may come within this circle; but what we now assert, what we wish to establish in this discourse, as sustained both by reason and by revelation, is, that the Sabbath, suitably observed, does come there.

This position I would now proceed to sustain; but it cannot be done understandingly, unless, as every thing will turn upon that, we still inquire, in a preliminary way, what we mean by a suitable observance of the Sabbath. That the first day of the week will continue to be distinguished in some way, cannot be doubted; but no one can suppose that this, of itself, would secure the proposed end. If we would receive practical benefit from the Sab-

bath, we must do by it as we do by any thing else which we put to a practical test—we must use it for the end for which it was made. The day must not be set apart for idleness or vice, but must be a Sabbath, kept in the manner and for the purpose designated by God.

Respecting this purpose of the Sabbath, and the manner in which it ought to be kept, I know there are different opinions; but if its *purpose* can be ascertained, the manner of keeping it must be also, *since any manner would be suitable which would accomplish that purpose.* If the Sabbath was given solely with reference to the physical well-being of man, then any mode of keeping it which should secure physical rest would be suitable. If it was given to man as needing amusement; or such cultivation of the social affections as is found in friendly visits, and in dinner parties; or as needing the relaxation there is in riding or sauntering abroad, or in reading novels and light literature,—then any mode of observing it will be suitable which will secure these ends. But if the Sabbath was given to man as having a religious nature, and derives its chief significance and obligation, its beauty and its grandeur, from the relations it implies between man as an immortal and an accountable being, and that God who made him, and redeemed him, and will judge him at the last, —then will it be suitably observed only as it is observed religiously—in the contemplation of those relations, and in preparation for an immortal life.

But on this point, can any one doubt, who looks at the moral state of man as related to a holy heaven, or at such passages of the word of God as I have chosen for my text? In this passage we not only find national blessings promised in connection with the Sabbath, but a specification, most beautiful and full, of that manner of observing it with which alone these blessings can be fully connected. Here man is plainly regarded wholly as a moral and a religious being. It is supposed that he has, and may pro-

perly have, pleasures and interests of other kinds; but these are to be held in abeyance, and the day is to be devoted to honoring God in those duties of which he is the immediate object, and to the enjoyments which flow from a contemplation of his holy and glorious character, and of our relations to him. Men are not to do their own ways, or find their own pleasure, or speak their own words. The meaning of these expressions can hardly be mistaken, and I leave them without comment, to be interpreted by the consciences of those who are disposed to a lax observance of the day. These parts of the text are negative and prohibitory, and present that aspect of the Sabbath in which the world generally view it. They regard it as a species of lent, on which the meats of worldly enjoyment are to be abstained from, only that they may be devoured the more greedily the rest of the week. Hence it seems to them a dull, tedious, unprofitable day. They are at a loss what to do with its hours, and exclaim with some of old, "When will the Sabbath be gone, that we may set forth wheat!" But the same principle is applied here that lies at the foundation of all Christian self-denial, *which is always the denial of an inferior part of our nature for the sake of that which is higher.* Men are not commanded to withdraw themselves from their ordinary business, and pleasures, and courses of thought, that they may pass into a state of vacuity, or as a penance; but for the purpose of meeting the great and essential wants of man as at once a social and a religious being, and of rising into a region of higher and purer enjoyment. There are great positive duties to be performed, and high pleasures to be enjoyed; and no Sabbath is ever truly kept, except in the performance of these duties and in the enjoyment of these pleasures. "If thou turn away thy foot from the Sabbath, from doing thy pleasure on my holy day; and call the Sabbath a delight, the holy of the Lord, honorable; and shalt *honor him*—then shalt thou *delight* thyself in the LORD."

These views do not seem to me to need the sanction of human authority; but perhaps it will commend them to some who hear me, to find them adopted by a distinguished novelist and man of the world. "If we believe," says Sir Walter Scott, "in the divine origin of the commandment, the Sabbath is instituted for the express purposes of religion. The time set apart is the 'Sabbath of the Lord;' a day on which we are not to work our own works, or think our own thoughts. The precept is positive, and the purpose clear. For our eternal benefit a certain space of every week is appointed, which, sacred from all other avocations save those imposed by necessity and mercy, is to be employed in religious duties. The Roman Catholic church, which lays so much force on observances merely ritual, may consistently suppose, that the time claimed is more than sufficient for the occasion, and dismiss the peasants, when mass is over, to any game or gambol which fancy may dictate; leaving it with the priests to do, on behalf of the congregation, what further is necessary for the working out of their salvation. But this is not Protestant doctrine, though it may be imitated by Protestant churches."*

Having thus shown that the perpetuity of free institutions depends on their purity, and stated what we mean by the suitable observance of the Sabbath, I now proceed to show, first, that such an observance of this day will infallibly secure the purity and consequent permanence of free institutions; and secondly, that without the Sabbath these cannot be secured.

And that the Sabbath thus observed, would secure the purity and consequent permanence of free institutions, appears, first, because it would presuppose a right state of mind towards God.

There is evidently a peculiarity in the law of the Sab-

* Critical and Miscellaneous Essays of Sir Walter Scott, Bart. Collected by Himself. Vol. iii. p. 93. American edition.

bath, as a test of simple obedience, and of a temper generally right towards the divine government. For obedience to the other commandments, reasons may be found in the obvious interests of society and of the individual; but this is so far from being the case with the Sabbath, that of all the ten commandments this is the only one concerning which the question has been raised whether it was moral or positive. This is not because the connection between the violation of this law and its results is less certain, but that it is less immediate and obvious. Its sanctions do not come directly, as when one puts his hand into the fire; but they come according to another general method in God's natural government, remotely, as in the effects upon the social fabric, of intemperance, or licentiousness, or revenge. Of these, individual instances may seem slight, and alarm on account of them may be mocked at; yet through them there will gradually steal in a moral malaria that will poison and blast every thing noble. Thus it is more especially with the Sabbath. God has infallibly linked cause and effect here; he has plainly revealed that connection; yet the chain itself which binds them together is often concealed, or revealed only to the eye of faith. Hence it is that Sabbath-breaking is what has been called a *leading* sin; it is the point at which men naturally break away from God; and when that is fully done, nothing can restrain them from any crime, but the absence of temptation or the fear of detection. Under these circumstances, let an individual devote the Sabbath to religious duties, public and private, honoring God and delighting himself in him, and he will show that regard to the principle of duty, as such, which will make him a good citizen—a pillar of strength to free institutions. He who thus walks humbly with his God, will do justly and love mercy.

I observe secondly, that such a mode of keeping the Sabbath would insure the purity and consequent perma-

nence of free institutions, from its effect upon the intellect of the community.

It ought not to be forgotten that Christ originated, in inseparable connection with the Sabbath, the first great and permanent system of popular instruction that the world had ever known. He was himself "a *teacher* come from God," and one part of his commission to his disciples was, that they should *teach* all nations. True the object of Christ was higher than mere instruction; it was persuasion and moral renovation; but since the moral and religious nature are reached only through the intellect, this necessarily implies much thought and much knowledge on subjects that naturally stir the human soul to its lowest depths. The man who knows the only true God, and Jesus Christ whom he has sent, and who seeks to apply practically the instructions of Christ, may be unable to read, he may know nothing of the classification of natural objects on the earth or in the heavens, but his intellect cannot be dormant or unimproved. He has a knowledge that is life eternal, and that will naturally draw other knowledge within its range. And this knowledge is to be made accessible to all classes of people. Constrained by the love of Christ, his ministers are to go out into the highways and hedges and compel them to come in. Nor in doing this are they to employ declamation, or rant, or fanaticism. They are, as Paul did, to *reason* of righteousness, temperance, and a judgment to come; and it is impossible that a community should hear these and similar topics treated earnestly and wisely from week to week, and not come up to that intellectual elevation which would fit them to be members of a free community. An *individual* may, indeed, as was just intimated, have the knowledge of God and of salvation without general knowledge; but this could not be the case with a community. Wherever there is an enlightened ministry and the instructions of the Sabbath, there, as all

experience shows, will be schools, and the diffusion of general intelligence. The very familiarity with the Bible itself, its history, its doctrines, its precepts, its poetry and its prophecies, implied in a suitable observance of the Sabbath, would preclude the possibility of an ignorant people. It is to be observed, too, that all knowledge is not, according to a popular fallacy, equally related to the well-being of free institutions. There is much knowledge, literary and scientific, that may be, and has been, the instrument or the ornament of tyranny and vice. But the knowledge drawn from the Bible and the Sabbath, is precisely that which is adapted to stimulate and direct the moral nature. It is that knowledge of duties and of rights which is essential to virtue, and which is needed in connection with it as the foundation of free institutions. Hence a people who keep the Sabbath as did our Puritan Fathers, attending church and studying their Bibles, not only may be, but will be, a free people. No power on earth can enslave them.

But thirdly, such an observance of the Sabbath would insure the purity of free institutions, by its elevating, and softening, and harmonizing effect upon the feelings of men.

In the present state of the earth, and of the moral nature of man, labor is necessary, and is for his good; but in itself it is an evil, and as stimulated by avarice, or as enforced by necessity or by power, it has been one great cause of the degradation of the race. Constantly enforced, it must deteriorate alike the body and the mind. But let now this burden be removed one day in seven, as recognizing not merely the physical wants of man, but his spiritual capacities and his higher affinities, and who can estimate its elevating effect? It places him at once in new relations. Let him, if need be, go down and toil six days in the mine of worldly gain,—it may be his duty, and God may be with him there,—but on the seventh, let him come up and breathe a purer air, and dwell in the

sunshine of a brighter light. Let him see that he has interests higher than those of earth, and that God has given him time to attend to those interests which no man has a right to take from him, and he feels at once that he is recognized as a child of God, and an heir of immortality. The very stillness of the Sabbath then becomes the voice of God, speaking to his heart of that sympathy which he feels for the transient and feeble races of time. He rests, after the example of God. He remembers that Redeemer who on this day rose from the dead, and that heaven to which he has ascended, of which the Sabbath is at once a type so beautiful and for which it is a means of preparation so necessary. And now let this stillness be broken by the sound of the Sabbath-bell; and having put off the garments and the soil of labor, let him go up with that outward purity, and that seemliness of appearance, which comport with the purity and order of divine worship, and let him unite with his family, and neighbors, and with the great congregation, in the services of God's house; and there is something in this outward decorum, in the reverent posture, in the voice of prayer, and in the notes of sacred praise, that is softening and humanizing, that must touch the feelings, and modify the associations, and tend to remove what is coarse and unseemly in the general deportment. Hence, what is called the rabble, is never composed of those who habitually attend a Protestant church; and where all should do this, there would be no rabble.

It is however with the harmonizing, still more than with the elevating and softening tendencies of the Sabbath, that our argument has to do. When men come together as the children of a common parent, bound alike to the grave and to the judgment seat; when they enter into the presence of that God, before whose eternity human life is but a point, before whose greatness all human distinctions are inappreciable, upon whose bounty

all are equally dependent, and whose mercy, as sinners, all equally need,—they must seem to themselves and to each other to stand upon the level of one common humanity, and there will be a powerful tendency to produce that feeling of brotherhood—of equality and affection—which lies at the foundation of our institutions. The rich and the poor meeting together under circumstances to make them feel that the Lord is the maker of them all, the rich will be humbled, and the brother of low degree will be exalted; pride and envy will be felt to be equally out of place; hostile and rancorous feelings will be subdued; he that is seeking to be forgiven his debt of ten thousand talents, will forgive that of a hundred pence. Surely if the Sabbath, thus kept, had been devised for the purpose, it could not have been better adapted than it is to promote that spirit of kindness, of equality, of mutual forbearance and regard, upon which the happy working of free institutions so much depends.

But I remark again, that the main effect of the Sabbath, thus observed, upon the purity and consequent perpetuity of free institutions, is to be found in its bearing upon the public conscience.

This is the point on which every thing must turn. Let the public conscience be sensitive and enlightened, and the one indispensable condition of free institutions is secured. This would involve knowledge enough for the successful working of such institutions; but without this, they can be sustained by no amount of knowledge, or refinement, or civilization. But the public conscience is often either seared, or perverted, and those evils which pervade communities under the sanction of such a conscience, are the last to be seen and thrown off by individual virtue. And not only may a seared conscience fail to see the enormity of such evils, but not seldom does a perverted conscience take sides with them and seek to throw over them the banner of right. This has been so

with war, and slavery, and polygamy, and duelling, and the sale of intoxicating drinks. This is so now with many practices sustained even in the church. They would certainly disappear before a sensitive conscience fully enlightened by the word of God. It is indeed wonderful, since the conscience is that faculty in man which God intended should control all the others, and since its actual power when fully awakened is so great, into what torpor and imbecility it may fall, and how it will quietly permit, and share in, general enormities that cry to the very heavens. But in proportion as the public conscience falls into this state, whatever may be the condition of society in other respects, that confidence, public and private, which is its only cement, will infallibly disappear, the bonds of social order will be relaxed, every right will be endangered, and security will be sought at the expense of liberty. But, on the other hand, let the conscience be sensitive, and it will prevent all intentional infraction of right; let it be enlightened, and it will prevent all violation of it from mistake. It will necessarily draw public attention to every abuse in the customs or institutions of society, and will gradually so correct public opinion as to put an end to those abuses. The law of reason and conscience in the individual, will take the place of the law of the land as a formal precept armed with an external force, and society will become instinct with a principle, which, in securing to every man his rights, will necessarily secure to him the largest practicable or desirable liberty.

But while this office and importance of the conscience cannot be denied, we shall look in vain to human wisdom for any institution or arrangement designed to render it enlightened and sensitive. Hence its perversions and torpor among heathen nations, and the striking fact, that, where the Sabbath and its accompanying light has not existed, no instance can be pointed out in which an established moral evil has been attacked and removed on

moral grounds. Who ever heard of a case among heathen nations in which infanticide, or polygamy, or lying, or slavery, having once been incorporated into the institutions and habits of a nation, has been attacked and eradicated through the native light and power of the conscience of its people? Who expects to hear of such a case? But that the Sabbath cannot be religiously observed by a people having the Bible in their hands, without improving the conscience, is obvious from the very nature of the case. Religious instructions and services, both in public and in private, elucidate and enforce those rights of God, and those duties towards him, which must include a regard for every right of a fellow creature which he has constituted, and a performance of every duty which he has commanded. The Sabbath, therefore, is God's institution for training the moral nature of man. It is his appointed school-day for the race, that they may learn lessons of piety and moral goodness; and what sight could be more beautiful or sublime than that of the whole race sitting at the feet of Jesus and hearing his words? Then should they know that highest of all freedom with which the truth makes men free; then fraud and oppression would cease; then every individual would understand his duties and his rights; and society, presenting thus, from week to week, an even surface for the impress of divine truth, would be enstamped with the image of heaven.

But since civil freedom is so great and high a result, it may seem to some strange that it should be secured by an observance of the Sabbath and a cultivation of the conscience, in which that result is not directly contemplated. But this is only in accordance with a great principle, which we find recognized every where in the works and in the word of God, *that incidental advantages are always best secured by aiming at the highest possible results.* Thus, in a plant, he who should obtain the blossoms and the fruit, would of course have the fragrance and the

leaves. Thus, physical well-being is best secured by that exercise which is sought for a further end. Thus, he who seeks first the kingdom of God and his righteousness, shall have all other things added unto him. Thus, he who would find his life, must lose it. Thus, it is always the highest expediency to do right. Thus, when the Sabbath is kept holy, every physical and intellectual advantage connected with it is most fully gained; and thus, when man is trained to become a citizen of heaven, he will be best fitted to be a good citizen in a free republic. It is indeed a high evidence that both the Sabbath and free institutions are from God, that they hold the same relation to something beyond themselves, that the chrysalis does to the winged insect, or that the twilight does to the full day, and that free institutions may be gradually merged and lost in the perfect government of God, as the light of the Sabbath may fade into the light of heaven.

Having thus shown that a suitable observance of the Sabbath would insure the purity and permanence of free institutions, it only remains to show, as was proposed, that without the Sabbath these cannot be secured.

The question here is not, whether a people who had never known the Sabbath, but who had days set apart for religious observances, and in whom the spirit of reverence should be cultivated in connection with a false religion, could sustain free institutions in their purity. Probably the very imperfect, and turbulent, and comparatively transient freedom of Greece and Rome would be all that could be reached under such circumstances. But the question is, whether these institutions could be sustained by a nation nominally Christian, who should reject the Sabbath?

And here we must keep steadily in view the contrast between free institutions, and others, as related to moral culture and influence. Let the forces of despotism be well organized, and every thing be subject to minute in-

spection; and a certain formal and unproductive order—the order of stagnation and of death—may be preserved all the better for the absence of that general culture and elevation which would fit man for freedom. But a free government, in the last analysis, is self-government. It is simply because men will preserve order, and respect the rights of others, of their own accord, that they do not need soldiers to govern them. But if external force be removed, there is no ground of security but the power of that invisible and eternal law which reveals itself in the conscience, and makes every man a law unto himself. Make this its key-stone, and the arch will not only support itself, but the more it is pressed, the firmer it will be. Hence every thing that weakens moral restraint tends to subvert free institutions, and hence we affirm that such institutions cannot be sustained without the Sabbath.

And that they cannot, will appear, first, because a rejected Sabbath would of itself become a powerful means of corruption. Clearly it could never be reclaimed to the same uses as ordinary days; and if the sanctions and restraints of religion were wholly withdrawn, it would become, for the whole nation, a day of idleness with its consequent temptations and vices. It would be the day for the roll-call and general muster of every division in the army of sin, and would do more to undermine free institutions than all the other days of the week. There are portions of this country now, where there is far more wickedness on the Sabbath than on any other day; and what shall prevent this city, or any other city, from becoming like Paris, where—and I wish the fact to be noted—a more numerous police is always abroad on the Sabbath.

But again, the same thing will appear from the peculiar relation which the Sabbath holds to many of those means and agencies on which the moral elevation of the community depends. This is not, as is sometimes said, the

relation of cause to effect, or of the foundation to the superstructure; but that of an essential condition, without which the effect could not take place. This relation does not make the Sabbath less important, but it may prevent its importance from being seen. An end can no more be accomplished, unless certain conditions be complied with, than it can unless certain causes act; and between these there is a broad distinction. The cause of the ignition of powder is the spark, its condition is that the powder be dry. The cause of the movement of the ship is the wind, its condition is that it should be afloat. The cause of the falls of Niagara is gravitation, its condition is the fluidity of the water. If some Archimedes were to move the world, the cause would be the force applied, the condition, a place where he might stand. Of itself, the condition can do nothing, and it may be as essential to evil as to good. The ocean may be there and no ship float upon it, or the ship may bear the black flag of the pirate; still without the ocean as a condition, we could not have the wealth and benefits of commerce; without a place to stand on, the world can never be moved.

Now it is back, among the great essential conditions of moral well-being, that God has placed the Sabbath. It is as the soil to vegetation; it is the place where we must stand to move the moral world; and without it the wants of man as at once a social and a religious being cannot be met. Destroy the Sabbath—and there can be no stated and public recognition of God, and communities would never unite their sympathies before him as the children of one common parent. Public worship, with all its elevating and purifying associations, would cease. The pulpit would be silenced; revivals of religion would be unknown; every Sabbath school and Bible class in Christian and in heathen lands would be disbanded; Christian instruction in families would be diminished or cease altogether; those great benevolent institutions, whose interests are linked in

with the Sabbath and are cherished chiefly in connection with it, would languish and die; and every obstacle would be removed to the setting in of one unbroken tide of worldliness and of ungodliness.

Has the true place of the Sabbath now been assigned to it? If so, I may observe again, that free institutions cannot be preserved without it, because the rejection of the Sabbath would be virtually a rejection of God himself.

It is very much from its recognition of the Christian Sabbath, that our government is known as a Christian government. Let legislative bodies sit, and judicial processes go on, on the Sabbath as on other days—and the chief bond which connects the government with the Bible and with the Christian religion would be sundered. Such a course would be, and it would be so regarded by Christendom, a national rejection of the Christian religion and of the authority of the God of the Bible. But—to say nothing of special judgments which would assuredly come—no dream can be wilder than that of the possibility of free institutions among a people who should, either nationally and in form, or by silent acquiescence, reject the authority of God. "Of all the dispositions and habits which lead to political prosperity," says Washington, "religion and morality are indispensable supports." Again he says, "Let us with caution indulge the supposition, that morality can be maintained without religion. Whatever may be conceded to the influence of refined education on minds of peculiar structure, reason and experience both forbid us to expect that national morality can prevail in exclusion of religious principle." This would not only remove all restraint now connected with the idea of God, but—what would be equally fatal—all the attraction and excitement and high assimilative influence by which alone man can reach his true end. If the current of human life is to flow evenly, it must move on and connect itself

with God and with eternity. The infinite alone is its ocean; and when it feels the attraction of this, then its water is clear, and flowers spring up along the banks. But let infidelity cast a dam across these waters, and they will stagnate and set back, and the surface of society will become a moral morass, breeding pestilence and death. Here is no middle ground. The rejection by a moral being of his essential good, necessitates the choice of essential evil. Man is not as a tree, which a Chinese gardner can dwarf without deforming. The immortal energies will well up, and if they do not flow in right channels, they must in those that are wrong. Wherever there are capacities groping in vain for their object, or there is the sad consciousness of baffled energy setting back upon itself, there will be either some form of melancholy, or the recklessness of vice. Hence the rejection of God not only does violence to the dictates of an enlightened understanding, but to those intuitive convictions belonging to the very nature of a rational and moral being, through which, far rather than by his understanding, man is linked to the divine government, and from the operation of which, however perverted, his nature must ever be essentially religious. But to suppose, when violence is thus done to the nature of man in its very sanctuary—when the sanctions of obligation, and the central idea that makes of the race one family having a common Father, are removed—that men will ever respect the rights or fulfil the duties implied in free institutions, is utter folly. Every form of evil must follow the rejection of God.

I observe once more, that the necessity of the Sabbath to free institutions, may be seen from the character and sources of the opposition that has been arrayed against it. Here Pilate and Herod become friends. Here infidelity and formalism, despotism and anarchy, join hands. The Sabbath elevates man, but it has ever been the policy of civil, and especially of spiritual despotism, to prevent that

true intellectual and moral elevation which would render the people capable of liberty, by amusing them with shows and sports, and by giving them license to indulge themselves in their lower and vicious propensities. Hence the enormous expense lavished by the Roman emperors upon theatres and gladiatorial shows. Hence the present carnivals and shows at Rome, and the fact that the Sabbath is nowhere kept holy where popery is prevalent. It cannot be. This policy of those who keep them in subjection, the people do not, in general, perceive. They are both pleased and degraded by the license granted them; and at the same time their intellectual and moral natures are so controlled, that they either become infidels or superstitiously and fanatically attached to forms. It is as it was of old. "The prophets prophesy falsely, and the priests bear rule by their means, and my people love to have it so." Ah, yes! and well might the prophet add, "and what will ye do in the end thereof?" But though the people have generally fallen into this snare, there is yet one instance in which they did not, and the temper manifested by their civil and ecclesiastical rulers showed how vital they felt this point to be. During the progress of the English reformation, the true place of the Sabbath began to be more clearly seen, and the contest between the enemies and the friends of civil liberty often turned upon this. Indeed it is remarkable that God intrusted the standard of true liberty only to the hands of those who had already learned to honor his Sabbaths. At one time even the justices of the peace, and the judges of the courts, attempted to suppress the wakes and sports which had been prevalent in the times of popery. This was resisted by the higher authorities as interfering with ecclesiastical jurisdiction. The justices then "signed an humble petition to the king," in which they declare that "these revels had not only introduced a great profanation of the Lord's day, but riotous tippling, contempt of authority,

quarrels, murders, &c., and were very prejudicial to the peace, plenty, and good government of the country," and therefore they pray that they may be suppressed. This petition was not regarded, and, says the historian, "to encourage these disorderly assemblies more effectually, archbishop Laud put the king upon republishing his father's declaration of the year 1618, concerning lawful sports to be used on Sundays after divine service, which was done accordingly." This declaration the ministers were required to read from the pulpit, and those who refused, as many did, were turned out of their places. "How many hundred godly ministers in this and other dioceses," says a writer of that day, "have been suspended from their ministry, sequestered, driven from their livings, excommunicated, prosecuted in the high commission, and forced to leave the kingdom, for not publishing this declaration, is experimentally known to all men." Riotous tippling and profaneness were nothing, but a conscientious desire to honor the Sabbath could not be tolerated. Here we see the opposition to the Sabbath, of despotism and formalism; the opposition of infidelity and anarchy showed itself in the French revolution. Infidelity is of course opposed to the Sabbath; and, so far as I know, non-resistants and no-government men now are almost universally opposed to the Sabbath, and make it the object of their special and virulent attacks. Now when we see the battle raging so often and so hotly around this battlement on the walls of freedom, we may estimate its importance in the eyes of the enemy. They feel that if they can gain this, their triumph will be sure.

Is it true, then, that the Sabbath, religiously observed, holds such a place in that circle of agencies on which the well-being of a free people must depend, that it would certainly secure to us the unspeakable blessings of that fair inheritance which has come to us through the suffer-

ings and blood of our Fathers? Is it true, that it must be a pillar in every social fabric where freedom can dwell, and must hold such a relation to the whole, that if any Samson of infidelity could pluck it away, the whole structure would come down in ruins? Then are we appealed to, by every consideration which can move a patriot or a Christian, to do what we can to uphold this sacred institution. This is not, as many seem to suppose, an institution slightly connected with the other arrangements of God. It may seem so at first, but trace its connections and you will find it inseparably blending with all the arrangements of God for the elevation and well-being of man. Its law of rest is enstamped even upon the physical organization of all beings capable of labor, whether of body or of mind; and in its simplicity and variety of adaptation, like the air, and the light, and the water, it bears the evident impress of the hand of God. How simple! and yet, while it meets the wants of the exhausted animal, how evidently was it "made for man" in all conditions and in all his relations! How perfectly is it adapted to the laboring man in his toil, to the young man in his temptations, to the business man in his perplexities, to the scholar in his exhausting processes of thought, and to the statesman as bearing the burdens of public life! How is it adapted to families, consecrating home, and giving opportunity for family instruction; how to communities, as the individuals composing them are related at once to each other and to God, and as needing opportunity both for private and public devotion! How does it blend the social and the religious nature of man, and fit him for a social heaven! How is it related to the Bible, as a book requiring study, and so time for study! How does it connect man with the past, by constantly reminding him of that great event which it commemorates; how with the future, by its glimpses and foretastes of that heaven which it typifies! Kept as God commanded, it would improve the

individual man, physically, intellectually, morally. In his social relations, it would secure purity and harmony; in his civil relations, security and freedom. It would unite man to man, and all men to God. Surely, whatever he may intend, he who fights against the Sabbath, fights against the best interests of his race, and against God himself. Surely this Association is engaged in a work of piety and of patriotism in making known the will of God on this subject.

This connection of the Sabbath with civil liberty, and with every earthly interest of man, I would especially urge, at this point, upon the attention of civilians and statesmen. Let them understand it, and if not as religious men, yet as patriots, they will honor this day, from the honest convictions of their own hearts; let the people understand it, and they will see to it that no man, whatever may be his talents or his party, shall have their favor, who will disregard an institution so vital to their welfare.

And this leads me to say finally, that while the Sabbath is thus adapted to man, at all times and in all circumstances, there is much in our present position, as related to free institutions and to the hopes of the world, which calls upon us for special interest in this cause. While, for reasons already indicated, there are always peculiar temptations to violate the Sabbath, and we are to expect at this point the first, and not the least violent onset of the enemies of freedom and of religion, there is also much in the circumstances, especially of our western and southern population—scattered as they are, with imperfect means of education, and little organized into societies—which must tend strongly to the desecration of this day. There is, too, pouring in upon us with prodigious and unexampled rapidity, a foreign population not trained in the school of freedom, and if they regard the Sabbath at all, having generally low views

respecting it. This population is of different nations, and languages, and sects, and being clothed at once with political power, and spread over the whole breadth of the land, it must enter, as a modifying if not a distracting element, into all our political and religious combinations and movements. This heterogeneous mass is taking possession of a country of exhaustless fertility and of boundless resources, and is sitting down under a government where there can be no effectual barrier between the people and their immediate will. If now we add to these characteristics peculiar to this country, those of the age—the general activity of mind, the triumphs of science and invention, the power of the press, the wonderful means of communication, and the facility with which vast masses may be concentrated at particular points—we must feel that the elements are combining which shall prepare the way for scenes such as this world has never witnessed. At present, the urgency of want, the facilities for enterprise, the newness and vastness of the country, may conduct harmlessly off the elements of evil. But when the population shall become dense, and its tide refluent, numbering, as it soon must, its hundred millions; when wealth and the arts of luxury shall be increased; then, what complexity of interests! what prizes for ambition! what means of corruption! Then, let the political heavens become black, let the storms of passion be raging, and the waves of faction be heaving and tossing over this mighty ocean; and there is no human power that can prevent the bark of our liberties from foundering and going down. Then will the sun of the brightest morning that ever dawned upon the earth set in storms and in blood. No! no human power can prevent this. If prevented at all, it must be by that God, "which by his strength setteth fast the mountains; being girded with power: which stilleth the noise of the seas, the noise of their waves, and the tumult of the people." Our hope

is in Him, in his word, in his ordinances, in his Sabbath. Let God be honored in these, and all will be well. Let the Sabbath sun, as he returns, look down upon these multitudes going up, over the hills of New England, and the prairies of the West, to worship together—to listen to the voice of God, to unite in prayer, and in sacred praise—and the purity and permanence of free institutions will be secured. The "people shall be all righteous," and "shall inherit the land forever."

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